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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study examines the role of Greek philosophy, specifically the ethical doctrines of the 
Epicurean sect, in Horace’s satiric poetry.  It endeavors to highlight the important influence of 
one of Horace’s contemporaries and neighbor in Italy, the Epicurean philosopher and poet 
Philodemus of Gadara.  This is done through considerations of Horace’s self-portrayal as a 
qualified moralist who meets Epicurean standards and employs their tools of investigation and 
correction.  A large portion of the study is dedicated to the manner in which he incorporates 
Epicurean economic and social teachings as communicated and preserved by Philodemus, and to 
explaining the significance of this for his literary persona in the Sermones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Horace, in describing the unreservedness of his predecessor Lucilius, notes that he “entrusted his 
secrets to his books as if they were faithful companions” (2.1.30-1: ille velut fidis arcana 
sodalibus olim | credebat libris), with the result that “the old poet’s whole life is open to view, as 
if painted on a votive tablet” (ibid. 32-3: quo fit, ut omnis | votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella 
vita senis).1  The self-revelatory expression of one’s inner thoughts and convictions, which is at 
the heart of Roman satire,2 continues in Horace’s Sermones but with one important shift 
regarding intention: whereas the revelation of Lucilius’ character and disposition is a byproduct 
(32: quo fit, ut . . .) of his frank criticism of contemporary society, Horatian satire is consciously 
introspective and, as such, revolves almost entirely around the poet’s reflections—whether 
explicit or made through implied contrast—concerning the development and presentation of his 
own persona.  This persona, which is informed by and responds to various literary traditions,3 is 
anything but simple, and it would be nearly impossible (if not rather misguided) to attempt to 
confine Horace to any one of these influences.  At the same time, however, it is possible to 
identify certain themes that, as will be shown in the following chapters, nearly pervade the 
1All passages of Horace are from the 1970 edition of Friedrich Klingner, and all 
translations are taken from H. R. Fairclough’s 1991 revised Loeb text with minor alterations.  
Citations of the Sermones will henceforth be given by book, poem and line number(s), e.g., 
1.2.1-3.  
  
2Philippson (1911) 77 points to this very parallel between Horace and Lucilius at the 
outset of his study.  Cf. Lejay (1915) xxxiii: “Le fond des Satires et des Épîtres est identique.  
Horace en est le principal sujet.”  Both scholars, however, tend to interpret Horace’s self-
portrayal as genuine autobiography, whereas I view it as the expression of an artistic and literary 
persona. 
 
3The best examination of the confluence of various literary, stylistic and philosophical 
aspects of the Sermones is still that of Freudenburg (1993).  
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 Sermones and therefore provide overall unity, such as the poet’s moral purity, his relationship 
with Maecenas, his attitude regarding wealth, his place in society and the correct approach to 
applying criticism.  One will immediately recognize that all of these easily fall within the realm 
of ethics, which is not surprising given that Horace is often distinguished from other satirists by 
his significant concern with moral correction.4  Insofar as the Sermones are largely introspective 
and deal with ethical issues, therefore, one may be justified in speaking of the “psychology of 
satire” with respect to Horace’s critical examinations, which are about his own mental health 
(ψυχή; cf. 1.4.128-29: teneros animos . . . ego sanus) as considered through prolonged and 
repeated conversations (λόγοι; cf. 1.4.48: sermo merus).  Although his informal, and, especially 
in Book 2, dialectical style has been linked to that of Plato,5 most commentators recognize the 
predominant role of Hellenistic ethics in Horatian satire.6  By highlighting the role of Epicurean 
ethics in the Sermones, this study aims to show how Horace shows consistency in developing a 
persona that is not only concerned with “saving face,” as Ellen Oliensis argues (1998), but with 
positively justifying his moral purity and defending his place in society, and that he 
accomplishes this largely within the framework of Philodemus of Gadara’s economic and social 
teachings, which would have been familiar to his closed-circuit audience of intimate friends and 
acquaintances.7  
4Philippson (1911) 77 makes a vivid observation regarding Horace’s portrayal of himself 
(emphasis mine): “Und die Lebensanschauung, die er zur Darstellung bringt, ist getränkt mit 
Gedanken, die er der griechischen Philosophie, vor allem der epikureischen entnommen hat.” 
  
5Anderson (1982) 41-9. 
 
6See, e.g., Kiessling-Heinze (1910) xv-xix, Lejay (1915) xxxiv-xxxv, Muecke (1993) 6-8 
and Gowers (2012) 20-1. 
 
7Although I recognize that my views regarding the poet’s moral concerns likely reflect 
something about the historical Horace, I intend to apply them exclusively to one aspect of his 
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 One finds a complex blend of ethical doctrines in the Sermones, although, in addition to 
expressing more general views such as Aristotle’s extremely influential concept of the virtuous 
mean (cf. 1.1.106: est modus in rebus), Horace also engages with the more specific teachings of 
other philosophical schools.8  These include various ethical paradoxes of the Stoics attributed to 
Chrysippus (expressed in 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7), the importance of decorum and consistency as 
emphasized by Panaetius (1.3.9: nil aequale; cf. 2.3.307-13 and 2.7.22-42), and, perhaps most 
prominent of all, Epicurus’ insistence on the withdrawal from public affairs (1.6.18: a volgo 
longe longeque remotos), the importance of meager fare (2.2.1: vivere parvo) and his doctrine 
concerning the pleasure calculus (1.2.77-9).  As mentioned above, it is the purpose of the 
following investigation to enhance this appreciation of Horace’s engagement with Hellenistic 
philosophy by considering the influence of Philodemus’ ethical views, specifically as they 
pertain to the administration of wealth, the problem of flattery and the therapeutic application of 
frank criticism.  There are various reasons for investigating such a connection, which, aside from 
a recent article dealing very briefly with Philodemus’ observations concerning flattery in the 
Sermones,9 has been completely overlooked in modern scholarship.  One of the justifying 
literary persona, namely, that of self-revealing and self-justifying moralist.  In this sense, I agree 
with Freudenburg (2010) 271, who, as part of a tradition beginning with Alvin Kernan (1959), 
regards any autobiographical details “not as documentary evidence for who [Horace] was, but as 
the first moves of a back-and-forth game played between reader and writer.”  On the other hand, 
while I think persona theory has undoubtedly contributed to a more sophisticated (or at least less 
naïve) understanding of the Sermones, I maintain that, in addition to playing various roles and 
wearing different masks, Horace presents his audience with a persona that is consistently 
engaged with Epicurean ethics throughout the entire collection.  This consistency may 
communicate something about the poet’s own convictions or idealisms, and I would align my 
reading of Horace with that of Suzanne Sharland (2009b), who posits the predominant role of a 
“second self,” which is the “overriding persona who is there in a sense throughout the Satires” 
(63).  
  
8Mayer (2005a) 141-44.  
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 reasons for this study is purely historical: not only was Philodemus a contemporary of Horace as 
well as his Italian neighbor to the south of Rome, but he was also familiar and even on 
demonstrably friendly terms with the poet’s intimate friends Plotius, Varius and Vergil (cf. 
1.10.81: Plotius et Varius . . . Vergiliusque).10  It is highly likely, therefore, especially given 
Horace’s playful fondness for Epicureanism (cf. Ep. 1.4.15-16: me . . . Epicuri de grege 
porcum),11 that, in addition to being familiar with Philodemus’ poetry (cf. 1.2.121: Philodemus 
ait), he would likewise have been familiar with, and, as I will argue, rather partial to his 
philosophical insights.  Closely related to this reason is another, perhaps more compelling one 
involving Horace’s uniquely Philodemean engagement with certain ethical issues: his expression 
of the mean regarding wealth is, of course, inevitably linked to Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea, 
but Philodemus preserves the substance of Epicurean economic theory, which, in addition to 
promoting a similar doctrine of the “measure of wealth” (πλούτου μέτρον), also includes 
9Kemp (2010b) 65-76.  There is also this scholar’s 2006 unpublished dissertation on the 
“philosophical background” of Horace, which deals with Epicureanism in the Sermones. 
 
10Körte (1890) 172-77, in a well-known and frequently cited article, presents the 
fragmentary evidence from two of Philodemus’ treatises dealing with flattery (PHerc. 1082) and 
avarice (PHerc. 253), in which the names of Varius and Quintilian are legible (I quote here 
Körte’s reconstruction of the second fragment): Ὁρά]τιε καὶ Οὐάρι[ε καὶ Οὐεργίλιε] καὶ 
Κοϊντίλιε.  Parts of two other names also appear, one of which is likely that of Vergil (as 
suggested by the visible Οὐ in PHerc. 1082 col. 11.3).  Regarding the ending –τιε in PHerc. 253, 
Körte’s restoration connects it to the name of Horace, although, as Della Corte (1969) 85-8 has 
argued, it probably refers to that of Plotius Tucca, who co-edited the Aeneid along with Varius 
after Vergil’s death.  In addition to the passage from 1.10 quoted above, the same list of friends 
appears in Sermones 1.5.40 (Plotius et Varius . . . Vergiliusque), which closely resembles the 
dedications of Philodemus and has led Gigante (1998) to conclude that the philosopher, “che non 
cita mai espressamente Orazio, fu lettore delle sue satire” (48). 
 
11Despite the playful tone of this and other passages, a formal connection between Horace 
and Epicureanism was made even by the ancients, as Porphyrio reveals in his commentary on 
Carm. 1.34 (ad 1): hac ode significat, se paenitentiam agere, quod Epicuream sectam secutus 
(“In this ode he indicates his remorse for having been a follower of the Epicurean sect”).   Cf. 
also pseudo-Acro (in Serm. 1.5.101), in which Horace’s “theology” is compared to that of 
Vergil, whom the commentator explicitly identifies as an Epicurean. 
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 specific advice about patronage and poverty that plays an important role in the Sermones; 
Horace’s concern with disassociating himself from flatterers and emphasis on his persona’s 
trustworthiness is directly linked to his relationship with Maecenas, which also reflects the 
concern of Epicurean clients such as Philodemus, who, much like the poet, met accusations of 
flattery by attempting to distinguish the sage’s disposition from that of the self-serving adulator; 
finally, Horace’s approach to frankness, which he frequently differentiates from the harsher 
invective of the Stoics and Cynics, features many of the elements discussed by Philodemus in his 
methodological treatment of therapeutic criticism.  The nature of these treatments and the 
specific contributions of Philodemus will be discussed below, but it may be helpful first to 
acknowledge his presence in Italy, give an overview of the broader scope of his works and 
consider their significance within the context of the present state of Horatian scholarship. 
Little is known about Philodemus’ philosophical training and subsequent presence in 
Italy, most of which is gleaned from references in his own treatises or the works of contemporary 
Romans such as Cicero.12  Born in Syria around the beginning of the first-century BC, and, if not 
himself of Greek origin, then heavily influenced by Hellenic literature and culture, Philodemus 
studied in Athens under the Epicurean scholarch and his fellow easterner Zeno of Sidon.13   
12For sources detailing the life and works of Philodemus, see first and foremost the 
important RE study of Philippson (1938) 2444-447.  This may be supplemented by Tait (1941) 1-
23, who includes a useful overview that links Philodemus to the Augustan poets, and Gigante 
(1990), who examines his presence in Italy and, more specifically, his work at the library in 
Herculaneum.  In addition to this, most modern editions of his treatises contain updated 
biographical information: see, e.g., De Lacy and De Lacy (1978) 145-55, Sider (1997) 3-24, 
Konstan et al. (1998) 1-3 and Tsouna (2013) xi.  There is also the ANRW article of Asmis (1990) 
2369-406, which also contains a summary of his life and works.   
 
13Cicero, who had heard Zeno’s lectures in 79/80 BC, describes him as “extremely sharp” 
even for an “old man” (Tusc. 3.38: acutissimus senex).  His research interests appear to have 
ranged from physics and geometry to ethics, and he was involved in logical disputes with the 
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 Sometime after his formal training in philosophy, Philodemus came to the Italian peninsula, 
although the date of his arrival has been the subject of some scholarly controversy.14  In any 
event, he settled in southern Italy and established an Epicurean community in the vicinity of 
Naples along with his fellow Epicurean Siro, whom Vergil fondly remembers for his “learned 
sayings” (Cat. 5.9: magni . . . docta dicta Sironis) and modest living conditions.15  While living 
in Italy, Philodemus appears to have formed a relationship with the aristocrat and politician 
Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 BC), whom Cicero, in a speech denigrating the 
latter’s character and drawing from comic stereotypes in order to do so, portrays as the patron of 
flattering Greeks and the recipient of lascivious poetry (Pis. 70-1), the latter of which is a playful 
reference to the Epicurean philosopher’s collection of thirty epigrams.16  Despite this rather 
negative portrayal of the subservient graeculus (which is nothing more than a means of 
discrediting his political opponent), Cicero, in his much more serious work De finibus bonorum 
et malorum (composed in 45 BC), is not shy about praising both Philodemus and Siro by name 
(2.119): Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos (“You mean 
Stoics.  Aside from what Philodemus reveals in his treatises and recorded lectures, the extant 
fragments of Zeno are preserved in the collection of Angeli and Colaizzo (1979) 47-133. 
 
14Relying on a reference in Cicero to Philodemus’ possible patron L. Calpurnius Piso 
Caesoninus as an adulescens when he met the Greek immigrant (Pis. 68), Philippson placed this 
event in the 70s.  Conrad Chicorius (1922) 296, however, had proposed a later date that was 
based on another reference in Cicero to Piso as imperator in Macedonia (Pis. 70), which would 
have occurred in the 50s. 
 
15Cf. Cat. 8.1-2: Villula, quae Sironis eras, et pauper agelle, | verum illi domino tu 
quoque divitiae (“O small villa and poor field, you who belonged to Siro, although to your 
master even you were rich indeed”).  
 
16See Sider (1997) for an edition, translation and commentary of these poems.  Piso, 
based on the evidence of Cicero and a certain reference in epigram 27, is often identified as 
Philodemus’ patron, although this connection has been challenged by Allen and De Lacy (1939) 
59-65.  For Cicero’s portrayal of Philodemus in the speech against Piso, see Gigante (1969) 35-
53. 
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 Siro and Philodemus, the best of men and most leaned human beings”).  This laudatory 
description, which for centuries had lacked any real justification, was eventually confirmed in 
the eighteenth century BC by the discovery of and subsequent archaeological excavations in a 
dilapidated villa which unearthed the remains of Philodemus’ works.17  The villa, which is 
located in Herculaneum and probably belonged to the Pisones,18 houses a philosophical library, 
the contents of which were immediately carbonized and thus preserved by the eruption of Mt. 
Vesuvius in AD 79.  Since its discovery, the development of new technology such as 
multispectral imaging (MSI) has made it possible for scholars to read Philodemus’ treatises, and, 
as a result, new interpretations of Horace—indeed, of Augustan poetry in general—have become 
possible. 
Philodemus’ literary output encompasses works on various topics including intellectual 
history, rhetoric, literary theory, music, logic, theology and, of course, ethics.  Major studies on 
his treatises are ongoing and include efforts to detail their content, as far as this is possible, as 
well as categorize them according to subject matter.19  Since their discovery, much progress has 
been made in terms of systematically cataloguing the surviving rolls and fragments, which, in 
accordance with an organizational method, are designated by the abbreviation PHerc. (papyrus 
hercolanensis) and followed by a number.20  Most of the ethical treatises from which will be 
17Sedley (1998) has a useful discussion of Philodemus in Italy (65-8) and the discovery of 
the Herculaneum papyri, with particular emphasis on fragments of Epicurus’ De natura (94-8).  
 
18As Mommsen (1880) 32-6 has indicated in his study of the epigrammatic remains at 
Herculaneum, there is no evidence linking Piso to the villa.  See also Allen and De Lacy (1939) 
63.   
 
19Gigante (1990) 1-60 has copious references to works dealing both with the architectural 
characteristics of the villa as well as the contents of its library.   
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 drawn evidence linking Philodemus’ thought to the content of Horace’s Sermones come from 
two collections, one of which deals with manners and is entitled Sermonum de vita et moribus 
compendiaria ratione excerptorum e Zenonis libris (ἐπιτομὴ περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίων ἐκ τῶν τοῦ 
Ζήνωνος σχολῶν), the other of which bears the title De vitiis atque oppositis virtutibus 
eorumque subiectis et obiectis (περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσι 
καὶ περὶ ἅ).  From the first collection are the following: PHerc. 1471, entitled De libertate 
dicendi, which was originally edited by Olivieri (1914) but has recently been republished by 
Konstan et al. (1998),21 whose translations I have borrowed throughout; PHerc. 182, entitled De 
ira, which was edited by Wilke (1914) but has been superceded by the edition, translation and 
commentary of Indelli (1988);22 PHerc. 1414, entitled De gratitudine, which is edited by 
Tepedino Guerra (1977); PHerc. 873, entitled De conversatione, which has an edition, translation 
and commentary by Amoroso (1975).  From the second collection are the following: PHerc. 
1424, entitled De oeconomia, of which the best critical edition continues to be that of Jensen 
(1907), although there is also the recent commentary and translation of Tsouna (2012); PHerc. 
163, entitled De divitiis, which is edited with a translation and commentary by Tepedino Guerra 
(1978) and has been expanded recently by the publication of a substantial number of new 
fragments in Armstrong and Ponczoch (2011); the treatise De adulatione is dispersed among 
20The catalogue, referred to as CatPErc, is in Gigante (1979) 65-400, to which must be 
added the supplements of Capasso (1989) 193-264 and Del Mastro (2000) 57-241 with expanded 
bibliography.  This monumental work gives detailed profiles of the scrolls which have been 
unrolled and examined, including inventory numbers, dates of unrolling, states of preservation, 
references to editions etc. 
 
21The problems regarding the organization and layout of this text are discussed by 
Michael White (2004) 103-30, and Konstan is currently preparing a revised edition of the 
treatise. 
 
22A new edition of this treatise by David Armstrong is forthcoming.  
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 various fragments, including PHerc. 222 (Gargiulo [1981]), PHerc. 223 (Gigante and Indelli 
[1978]), PHerc. 1082 (Caini [1939]), PHerc. 1089 (Acosta Méndez [1983]), PHerc. 1457 
(originally edited by Bassi [1914] but later revised by Kondo [1974]) and, finally, PHerc. 1675 
(De Falco [1926]).  In addition to the fragments dealing with ethical topics, among which must 
be included PHerc. 1251 (named the “Comparetti Ethics” after the original editor but recently 
superceded by the edition, translation and commentary of Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 
[1995]), the following study will also draw from Philodemus’ methodological treatise PHerc. 
1965, entitled De signis and edited by De Lacy and De Lacy (1978).  It will also take into 
consideration certain aspects of his literary theory as expounded in PHerc. 1425 and 1538, the 
fifth book of a treatise entitled De poematis and edited by Christian Jensen (1923),23 as well as 
his historical indices PHerc. 1418 and 310, entitled De Epicuro and edited by Militello (1997), 
PHerc. 1021 and 164, entitled Academicorum Historia and edited by Dorandi (1991) and PHerc. 
1018, entitled Stoicorum Historia, also edited by Dorandi (1994).24          
The degree to which scholars have investigated the presence of Philodemus in Horace’s 
works has fluctuated over the decades, although it was particularly high soon after the 
Herculaneum papyri began to be published.25  As mentioned already, it was Alfred Körte who 
first considered the fragmentary evidence connecting Philodemus to Augustan authors, which 
inspired Philippson, himself a scholar of and expert on Philodemus, to examine in more detail 
23There is also the newer edition of Mangoni (1993), which does not necessarily 
supercede that of Jensen but does include a helpful introduction, translation and commentary.  
 
24A few references will also be made to PHerc. 1507, entitled De bono rege secundum 
Homerum and edited by Dorandi (1982).  There is a newer edition forthcoming by Jeffrey Fish. 
 
25Armstrong (2004) 5-9 includes a similar review of literature but dealing more broadly 
with the Augustan poets in general. 
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 Horace’s relationship to Epicureanism.26  Such a connection had already been intimated by 
Richard Heinze in his revision of Kiessling’s commentary,27 and Giorgio Pasquali went further 
by connecting fragments of Philodemus to Horace’s views on sexual vice in Sermones 1.2.28  As 
Teubner editions of Philodemus continued to be published and made his philosophical and poetic 
works readily available, they inspired articles dealing specifically with the role of his poetry in 
Horace.  One of the earliest of these articles is that of Hendrickson, which, drawing from 
Kaibel’s 1885 edition of Philodemus’ epigrams, investigates their possible connection to 
Sermones 1.2.29  Although determining that the original epigram of Philodemus to which Horace 
refers is no longer extant, he expresses restrained yet enthusiastic support of Körte’s 
identification of Horace as one of the dedicatees of the aforementioned Philodemean treatise, 
even asserting that “we are justified in concluding that a personal relationship of friendship 
existed between the two men.”30  This important article was followed a few years later by F. A. 
Wright’s short piece, which responds to Hendrickson’s thesis that the original source had been 
lost by proposing that Horace was in fact alluding directly to one of Philodemus’ surviving 
epigrams, thus strengthening the connection between the two.31  Around this time, the evidence 
regarding Philodemus’ poetic theory in general was being studied by Rostagni, who considered 
26Philippson (1911) 77-110 and (1929) 894-96, who wrote his dissertation on 
Philodemus’ treatise De signis (1881) and also contributed the RE article cited above detailing 
the philosopher’s life and works. 
 
27Kiessling-Heinze (1910) xv, referring in the introduction to Horace’s “Bekanntschaft 
mit Philodemos,” which, for Philippson (1911) 78 n. 1, was too brief an observation and inspired 
his much longer study.  
 
28Pasquali (1920) 235. 
  
29Hendrickson (1918) 27-43. 
  
30Hendrickson (1918) 37.  
 
31Wright (1921) 168-69.  
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 its influence on and challenges for Horace and the other poets.32  As the scholarship tradition 
clearly shows, in the early nineteenth century many Horatian scholars interpreted the evidence 
from Herculaneum as proof that the Augustan poets associated with Philodemus, an 
interpretation which is further confirmed by Clayton Hall in his short article supporting the view 
that these men, including Horace, were involved in the Epicurean school at Herculaneum.33  In 
the same year, classicist and philosopher Norman DeWitt published two studies that deal 
specifically with the influence of Philodemus on Horace.  The first of these appeared in 1935 
and, along with the work of Philippson, is one of the earliest attempts to show the influence of 
Philodemean ethics, specifically the role of Epicurean παρρησία, in the works of Horace.34  
DeWitt shows how the therapeutic application of frank criticism, which is not mentioned by 
Epicurus but expounded upon in Philodemus’ treatise De libertate dicendi, is employed by 
Horace in the Carmina and Epistulae.  Four years later, DeWitt published another study in which 
he lists parallels relating Horatian poetry to various Epicurean doctrines, many of which appear 
in the writings of Philodemus but cannot be identified as distinctively his.35  Along with 
DeWitt’s findings regarding παρρησία in Horace, one may include the study of Agnes Michels, 
which expounds on the former’s thesis and provides more supporting details.36  Perhaps one of 
the most significant achievements in the area of Philodemus’ influence on the Augustan poets 
during this time, however, is Jane Tait’s 1941 dissertation, which examines the importance of 
32Rostagni (1923-1924) 401-34.   
 
33Hall (1935) 113-15.  
 
34DeWitt (1935) 312-19  
 
35DeWitt (1939) 127-34.  
 
36Michels (1944) 173-77.  
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 Philodemus’ literary theory on Horace’s Carmina.  Related to this are the 1955 dissertation of 
Nathan Greenberg, which provides a detailed and systematic consideration of Philodemus’ poetic 
theory, and the article of Cataudella, in which Sermones 1.2 is read in the light of evidence from 
Philodemus’ ethical treaties and epigrams.37 
The following years witnessed important advancements in the appreciation of both the 
sophistication and artistic value of the Sermones as well as Horace’s engagement with the 
Epicurean tradition.  This was undoubtedly facilitated by the monumental studies of Eduard 
Fraenkel, and, perhaps to a greater degree considering its more focused approach, that of Niall 
Rudd.38  Both acknowledge the role of philosophy in Horace’s satiric criticisms and were 
followed by more in-depth studies in this area, such as the article by Aroldo Barbieri, which 
examines the role of Epicurean ethics in Sermones 2.6,39 and the monograph of C. O. Brink, 
whose examination of literary debates in the Hellenistic period and their significance for Horace 
draws heavily from Philodemus’ criticisms in De poematis.40  Along with these studies should be 
included those of Alberto Grilli on Sermones 1.3 and R. L. Hunter on the importance of 
friendship and free speech.41  In the 1970s shortly before these essays appeared, however, major 
breakthroughs in the organization and promotion of the Herculaneum papyri (and therefore of 
Philodemus’ works) were made under the guidance of Marcello Gigante, who, in addition to 
becoming the successful director of the Centro Internazionale dei Papiri Ercolanesi (CISPE) in 
37Greenberg (1955); Cataudella (1950) 18-31.  
 
38Fraenkel (1957); Rudd (1966).  
 
39Barbieri (1976) 479-507.  
 
40Brink (1963).  
 
41Grilli (1983) 267-92; Hunter (1985a) 480-90. 
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 Naples, also provided scholars with access to advanced technology and specialized venues for 
their scholarship, such as the Cronache Ercolanesi and La Scuola di Epicuro, both of which are 
series devoted to the publication of new scholarship and editions of Herculaneum fragments.  
These newer and more accessible editions, many of which have already been mentioned above, 
provide translations and insightful commentaries on difficult texts, thus inspiring scholars to 
revisit the literary climate in which poets like Horace lived and wrote.  The fruits of such 
research are already visible in Gigante’s contribution, published at the outset of these 
advancements, of various papers dealing with Philodemus and his connection to authors 
including Cicero and Horace.42  This work, which includes a chapter that explores Philodemus in 
Sermones 1.2, was followed decades later by a full-length treatment of the same poem that 
explores further the connections between Horace and Epicurean ethics.43  In the same year, 
scholars like Kirk Freudenburg began to emphasize the complexity of Horace’s Sermones by 
underscoring the importance of persona theory and recognizing that “the speaker who delivers 
his criticisms in the first person is not the poet himself but the poet in disguise.”44   The main 
contribution of this groundbreaking study lies in its emphasis on the importance of interpreting 
the content of the Sermones, whether philosophical or otherwise, as relating to a largely fictional 
and self-consciously elusive persona that is not always to be taken seriously.45  Along similar 
lines, Rolando Ferri, whose study focuses on connections between Lucretius’ didactic poem to 
Memmius and Horace’s intimate and philosophical discourse in the Epistulae, recognizes 
42Gigante (1969).  
 
43Gigante (1993).  
 
44Freudenburg (1993) 3.  
 
45The impact of this theory, which was later expanded on in Freudenburg (2001), is easily 
detected in subsequent studies of Horace’s persona, especially those of Braund (1996), Oliensis 
(1998), Gowers (2003) 55-92 and Turpin (2009) 127-40. 
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 parodic treatments of Epicureanism in the Sermones.46  Around the same time Pierre Grimal 
similarly attempted to highlight Horace’s philosophical eclecticism by pointing to the presence 
of distinctively anti-Epicurean sentiments in his iambic poetry.47   
Some scholars, on the other hand, continued to demonstrate the presence of Philodemus’ 
literary theory in Horace’s works in light of newer fragments of his treatise De poematis.  These 
studies include David Armstrong’s long article on the dedicatees of the Ars Poetica and 
Anastasia Tsakiropoulou-Summers’ 1995 dissertation on Philodemean poetic theory in the same 
work.48  This research was subsequently consolidated and expanded in a volume edited by Dirk 
Obbink, which features chapters examining the role of Philodemus’ theory concerning the 
interconnectivity of poetic syntax with regard to Lucretius’ epic and Horace’s Sermones 1.4.49  
To all of these advancements must be added the pioneering efforts of various Philodemean 
scholars who contributed their findings to a 2004 volume entitled Vergil, Philodemus and the 
Augustans.  Among these individuals are Giovanni Indelli and Jeffrey Fish, who examine 
Philodemus’ sophisticated understanding and treatment of anger and explain how it relates to 
Vergil’s Aeneid, F. M. Schroeder, who considers the role of Epicurean pictorial imagery within 
the context of frankness in the works of Vergil, and David Armstrong, who draws connections 
between various Philodemean ethical treatises and Horace’s Epistulae.50  Returning to Horace’s 
earliest work, an essay by William Turpin appeared five years later, who, perhaps misapplying or 
46Ferri (1993) 33-40. 
 
47Grimal (1993) 154-60.  
  
48Armstrong (1993) 185-230; Tsakiropoulou-Summers (1995). 
  
49Oberhelman and Armstrong (1995) 233-54. 
  
50Indelli (2004) 103-10; Fish (2004) 111-38; Schroeder (2004) 139-58; Armstrong (2004) 
267-99.  
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 rather overapplying persona theory, considers Horace’s self-portrayal as a buffoon and morally 
bankrupt parasite in Sermones 1.3; this piece was met with a response in Jerome Kemp’s 
balanced article, reminding scholars not to overemphasize humor and self-parody to the 
complete exclusion of serious content.51  This was followed soon afterwards by a brief 
examination of the same scholar, this time dealing specifically with the influence of Philodemus’ 
fragmentary treatises De adulatione and De libertate dicendi on Horace’s Epistulae and 
Sermones 2.5 and 2.8.52  More recently, Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders have edited a volume 
entitled Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, which engages rigorously with Philodemus’ 
ethical works and their influence on authors such as Cicero and Seneca.53  Nevertheless, 
Horatian scholarship continues to lack a study that systematically investigates Philodemus’ 
moral presence in the Sermones as a whole.  The following considerations will attempt to fill this 
gap, not by forcing parallels from an Epicurean point of view that pretend to unlock the historical 
Horace, but rather by considering the relevance of his teachings for a Roman qua poet dealing 
with difficult issues such as property loss, wealth administration, the corrupt patronage system 
and the proper manner to discuss these tactfully and frankly with one’s friends.  In order to 
accomplish this, however, it will first be necessary to provide a brief overview of Philodemus’ 
interpretation of and contributions to the Epicurean tradition regarding economic theory, flattery 
and frankness. 
51Turpin (2009) 122-37, to which cf. the similar thesis of Labate (2005) 47-63; Kemp 
(2009) 1-17, also (2010) 59.   
 
52Kemp (2010b) 65-76.  
  
53I should also mention here the recent commentary of Gowers (2012), who briefly 
mentions the influence of Philodemus and the Epicurean community at Herculaneum in her 
introduction (20). 
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 Philodemus preserves the substance of Epicurean economic theory in his treatises De 
oeconomia and the fragments of De divitiis, the latter of which is completed by fifteen fragments 
(or rather pezzi) that do not bear his name but are probably his.54  Both of these works involve a 
critical analysis of rival economic theories, especially those expounded in Xenophon’s 
Oeconomicus and pseudo-Theophrastus’ Oeconomica,55 in contrast to which Philodemus 
reproduces, defends and carefully modifies the traditional doctrines of the founders Epicurus and 
Metrodorus of Lampascus.56  The intended audience of his treatise is the Epicurean sage (De 
oec. col. 12.16: φιλοσόφωι),57 who is urged to concern himself with the “acquisition” (De oec. 
col. 12.8-9: κτῆσις) and “preservation” (ibid. 9: φυλακή) of wealth rather than with its 
organization and use, which is more properly the domain of the professional manager (ibid. col. 
7.2-3: τεχνίτης) as shown by preceding economic treatises.58  Central to this view of economics 
54See Armstrong and Ponczoch (2011) 97-9 for the state of these columns and their 
attribution to Philodemus.  For Philodemus’ presentation of economic theory in general, see 
Castaldi (1928) 287-308, Laurenti (1973), Tsouna (1993) 701-14, Natali (1995) 95-128, Asmis 
(2004) 133-76, Balch (2004) 177-96, Tsouna (2007) 163-94 and especially Tsouna (2012) along 
with the very helpful review of Armstrong (2013).  
  
55See Laurenti (1973) 21-95 for a detailed treatment of these criticisms.  Philodemus is 
the only ancient source to ascribe the Aristotelian Oeconomica to Theophrastus, although this 
identification is problematic.  See Natali (1995) 102 and Renate Zoepffel’s commentary (2006) 
206-9.  Jensen’s introduction to his 1907 edition includes a general but useful outline of 
Philodemus’ criticisms (18): coll. 1-7.37, de Xenophontis oeconomico; coll. 7.37-12.2, de 
Theophrasti oeconomico; coll. 12.2-28.10, de propriis scholae praeceptis. 
 
56Philodemus also names the other two founders Hermarchus (De oec. col. 25.1) and 
Polyaenus (De div. coll. 34.14 and 40.8). 
 
57Ancient treatises on economics appear to fall into two categories with regard to 
audience: 1) those written for the expert manager (δεσπότης), such as the works of Xenophon 
and pseudo-Theophrastus and 2) those intended for the sage or philosopher (σοφός), such as 
Philodemus’ treatise.  See Natali (1995) 101-2.   
 
58“Organization” (κόσμησις/διακόσμησις) and “use” (χρῆσις) are the two other elements 
of traditional economics, with which Philodemus is not concerned.  Tsouna (1993) 714 notes 
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 is the emphasis placed on the sage manager’s disposition, which must always be characterized by 
the observation of a proper “measure of wealth” (ibid. col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον).59  
Drawing from a lost treatise of Metrodorus for the most part (ibid. col. 12.25-7: 
Μ[ητρ]οδώρου),60 in both of his economic treatises Philodemus draws an important distinction 
between the Cynic practice of begging daily (De oec. col. 12.40-1: [τὸ κ]αθ’  ἡ[μέραν 
π]οριζόμε[νον]; De div. col. 43.1: πτωχείαν), which is necessitated by their complete rejection 
of all goods (De div. col. 45.16-17: στέρησιν . . . πάντων), and the Epicurean understanding of 
poverty, which entails having and enjoying the few possessions required by nature (De div. col. 
that, by making a clear distinction between the sage manager, who is concerned with happiness 
and virtue but may successfully acquire and maintain wealth, and the professional and skilled 
businessman, who cares primarily for financial profit as accomplished through systematic 
organization and use, Philodemus anticipates the modern concept of economics. 
 
59Cf. Arist. Pol. 1257b17-1258a14 for the concept of limited or “natural wealth” (ὁ 
πλούτος κατὰ φύσιν) within the context of economic theory.  Philodemus implicitly contrasts 
this doctrine with his rival’s promotion of the seemingly unlimited acquisition of wealth (cf. 
Xen. Oec. 7.15): ἀλλὰ σωφρόνων τοί ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς οὕτως ποιεῖν, ὅπως τά τε 
ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἕξει καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται 
(“But it is prudent, you see, for a husband and wife to act in such a way that their goods will be 
disposed in the best manner and that as many other goods as possible will be added to them 
properly and justly”).  The suggested methods of acquiring wealth are not limited to Athenian 
practices: Xenophon’s Socrates, for instance, considers the Persian king a good example of the 
responsible manager (4.4-25) and pesudo-Theophrastus praises Persian and Spartan economic 
strategies (1344b29-34).   
 
60This mention of Metrodorus’ teachings (which also occurs in De div. col. 37.11-15), has 
led to an ongoing discussion concerning the originality of Philodemus’ contribution and also the 
origin of this section of De oeconomia.  Siegfried Sudhaus (1906), for example, refers to coll. 
12.45-21.35 as “ein . . . Abschnitt, der nach Sprache und Stil unmöglich aus der Feder des 
Philodem stammen kann” (45).  Another scholar who views this section as a verbatim copy of 
Metrodorus’ earlier treatise is Laurenti (1973) 108.  Tsouna (1993), on the other hand, does not 
consider details such as the presence of hiatus significant enough to rule out Philodemean 
authorship or at least interpretation (n. 6).  In any case, the columns following this section, which 
will be the most important for the present study, most certainly contain Philodemus’ own 
contemporary views regarding economics, for which see especially Asmis (2004) 149-61.  For 
the fragments of Metrodorus, see Alfred Körte’s 1890 Teubner edition.  
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 49.10-12).61  As Epicurus states elsewhere, the requirements of natural wealth are “easily met” 
(Arr. 5.144.1-2 = ibid. 6.8: εὐπόριστος), and Philodemus echoes the Master’s teaching when he 
emphasizes that the sage is “not bad at finding what suffices for himself” (De oec. col. 17.6-8: 
οὔτε κ[α]κὸς εὑρέσθαι τὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἱκανά), with the result that he never fears poverty (ibid. 
coll. 15.45-16.4; cf. De div. col. 36.11-12: οὐ γ[ὰρ] ἄξιον φόβου).  On the other hand, whereas 
Epicurus’ concept of natural wealth imposes strict limits on the acquisition of goods, 
Philodemus, either adopting the view of Metrodorus or possibly responding to the sensitivities of 
his Roman and aristocratic dedicatees, carefully notes that the sage “inclines in his wishes 
toward a more affluent way of life” (De oec. col. 16.4-6: ῥέπει δὲ τῆι βουλήσει μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν 
ἀφθονωτέραν) and “accepts more whenever it comes easily and without harm” (ibid. 44-6: τὸ 
[δὲ π]λεῖον, ἂ[ν ἀ]βλ[α]βῶς καὶ [εὐ]πόρως γίνηται, δεκτέ[ον]).  He recognizes, furthermore, 
that wealth has the power to remove difficulties and that it can provide the leisure necessary for 
philosophical study (ibid. col. 14.9-13), but, like an orthodox Epicurean, he notes that its 
acquisition should not be born out of empty fear or desire, and that one should be generous and 
share excess wealth with one’s friends (ibid. coll. 24.11-27.12).62  Finally, Philodemus identifies 
acceptable sources of wealth, among which the first and by far the best is “to receive gratitude 
 
61Cf. Arr. 6.25: Ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· 
πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὁριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία (“Poverty measured by the limits of nature is 
great wealth, but wealth that is not limited is great poverty”). 
 
62See Asmis (2004) 156-59. 
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 from a receptive person in exchange for philosophical conversation” (ibid. col. 23.23-36), which 
is precisely what happened to both himself and Epicurus.63 
One of the difficulties immigrant philosophers like Philodemus had to overcome or at 
least address was the charge of flattery, which, in addition to being a vice the Romans generally 
associated with Greek clients (cf. Cic. Pis. 70: ut Graeculum, ut adsentatorem), was also easily 
attached to the Epicureans on account of their utilitarian view of friendship (Arr. 6.34 and 23).64  
Indeed, Philodemus addresses this issue at length in the fragments of his treatise De adulatione, 
in which he notes that, despite certain similarities between the flatterer and the sage (PHerc. 222 
col. 2.1-22), there are real differences in their dispositions as well as their behavior.65  Drawing 
much inspiration from the comic tradition and Theophrastus’ character portraits of the flatterer 
(Char. 2) and the obsequious man (ibid. 5), he describes the various tactics, motives, approaches 
and reactions typical of individuals suffering from this vice.  For Philodemus, one of the major 
differences between the two is that the flatterer rarely speaks frankly (PHerc. 222 col. 3.27-8: 
παρρη[σιαζόμενον]), since his main objective is to say whatever will please his victim (PHerc. 
1457 col. 1.9: [ὁ λέγων πρὸ]ς χάριν).  This identification of frankness as the hallmark of a true 
63Epicurus also identifies patronage as the best—in fact, the only—way for the sage to 
acquire wealth (Arr. 121b.4-6): χρηματίσεσθαί τε, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα.  καὶ 
μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν (“[He said that the sage] will be ready to make money, but 
only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy.  He will pay court to a king as 
occasion demands”). 
 
64Glad (1996) 25 and (1995) 111-13 discusses the nature of this “anti-Epicurean 
polemic.”  See also Konstan (1997) 108-13.  
 
65For flattery in Philodemus, see Longo Aurucchio (1986) 79-91, Glad (1996) 23-9 and 
Tsouna (2007) 126-42 in addition to the introductions of the various fragments cited above.  
There is also the comprehensive study of Ribbeck (1884) on flattery in antiquity, as well as the 
RE article of Kroll (1921) 1069-1070 and the modern commentary on Theophrastus’ Characters 
by Diggle (2004) 181-82.  The topic of the similarity between flatterers and true friends is of 
course addressed at length by Plutarch in Mor. 4 (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur).  
Other relevant ancient sources will be dealt as appropriate with in the chapters to follow. 
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 friend developed toward the end of the Classical period, before which παρρησία generally 
referred to the public right of free speech within a democratic polis such as Athens.66  
Afterwards, the political limitations consequent upon the formation of monarchical rule resulted 
in frankness becoming more of a private or moral virtue, and hence one that was of particular 
concern to Hellenistic philosophers.67  For the Epicureans, the application of frank criticism was 
largely pedagogical or rather psychogogical, and, exercised within the context of small 
communities consisting of pupils and sages, its purpose was to foster virtue through the 
therapeutic and purifying medicine of self-knowledge, which, in accordance with a long tradition 
going back to Socrates, is viewed as a prerequisite for moral correction.68  In his treatise De 
libertate dicendi (the only ancient tractate with that name), Philodemus explains the nature of 
frank criticism as a pedagogical method as well as its aims, the different kinds of pupils and their 
respective challenges and the proper disposition of the sage.69  As a method strictly speaking, 
frankness is conjectural and based on the sage’s extended observations of another’s behavior (cf. 
De lib. dic. fr. 1.9-8: στοχαζόμενος εὐ[λ]ογίαις), to which he responds in a timely fashion (ibid. 
 
66See Scarpat (1964) 11-57, Momigliano (1973-74) 2.258 and Konstan (1996) 7-10. 
 
67The earliest reference to this understanding of παρρησία appears to come from the 
correspondence of Isocrates, especially Nic. 3: ἡ παρρησία καὶ τὸ φανερῶς ἐξεῖναι τοῖς τε 
φίλοις ἐπιπλῆξαι καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐπιθέσθαι ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἁμαρτίαις (“. . . frankness, as 
well as the privilege of friends to rebuke and of enemies to attack each other’s faults”).  This, as 
well as other noteworthy passages, are discussed by Glad (1996) 31-2.  See also Scarpat (1964) 
62-9 for Cynic παρρησία. 
 
68Philodemus employs medical imagery throughout his treatise De libertate dicendi, for 
which see Gigante (1975) 53-61 and Konstan et al. (1998) 20-3.  The pedagogical nature of 
Epicurean frankness, which Glad (1995) examines in terms of communal psychagogy (101-60), 
is also treated by Gigante (1974) 37-42.  
  
69For the structure and an overview of the treatise, see Konstan et al. (1993) 8-20.  As 
mentioned already, however, White (2004) 103-27 notes there are still significant problems and 
confusion regarding the proper order of the fragments. 
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 fr. 25.1: καιρόν) with a degree of harshness commensurate with the pupil’s needs.70  Although 
this is indeed a communal affair, extreme harshness and public embarrassment are avoided at all 
costs and, instead, constructive and well-intentioned—even cheerful—criticism is encouraged.71  
The different levels of frankness required and their possible effects depend ultimately on the 
pupil’s disposition, which Philodemus categorizes in terms of sex (coll. 21b.12-22b.9), age (coll. 
24a.7-24b.12), social status (coll. 22b.10-24a.7) and, above all, “strong” and “weak” tempers (fr. 
7.1-5: τοὺς μᾶλλον τῶν ἁπαλῶν ἰσχυρούς).72  With regard to the sage, he emphasizes the 
importance of moral purity, perseverance, careful observation, patience and especially humility: 
the reason why sages do not criticize harshly, for example, is that they see their own faults and 
recognize their imperfections (fr. 46:  γινώσκω[ν] αὑτὸν οὐκ ὄντα τέλε[ι]ον).  The following 
chapters will show how this Epicurean, or, perhaps more accurately, Philodemean, concern with 
distinguishing the flatterer from the sage, who accepts wealth cheerfully from a grateful patron in 
exchange for moral advice given in a gentle but effective manner, plays a significant role in 
Horace’s self-conception as a satirist and client-friend of Maecenas. 
The first chapter of this study provides a somewhat preliminary consideration of the 
Epicurean aspects of Horace’s upbringing and moral formation as described in Sermones 1.4.  
More specifically, it will attempt to show how the poet justifies the moral credentials of his 
 
70Gigante (1969) 55-113 provides an extended consideration of Epicurean παρρησία as a 
way of life and a conjectural method that depends on correct timing. 
 
71Cf. De lib. dic. frs. 37 and 38, as well as 79, in all of which Philodemus condemns harsh 
and bitter frankness.  Philodemus also condemns the ridicule employed by the Cynics (ibid. fr. 
73.12-13) and the Stoics (De ir. col. 1.7-27, naming both Bion of Borysthenes and Chrysippus as 
part of a quotation of another Epicurean’s opinion).  See Glad (1995) 117-20. 
 
72For the distinction between “strong” and “weak” pupils, as well as for the different 
types of students, see Glad (1995) 137-52.  
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 persona by establishing connections to Epicurean ethical and methodological doctrines, which, 
given the programmatic nature of this satire, will have implications for the rest of the Sermones. 
Having established the moral purity of his literary persona in terms of the Epicurean 
tradition, the next chapter examines how Horace attempts to portray his relationship with 
Maecenas within the framework of Epicurean patronage.  Beginning with the encounter scene 
between the two in Sermones 1.6, it shows how he promotes himself as an Epicurean client-
friend and economist, whose ethical virtue is communicated through salubrious advice, which, in 
the case of Horace, takes the form of satirical conversations directed toward Maecenas.  
Chapter 3 continues to investigate Horace’s self-portrayal as a sage economist, who 
observes the “measure of wealth” doctrine and recognizes the requirements of nature, and is thus 
able to bear the loss of property with equanimity, just like his surrogate interlocutor Ofellus in 
Sermones 2.2.  At the same time, however, his willingness to be content will little does not 
preclude his acceptance of greater wealth from a grateful patron, as he shows in Sermones 2.6.  
In fact, his acceptance of the Sabine estate is perfectly in harmony with Philodemus’ economic 
recommendations, since its bestowal makes possible the kind of philosophical withdrawal among 
friends advocated in De oeconomia.     
The topic of patronage and friendship between Horace and Maecenas naturally leads to a 
consideration of the charges of flattery and subservience which were made by the poet’s rivals.  
Chapter 4 considers how Horace attempts to distinguish himself from the typical flatterer 
through character portraits such as the one in Sermones 1.9, which incorporates details also 
found in Philodemus’ De adulatione.  An integral part of this effort is his self-promotion as a 
lover of frankness, which, having been taught to Horace by his father in Sermones 1.4, naturally 
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 recurs in the satiric portraits of Sermones 1.1-3 and thus helps to confirm his identity as a true 
and honest friend.   
The final chapter looks at the manner in which Horace exposes the flatterer’s arts in 
Sermones 2.5, which testifies to his candor and willingness to invite comparison in the eyes of 
Maecenas.  At the same time, the poet cleverly recapitulates his moral purity and humility 
through self-imposed, self-deprecatory examinations at the hands of social inferiors in Sermones 
2.3 and 2.7, thus illustrating—at the expense of the Stoics—how not to conduct frank criticism 
and further endorsing his own portrayal as a tactful critic and a man of integrity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EPICUREAN ASPECTS OF  
          HORACE’S UPBRINGING 
 
Horace’s famous description of his upbringing in Sermones 1.4.103-29 is an extremely important 
scene, particularly because it serves to establish the poet’s ethical credentials and justify his role 
as professional critic.  It is also one of the most complex and multifaceted passages in the entire 
collection, for in the process of constructing his ethical persona Horace synthesizes various 
literary and philosophical influences in a sophisticated and yet often parodic manner.  Scholars 
have repeatedly shown the significant role of Roman comedy, especially Terence’s Adelphoe, in 
Horace’s serio-comic portrayal of his father’s training.  Perhaps one of the least explored facets 
of Horace’s father’s pedagogical method, however, is the more serious role of Epicureanism, 
which, in conjunction with other traditions, has much to offer a satiric poet who is concerned 
with practical ethics and offers moral correction through the close observation of morally flawed 
individuals’ defects.  The following chapter will consider how, in addition to contributing to the 
ethical content of the Sermones, Epicurean philosophy adds depth to the poet’s presentation and 
analysis of the many foibles of contemporary Roman society; the reliance on sensation, for 
example, grants the audience full access to the colorful (and often disturbing) details of Roman 
life, but its importance for Epicurean epistemology suggests a more profound engagement with 
contemporary doctrines.  It will also explore the conventionality of the language Horace typically 
employs in the Sermones, which is certainly fitting for satire but also compatible with the 
semantic concerns of Epicurean language theory.  Furthermore, it will examine Horace’s 
practical advice concerning choices and avoidances as motivated by a calculation of pains and 
foreseeable pleasures, which likewise reflects the Epicurean tradition.  Finally, this chapter will 
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consider the possibility that Horace’s evaluation of vicious behavior, though containing elements 
derived from the comic and Cynic traditions, may also incorporate an Epicurean methodological 
approach to ethical investigation which was a topic of popular debate in Rome in the first century 
BC. 
 Horace frequently pays tribute to his father by identifying him not only as the source 
(1.4.129: ex hoc) of his moral purity, but also as the cause (1.6.71: causa) of his successful 
encounter with Maecenas.  A proper understanding of his significance, therefore, is essential for 
an appreciation of the poet’s own literary persona and an accurate interpretation of the role of 
Epicurean ethics in the Sermones.  His portrayal in Sermones 1.4 as the paternal source of 
Horace’s poetry and generic origin of his subdued, morally conscious style at once distinguishes 
the poet from his literary predecessor Lucilius and defines the principles informing Horatian 
satire: 
liberius si 
dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris 
cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me . . . (S. 1.4.103-5) 
If in my words I am too free, perchance too light, this bit of liberty you will 
indulgently grant me. It is a habit the best of fathers taught me . . . 
 
 
This description is carefully designed to emphasize the benign tone of Horatian satire, which 
criticizes “rather freely” and “jokingly,” while ostensibly severing the connection to Old 
Comedy and hence the modus Lucilianus (cf. 1-5),1 which criticizes publicly, caustically and by 
1Schlegel (2000) 95: “The satire will demonstrate that ultimately Horace and Lucilius 
have separate genealogies . . . Though Horace writes in Lucilius’ genre, they have no common 
ancestors.”  It was Hendrickson (1900) 124, however, who argued early on that in 1.4 Horace 
completely severs the connection to traditional satire.  Anderson (1982) 29 views Horace as a 
Socratic figure who is exclusively concerned with ethics while Fiske (1971) 277-80 considers 
Horace’s brand of humor as thoroughly influenced by Aristotle’s portrayal of the εὐτράπελος 
(“gentleman”), for which see Eth. Nic. 1127b34-1128a33.  For the various philosophical 
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name.2  The reconfiguration of his literary parentage, however, is by no means absolute: 
Horace’s description of his own satire as directed toward those who are “worthy of being 
blamed” (25: culpari dignos), as well as his frequent criticisms of individuals by name (which 
has apparently caused a public reaction; cf. 70 and 78-9), plainly indicates that his works retain 
something of the Lucilian spirit.3  Nevertheless, the major differences between Horace and 
Lucilius, especially with regard to their distinct approaches to style and ethics, are widely 
recognized.  These differences are primarily communicated by the poet’s shift from public 
criticism to the more private concerns and stock characters reminiscent of New Comedy (cf. 25-
32 and 48-52), which suggests that Horatian satire will engage moral deficiency in a lighthearted 
manner but at a more sophisticated and personal level.  Horace’s portrayal of his father within 
the context of this tradition, moreover, is particularly worthy of further consideration, since it has 
significant implications for the origin and character of Horatian satire itself. 
The tradition of Roman comedy plays an important role in Horace’s creation of his 
father’s literary persona, but the complexity of this role and its programmatic significance have 
not been wholly appreciated.  Horace clearly recognized Terence’s well-deserved reputation in 
antiquity for purity of diction and skill (Ep. 2.1.59: arte),4 and his willingness to employ 
specifically Terentian stock characters and scenes likely reflects his own concern for refinement 
influences related to Horace’s partial rejection of Aristophanic invective and preference for a 
more gentle tone, see Rudd (1966) 96-7.  Freudenburg (1993) 55-108 argues for a “hybrid 
theory” of satiric humor that embraces both Aristophanic and Peripatetic elements.        
 
2See Fraenkel (1957) 126-27, Rudd (1966) 88-92, Brisk (1963) 157 and Courtney (2013) 
88 for the role ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν in this satire. 
 
3This is discussed by Rudd (1966) 91-2, Hunter (1985a) 486 and Freudenburg (1993) 
100.  Cf. also Leach (1971) 622: “Horace follows Lucilius in his verisimilitude, but rejects the 
Aristophanic spirit, thus casting off the last vestige of old comedy.”   
 
4The popularity of Terence’s language and style is discussed by Müller (2013) 366-70.  
Barsby (1999) 19-27 includes a useful introduction to its general characteristics. 
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and stylistic rigor.5  The exploration of intimate and familial affairs typical of Terentian drama, 
moreover, is closely paralleled by the domestic origin of Horatian satire and its concern with 
privacy.6  But Horace’s allusions to his father’s Terentian qualities do more than communicate 
the importance of stylistic refinement and poetic confidentiality; the comparison with Demea,7 
who may be a comic embodiment of the traditional Roman paterfamilias,8 suggests that 
Horace’s father (and therefore Horatian satire itself) censures vice by promoting ancestral virtue 
5Fairclough (1913) 188-93.  In addition to the “bumpkin father” of 1.4.109-26, Horace 
incorporates other Terentian stock characters into the Sermones, such as the “self-tormentor” 
(1.2.20-2) and the “raging father” (1.4.48-52). 
 
6Cf. 1.4.22-3, 1.10.74-91 and Ep. 1.19.35-49.  Note that Horace’s proclaimed 
confidentiality regarding poetic recitation in these passages contradicts his claim in 1.4 to have 
offended a wider public.  Courtney (2013) 92 n. 87 compares Horace’s reluctance to recite in 
public to Epicurus’ statement that the wise man will read in public, but only under compulsion 
(Arr. 1.121.7-8).  Cf. Lucilius’ consideration of his intended audience (588-96 M) and Persius’ 
admission of a lack thereof (1.1-3).  
  
 7Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 72.  Leach (1971) provides the first extended consideration of 
the similarities between Horace’s father at Sermones 1.4.109-26 and Demea in the Adelphoe.  
She is followed by Hunter (1985a) 490 and Freudenburg (1993) 33-9.  The notion that Horace’s 
portrayal of his father is a purely fictional creation and therefore devoid of any serious ethical 
content, however, is challenged by Schrijvers (1993) 50-2 and Schlegel (2000).  The relevant 
passage from the Adelphoe follows: 
 
   fit sedulo, 
nil praetermitto, consuefacio.  denique 
inspicere tamquam in speculum in vitas omnium  
iubeo atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi. 
hoc facito . . . hoc fugito. (Ad. 414-18) 
 
One does one’s best.  I never turn a blind eye.  I teach him good habits.  Above all I tell 
him to look into the lives of others as if into a mirror and to take from them an example 
for himself.  “Do this,” I say . . . “Avoid that.” 
 
8See Traill (2013) 318-39 for the introduction of Roman customs into the Adelphoe.  
Barsby (2001) 245 considers the possibility that Demea represents the typical Roman 
paterfamilias, whereas Hunter (1985b) is more cautious about associating the Adelphoe with “a 
very specific social and historical context” (109). 
27 
 
                                                          
within a funny, harmlessly conservative context.9  On the other hand, this comparison rests on 
textual parallels that may overlook the broader context in which both Demea and Horace’s father 
are portrayed: poets like Menander and his Roman successors, who stage plays that center on the 
dynamics of the typical father-son relationship and its ethical implications and consequences, are 
likely responding to Aristotle’s teaching concerning the important role of education in forming a 
virtuous disposition.10  The portrayals of this relationship in Terence’s plays (especially the 
Adelphoe), however, are notoriously problematic on account of their overwhelming negativity: 
indeed, all of them revolve around a disobedient son’s amor turpis (to use the Horatian 
description),11 while the fathers are typically described as unstable12 and overly emotional 
authoritarian figures who give barking commands that ultimately provoke their children’s hatred 
(cf. Ad. 870-71).  Perhaps a better parallel for Horace’s father can be found in a touching scene 
from Plautus’ Trinummus, in which the virtuous Lysiteles fondly attributes his moral purity to 
his father’s training: 
 9Freudenburg (1993) 33-9 reads Horace’s father as the doctor ineptus of Roman comedy, 
whose portrayal in 1.4 serves the programmatic function of characterizing Horace’s persona in 
Sermones 1.1-3 as comically inept.  
 
10The connection between παιδεία and a healthy disposition goes back to the sophist 
Protagoras of Abdera (cf. DK B3), who employs the “example method” in Pl. Protag. 325c6-d7.  
Aristotle discusses the relationship between a virtuous disposition (ἕξις) and training from 
childhood in more detail in Eth. Nic. 1103b20-25.  For the Cynics’ incorporation of childhood 
training into their educational theory, see Dudely (1974) 87-8.  The education of children is 
encompassed by Epicurus’ universal invitation to philosophy (Arr. 4.122.1-6), which Philodemus 
echoes in De electionibus et fugis col. 21.12-13.  Cf. Ep. 1.1.24-26: id [sc. philosophia] quod . . . 
aeque neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit (“That task which . . . if neglected, will be harmful 
alike to young and to old”). 
 
11Hunter (1985b) 99-109 examines the four Terentian plays which include father-son 
relationships (i.e., Samia, Andria, Hauton Timorumenos and Adelphoe). 
  
 12Traill (2013) 328-29 discusses the important presence of recognition scenes in 
Terentian drama, and how Demea (as well as the other fathers in the playwright’s works) fits into 
this by realizing his own ignorance as a father and failure as a moral guide. 
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 Semper ego usque ad hanc aetatem ab ineunte adulescentia 
 tuis servivi servitutem imperiis [et] praeceptis, pater.   
 pro ingenio ego me liberum esse ratus sum, pro imperio tuo 
 meum animum tibi servitutem servire aequom censui. 
 .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     . 
 Istaec ego mi semper habui aetati integumentum meae; 
 ne penetrarem me usquam ubi esset damni conciliabulum 
 neu noctu irem obambulatum neu suom adimerem alteri   
 neu tibi aegritudinem, pater, parerem, parsi sedulo: 
 sarta tecta tua praecepta usque habui mea modestia.   
 (Trin. 301-4; 313-17) 
 
I have always obeyed your commands and precepts, father, from my youth to the present 
day.  I consider myself free with regard to my nature, and I deemed it proper that my 
mind should faithfully heed your precepts.  These teachings of yours I have always 
considered a protection in my youth, and I have taken careful precautions, father, lest I 
should ever enter into any place where pernicious vice was intended, or go about strolling 
at night, or steal from another, or cause you grief: I have always maintained your 
precepts, which are a well-made protection, by means of my temperance.    
 
In this scene, which is an extremely rare one in New Comedy,13 the mention of age (aetas), 
intellect (animus), precepts (praecepta) and the abstinence from vicious behavior bears a 
significant resemblance to Horace’s description of his own upbringing (cf. 1.4.119: aetas, 120: 
animum, 121: dictis).  It is even possible that Horace’s healthy relationship with his father is 
intended as a success story that defies comic tradition and “corrects” the behavior of the typical 
adulescens.  Either way, Horace’s portrayal of his father within the context of the traditional 
paterfamilias from Roman comedy (whether a pater durus like Demea or a pater lenis like 
Philto) is deliberate, and its significance is partly expressed by Donatus in his commentary on 
Demea’s pedagogical method (ad 418: non philosophice, sed civiliter monet . . . ergo ut idioticus 
et comicus pater, non ut sapiens et praeceptor (“He does not advise as a philosopher but as a 
13Duckworth (1952) 286. 
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layman . . . therefore [he advises] as a comic and unskilled father, not as a sage and a teacher”).14  
The advantage of this portrayal is twofold: first, it creates the illusion that Horatian satire is the 
pedestrian ranting of an ordinary, home-grown local rather than the educated expression of a 
mind suspiciously imbued with foreign doctrines;15 second, it advertises the Sermones as an 
unabashedly Roman creation that is committed to preserving “ancient tradition” (1.4.117: 
traditum ab antiquis morem).16  Regardless of whether or not Horace publicly recited his verses, 
the creation of a persona such as this not only complements the thoroughly Roman nature of 
satire,17 but it also provides ample opportunity for the contradictory distinctions so typical of 
Horace’s style: like his poetry, the bumpkin father’s humble exterior may conceal a more 
sophisticated core shaped by contemporary ethical doctrines.18 
14Freudenburg (1993) 36, like Hunter (1985a) 490, applies Donatus’ evaluation to 
Horace’s father, whose modest deferral to the sage (sapiens) at 1.4.115-16 allegedly implies the 
same distinction. 
 
 15For Roman satirists’ ostensible rejection of foreign influences, especially philosophy, 
see Mayer (2005b) 146-59 and Jocelyn (1977) 323-66.  Cf. also Lucilius’ famous criticism of 
Albucius (88-94 M) and Juvenal’s tirade against Greek philosophers (3.114-25).  Cicero 
denigrates the Greeks as liars and flatterers at Orat. 1.11.47 and especially Q. fr. 1.5.16, as well 
as in his serio-comic speech In Pisonem (70), although the authenticity of this attack has been 
called into question by Nisbet (1987) 186 and Powell (1995a) 25. 
 
 16Leach (1971) 619 cites a similar passage from Terence’s Adelphoe (411-12) and notes 
that “the fathers are similar, both in their moral and educational convictions and in their reliance 
on ancestral virtue as a standard of perfection.”  Cf. also Plaut. Trin. 295-296: meo modo et 
moribu’ vivito antiquis, quae ego tibi praecipio, ea facito (“Live according to my example and 
the ancient custom, and do whatever I enjoin upon you”). 
  
 17Freudenburg (2005) 1-7 offers a brief introduction to the history of Roman satire. 
Horace clearly promotes the Sermones as emphatically Roman at 1.10.31-5, where Quirinus 
appears in a dream vision and urges him to compose in pure, unadulterated Latin.  See Gowers 
(2012) 307 for the relevant literary parallels, including Callimachus’ Aetia (fr. 1.21-4 Pf.) and 
Ennius (fr. 1.2-10 Sk.).  Rudd (1986) 172-74 considers Horace’s Romanization of Greek words 
an expression of literary “purism.” 
 
18For the multiplicity of Horace’s persona, see Martindale (1993) 1 and Oliensis (1998) 2.  
Zetzel (2009) 21 emphasizes the importance of considering the underlying significance of the 
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In some ways, Horace’s potentially self-effacing description of his father’s training 
resembles his disingenuousness regarding the literary pretensions of the Sermones.  According to 
his own admission (38-65), another generic similarity between satire and comedy is that neither 
ranks as true poetry.  Employing what Horace presents as a standard pater ardens scene at lines 
48-52,19 the poet tells us that satire’s conversational tone likewise lacks the syntactical 
complexity and indissolubility of poetry: it is nothing more than versified, “informal speech” 
(48: sermo merus).  In order to illustrate poetry’s unity, Horace introduces a passage from Ennius 
and declares that, unlike the Sermones, any transposition of these epic verses would result in 
dismemberment and utter destruction (62: disiecti membra poetae).  Our poet, however, is not to 
be trusted: the insincerity of his modest claims is betrayed by the fact that he has carefully 
structured his satires in accordance with Philodemean compositional theory, and his description 
of the impossibility of transposition actually illustrates the application of this theory to his own 
work.  Oberhelman and Armstrong explain:   
 
 To summarize what Horace is doing here.  The text seems to state that Horace’s satire is 
 poetry only because of meter and word-order.  But we must beware of this surface 
 reading in an author like Horace, where texts may at any one moment be undercut by 
 humorous undertones and ironic slippage.  In fact, Horace’s subtext (if we so choose to 
 call it) may well assert that Ennius, at least in the lines quoted, lives up no better than 
 Lucilius to Horace’s poetic ideal.  If we transpose Ennius’ text, what have we left? 
 Nothing more than the same pedestrian sentence with a different word-order . . . But the 
“surface meaning” of Horatian satire.  This is particularly true with regard to Horace’s origin, 
which the poet himself playfully describes as anceps at 2.1.34.  See also Gowers (2003) 55-7.  
With regard to Horace’s father’s educational approach, Citroni Marchetti (2004) 17 examines the 
possibility of “una tradizione pedagogica-filosofica che può averlo influenzato,” which she traces 
back to Plato. 
  
19Cf. Ars. 93-4: interdum tamen et vocem comoedia tollit | iratusque Chremes tumido 
delitigat ore (“Yet at times even Comedy raises her voice, and an angry Chremes storms in 
swelling tones”).  Leach (1971) 621, on the other hand, suggests that Horace’s reference to the 
pater ardens in this passage is consistent with his later allusion to Demea, and that both comic 
figures describe his father.  This view is challenged by Schlegel (2000) 105 n. 15, who suggests 
that the pater ardens is a foil to the “real” father in the satire. 
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 delicious humor is that Horace’s metathesized lines . . . are poetic—Ennius’ lines are 
 not.20 
 
This modesty regarding literary sophistication, therefore, which necessarily extends to Horace’s 
deceptively simple description of his upbringing later on, is merely topical, whereas a more 
profound examination reveals the confidence of a skilled vates.  Given Horace’s subtle yet 
stimulating disingenuousness regarding the literary merits of the Sermones, one wonders whether 
he plays a similar game with respect to its moral content.21  Of course, such an inquiry will 
require a consideration of Horace’s ethical training that extends beyond the function of humor 
(τὸ γελοῖον) and into the realm of philosophical thought (τὸ σπουδαῖον).22 
The simplicity of his father’s educational method, which emphasizes his portrayal as a 
conservative Roman interested in practical ethics, forecasts Horace’s concern with offering 
moral correction through useful advice elsewhere in the Sermones.   This is communicated 
primarily by examples from everyday life and the abundance of purpose clauses, which 
underscore the importance of practicality:  
 
cum me hortaretur, parce frugaliter atque 
viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset: 
“nonne vides, Albi ut male vivat filius utque 
Baius inops? magnum documentum, ne patriam rem 110   
 20Oberhelman and Armstrong (1995) 243-45.  See also Freudenburg (1993) 139-45 and 
Kemp (2010a) 68-74. 
 
21Schlegel (2000) 104: “Horace’s suggestion that in writing satire, he was not writing 
poetry, was not entirely serious . . . but the playful suggestion receives a lengthy treatment and 
has, I think, a true meaning in preparing the reader for the redefinition of satire and what to 
expect of the genre, which Horace accomplishes in the second half of the poem when he makes 
his father’s ethical training the basis, the equivalent, of his own satirical poetic activity.”  Kemp 
(2010a) 61 and Cucchiarelli (2001) 109 similarly take Horace’s portrayal of his father in this 
poem as containing serious undertones and therefore not entirely comic. 
  
 22Fiske (1971) 298: “[I]n lines 102-142 Horace lets us see τὸ σπουδαῖον, the earnest 
features of the satirist beneath the comic mask.”  
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perdere quis velit.” a turpi meretricis amore 
cum deterreret: “Scetani dissimilis sis.” 
ne sequerer moechas, concessa cum venere uti 
possem: “deprensi non bella est fama Treboni”   
aiebat. “sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu   115 
sit melius, causas reddet tibi; mi satis est, si 
traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque, 
dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri 
incolumem possum; simul ac duraverit aetas 
membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice.”   120 
(S. 1.4.107-20) 
Whenever he would encourage me to live thriftily, frugally, and content with what he had 
saved for me, “Do you not see,” he would say, “how badly fares young Albius, and how 
poor is Baius?  A striking lesson not to waste one’s patrimony!”  When he would deter 
me from a vulgar amour, “Don’t be like Scetanus.”  And to prevent me from courting 
another’s wife, when I might enjoy a love not forbidden, “Not pretty,” he would say, “is 
the repute of Trebonius, caught in the act.  Your philosopher will give you theories for 
shunning or seeking this or that: enough for me, if I can uphold the rule our fathers 
handed down, and if, so long as you need a guardian, I can keep your health and name 
from harm.  When years have brought strength to body and mind, you will swim without 
the cork.”   
 
This method closely reflects Horace’s own approach, which likewise involves practical advice 
intended either to produce or prevent a certain outcome: Denique sit finis quaerendi . . . ne facias 
(1.1.92-4: “In short, set bounds to the quest of wealth . . . lest you fare like . . .”); quare, ne 
paeniteat te, | desine matronas sectarier (1.2.77-8: “Wherefore, that you may have no reason to 
repent, cease to court matrons”).  The poet also tends to emphasize the practical reasons for his 
observations of everyday life: ne te morer, audi, | quo rem deducam (1.1.14-15: “Lest I should 
delay you any further: listen, here’s where I’m going with this”); si quis nunc quaerat ‘quo res 
haec pertinet?’ illuc (1.2.23: “If anyone should now ask ‘what’s this got to do with anything,’ 
here’s the answer . . .”); 1.3.137: ne longum faciam (“lest I should drag this on . . .”).23  Indeed, 
one of the major characteristics of the Sermones is the concern with offering real-life criticisms 
23Cf. also Horace’s practical advice to the miser at 1.1.73: nescis, quo valeat nummus, 
quem praebeat usum? | panis ematur, holus, vini sextarius (“Don’t you know what money is for, 
what is can provide?  You may buy bread, veggies, a pint of wine”). 
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for the sake of correction rather than engaging in theoretical speculation; this, however, was 
instilled in young Horace by his father, who promotes his own ignorance by casually 
depreciating the complicated theories behind his son’s ethical decisions (1.4.115-16): sapiens, 
vitatu quidque petitu | sit melius, causas reddet tibi (“Your philosopher will give you theories for 
shunning or seeking this or that”).24  As mentioned above, however, one must avoid taking 
Horace at face value and overlooking the possibility of underlying themes: this incorporation of 
an exclusively practical method, for example, has been linked to the Cynics’ preference for 
λόγοι χρηστοί (“useful advice”) and their rejection of the theoretical pursuits associated with 
formal education.25  Epicurus also rejected the alleged uselessness of theoretical speculation 
(Arr. 38.1 and 82), which in his day included Platonic and Aristotelian elements,26 and instead 
24Lejay (1915) 305 describes Horace’s father’s method as “éducation practique qui 
néglige les belles spéculations des philosophes, mais qui maintient le forte tradition nationale.”  
Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 72 offer a similar evaluation.  It is possible that this approach is an 
intentional reversal of the Stoic method, which emphatically prescribes theory before practice.  
Cf. Arr. Diss. Epict. 1.26.3 and Musonius Rufus Diss. 5.  The concept of choices and avoidances 
was already a philosophical conventionality by the time of Seneca (cf. Ep. 95.13), although 
Philippson (1911) 127-34 argues that “vitare und petere . . . sind Grundbegriffe dieser Schule.”  
See also DeWitt (1939) 127-34 for the prevalence of this notion in Horace’s works.  It should 
also be noted that Epicurus wrote a lost treatise entitled De electionibus et fugis (Arr. 1.27.9), 
and it is likely that a treatise of the same name recovered from the Herculaneum papyri belongs 
to Philodemus (mentioned above, p. 5 n. 10), for which see the 1991 edition and translation of 
Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan.  
 
 25Fiske (1971) 298-99.  For an overview of the characteristics of Cynic παιδεία, for 
which there is little evidence, see Dudely (1974) 87-9 and Desmond (2008) 128-29.  Oltramare 
(1926) 44-5 provides a collection of fragments detailing the Cynics’ rejection of formal 
education, from dialectic to music.  Gerhard’s 1909 edition and commentary of the Hellenistic 
poet Phoenix of Colophon considers the role of λόγοι χρηστοί in the Cynic and comic traditions, 
and his evidence includes various relevant quotations from Menander’s Sententiae (124-26). 
 
26DeWitt (1954) 44-9 and Rist (1972) 2 discuss Epicurus’ reaction to Platonism; 
Nussbaum (1994) 121 describes the difference between Epicurus’ and Aristotle’s understanding 
of practicality.  See also Cic. Fin. 1.42 (an explanation of Epicurean practicality) and 1.72 (a 
criticism of the Platonic curriculum and poetry as having nulla solida utilitas).  A good treatment 
of the Epicurean view of traditional παιδεία can be found in Chandler (2006) 1-5.  
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laid particular stress on the importance of efficacy with regard to his own philosophical 
teachings.27  In addition to this, he especially appreciated the pedagogical role of χρήσιμα 
διαλογίσματα (Arr. 3.85.1-4), and his willingness to provide followers with useful summaries 
of his doctrines (cf. Arr. 2.35.1-7) likewise reveals his concern for practicality and the 
preservation of moral virtue, which reflects Horace’s father’s understanding of philosophy as 
ancillary to the preservation of ancient mores (1.4.115-19).  And while it is true that both the 
Cynics and the Epicureans employed pithy maxims for pedagogical purposes,28 it was the latter 
who placed more emphasis on the importance of brevity for the sake of memorization and 
usefulness, to which one may compare Horace’s advice regarding useful poetry in the Ars 
Poetica: 
aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae 
aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae. 
quiquid praecipies, esto brevis, ut cito dicta   
percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles.  (Ars. 333-36) 
 
Poets aim either to benefit, or to amuse, or to utter words at once both pleasing and 
helpful to life.  Whenever you instruct, be brief, so that what is quickly said the mind may 
readily grasp and faithfully hold.29 
 
27Us. 221: κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφ’ οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου 
θεραπεύεται (“Empty is the argument of that philosopher by which no passion of humans is 
therapeutically treated”).  As Chandler (2006) 4 and Erler (2011) 23-4 note, however, later 
Epicureans like Philodemus were not as critical as Epicurus regarding the potential educational 
value of outside sources. 
 
28Hadot (1970) 347-54 discusses the importance of usefulness and memorization in 
relation to Epicurean pedagogy.  For the Cynics’ use of pithy maxims (χρείαι), see Dudley 
(1974) 112. 
 
 29Cf. Ars. 343-44.  Jensen (1923) 109, Tate (1928) 67-8, Brink (1963) 128-29 and 
Tsakiropoulou-Summers (1995) 237-42 attribute Horace’s view that poetry should be both 
delightful and useful to Neoptolemus of Parium, whom Porphyrio identifies as one of Horace’s 
sources in his commentary on the Ars Poetica (ad 1-2).  This is the same grammarian 
Philodemus opposes in his treatise De poematis (coll. 10.32-13.28 in Jensen’s 1923 edition).  
Armstrong (1993) 223-24, on the other hand, considers Horace’s poetic theory more in line with 
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The language in this passage strongly suggests that Horace, like Epicurus, understands the 
importance of practically communicating philosophical wisdom (334-35: idonea vitae, 
praecepta) in order that it may be quickly memorized (336: animi teneant);30 and although 
Epicurus himself rejected poetry as a suitable means of imparting moral truth or even 
philosophical instruction in general,31 his later followers seem to have been more receptive to the 
possibilities of poetic expression: Philodemus, for example, admits to the dangers of poetry but 
recognizes its potential usefulness for moral instruction,32 while Lucretius (not to mention other 
Roman Epicureans, such as Titus Albucius and Lucius Varius Rufus) wholeheartedly embraces 
that of Philodemus, who views good poetry as necessarily delightful and only potentially useful.  
Cf. especially De poem. col. 29.17-19: κἂν ὠφελῇ, κα[θὸ πο]ήματ’ οὐκ ὠφελεῖ (“And if they 
[sc. poems] are beneficial, this is not by virtue of the fact that they are poems”).  That Horace 
was familiar with Philodemus’ poetry and therefore with his poetic theories is obvious from 
1.2.121, in which he mentions the philosopher by name and cites one of his epigrams.  See 
Hendrickson (1918) 27-43 for this connection and Sider (1997) for an edition and translation of 
Philodemus’ epigrams, including the one mentioned above (138-41).  As Cicero reveals in Pis. 
70 and Fin. 2.119 respectively, both Philodemus’ poetry and philosophical views were known 
and well respected in the first century BC. 
 
30Of course, this is not to say that Horace actually envisioned his eclectic poetry as an 
Epicurean epitome, but rather as containing useful advice (often with Epicurean undertones) that 
could be easily interpreted and even entertaining.  See Snyder (2000) 53-6 for Philodemus’ 
criticisms of many Epicurean “manuals” as shallow and based on a lack of learning. 
  
 31Arr. 1.121.b3: ποιήματά τε ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι (“[And he said that the sage] 
does not spend his life composing poetry”).  Asmis (1995) 15-34, who provides substantial 
consideration of this passage, notes that the popular view that Epicurus rejected poetry wholesale 
may owe more to ancient polemical descriptions of his ignorance and boorishness than to 
anything else.  Cf. especially Cic. Fin. 1.25-6 and 71-2; Plut. Mor. 76.1092c-1094e (Non posse 
suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum) and Mor. 4.58d (Quomodo adulator ad amico internoscatur). 
  
 32This is obvious from the fact that Philodemus imparts politico-ethical advice to his 
friend Piso in his treatise De rege bono secundum Homerum, for which see Dorandi (1982) 15-
21 and Asmis (1991) 1-45.  Cf. also Indelli’s 1988 edition of De ira (col. 8.31-2 and col. 19.20-
5, both quotations from Homer’s Iliad illustrating Achilles’ destructive anger).  Horace likewise 
uses Homer’s poetry in order to impart ethical advise, for which see especially his letter to 
Lollius Maximus (Ep. 1.2). 
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the poetic medium in his philosophical epic.33  In addition to being practical, moreover, 
Epicurean doctrine is especially accessible because it transfers the source of knowledge from 
theoretical speculation to the familiar sense perceptions of everyday life.   
 Horace’s father’s concern for practicality is emphasized by his empirical method and 
reliance on sense perception, which involves exposure to the nitty-gritty details of life on the 
streets of Rome.  This is communicated through the importance of observation (1.4.106: 
notando), vision (109: vides), exposure (123: obiciebat) and hearsay (114: fama) in relation to 
the various moral and social troubles of contemporary Roman life: abject poverty (110: inopia), 
adulterous affairs (111: amor turpis) and the latest gossip (125: rumor malus).  Indeed, the 
reliance on perception as a springboard for moral correction is a common feature of Horace’s 
approach.  In Sermones 1.6, for example, he communicates the burdens and many disturbances 
of political ambition by means of sense impressions: the glitter of Glory’s chariot (23), the color 
and constricting feel of the trappings of senatorial office (27), the sounds of envious gossip (29), 
the blaring of trumpets in the forum (43-4) and the sight of poor Tillius loaded down with more 
paraphernalia and responsibilities that he can calmly manage (107-9).34  At the same time, 
however, such descriptions are also one of the satirical characteristics of Old Comedy, and 
Horace’s father’s finger-pointing and identification of specific individuals like Baius (1.4.110) 
and Scetanus (112)35 owe much to the comic tradition ostensibly rejected by Horace at 1.4.1-5, 
33See Asmis (1995) 34 and especially Sider (1995) 35-41.  
 
34Other vivid examples of sensation related to vice abound in the Sermones, especially in 
the introductory poems: sight (1.2.80: niveos viridesque lapillos); sound (1.1.66: sibilat, plaudo; 
1.2.18: exclamat, 128-30: latret canis, strepitu resonet, clamet; 1.3.7-8: summa voce, resonat, 
18: stertebat, 136 rumperis et latras; 1.5.15: cantabat; 1.8.46: displosa); smell (1.2.27-30: olet, 
olenti); touch (1.1.38: aestus, 39: hiems, 80: frigore; 1.2.6: frigus). 
 
 35See the Enc. Or. 1.658-59 for the identity of Baius; virtually nothing is known of 
Scetanus.  The identification of individuals by means of the demonstrative hic . . . ille 
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and which thrived on the public criticism of perceptible behavior through the branding of 
individuals by name.  As G. C. Fiske notes in his important study, moreover, this method also 
resembles the Cynics’ “empirical morality,” which often involves denouncing perceptible 
behavior in a public setting through the character portrait (χαρακτηρισμός).36  All of these 
influences are certainly important, but little attention has been given to the tradition of formal 
epistemology and its close connection to ethics: that is to say, the emphasis on the primacy of 
empirical observation as necessary for Horace’s education (cf. 110: magnum documentum) 
resembles the epistemological doctrines of Hellenistic philosophers, who likewise attached great 
importance to sensation.  Aristotle’s lengthy treatment of this topic in the De anima (413b2-
429a9), for example, influenced the Stoic and Epicurean identification of sensation as a criterion 
of truth and starting point of knowledge.37  It was Epicurus alone, however, who maintained that 
all sense impressions are true and therefore absolutely foundational for the formation of 
knowledge and ethical decisions.38  According to Diogenes’ account of Epicurean epistemology 
combination, which is used by Horace’s father at 1.4.126 to introduce practical examples, occurs 
numerous times in Sermones 1: 1.11, 29; 2.4, 7, 4; 3.57-8; 6.41-2; 9.6-7, 13-16, 41-4.  Cf. also 
2.3.50. 
 
36Fiske (1971) 299.  Cf. [Cic.] Rhet. Her. 4.65, where he refers to the positive moral 
function of notationes, which are descriptions of another’s inner “nature” (natura) by means of 
“clear and perceptible signs” (certis signis).   
 
37Cf. also Aristotle’s subsequent treatment of sensation in De sensu.  It is important to 
note that Aristotle regarded perceptions as false only “very seldom” (De an. 428b2: ὅτι 
ὀλίγιστον), whereas the Stoics only accepted the sense data from “cognitive impressions” (cf. 
Diog. Laert. 7.54 = SVF 2.105: καταληπτικὴ φαντασία).  For evidence for the role of sensation 
in Stoic epistemology, see the text, translation and commentary of Long and Sedley (1987) 238-
59.   
 
38The primacy of sensation is expressed in Epicurus’ Epistula ad Herodotum (Arr. 
2.38.3-8), in Diogenes’ biography (Arr. 1.32.3-6) and in Ratae sententiae 22-4 (Arr. 5.146.5-
147.8), to which cf. Lucr. 4.469-521.  See also Striker (177) 125-42 and Taylor (1980) 105-24.  
For the relationship between the Aristotelian and Epicurean understanding of sensation, see 
Bourgey (1969) 252-55 and De Lacy (1978) 171-73. 
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(Arr. 1.31.3-4), “sensation” (αἴσθησις) was one of the three “interpretive tools” (κριτήρια) for 
engaging with and reacting to the visible world along with “anticipations” (προλήψεις) and 
“affections” (πάθη).39  As the starting point of knowledge, sense perception would have 
supplied young Horace with the information necessary to interpret his surroundings, as suggested 
by the Lucretian phrase nonne vides which introduces his father’s empirical method.40  
Furthermore, the pervasive use of the imperfect tense throughout this passage strongly implies 
that such sensory experiences occurred habitually and over an extended period of time: 
hortaretur (107); deterreret (112); aiebat (115); formabat (121); iubebat (121); vetabat (124).  
This raises the question: in what manner did Horace’s exposure to everyday life inform his 
understanding of the world around him and—perhaps more importantly—how did this effect the 
way in which he communicated this knowledge?  
Horace would not have forgotten easily the multiple and repeated sensory experiences of 
moral corruption to which his father had exposed him at such an impressionable age; on the 
contrary, they would have been stored away in his memory and categorized as universal 
39For Epicurus’ own description, see the following: anticipations (Arr. 4.37.6-38.3); 
sensation and affections (Arr. 4.38.3-8).  Useful introductions to Epicurean epistemology include 
Bailey (1964) 232-74, Long (1986) 21-30, Rist (1972) 114-40, Mitsis (1988) 19-45 (less 
accessible but contains useful observations) and Asmis (1984), which is an extended study of 
Epicurus’ “scientific method.” 
 
40Lucretius employs this phrase to emphasize the epistemological value of sensation, in 
particular vision, and the verb videre occurs quite often in book one alone (e.g. 175, 197, 208, 
210, 224, 255, 262, 319, 358, 407, 450 and 465).  Schiesaro (1984) examines Lucretius’ use of 
nonne vides as “un preciso segnale che indica al lettore il passagio ad una illustrazione 
esemplificativa” (145), which he connects to Horace’s father’s use of nonne vides as introducing 
a didactic digression into examples of moral vice (149).  Cf. Verg. G. 1.56: nonne vides (used to 
introduces examples of the natural products peculiar to certain regions) as well as 3.103 and 
3.250.  Horace also quotes from Lucretius within the context of his Epicurean education at 
1.5.101: namque deos didici securum agere aevum (“I have learned that the gods lead a care-free 
life”), to which cf. Lucr. 5.82. 
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concepts,41 eventually forming a kind of database for future reference and investigation.  The 
Epicureans identify these categorized memories as “anticipations” (προλήψεις), which, in 
addition to being a reference point for scientific investigation, are also a prerequisite for 
successful communication.42  Diogenes offers the following definition:  
Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν 
 νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος.  
 (Arr. 1.33.1-4) 
 
And they say that prolēpsis is either an apprehension, or a correct opinion, or thought, or 
stored, general idea; that is to say, a memory of that which has often appeared from 
outside. 
 
Horace’s empirical training, for example, would have provided him with an acute cognitive 
awareness of the vices, challenges and temptations associated with living in contemporary Rome, 
of which his compatriots certainly would have been aware: political corruption (1.6.51-2: prava | 
ambitione), sexual promiscuity (ibid. 68: mala lustra) and insatiable greed (ibid.: avaritiam) in 
addition to the economic and sexual vices mentioned in Sermones 1.4.  According to Horace’s 
description, however, it was his father’s verbal cues that allowed him to identify and ultimately 
communicate these realities by associating them with the corresponding Latin words early on 
41For the meaning of “universal” (καθολική) within the context of Epicurean 
epistemology as distinct from the Aristotelian tradition, see Asmis (1984) 63. 
  
42The most useful modern treatments of πρόληψις are the following: Kleve (1963); Long 
(1971) 119-22; Manuwald (1972); Asmis (1984) 61-80; Glidden (1985) 175-217.  For a 
discussion of the scholarly debate regarding whether προλήψεις are acquired through multiple 
sensory experiences or inborn, the origin of which is an apparent discrepancy between the 
accounts of Diogenes (Arr. 1.33.1-4) and Cicero (N.D. 1.44 and Fin. 1.31), see Manuwald (1972) 
3-39 and Asmis (1984) 66-72.  More recent interpretations are the conflicting views of Sedley 
(2011) 28-52 and Konstan (2011) 53-71.  Cf. also Lucretius 478-79 (= Arr. 1.32.9): Invenies 
primis ab sensibus esse creatam | notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli (“You will find that it 
is from the senses in the first instance that the concept [i.e., πρόληψις] of truth has come, and 
that the senses cannot be refuted”).  See Bailey (1947) 1239 for the identification of notities with 
πρόληψις.    
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(1.4.120-21): sic me | formabat puerum dictis (“Thus he would form me with his words”).  His 
father, therefore, is the origin not only of his moral integrity, but also of the moral vocabulary he 
so often employs elsewhere in his satiric portraits: turpis (1.2.85, 102; 1.3.39, 100 1.6.63, 84; 
1.9.75; 2.1.65; 2.7.55, 59, 91); honestus (1.2.42); inhonestus (1.6.36); inutilis (2.8.12); rectus 
(1.1.107; 1.2.37, 74, 82, 90; 2.1.21; 2.2.100; 2.3.88, 162, 201; 2.6.75; 2.7.25).43  This is the 
language of traditional Roman ethics, but its presence in the Sermones is partly a conscious 
imitation of the conversational diction and plain style advocated by the Stoic philosopher 
Panaetius and put into practice by Lucilius, as well as the Roman comic playwrights and later 
satirists like Persius (cf. 5.14: verba togae).44  What makes this language traditional, however, is 
precisely the fact that it is the conventional, universally accepted means of communicating the 
moral and cultural values shared by all Romans.  In some ways, this connection between 
concepts and words reflects Epicurus’ assertion that the use of everyday language, the utterance 
of which evokes the shared concept in a given society, is essential for proper communication, 
since one can only express common features of reality in conjunction with linguistic convention: 
43Schrijvers (1993) 58-9 describes this language as corresponding to the conventionally 
accepted “éthique populaire” of ancient Rome, which reflects Horace’s father’s persona as a 
traditional paterfamilias concerned for his son’s moral purity.  Cf. Lucilius’ definition of virtue 
(1329-330 M): virtus, scire, homini rectum, utile quid sit, honestum, quae bona, quae mala item, 
quid inutile, turpe, inhonestum (“Virtue is for a man to know what is right, what is useful and 
honorable, what is good, bad, useless, base, dishonorable”). 
 
44Cf. Cic. Off. 1.134-37 for a discussion of the characteristics of sermo as “easy and not at 
all dogmatic” (lenis minimeque pertinax).  This definition is important, since it relates to 
Cicero’s distinction in Fin. 3.3 regarding Torquatus’ conversational style (sermone), which has 
allowed for a clear discussion (dilucida oratio), and the Stoics’ more complex and dialectical 
approach to philosophy, which is a “very subtle or rather thorny style of argument” (subtile vel 
spinosum potius disserendi genus). This may be compared to Cic. Ac. 1.5 (a criticism of the 
Epicureans’ conversational style): Vides autem . . . non posse nos Amafini aut Rabiri similes 
esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant (“You see, 
moreover, that we cannot be similar to Amafinius or Rabirius, who discuss things that lie open to 
the view in ordinary language”).  
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 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι,  
ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγάγοντες 
 ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν ᾖ εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ κενοὺς 
 φθόγγους ἔχωμεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον 
 βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ 
 ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν. (Arr. 2.37.6-38.3) 
 
First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may 
be able to refer them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of 
investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on 
explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.  For this purpose it is essential that 
the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there 
should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a 
problem of investigation or reflection or mental inference.45  
 
Diogenes notes that in his writings Epicurus was concerned above all with clarity of expression 
(Arr. 1.13.10-14.1: σαφηνείαν), so much so that the grammarian Aristophanes criticized his 
“conventional diction” (λέξις κυρία) as being “too pedestrian” (ἰδιωτάτη).46  With the obvious 
exception of philosophical vocabulary, which would have been out of place in a traditionally 
45Cf. Arr. 2.75.1-76.7 and Lucr. 5.1028-90 for the Epicurean doctrine of the evolution of 
language.  Other discussions of language theory in general are in Long (1971) 114-33 and 
Atherton (2008) 198-203.  Not all scholars agree, however, on the precise relationship of 
anticipations to the words that signify them.  See, for example, the conflicting views of 
Manuwald (1972) 111-14 and Glidden (1983) 221-24.  Horace includes a parodic imitation of 
Lucretius’ account of the evolution of language at 1.3.103-4, for which see Ferri (1993) 38 and 
Freudenburg (1993) 26.  Harrison (2007) 85, on the other hand, considers such imitation “no so 
much parody as a shift of generic framework.” 
 
46Cic. Fin. 2.15 acknowledges Epicurus’ concern for communicating clearly: Epicurus 
autem . . . plane et aperte . . . de re . . . iam in vulgus pervagata loquitur (“But Epicurus . . . 
speaks plainly and clearly . . . about things that are generally familiar already”).  This is also one 
of the hallmarks of Lucretius’ style (cf. 1.136-45), as Bailey (1947) 623 notes: “[W]hereas 
Cicero invented Latin words to correspond to the Greek . . . Lucr. preferred to express the ideas 
in words for the most part already in circulation . . . Lucr. no doubt had in mind here Epicurus’ 
precepts as regards the use of words in their obvious meaning.”  Cicero apologizes for inventing 
new words in order to express philosophical ideas in the introduction to his exposition of Stoic 
ethics (Fin. 3.1-5), which includes the following statement: verba parienda sunt imponendaque 
nova rebus novis nomina (“Words must be created and new terms invented for new concepts”).  
On Cicero as a pioneer in the philosophical vocabulary of Latin, see Powell (1995b) 288-97. 
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Roman genre, this hermeneutical approach could also be applied to Horatian satire, which, on 
account of having been informed by the teachings of a pater idioticus, is presented as nothing 
more than “pure conversation” (1.4.48: sermo merus) that employs unadorned, everyday speech 
in order to communicate moral truth.47  Furthermore, the ostensibly prosaic, down-to-earth 
nature of the Sermones is perfectly consistent with Horace’s concern in the Ars Poetica for 
avoiding obscurity of expression (cf. 26: obscurus) and preserving syntactical clarity (256: 
lucidus ordo).48  The fact, moreover, that the obscurity traditionally associated with poetry is one 
of Philodemus’ major objections to viewing it as an ideal medium for communicating 
philosophical truth may be significant: perhaps in response to Epicurus’ views on language and 
Philodemus’ poetic theory, Horace designed his Sermones to be friendly chats, which are “closer 
to conversations” (1.4.42: sermoni propriora) than to poetry and therefore suitably communicate 
47One thinks of Horace’s rejection of hybrid and unusual words (1.10.23-30) and 
Quirinus’ injunction to compose in pure Latin (see n. 17 above).  Cf. also Horace’s description of 
Satyr plays at Ars. 231-35, which implies that trivial poetry (231: levis versus), i.e., satire (cf. 
1.4.53: leviora), employs the “usual and conventional words” (inornata et dominantia nomina).  
Fairclough (1991) 470 and Rudd (1989) 189 equate dominantia with κυρία, which recalls 
Epicurus’ writing style as described above.  Horace’s concern for the use of conventional 
language is explicitly stated in the Ars Poetica: 
 
multa renascentur quae iam cecidere, cadentque 
quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus, 
quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi. (AP 70-72)     
 
Many terms that have fallen out of use shall be born again, and those shall fall that are 
now in repute, if Usage so will it, in whose hands lies the judgment, the right and the rule 
of speech. 
 
 48Lucretius attempts to justify his decision to communicate Epicurean doctrine through 
poetry by appealing to his clarity of expression (cf. 1.993-94: lucida | carmina) and charm (cf. 
1.28: leporem), for which see Asmis (1995) 33.  Cf. also Cic. Orat. 1.94: quod eum statuebam 
disertum, qui posset satis acute, atque dilucide, apud mediocres homines ex communi quadam 
opinione dicere (“For I held up as a model of eloquence, the orator who can speak among 
average men about matters of common opinion with enough skill and clarity”). 
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moral wisdom through conventional language expressed in an ostensibly prosaic manner.49  In 
light of this, the simplicity and directness so characteristic of Horace’s expression in the 
Sermones, which originates with his father’s training, may owe at least something to Epicurus’ 
and Philodemus’ concerns regarding clarity and the use of the obvious meanings of words for the 
sake of practicality. 
The primacy of sensation and ability to express accurately the concepts which develop 
from sense experiences are prerequisites for knowledge and communication; as Aristotle points 
out in the Ethica Nicomachea, however, the ultimate purpose of moral virtue is correct action 
(1103b30: πῶς πρακτέον).  Plato was perhaps to first philosopher to examine seriously the 
philosophical significance of pleasure (ἡδονή) with regard to action,50 and both Aristotle and 
Epicurus recognize the role of pleasure and pain in motivating ethical decisions (cf. Arr. 1.34.7-
9).51  Epicurus’ position, however, was controversial because it identified all pleasure as 
“inherently good and natural” (Arr. 4.129.1: ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικόν),52 although he 
makes an important distinction regarding choices and avoidances:  
 49 Philodemus mentions the superiority of prose for communicating philosophical truth at 
De poem. col. 28.26-32.  See also Asmis (1995) 28.   
 
 50The most extensive source of information comes from Socrates’ expression of 
hedonistic doctrines in Protag. 351b4-358d5.  For a detailed examination of Plato’s 
understanding of pleasure and the evidence from other dialogues, see Gosling and Taylor (1982) 
45-192. 
  
51Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1104b4-1105a17.  Mitsis (1988) 11-58 offers a detailed examination 
of Epicurus’ doctrine of pleasure and its connection to happiness and desire.  See also Rist 
(1974) 167-79 and Gosling and Taylor (1982) for the ancient tradition regarding Aristotle (285-
344) and Epicurus (345-414).   
 
52The notion that pleasure is naturally ingrained in all humans, which is known as the 
“cradle argument,” was also expressed by Aristotle at Eth. Nic. 1105a2-4 and corresponds to the 
Stoic doctrine of self-preservation or οἰκείωσις.  It was, in other words, quite popular among 
philosophers in antiquity (see Cic. Fin. 5.55).  Epicurus does not refer to it explicitly, but the 
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Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν 
 αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ 
 δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἕπηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, 
 ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. 
(Arr. 4.129.4-9) 
 
But although [pleasure] is the first good and natural, we do not on account of this choose 
 every pleasure; rather, there are times when we pass over many pleasures if more misery 
 will follow as a consequence.  And we reckon that there are many pains better than 
 pleasures, whenever a greater pleasure will come to us after some time as a result of 
 enduring those pains. 
 
 
Ethical decisions, therefore, are sound if they ultimately result in more pleasure than pain, which 
will only be possible if such decisions are made in accordance with desires that observe the 
requirements of nature (cf. Arr. 4.127 and 5.149.1-8).53  Otherwise, the result will be 
overwhelmingly detrimental, as Philodemus explains in De elect. col. 5.7-14: ἕνεκα γὰρ τῶ[ν] 
ξενοτάτων ὡς ἀναγκαιοτάτων τὰ χαλεπώτατ’ ἀναδέχ[ο]νται κακά (“Men suffer the worst 
evils because of the most alien desires which they regard as most necessary).”  The reason for 
this suffering is that their pleasures will be outweighed by the pains that follow, whereas those 
who have grown accustomed (1.4.105: insuevit) to calculate pleasures responsibly and whose 
dispositions are morally sound (129: sanus) will likely escape this predicament.  Horace, for 
example, will choose to avoid making unnecessary expenditures and indulging in illicit sexual 
affairs on account of the terrible consequences that often accompany such behavior; this reaction, 
testimony of Torquatus in Fin. 1.30 proves that later Epicureans employed it.  See Brunschwig 
(1986) 113-44 for both the Epicurean and Stoic versions.  Cicero often grossly misrepresents 
Epicurus’ doctrine of pleasure as the moral standard (cf. especially Tusc. 3.36-51).   
 
53This is an expression of Epicurus’ threefold division of desires as follows: natural and 
necessary (e.g., food), natural but unnecessary (e.g., sex) and unnatural and unnecessary (e.g., 
fame).  See Annas (1989) 147-52 for an explanation of the necessity of such a division.  Cf. also 
Pl. Rep. 558d-559c and Arist. Eth. Nic. 1148b15-1149a24 for discussions of 
necessary/unnecessary and natural/unnatural pleasures.   
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moreover, is described as the practical result (129: ex hoc) of his father’s training, which deterred 
him from social and economic failure: 
 
                       avidos vicinum funus ut aegros 
exanimat mortisque metu sibi parcere cogit, 
sic teneros animos aliena opprobria saepe 
absterrent vitiis. (S. 1.4.126-28) 
 
As a neighbor’s funeral scares gluttons when sick, and makes them, through fear of 
death, careful of themselves, so the tender mind is oft deterred from vice by another’s 
shame. 
 
 
As Horace implies, it is the dreaded prospect of suffering similar fates as individuals like Baius 
and Scetanus which motivates his decision to flee (128: absterrent).  More likely than not, this 
abstinence from the transitory pleasures offered by material possessions and sexual gratification 
was a source of pain for young Horace, as the verbs “wish” (111: velit) and “enjoy” (113: uti) 
suggest.54  Nevertheless, the choice to avoid them is proportionately beneficial: it will ultimately 
contribute to the preservation of his patrimony and reputation (118: vitam famamque), which is a 
far greater pleasure indeed.55  This method of calculating the potential outcomes of ethical 
54Epicurus distinguishes between “kinetic” pleasure, which is caused by the active motion 
of agreeable atoms in the sense organs (e.g., sexual gratification), and “katastematic” pleasure, 
which refers to the state of physical and mental freedom from all atomic disturbances (e.g., not 
being plagued by poverty and scandal).  See Arr. 1.136.1-3.  For detailed examinations of this 
division, see Rist (1972) 102-11, Gosling and Taylor (1982) 365-96, Giannantoni (1984) 25-44, 
Long (1986) 64-6 and Mistis (1988) 45-51.   It should be noted that Horace’s father does not 
deter his son from sexual pleasure itself, which is inherently good, but from the pursuit of illicit 
pleasure, which will result in greater pain through the destruction of his reputation.  
 
55The preservation of one’s reputation was repudiated by the Cynics, as Fiske (1971) 317, 
who gives Teles’ record of Bion’s opinion concerning reputations, shows: πρὸς δόξαν καὶ 
ἀδοξίαν ἴσως ἔχοντα (“[He said that] he was equally disposed towards a good reputation or a 
bad one”).  On the other hand, it was obviously of great importance to the Romans as well as to 
Philodemus, who was writing for a Roman audience and addresses this issue in his treatise De 
adulatione (PHerc. 222 col. 4.4-8): [ἡ] δόξα τοίνυν χάριν ἀσφαλείας ἐδιώχθη κατὰ φύσιν, ἥν 
ἔξεστιν ἔχειν καὶ ἰδιώτηι καὶ φιλοσόφωι , κακία[ς δ’ οὐ] πάσης (“A good reputation, which 
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decisions in terms of foreseeable pleasure is an expression of the so-called hedonic calculus,56 
which Horace clearly incorporates into his moral deliberations: 
 
           neque enim, lectulus aut me 
porticus excepit, desum mihi: ‘rectius hoc est; 
hoc faciens vivam melius; sic dulcis amicis   
occurram; hoc quidam non belle.  numquid ego illi 
imprudens olim faciam simile?’ (S. 1.4.133-36) 
 
For when my couch welcomes me or I stroll in the colonnade, I do not fail myself: “This 
is the better course: if I do that, I shall fare more happily; thus I shall delight the friends I 
meet: that was ugly conduct of so and so.  Is it possible that I may ever thoughtlessly do 
something like that?” 
 
 
The inclusion of the comparative adverbs rectius and melius effectively implies moral 
deliberation in terms of comparison or calculation, while the tense establishes futurity.  Epicurus 
gives similar advice:    
 
 Πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν 
 τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;  (Arr. 6.71) 
 
 Let the following question be posed regarding all desires: what will happen to me if this 
 desire is fulfilled?  What will happen if it is not fulfilled? 
 
Once again, the programmatic element of this passage alludes not only to the language Horace 
will employ throughout the Sermones, but also to way in which he will evaluate his 
both the philosopher and the layman can have, is pursued for the sake of security in accordance 
with nature, but not by means of every vice”).  Gargiulo (1981) 103-27 provides an edition and 
translation of this text.  
 
56See Arr. 129.9-130.3 for the importance of “calculating” (συμμετρήσει), through 
careful “consideration” (τῇ βλέψει), the “advantages” (συμφερόντων) and “disadvantages” 
(ἀσυμφόρων) of ethical judgments.  Cf. also Cic. Fin. 1.32-33 for Torquatus’ description of the 
hedonic calculus.  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 30 recognize the “elementaren Sätzen epikureicher 
Ethik” in this passage; Gowers (2012) 180, on the other hand, refers to Horace’s deliberations as 
“hypercritical calculation,” which overlooks the philosophical undertones presently under 
discussion.     
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contemporaries’ ethical decisions with respect to the pleasure calculus.  At Sermones 1.1.56-8, 
for example, Horace illustrates the detrimental effects of unnecessary desires (57: plenior . . . 
iusto) by employing a weather metaphor involving drowning, which recalls his father’s 
expression “you will swim without the cork” (1.4.120: nabis sine cortice) and may allude to the 
Epicureans’ predilection for such metaphors.57  The Epicurean calculus is also clearly invoked at 
1.2.38-9, where “pleasure is marred by much pain” (multo corrupta dolore voluptas), and a 
similar example occurs later on at 78-9: desine matronas sectarier, unde laboris | plus haurire 
mali quam ex re decerpere fructus (“cease to court matrons, for thence one may derive pain and 
misery, rather than reap enjoyment in the reality”).58  Horace again contextualizes decisions by 
the calculation of pleasures and pains in Sermones 1.6, in which he states that he would “avoid” 
(99: nollem) carrying the distressful burden of political office (99: onus molestum) because it 
would result in comparatively more financial (100: maior res) and social (101: salutandi plures) 
responsibilities; rather, he intends to “live more pleasurably” (130: victurum suavius) by being 
content with his meager fare and life of leisure (111-31).59  It is important to note, moreover, that 
in the same poem Horace identifies the “cause” of his ability to make such decisions as his 
father’s moral training (71: causa fuit pater his), suggesting that the underlying foundation of 
57 Horace describes the Aufidus River in Sermones 1.1.56-60 as bringing turbatam 
aquam, to which cf. Lucr. 2.1: mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis (“on the great sea the 
winds trouble the waters”).  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 73 describe Horace in Sermones 1.4.120 as 
a “gelernter rüstiger Schwimmer im Strome des Lebens,” obviously indicating a weather 
metaphor.  This kind of language was a common feature of Epicurean ethics; cf. especially 
Epicurus’ use of χειμάζων (Arr. 1.137.4) and χειμών (Arr. 4.128.5-6).  For similar expressions 
in Philodemus’ works, see Vooys (1934).  Even the Epicurean identification of ἀταραξία as the 
summum bonum originates in an expression associated with weather, since it literally means 
“freedom from being stirred up.” 
 
 58See Curran (1970) 223 for a similar interpretation involving the pleasure calculus. 
  
 59Note the use of comparatives (maior, plures, suavius), as in 1.4: rectius (134); melius 
(125).  
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this evaluative method was laid by none other than the bumpkin father who had earlier 
disavowed any knowledge of such philosophical “causes” (1.4.116: causas). 
According to Horace’s description, this pedagogical method effectively provided him 
with a virtuous disposition, which the poet describes in terms of contentment (108: contentus) 
and health (129: sanus).60  The former is communicated through his exposure to examples of 
economic failure, which was intended to emphasize the benefits of living frugally and content 
with one’s possessions (107-8): parce frugaliter atque | viverem uti contentus eo, quod mi ipse 
parasset (“he would encourage me to live thriftily, frugally, and content with what he had saved 
for me”).61  Horace’s decision to use contentus is noteworthy, since its literal meaning suggests 
that his desires will rarely exceed the limits of nature, as Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman 
Torquatus explains (Fin. 1.44): ut sapiens solum, amputata circumcisaque inanitate omni et 
errore, naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere (“Hence, only the 
wise man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled 
by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set”).62  He will not, for 
60This positive outcome should be contrasted with Demea’s utter failure to educate 
Ctesipho in Adelphoe, for which see especially Demea’s lamentation speech (855-81).  Courtney 
(2013) 94 ignores this obvious contrast and instead focuses on the “minor flaws” shared by both 
Horace and Ctesipho.   
 
61Cf. De oec. col. 16.1-12 for Philodemus’ discussion the importance of being content 
and satisfied with little (τὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἱκανά) within the context of property management.  This 
treatise has recently been translated by Tsouna (2012), who, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
also provides a useful commentary. 
 
62Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1106a14-1107a27 for the doctrine of the mean and Pol. 1257b10-34 
for a discussion of the limits of “natural wealth” (ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ φύσιν).  The “limits of 
nature” doctrine was also of particular importance for the Cynics’ understanding of αὐτάρκεια.  
See Oltramare (1926) 49-54 for the evidence as well as Desmond (2008) 150-61.  For Epicurus’ 
qualification of αὐτάρκεια as the willingness to subsist with few possession rather than the 
actual intention to do so (i.e., the Cynic practice), see Arr. 4.130.5-7.  This will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2.  
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example, mistake the most unnecessary things (i.e., luxury goods) for the most necessary (i.e., a 
secure livelihood), as Philodemus warns in De electionibus et fugis: 
μετὰ δ[ὲ τ]αῦτ[α καὶ] τὰς τῶν ἐπιθυμ[ιῶ]ν π[ερί] τε τὰ[ς] ἡδονὰ[ς] καὶ   
 τὰ ποι[ητ]ικὰ διαφορὰς ἀναλογισ[τέ]ον· ἐπ[ειδὴ] καὶ παρὰ τὴν    
 [ἀδι]αληψ[ία]ν [δι’] αὐτῶν μεγάλα γίνεται δ[ι]απτώματα κατὰ τὰς   
 αἱρέσ[εις] καὶ φυγάς.  (De elect. col. 5.4-11) 
 
 Having looked into these matters, one should also consider the differences among desires, 
 both with regard to the pleasures and with regard to their causes.  For it is on account of 
 the failure to distinguish between them that important errors occur through them with 
 respect to choices and avoidances.  
 
The importance of being content with the requirements of nature and the understanding that these 
are “easily satisfied” (Arr. 4.130.9, 133.1-5; 5.144.1-2: εὐπόριστον), which Horace owes to his 
father’s training, forms the backdrop to many of his evaluations of vicious behavior in the 
Sermones.63  Aside from growing accustomed to live frugally, Horace also indicates that the 
ultimate result of calculating pleasure in accordance with correct desires is “health” (1.4.129: 
sanus ab illis).64  This allusion to the familiar medical analogy, which was enormously popular 
in ancient Greek philosophy,65 may also reflect Epicurus’ description of frugality and 
63The important concept of being “content” occurs often in the Sermones: 1.1.3, 118; 
1.3.16; 1.6.96; 1.10.60, 74; 2.2.110; 2.7.20, 97.  For passages involving the “limits of nature,” 
see the following: 1.1.74-5 (to which, cf. Arr. 6.34), 1.2.111-13 and 1.6.127-28 (to which, cf. 
Arr. 4.130.9-131.1). 
  
 64Cf. Horace’s parodic definition of the Stoic sage at Ep. 1.1.107-8: [sapiens est] liber, 
honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum, | praecipue sanus (“[The wise man is] free, honored, 
beautiful, nay a king of kings; above all, sound”).  For medical analogies among the Stoics, see 
Cic. Tusc. 3.1-21. 
 
65It was popular at almost every stage of Greek philosophy, beginning with the sophists 
(if not earlier) and extending into the Hellenistic period and beyond.  Useful treatments of this 
rich subject include Wehrli (1951) 177-84, Jaeger (1957) 54-61 and Nussbaum (1994).  Cf. Lucr. 
4.510-11: Et quoniam mentem sanari, corpus ut aegrum, | cernimus et flecti medicina posse 
videmus (“And since we see that the mind, like a sick body, can be healed and changed by 
medicine”).  Epicurean doctrine was commonly described in terms of medicine (cf. the 
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contentment as prerequisites of health and the bulwarks of a virtuous disposition (Arr. 4.131.2-
7).  Additionally, it may express the twofold Epicurean summum bonum, which is described in 
terms of health (Arr. 4.128.2: ὑγιεία) and includes the “katastematic” pleasures of freedom from 
physical toil (Arr. 7.2: ἀπονία) as well as from mental disturbances (Arr. 4.12.82-3, 7.2: 
ἀταραξία).66  It is perhaps not a coincidence, therefore, that Horace’s description of his virtuous 
upbringing and overall health is centered on the avoidance of prodigality and lust, both of which 
are clearly described as resulting in physical (1.4.110: inopia) and mental (114: fama) 
disturbances respectively.  According to Epicurus’ explanation, moreover, the attainment of 
pleasures such as tranquility of body and mind originates in the ability to exercise “prudence” 
(φρόνησις), which indicates a connection to practical intent as opposed to theoretical wisdom:67 
 
Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις.  Διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας 
τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα 
ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.   
(Arr. 4.132.7-12) 
 
description of the first four Ratae sententiae as the τετραφάρμακος or “fourfold drug”).  Juv. 
10.356 includes a conscious imitation of Epicurean ethics: mens sana in corpore sano (“a 
healthy mind in a healthy body”).  For medical imagery among the Epicureans, see Gigante 
(1975) 53-61, Kilpatrick (1996) 69-100 and Konstan et al. (1998) 20-3.  Philodemus describes 
the sage as “pure” from vice in De lib. dic. col. 1b (7: καθαρός) and in De grat. col. 11 (18: 
καθαρούς). 
 
66Cf. also Arr. 247.  Gowers (2012) 179 translates sanus ab as “free from,” which 
resembles Epicurus’ description of the greatest goods in terms of the privation or lack of evil as 
defined by Horace at Ep. 1.1.41: virtus est vitium fugere (“To flee vice is the beginning of 
virtue”). 
 
67See Bailey (1926) 338-39, who translates φρόνησις as “prudence” in contrast to the 
loftier and more detached σοφία.  See also the LSJ s.v. φρόνησις, which offers “purpose, 
intention” (1) and “practical wisdom” (2) as meanings.  Stob. 2.59.4 (= SVF 3.262) gives the 
Stoic understanding of this term: φρόνησιν δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον 
(“[They say that] prudence is the knowledge of what ought to be done and what ought not to be 
done”). 
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Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence.  Wherefore prudence is a 
more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other 
virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently 
and honorably and justly. 
 
 
Horace suggests that such considerations motivate his ethical deliberations when he depicts them 
as concerned with prudent forethought (1.4.136-37): numquid ego illi | imprudens olim faciam 
simile? (“Is it possible that someday I may thoughtlessly do anything like that?”).68  If these self-
conscious deliberations are read closely, the implication appears to be that for Horace, as for 
Epicurus, the life that is sweet (135: dulcis), beautiful (136: belle) and just (134: rectius) requires 
a practical sense of moral uprightness (prudentia).  
Horace’s training, which combines sensation, communication and feelings for the 
purpose of moral guidance, also involves exposure to and observation of the patterns of 
perceptible behavior which reveal his contemporaries’ vicious dispositions.  The approach to 
investigating invisible realities through sensory evidence is addressed by Epicurus, who states 
the following:  
 
 Εἶτα κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς 
 εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ’ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, 
 ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.  
 (Arr. 2.38.3-8) 
 
 Whence it is necessary to observe everything in accordance with sensation and attendant 
 contacts, whether of concepts or of the senses, and in accordance with the present 
 affections, in order that we may be able to infer from signs what is currently invisible and 
 what is invisible per se. 
68The connection between φρόνησις and practical intent is suggested by Gowers (2012) 
180, who translates imprudens as “unintentionally.” 
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 According to this passage, Epicurus advocates close observation of perceptible signs through 
sensation, anticipations and affections, by means of which invisible realities may be inferred.69   
As Philodemus explains in his methodological treatise De signis,70 however, in order to infer the 
presence of an imperceptible with consistent accuracy one must first gain experience by 
frequently “attending to the manifold variety of visible signs that accompany it” (col. 33.9-15: τὸ 
παντοδαπὸν ποίκιλμα τῶν φαινομένων κατοπτεύσας).  After the careful observation of such 
signs, one appraises or “calculates the phenomena” (ibid. col. 27.22-23: ὁ τῶν φαινο[μένων] 
ἐπ[ιλογισμό]ς71), and, noting that these signs or phenomena have similarly coincided on many 
occasions, uses this as a basis for making the actual inference.  Philodemus gives a useful 
69Cf. Diogenes’ summary (Arr. 1.32.7-8): καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων 
χρὴ σημειοῦσθαι (“We must infer from perceptible signs what is imperceptible”).  There are 
two classes of imperceptibles: that which is expected to become visible (e.g., an object blurred 
by distance) and that which is invisible per se (e.g., atoms and the void).  Knowledge of both can 
be inferred through close empirical observation of the perceptible (τὰ πρόδηλα), and I follow 
Asmis (1984) 84-6 in translating Epicurus’ τηρεῖν as “observe,” thus distinguishing it from mere 
perception and linking it to this inferential method.  
 
70As Sedley (1982) 239-72 argues, this treatise is largely devoted to addressing criticisms 
from Stoic adversaries, against which Philodemus defends the inductive method of drawing 
conclusions based on similarity.  For a more detailed analysis of the importance of the similarity 
method, see Allen (2001) 208-41. 
 
71Although references to this term in Epicurus’ extant remains are few and ambiguous, 
Philodemus describes ἐπιλογισμός and ἐπιλογίζεσθαι as the rational process by which an 
observer makes calculations, based on similarities or differences, in order to infer something 
regarding what is imperceptible.  For the exact meaning of ἐπιλογισμός, see the contrasting 
views of Arrighetti (1952), De Lacy (1958, 1978), Sedley (1973), Asmis (1984) 205 n. 23, 
Schofield (1996) 221-38 and Tsouna (2007) 55.   The reconstruction of this term in the passage 
quoted above is that of Philippson and is justified by the same, better preserved expression in De 
sign. col. 22.37-9 (quoted again immediately below): διὰ τοῦ τῶν φαινομέμων ἐπιλογισμοῦ. 
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example of this method in De signis which involves the inferential proof, based on observed 
similarity, that all men are mortal:72  
 
 [o]ὔτε μὴν τοὐναντίον τῶι προκειμένωι προλήψομαι, καταντήσω δὲ διὰ τοῦ τῶν 
 φαινομένων ἐπιλογισμοῦ [ἐπὶ] τὸ καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ δεῖν τὴν ὁμοιότητα ὑπάρχειν.  ἐπεὶ 
 γὰρ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο παρέπεται τὸ σύμπτωμα, πάντως ἀξιώσω 
 πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο παρακολουθεῖν, ἐπιλογισμῶι συμβιβάζων ὅτι καὶ κατὰ 
 τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν ὁμοιότητ’ εἶναι. (De sign. coll. 22.35-23.6) 
 
 Nor shall I assume in advance the opposite of this statement [i.e., that all men are mortal]; 
 but by empirical inference from appearances I shall arrive at the view that similarity must 
 exist in this respect also.  For since this property follows on the man among us, I shall 
 assuredly judge that it follows on all men, confirming by empirical inference that the 
 similarity must exist in this respect also. 
 
This process of identifying external, perceptible signs as manifestations of invisible realities 
bears striking resemblance to the empirical methodology of ancient Greek medicine; indeed, this 
tradition significantly influenced the ethical approach of Epicurus’ followers, who considered the 
perceptible signs of vice analogous to the visible symptoms of a hidden disease, namely, the 
underlying disposition (διάθεσις).73  This method is of particular importance for Philodemus, 
 72Cf. De sign. coll. 8.32-9.2 (a similar proof of the existence of void): Τὰ γοῦν 
παρακολουθούντ[α πά]ντα τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν κινουμέν[οις, ὧ]ν χωρὶς οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν 
κ[ινούμ]ε[νον,] ἐπ[ιλογι]σάμενοι, [τούτ]ωι πά[νθ’ ὅσα κι]νεῖται κατὰ π[ᾶ]ν πρὸς [τὴν 
ὁμοι]ότητ’ ἀξιοῦμε[ν κιν]εῖσθαι, [καὶ] τῶι τρόπωι τούτωι τὸ μ[ὴ] δυνατὸν εἶναι κίνησιν ἄνευ 
κενοῦ γίν[εσ]θαι σημε[ι]ούμεθα (“Thus we first determine empirically [ἐπ[ιλογι]σάμενοι] all 
the conditions attendant on moving objects in our experience, apart from which we see nothing 
moved; then by this method we judge that all moving objects in every case are moved similarly 
[πρὸς [τὴν ὁμοι]ότητ’ ἀξιοῦμε[ν]]; and this is the method by which we infer [σημε[ι]ούμεθα] 
that it is not possible for motion to occur without void”). 
 
73De Lacy (1978) 165-82 mentions the important influences of Aristotle and the 
Empirical School of medicine.  Asmis (1984) 180-90 discusses other Hellenistic theories of 
signs, including that of the Stoics, Skeptics and Rationalist physicians.  See especially the recent 
study of Allen (2001) 89-97 for the medical background of sign-inference. For a definition of 
Epicurean διάθεσις as the arrangement of soul atoms and hence an imperceptible reality, see 
Konstan (1973) 62-3.  For the relationship between the Epicurean and Aristotelian tradition 
regarding this concept, see Furley (1967) 228, Grilli (1983) 93-109 and Konstan (1973) 62-3.        
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whose ethical treatises often begin with a clinical description of the symptoms and signs that 
accompany certain vicious dispositions.74  He observes, for instance, that the presence of an 
individual vice such as anger can be inferred through the observation of signs that have regularly 
and similarly coincided with certain other phenomena:75 
  
 [ν]υνεὶ δ’ ἐροῦμεν τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς [συμπτώ]ματ[α ε]ἶνα[ί πως ὁ]μο[ιότατα], κἂν 
 περι[ττότερόν τινες] καταφρον[ούμενοί πως] ἐπὶ πᾶσιν [ὀργίζωνται], καὶ τὰ 
 συμ[πτώματα τοῦ πάθους] εἶναι [πάσι κοινὰ οὔτε] νέοις οὔ[τε γέρουσιν οὐσ]ῶν 
 εὐ[λαβειῶν.]  (De ir. coll. 7.26-8.8) 
 
 But now we say that the symptoms of anger are very similar, even if some, being 
 exceedingly scornful, get angry with everyone, and that the symptoms of this passion are 
 common to all, there being safeguards for neither the young nor the old.76 
 
 
In the following section he describes, in a strikingly colorful manner reminiscent of Cynic 
character portraits, the symptoms of an irascible disposition in much detail (ibid. col. 8.21-38): 
flaring up (ἐκπυρώσεως), swelling (διοιδή[σ]εως), heaving of the lungs (διάστασιν [τ]οῦ 
πλεύμονος), redness (διερεθισμοῦ), the desire for revenge (ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ μετελθεῖν) and 
rapid breathing (μετεωρότερον ἆσθμα) among others.77  This method of “marking” 
74See Tsouna (2007), who discusses this method with regard to several treatises, 
including De adulatione (127-32), De superbia (145-51) and De ira (210-17).   
  
75This method is described in Epidemics 6.3.12, and Galen, for which see Deichgräber 
(1930) 48-49, notes that it was further developed by the Empiricist physicians, who made 
diagnoses by relying on the careful and frequent observation (ἐμπειρία) of visible symptoms 
(συμπτώματα) that often appear simultaneously in a syndrome (συνδρομή). 
  
76The damaged state of this passage, which Philippson (1916) 444 inserted after column 
7, has been restored by the conjectures of Wilke (1914), which are consistent with Philodemus’ 
language and methodology in other ethical treatises.  
 
77See Tsouna (2011) 191.  For the influence of Cynic techniques on later Epicureans like 
Philodemus, see Indelli (1988) 25 and especially Gigante (1992) 107-8: “Così Bione, cinico 
impuro . . . lascia un’orma manifesta o segreta nell’opera di Filodemo: forse Bionei sermones 
possono essere considerati alcuni libri filodemei a maggior diritto che alcune satire oraziane.”  
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imperceptible vices by means of drawing inferences based on similarity, which Philodemus 
consistently employs in his ethical treatments, was apparently a topic of heated debate in the first 
century BC, as the polemical tone of De signis and certain passages from Cicero reveal.78  It is 
not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that such controversies might have contributed something 
to Horace’s portrayal of his father’s pedagogical method as well as his own approach to moral 
investigation in the Sermones. 
 In addition to reflecting an educational strategy traditionally employed by both Greeks 
and Romans, Horace’s father’s training may also engage with contemporary methods of sign-
inference as elucidated by Philodemus in his ethical and methodological treatises.  The use of 
visible examples for the purpose of moral instruction, which is described in passing by the 
sophist Protagoras and became commonplace among the Cynics,79 was also widely popular 
among Greek comic playwrights as well as their Roman counterparts, as the passage from 
Terence’s Adelphoe quoted above (p. 4 n. 7) clearly shows.  In his treatise De liberis educandis, 
moreover, Plutarch identifies the use of “examples” (παραδείγματα) as one of the most basic 
and effective methods of childrearing,80 which closely resembles Philodemus’ use of the verb 
παραδείκνυμι in reference to the “manifestations,” “proofs” or “showings” of perceptible 
 78Cf. Cic. N.D. 1.87-8 for criticisms of the Epicureans’ preference for empirical 
inference.  Philodemus’ Stoic adversaries are addressed by Sedley (1982) 239-72; De Lacy 
(1978) 206-30 discusses the “logical controversies” of the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics. 
  
79Pl. Protag. 325d2-5: διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι “τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ 
ἄδικον,” καὶ “τόδε μὲν καλὸν, τόδε αἰσχρόν,” καὶ “τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον,” καὶ “τὰ 
μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει” (“By teaching and instructing them, saying that ‘this is just, that is 
unjust,’ and ‘this is admirable, that is shameless,’ and ‘this is pious, that is impious,’ and ‘do this, 
avoid that’”).  
  
 80Cf. Plut. Mor. 1.16c, which bears many resemblances to Horace’s father’s method; his 
mention of “threats” (ἀπειλοῦντας), “prayers” (δεομένους) and the “fear of punishment” 
(φόβος τιμωρίας), however, strikes an admittedly discordant note. 
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phenomena (De sign. col. 27.16-17: τ[ὰ] φα[ι]νό[μενα π]αρέδειξ[ε]; cf. col. 28.33-34: αὐτὰ τὰ 
φαινόμενα παρέδειξεν).  With regard to Horace’s training, a similar introduction of paradigms 
of manifest behavior may serve as the proof or basis for an inference by similarity: that is to say, 
his father conducts ethical investigations by inferring (notando) each of the vicious dispositions 
(quaeque vitiorum) by means of manifest patterns of observable behavior (exemplis).  The verb 
noto, in addition to establishing a connection to the Greco-Roman tradition of branding, may also 
mean “to infer by a sign;”81 thus, one may infer the time of year by observing the stars (Sen. Ben. 
7.31.4: notant), just as Caesar inferred the Ides of March by means of the constellation Scorpio 
(Plin. Nat. 18.237: notavit), and the sun is wreathed in heat which cannot be inferred through 
visible signs (Lucr. 5.612: notatus).82  Returning to Horace’s training, inferences about hidden 
dispositions are made based on certain “manifestations of visible phenomena,” which, as 
Philodemus and Plutarch demonstrate, are expressed by the Greek παραδείγματα and closely 
correspond to the Latin exempla.  These phenomenal paradigms are “proofs” or “showings” of 
the observable symptoms and consequences which accompany particular vices, and which 
Philodemus identifies as being “very similar” and “common” in all victims (De ir. coll. 7.26-8.8: 
[ὁ]μο[ιότατα] . . . [κοινά]).83  The paradigms to which Horace’s father refers, therefore, 
correspond to the visible symptoms of individuals like Baius and Scetanus, who are “copies” or 
81Cf. the OLD s.v. noto (8), which lists the following: “to indicate by a sign; to be a sign 
or token of, mark.” 
   
82Horace clearly associates marks (nota) with signs (signa) in reference to conventionally 
accepted language at Ars. 58-9: licuit semperque licebit | signatum praesente nota producere 
nomen (“It has ever been, and ever will be, permitted to issue words stamped with the mint-mark 
of the day”).  Cf. also [Cic.] Rhet. Her. 4.65, where he refers to the positive moral function of 
notationes, which are descriptions of another’s inner nature (natura) by means of clear and 
perceptible signs (certis signis). 
 
83For the reconstruction and relocation of this passage by Philippson, see n. 76 above.  
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“patterns” (i.e,. παραδείγματα, exempla) in the sense that their actions show them to be typical 
representatives of their class: based on similarity, Horace learns to expect (or, more accurately, 
to infer) that other individuals, who, like them, suffer from lust or prodigality, will invariably 
display the same symptoms.  As Philodemus explains, moreover, such an inference is based on 
the careful observation of phenomena, which, unless contradicted by other observable 
evidence,84 is a true and reliable conclusion:  
  
 ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμηριοῦσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν, μήτ’ ἀπ[ισ]τεῖν τοῖς δι’ αὐτῶν  κατὰ 
 τὴν ὁμοιότητα παραδεικνυμένοις, ἀλλ’ οὕτω πιστεύειν ὡς καὶ τοῖς ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ 
 σ[ημείωσι]ς. (De sign. fr. 2.1-6) 
 
 [One ought not to stop with evident things] but from them make inferences about the 
 non-apparent, and one should not mistrust the things exhibited through them by analogy 
 but trust them just as one trusts the things from which the inference was made. 
 
In other words, a careful inference based on similarity is as trustworthy as the initial sensory 
data, which is presented (in the case of ethical investigations) to the keen observer by manifest 
behavior and consequences.  Based on his frequent exposure to his father’s empirical method, for 
instance, Horace can successfully “diagnose” avarice whenever he encounters a particular 
combination of “symptoms,” among which are included excessive toil (1.1.93: labor), universal 
abandonment (1.1.85: odium), squalor (2.2.53-69: sordes), envy (1.1.40: invidia), speechlessness 
(1.4.28: stupor) and greed (1.1.61: cupido).85  In a similar fashion, individuals who suffer from a 
sexual addiction commonly place themselves in dangerous situations (1.2.40: pericla), commit 
suicide (1.2.41: se praecipitem tecto dedit), suffer death (1.2.41-42: flagellis | ad mortem 
 84Epicurus refers to a theory about phenomena as true whenever it is “not counter 
witnessed” (Arr. 2.50.10: μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι) by other phenomena, and false whenever 
it is “counter witnessed” (ἀντιμαρτυρουμένου).  See also Asmis (1984) 145 and 178-79. 
 
 85These “symptoms” and their consequences will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
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caesus), buy their own safety (1.2.43: dedit hic pro corpore nummos), ruin their reputations 
(1.2.61: famam) and undergo tremendous toil (1.2.78: laboris).86  The irascible disposition is 
characterized by the inability to meet slight offenses with a calculated response (1.3.78: 
ponderibus modulisque), which results in egregious acts of violence such as beatings (1.3.119: 
horribili . . . flagello) and executions (1.3.82: cruce); in addition to this, the irascible individual 
may be detected by means of physiological changes in voice and appearance (1.3.136: rumperis 
et latras).  Finally, the flatterer shows signs of a vicious disposition through his social 
interactions with wealthy or influential figures, which include accosting them in the street (1.9.3: 
accurrit), imitating or mimicking their usual behavior (1.9.23-5), constant and obsequious prattle 
(1.9.13: garriret) and a relentless desire to eliminate any competition for their victim’s favor 
(1.9.48: summosses omnis).87  By having recourse to the similarity method of sign inference as 
described above, Horace may safely conclude that such vicious behaviors will consistently 
accompany the presence of their corresponding dispositions in every instance and at all times.   
Of course, it is highly unlikely that Horace had more than a rudimentary understanding of 
such logical controversies (or was even interested in the relevant details), but this reliance on 
empirical signs and observation would have appealed easily to a satirical poet with Epicurean 
tendencies: in addition to allowing Horace many opportunities for humorous depictions of moral 
deficiency, such a method would simultaneously facilitate his investigations by improving the 
accuracy of his conclusions.  And while one can hardly suggest that the philosophical undertones 
of Horace’s training reflect anything about the poet outside of the fictitious world he constructs, 
within a literary construct, in which he endeavors to engage with contemporary society in the 
86This disposition and that of the irascible individual will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
  
 87The characteristics relating to the flatterer’s disposition will be examined in more detail 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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capacity of a trained moralist, it contributes to the justification of his ethical superiority and the 
creation of a quasi-philosophical persona.  The preceding examination has considered in detail 
the Epicurean aspects of Horace’ father’s pedagogical method, which, as part of a programmatic 
poem, has implications for the poet’s methodology elsewhere in the Sermones.  In addition to 
enriching the traditional interpretation of Horatian satire, moreover, these considerations have 
also attempted to explore (at least in part) the debates and issues relevant to Epicureanism in the 
first century BC, of which Horace was certainly aware.  The next chapter will continue the 
investigation of Epicureanism in Horace’s Sermones by considering the significance of this 
quasi-philosophical persona for the poet’s social interactions and contributions to his relationship 
with his patron Maecenas.  This will involve the introduction of parallels between Epicurean 
economic theory, as preserved by Philodemus’ treatises De divitiis and De oeconomia, and 
Horace’s portrayal of his patron-client relationship, his management of the financial benefits that 
resulted from it and his criticisms of wealth administration in the Sermones. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EPICUREAN ECONOMIC  
THEORY IN SERMONES 1 
 
According to Philodemus’ description in De oeconomia, the most appropriate source of income 
for the Epicurean sage is the generosity of a patron, who expresses his “gratitude” (col. 23.27: 
εὐχάριστο[ν]) for useful advice in the form of financial benefits.  The following chapter will 
consider the ways in which Horace attempts to replicate the dynamics of this ideal relationship 
by presenting himself as the recipient of Maecenas’ generous gifts, which he earns by sharing 
moral advice through his poetry.  A preliminary consideration of the patterns associated with 
patronage among Epicureans, including the primacy of philosophical discussion, the essential 
role of intimate friendship and the selection of a benefactor suitably receptive to Epicurean 
doctrine, will establish the context necessary for appreciating a similar relationship between 
Horace and Maecenas, particularly as portrayed in Sermones 1.6.  More specifically, this will 
include examinations of how their respective roles as patron and client reflect the ideal Epicurean 
community as explained by Philodemus: as the morally pure client, for example, Horace 
dedicates to his patron satiric verses that are the equivalent of useful “advice” (1.4.133: 
consilium; 1.6.130: consolor); as the thankful patron, Maecenas expresses gratitude in the form 
of impressively generous remunerations.  In the process of considering these roles it will also be 
important to demonstrate, on the one hand, the potential of poetry for moral instruction (which 
conflicts with Philodemus’ literary views) and, on the other hand, the lavishness of these gifts 
and Horace’s willingness to accept them (which are consistent with Philodemus’ economic 
views).  The examination will conclude by investigating the actual content of Horace’s consilia 
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as expressed in Sermones 1.1, in which the poet invites Maecenas to consider the vulgar masses’ 
financial choices and (imitating his father’s method) presents him with examples of behavior 
typically associated with economic vice. 
Horace’s portrayal of his relationship with Maecenas may owe something to the 
Epicurean identification of patronage as based on the exchange of philosophical advice for 
economic benefits, which occurs within the context of intimate friendship.  According to 
Epicurus, patronage is the only acceptable means of acquiring wealth in order to provide for the 
necessities of life (Arr. 1.121b.4-6): χρηματίσεσθαί τε, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα.  
καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν (“[He said that the sage] will be ready to make money, 
but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy.  He will pay court to a king as 
occasion demands”).  This statement reflects a system of patronage that developed in the 
Hellenistic period and involved the exchange of benefits for political advice or moral instruction 
(i.e., λόγοι, consilia), usually offered to a monarch or wealthy potentate.1  Antigonus Gonatas, 
for example, famously surrounded himself with philosophers like Bion of Borysthenes, who 
offered him ethical advice in exchange for financial benefits.2  With regard to Epicurus, 
fragmentary evidence from Philodemus reveals that he received substantial support from a 
1For the origins of this system in the mobile consilium of companions that followed 
Alexander the Great and advised his royal Successors, see Plaumann’s RE article s.v. Ἑταῖροι, 
1374-380.  Other important sources are conveniently listed by Allen and DeLacy (1989) 59 n. 1.  
For a more recent study, see Gold (1987) 35-7. 
 
2Cf. especially Kindstrand (1976) F16A: καὶ σὺ μὲν εὔπορος γενόμενος δίδως 
ἐλευθερίως, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνω εὐθαρσῶς παρὰ σοῦ οὐχ ὑποπίπτων οὐδὲ ἀγεννίζων οὐδὲ 
μεμψιμοιρῶν (“You give freely out of your wealth, and I cheerfully accept without suspicion, 
boorishness or complaints about my lot”).    Bion’s acceptance of money in exchange for 
wisdom, which would have been unacceptable to so-called “hard” Cynics like Diogenes, is due 
to his eclecticism (cf. Diog. Laert. 4.47: σοφιστὴς ποικίλος), for which see Desmond (2008) 33-
6.  For a discussion of Cynics as court-philosophers, see Dudely (1974) 69. 
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wealthy landowner and financial officer of Lysimachus named Mithres,3 with whom the 
philosopher had corresponded often and shared sage advice through an ethical treatise entitled 
Sententiae de vitiis (Arr. 1.28.9-10).  Epicurus’ contempt for the vulgar masses (Arr. 6.29: τῶν 
πολλῶν), avoidance of public speaking (Arr. 1.121b7-8), encouragement of semi-private 
communal meals and gatherings4 and high regard for the value of friendship,5 moreover, 
suggests that his frequent exchanges with Mithres contributed to the formation of a close bond.  
In addition to this, Diogenes remarks on the philosopher’s practice of addressing friends and 
patrons with affectionate titles like “dearest” and “my lord” (Arr. 1.4.10-6.5),6 while Plutarch 
preserves anecdotes relating how Epicurus went so far as to ransom Mithres from the hands of 
Crates, a Macedonian general related to Antigonus Gonatas.7  All of this suggests that Epicurean 
3Diogenes mentions Mithres briefly at Arr. 1.4.10-5.1.  See also Beloch (1926) 331-35.  
Castaldi (1928) 293-99 early on presented the evidence from the treatise De Epicuro (PHerc. 
1418), in which Philodemus records Epicurus’ correspondence, mostly involving requests for 
financial support, with members and associates of the Garden, especially Mithres.  For the 
evidence, see the edition of Militello (1997), in which the name of Mithres appears more 
frequently than that of even Epicurus. 
 
4Cf. Sen. Ep. 6.6: Metrodorum et Hermarchum et Polyaenum magnos viros non schola 
Epicuri sed contubernium fecit (“It was conviviality and not the school of Epicurus that made 
Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus great men”).  For modern discussions of the intimacy 
and organization of Epicurean communities, see DeWitt (1936) 55-63 and Clay (1983) 255-79.  
 
5Arr. 5.148.9-10 (to which, cf. Cic. Fin. 1.20): Ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ 
ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις (“Of all the things which 
wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, by far the greatest is the 
possession of friendship”). 
 
6Castaldi (1928) 299-300 rejects Diogenes’ record of Epicurus as a flatterer of Mithres 
(Arr. 1.4.11: αἰσχρῶς κολακεύειν) as “molto esagerata” and maintains that Epicurus considered 
his patron a “vero amico.”  For the Epicurean practice of employing terms of endearment with 
members and associates of the school, see Philodemus De lib. dic. fr. 14.5-10.  The issue of 
flattery will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
7Cf. Plut. Mor. 77.1126e (Adversus Colotem) and 76.1097b (Non posse suaviter vivi 
secundum Epicurum) for the accounts.  It is also possible that Philodemus himself refers to this 
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patronage was informed early on by the important role of philosophical friendship, which is 
corroborated by later evidence showing that Roman Epicureans in the first century BC regarded 
genuine friendship as possible within the highly formalized system of amicitia.  
In De oeconomia, Philodemus advances views concerning patronage that define it as a 
most acceptable source of income that is strengthened and enriched by the bonds of friendship; 
in fact, friends are so important that they define economic decisions (col. 15.3-6) and are 
regarded as the “most secure treasures” (ibid. col. 25.4: ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροί).8  His 
acceptance of other sources of revenue such as agriculture and entrepreneurship (ibid. col. 23.11-
22) probably reflects the sensitivities of wealthy Romans (ibid. col. 25.38: ἔνι[ο]ι Ῥωμαίων)9 
while faithfully adhering to Epicurus’ emphatic identification of patronage based on the 
exchange of philosophical discussions as the ideal economic state:10   
 
 πρῶτον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἀπὸ λόγων φιλο[σό]φων ἀνδράσιν δεκτικοῖς 
 μεταδιδομέν[ων] ἀντιμεταλαμβάνειν εὐχάριστο[ν ἅμ]α μετὰ σεβασμοῦ 
 παντ[ός], ὡς ἐγένετ’ Ἐπικο[ύρωι, λο[ιπὸ]ν δὲ ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλο[ν]ε[ί]κων καὶ 
 [σ]υ[λ]λήβδη[ν εἰπεῖν [ἀτ]αράχων, ὡς τό γε διὰ σοφ[ιστι]κῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικ]ῶν 
 ο[ὐδέ]ν ἐστι βέλτιον τοῦ διὰ δη[μοκ]οπικῶν καὶ συκοφαντικ[ῶν].    
 (De oec. col. 23.22-36) 
 
It is superior and better by far to receive gratitude and respect in return for wise 
discussions shared with receptive men, which is what happened to Epicurus.  Moreover, 
these discussions should be truthful, free from strife, and, in a word, peaceful, since 
event in De Epic. coll. 28-9, for which see Militello (1997) 37-9.  Beloch (1926) 331-35 
considers the evidence in more detail. 
    
8For Roman patronage in general, see Saller (1989) 49-62 and Wallace-Hadrill (1989) 
63-88; for literary patronage in the Early Empire, see White (1978) 74-92, Gold (1987) 111-72 
and especially Bowditch (2010) 53-74. 
 
9See also Asmis (1990) 2389 and Tsouna (2007) 182 (especially n. 36). 
 
10Cf. Stob. Ecl. 2 (= SVF 3.686) and Plut. Mor. 75. 1043e (De communibus notitiis = SVF 
3.693) for the Stoic description of the three acceptable ways of life as “royal” (βασιλικόν), 
“political” (πολιτικόν) and “intellectual” (ἐπιστημονικόν).  
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holding discourse through sophistical and contentious speeches is no better  
than doing this through demagogical and slandering ones. 
 
 
The primacy of philosophical discussion reflects Epicurus’ aforementioned injunction to earn a 
living “from wisdom alone” (Arr. 1.121.4: ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας),11 but it may also reflect the 
nature of Philodemus’ correspondence with the aristocrat and politician L. Calpurnius Piso 
Caesoninus,12 to whom he had dedicated a politico-ethical treatise entitled De bono rege 
secundum Homerum.13  In addition to this, Piso was also the dedicatee of an epigrammatic poem, 
in which Philodemus addresses him as “dearest” (27.1: φίλτατε), refers to himself as a 
companion (ibid. 2: ἕταρος) and personally invites him (ibid. 7: Πείσων) to partake of the ritual 
festivities associated with “the Twentieth,” a semi-private celebration held monthly in honor of 
Epicurus.14  As David Sider explains, the dynamics of their friendship is communicated partly by 
the vocabulary Philodemus employs:  
11See Laurenti (1973) 164-66.  According to Diogenes’ account, Chrysippus also 
recommended making money from wisdom (7.188 = SVF 3.685: ἀπὸ σοφίας), although 
Plutarch further defines this source as “sophistry” (Mor. 73.1043e = SVF 3.693: ἀπὸ 
σοφιστείας), which suggests the more formal and contentious speeches criticized by Philodemus 
above.  See Natali (1995) 122-23. 
 
12Tait (1941) 1-13 and Sider (1997) 5-14 (especially 14 n. 7) discuss the evidence in 
favor of the identification of Piso as Philodemus’ patron.  As mentioned in the Introduction (pp. 
6-7), Allen and DeLacy (1989) 59-65 question the view that Philodemus had successfully 
become Piso’s client and note that there is no evidence linking the latter to the Villa dei Papyri or 
even Herculaneum.  This lack of archaeological evidence was pointed out early on by Mommsen 
(1880) 32-6.   
 
13See Dorandi (1982) for an edition, translation and commentary.  Asmis (1991) 4-13 
discusses the treatise’s usefulness within the context of Philodemean poetic theory, which will be 
discussed below.   
14Sider (1997) 157 gives the text along with a translation and commentary.  Allen and 
DeLacy (1989) 64 describe the language of this epigram as “an attempt to establish firmly the 
relation of amicitia.”  For Epicurean festival meals, see Clay (1983) 274-79.  The use of 
superlative terms of endearment in the vocative within a philosophical context is 
characteristically Platonic; cf., e.g., Crat. 434e4 and Sym. 173e1 (ὦ φίλτατε). 
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Piso, the addressee of this poem, can be expected to understand the Epicurean 
connotation of friendship, but as a Roman statesman, he would know that the friendship 
alluded to in this poem could also evoke the patron-client relationship.  For Philodemus 
quite clearly, if not shamelessly, is angling for reciprocal benefits from Piso in the future.  
In return . . . Piso will receive the combined pleasures of poetry and Epicurean friendship.  
Piso, that is, will provide patronage, while Philodemus will provide both Epicurean 
ambience and poetic delights: Piso and Philodemus will be both amici—i.e. patron and 
poet—and φίλοι, i.e. two members of an Epicurean friendship.15 
 
 
The intimate nature of this relationship, which Cicero easily manipulates for his own purposes in 
the political invective In Pisonem,16 corresponds to Philodemus’ above emphasis on camaraderie 
and the importance of informal conversation that takes place in a relaxed and friendly setting.17  
Like Epicurus, moreover, Philodemus is accused of flattery (cf. Cic. Pis. 70: adsentatorem) and 
his friendship with Piso is deliberately misconstrued as founded on sensuality and other simple 
pleasures.18  Despite Cicero’s intended misrepresentation of Epicurean pleasure as libido (ibid. 
69) and omnia stupra (ibid. 70), however, the importance of pleasure for patronage is also 
communicated by Lucretius, who famously identifies his motivation in composing a 
 
15Sider (1995) 47-8.  For the differences between φίλοι and amici, see Gold (1987) 36.  
 
16Nisbet (1987) 186 and Powell (1995) 25 have questioned the authenticity of this speech.  
Cicero mentions their intimacy numerous times, especially at 68: dedit se in consuetudinem sic 
ut prorsus una viveret nec fere ab isto umquam discederet (“He [i.e., Piso] made it his custom to 
live with him thenceforth and never to depart from him”).  
 
17Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 28.3-10 for the importance of self-expression and intimate 
conversation within the Epicurean community.  Philodemus also discusses the importance of 
intimate conversation (ὁμιλία, λαλιά) that promotes friendship and virtue in his treatise De 
conversatione (PHerc. 873), which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
18Cic. Pis. 69: sic suos sensus voluptarios onmis incitavit, sic ad illius hanc orationem 
adhinnivit, ut non magistrum virtutis sed auctorem libidinis a se illum inventum arbitraretur 
(“So much did he [i.e., Philodemus] insight all of his sensual appetites, so much did he enrapture 
him with this kind of rhetoric, that he fancied he had found for himself not a teacher of virtue but 
a source of sensuality”).  Diogenes records similar accusations concerning Epicurus’ 
correspondence with his intimate friends (Arr. 1.5-7). 
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philosophical epic for Memmius as “the expected delight of your pleasant friendship” (1.140-41: 
sperata voluptas suavis amicitiae).19  Here again the usual patterns of Epicurean patronage 
emerge: the primacy of philosophical discussion, the engagement—or, in Lucretius’ case, the 
expected engagement—with receptive men, the role of pleasurable friendship and the concern 
with establishing intimacy.20  As will soon become evident, many of the characteristics of 
Horace’s persona’s relationship with Maecenas closely correspond to this pattern, thereby 
suggesting the influence of Epicurean patronage. 
Horace’s correspondence with Maecenas highlights the intimacy of their relationship, 
which is most explicitly conveyed through introductory addresses and terms of endearment.  
Like Epicurus and Philodemus, many of Horace’s literary dedications to his patron are 
introduced by affectionate titles that communicate their friendship in Epicurean terms.21  In 
Carm. 1.1, for example, he invokes Maecenas as his “bulwark and sweet glory” (2: praesidium et 
dulce decus meum; cf. Verg. G. 2.40: o decus), recalling Epicurus’ description of friendship as 
the strongest safeguard against evil (Cic. Fin. 1.69: praesidium) and perhaps implying 
Philodemus’ declaration that one cannot live sweetly without friends (cf. De elect. col. 14.1: 
19See Bailey (1947) 597-98 for the evidence concerning Memmius.  Allen (1938) 167-81 
argues that Lucretius, like Catullus before him (cf. Carm. 28), failed to gain Memmius’ 
patronage, and that his use of amicitia more closely relates to Roman patronage than to 
Epicurean friendship (especially 176).  For the possible relationship between Catullus and 
Epicureans like Memmius, Piso and Philodemus, see Fordyce (1961) 210-11.  Landolfi (1982) 
137-43 detects the influence of Philodemean literary theory in Catullus’ poetry. 
 
20Cf. Lucr. 1.50-1: Quod superset, vacuas auris animumque sagacem | semotum a curis 
adhibe veram ad rationem (“For the rest, ears unpreoccupied and keen intelligence detached 
from cares you should apply to true philosophy”). 
 
21Konstan (1997) 143: “Horace was disposed to prefer private friendships to public life, 
and his poetry is rich in tender expressions of affection.”  
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ἡδέως).22  He addresses Maecenas as “my dear” in Carm. 1.20 (5: care),23 which is an invitation 
poem that undoubtedly imitates Philodemus’ epigrammatic invocation to Piso (cf. φίλτατε, as 
discussed above).24  The sweetness of friendship is invoked once again in the Epistulae (1.7.12: 
dulcis amice), which recalls Philodemus’ advice concerning the role of terms of endearment 
among members of the Epicurean community mentioned above but worth quoting here (De lib. 
dic. fr. 14.8-10): οὐκ ἐπιλήσεται τοῦ φιλτάτου λέγω<ν> καὶ γλυκυ[τ]ά[του] καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων 
(“He [sc. the sage] will not, as he speaks, forget ‘dearest’ and ‘sweetest’ and such similar 
things”).  The poet’s desire to celebrate festivities with his patron is similarly expressed in the 
Epodi, in which he invokes him as “blessed” (9.4: beate; cf. Arr. 82: μακάριε) and again in the 
Carmina, in which he affectionately expresses joy at the thought of celebrating the birthday of 
“my Maecenas” (4.11.21: Maecenas meus).25  According to Suetonius, moreover, Maecenas 
himself expressed his profound fondness for Horace by dedicating an epigram to him (Vit. Hor. 
13-15): 
Ni te visceribus meis, Horati, 
 plus iam diligo, tu tuum sodalem 
 †nimio videas strigosiorem. 
 
22Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 4 point out that praesidium is used of patrons whereas dulce 
is “naturally used of family and friends.”  Cf. 1.4.135: dulcis amicis. 
 
23This is the consensus of all the ancient MSS. (i.e., ΞΨQ), which seems more 
appropriate than the “correction” offered by the codices recentiores and Bentley (i.e., clare).  Cf. 
also Horace’s self-description as carus amicis at 1.6.70. 
 
24This is noted by Sider (1997) 153 and Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 243-45, who add that 
here the “poet writes with affection to a more important friend.”  Cf. also Carm. 3.8, in which 
Horace again invites his patron, this time addressed by name alone (13: Maecenas), to his Sabine 
estate in order to celebrate the anniversary of his escape from death.   
25Cf. Suet. Vit.  Hor. 6, according to which Augustus requests from Maecenas the 
presence of “our Horace” (Horatium nostrum). 
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If I do not love you now more than my own innermost self, Horace, may you see 
your friend quite emaciated indeed [following here the MSS. reading]. 
 
Regardless of the poor quality of this specimen, which Fraenkel rightly calls “an exceedingly 
lame parody of one of the most beautiful poems of Catullus,”26 the fact that Maecenas dedicated 
and obviously shared poetry with Horace may indicate that their relationship eventually evolved 
beyond the level of utility and mutual exchange: indeed, what could possibly have motivated 
Maecenas to compose such verses aside from sheer friendship?27  In the Sermones, Horace’s 
addresses to his patron are characterized not only by a sense of privacy and exclusivity, but also 
by an informal tone that reflects their status as friendly conversations (they are, after all, sermo 
merus).  Sermones 1.1, for instance, opens with an intentionally blunt and personal address (1: 
Qui fit, Maecenas), thereby emphasizing the patron’s prominence as financial supporter but also 
the client’s attachment to a friend who is receptive to moral lessons (and who can be addressed 
in such a direct fashion with impunity).28  Furthermore, Horace apparently valued his patron’s 
literary opinion and probably shared ideas with him, as revealed in his list of intimate friends in 
Sermones 1.10.81-90.29  Despite this attachment, however, Horace does not overlook or attempt 
to obscure the social disparity between himself and his patron: the extended address to Maecenas 
26 Fraenkel (1957) 17. 
 
27As Brown (2002) 78 and O’Keefe (2001) 288 note, Cicero’s testimony at Fin. 1.69 
reveals that later Epicureans accepted the possibility that friendship, although born out of utility, 
can eventually “blossom” (efflorescere) and exist “for its own sake” (propter se), even if “no 
practical advantage accrues” (etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia).  This will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4.  
28See Freudenburg (2001) 21 and Gold (1992) 164 for both views. 
 
29DuQuesnay (2009) 52, who notes this connection, describes the relationship between 
Horace and Maecenas by citing Cicero’s quasi-Aristotelian definition of true friendship (Amic. 
15) as the “complete consensus of wants, enthusiasms and of thoughts” (voluntatum studiorum 
sententiarum summa consensio).    
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in Sermones 1.6.1-4 is clearly intended to highlight his royal Etruscan ancestry,30 which also 
features prominently in Carm. 1.1 (1: Maecenas atavis edite regibus) and 3.29 (1: Tyrrhena 
regum progenies).31  The overall effect of this correspondence underscores his patron’s noble 
pedigree while conveying a sense of intimacy that, though consistent with Epicurean patterns of 
patronage, surpasses and may even challenge contemporary Roman social norms.32  
In addition to acknowledging Maecenas’ social superiority, in Sermones 1.6 Horace also 
emphasizes his own social and economic “disadvantages,” which ultimately motivated his 
decision to seek literary patronage.  To the extended four-line description of Maecenas’ greatness 
(1.6.1-4), for example, Horace juxtaposes a measly four-word reference to his own humble status 
as “son of an ex-slave” (1.6.6: me libertino patre natum),33 thus widening further the already 
30For Maecenas’ Lydian origins, see Scullard (1967) 34-57.  As Gowers (2012) 200 
observes, Horace more than once uses Lyde as a slave-name, and by invoking Maecenas’ Lydian 
origin in 1.6, which is a poem about social status, he may be leveling the playing field by 
playfully branding his patron with “potentially servile descent.”  MacKay (1942) 79-81 has 
suggested that Maecenas’ father’s was nothing more than a scriba (like Horace), and it should be 
remembered that both Horace and Maecenas belonged to the rank of eques.  
 
31Cf. Arr. 1.5.1, where Epicurus refers to Mithres as “my king” (ἄνακτα).  Like Epicurus 
and Philodemus, Horace was also accused of flattery.  See Suet. Vit. Hor. 9-10: ac primo 
Maecenati, mox Augusto insinuatus non mediocrem in amborum amicitia locum tenuit (“And 
having insinuated himself first with Maecenas and soon afterwards with Augustus, he held an 
exceptional place in the friendship of both men”).  Cf. also Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 348 
(“flattery”) and Gowers (2012) 218 (“flattering publicity”).  Of the opposite opinion, at least with 
regard to Suetonius’ account, is Fraenkel (1957) 16.  This will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
32The traditional view of amicitia as a euphemism for clientela or patrocinium, which are 
terms the social elite avoided (cf. Cic. De off. 2.69), is given by the references in Allen (1938) 
167, to which cf. Syme (1939) 157.  This also reflects Seneca’s view, according to which clients 
were only nominally friends (Ben. 6.34).  Konstan (1997), 122-24 on the other hand, following 
Brunt (1988) 360, examines the role of “true affection” within the context of Roman patronage.  
Cf. Philodemus’ description above (n. 15). 
 
33This claim, which Horace emphasizes repeatedly in 1.6, is strategically designed to 
highlight his personal merit and inherent worthiness (cf. 1.6.51: dignos).  It is, therefore, a poetic 
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recognizable social rift between patron and client.  The obvious disparity is confirmed by 
Horace’s pathetic description of his “poor father’s starveling little farm” (1.6.71: macro pauper 
agello), which, in conjunction with his self-proclaimed low status, reemphasizes the poet’s 
childhood poverty.34  In this short passage, the poet gives more information regarding the 
paternal inheritance mentioned in Sermones 1.4 (110: patriam rem), which his father had striven 
so eagerly to preserve.  According to Horace’s later account in the Epistulae, however, these 
efforts were made in vain: the political chaos following the Battle of Philippi, at which Horace 
had fought on the losing side, undoubtedly resulted in the confiscation of his father’s tiny estate.  
The poet’s encounter with economic disaster is dramatically (and perhaps rather humorously) 
related in his later correspondence with Julius Florus: 
unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi, 
decisis humilem pinnis inopemque paterni  
et laris et fundi paupertas inpulit audax 
ut versus facerem: sed quod non desit habentem . . . (Ep. 2.2.49-52) 
Soon as Philippi gave me discharge therefrom, brought low with wings clipped and 
beggared of paternal home and estate, barefaced poverty drove me to writing verses.  But 
now that I have sufficient store . . .  
 
According to this description, Horace’s decision to seek employment as a professional poet was 
essentially forced upon him by the barefaced poverty and destitution his father had earlier sought 
construct shaped by the author’s own agenda and has absolutely no basis in historical fact.  See 
Williams (1995) 296-313.  
 
34Lyne (1995) 1-8 observes that this pathetic description is rendered suspect by the fact 
that Horace’s father managed to afford his son’s high-quality education in Rome among social 
superiors (described at 1.6.76-80).  See also Armstrong (1986) 275, who notes that his ability to 
abandon the small farm and accompany his son to Rome “implied, on Horace’s father’s part, all 
the leisure in the world, and therefore a made fortune.”  Horace’s description, however, may be 
intended to establish a connection to the Epicurean concept of poverty (Arr. 6.25: πενία) as the 
possession of few things that satisfy the requirements of nature.  Cf. Verg. Cat. 8.1 (a description 
of the Epicurean Siro’s house): Villula, quae Sironis eras, et pauper agelle.    
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to prevent.35  The circumstances surrounding his motives for seeking financial assistance, 
therefore, while communicated in a rather playful and ironic manner, also perfectly satisfy 
Epicurus’ requirement concerning “dire straits” (Arr. 1.121.5: ἀπορήσαντα); the identification 
of patronage as his only source of income, moreover, reflects Philodemus’ description of the 
ideal economic state, according to which financial security results from the patronage of a 
grateful friend.  It is interesting to note, however, that Horace does not mention financial 
difficulty in Sermones 1.6 as his motive for seeking literary patronage, although he certainly 
emphasizes his poverty and low status.  This omission is likely intended to deflect the charge of 
ambition, which may also explain why he overlooks his acquisition of the lucrative post of 
scriba: besides, the many obligations associated with this supposedly sinecure position36 conflict 
with his self-portrayal as a detached observer of the vulgar masses (1.6.18: a volgo longe 
longeque remotos).  Indeed, according to Horace’s description, his acceptance into Maecenas’ 
literary circle was the direct result of his moral purity—a claim that is rendered all the more 
35But cf. Carm. 1.12.43-4, in which Camillus’ “cruel poverty” (saeva paupertas) is 
equated with his “ancestral estate and suitable home” (avitus | apto cum lare fundus).  See also 
Enc. Or. 1.658.  Horace’s autobiographical account skips a chapter of his life by omitting to 
mention his acquisition of the post of scriba quaestorius, for which see Suet. Vit. Hor. 7-8: 
victisque partibus venia inpetrata scriptum quaestorium conparavit (“After his faction had been 
defeated and he had obtained pardon, he purchased the post of treasury official”).  For a 
description of the duties associated with this post, see Fraenkel (1957) 14-15, Armstrong (1986) 
263-64 and especially Purcell (1983) 154-61.  Armstrong (1986) 263 dates this event to “as soon 
as possible after Philippi, probably in 41.”  The office was quite popular among individuals with 
literary aspirations, since it combined the possibility of otium with an impressive salary.  See 
DuQuesnay (2009) 50 and Mommsen (1887) 335, the latter of whom is the main source for the 
different salaries of the apparitores, among which the office of scriba is listed as the most 
lucrative (n. 1).  Horace’s new income allowed him not only to match the property qualifications 
for the rank of eques (valued at 400,000 sesterces), but also to able to afford a house in Rome. 
36Cf. 2.6.32-9 for Horace’s description of the manifold annoyances (negotia centum) that 
come with civic duty, in particular with the post of scriba.  According to Gowers (2009) 305, in 
Sermones 1.6 Horace “lives out an escapist fantasy, a dream of independence and unassailable 
integrity, which, though (or because) remote from notions of bureaucratic routine, can equally be 
regarded as ‘apparitorial’ in aspiration.” 
 
72 
 
                                                     
impressive by the fact that it transcends the obvious social and economic barriers separating him 
from his patron.37   
It is clear that Horace attributes this successful encounter with Maecenas to his freedom 
from “base ambition” (1.6.51-2: prava ambitione) and his moral purity (cf. 1.6.69: purus et 
insons).  He certainly does not portray himself as actively seeking patronage; on the contrary, his 
poet-friends vouched for his personal merit and secured an interview on his behalf (cf. 1.6.55).  
In all likelihood, Horace’s passing mention of Vergil and Varius implies his poetic capabilities, 
but nowhere does he explicitly identify this as the reason for his initial meeting with Maecenas.38  
Instead, he declares his personal worth and subordinates this relationship entirely to his virtuous 
disposition (55: quid essem; 60: quod eram).39  As many scholars have pointed out, this passage 
involves a conscious imitation of Bion’s audience with Antigonus Gonatas,40 by means of which 
Horace firmly situates his literary persona within the context of philosophical patronage.  
Immediately following the encounter scene, the poet discusses his ethical credentials and 
identifies his father’s training as the direct cause of this virtuous nature, the description of which 
is fittingly introduced by philosophical terminology: 
37Cf. 1.6.7-8: cum referre negas quale sit quisque parente | natus, dum ingenuus (“When 
you say it matters not who a man’s parent is, if he be himself free-born”).  As Oliensis (1998) 30 
observes, this view is cleverly placed in the mouth of Maecenas, thereby allowing the poet to 
avoid “making the self-promoting argument himself.”  For the ambiguity of ingenuus, which 
may mean “freeborn” or “gentlemanly,” see Gowers (2012) 222-23.  
 
38Rudd (1966) 41; Oliensis (1998) 32; Bowditch (2010) 59.  
39Schlegel (2000) 111.   
 
40See Kindstrand (1976) F1A-C and F2 for the biographical account of Bion’s meeting 
with Antigonus, in which the Cynic declares to the monarch σκόπει δέ με ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ 
(“Consider me for what I am”).  This connection was noted early on by Rudd (1966) 49, Fisk 
(1971) 316 and Freudenburg (1993) 14-16.  Moles (2007) 166 conveniently presents the many 
parallels and similarities between Horace and Bion in this passage. 
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Atque si vitiis mediocribus ac mea paucis   
mendosa est natura, alioqui recta velut si 
egregio inspersos reprendas corpore naevos, 
si neque avaritiam neque sordes nec mala lustra 
obiciet vere quisquam mihi, purus et insons, 
ut me collaudem, si et vivo carus amicis,   
causa fuit pater his . . . (S. 1.6.65-71) 
And yet, if the flaws of my otherwise sound nature are but trifling and few in number, 
even as you might find fault with moles spotted over a comely person—if no one will 
justly lay to my charge avarice or meanness or lewdness; if, to venture on self-praise, my 
life is free from stain and guilt and I am loved by my friends—I owe this to my father . . . 
 
The word natura expresses the result of his father’s pedagogical influence, which made him 
predisposed toward the virtuous mean and consequently able to resist the temptations associated 
with political power and success.  As common usage of the verb nascor reveals,41 moreover, 
Horace’s disposition is the gradual product of a continuous and repeated formation (cf. 1.4.120: 
formabat), which eventually encouraged the development of good habits (105: insuevit).  His 
moderate imperfections (130-131: mediocribus vitiis) reflect this temperate disposition, which is 
straight (134: rectius) and neither overlooks nor transgresses the requirements of nature.  By 
living frugally, sparingly and content with his father’s modest wealth (cf. 107), he has become 
content with his own status (1.6.96; cf. 1.4.108: contentus) and unaccustomed to bearing 
distressful burdens (1.6.99: onus molestum).42  For these reasons, Horace is not plagued by 
unnatural and unnecessary desires for limitless wealth (avaritia), meanness (sordes) or lewdness 
41Konstan (2011) 67-8 gives many examples derived from comedy. 
42DuQuesnay (2009) 50: “It should be stressed that Horace’s underlying assumption is 
that cura rei publici is an onus which requires considerable expenditure and is not simply an 
honos.”  Gowers (2012) 241 connects this passage to the image of Tillius weighed down by his 
paraphernalia (107-11). 
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(mala lustra),43 and he once again identifies his distaste for such disturbances as physical and 
mental “health” (1.6.98; cf. 1.4.129: sanus).44  With regard to Maecenas, therefore, Horace’s 
nature rather than his poetry is the foundation of their relationship and the source of his wisdom, 
which he shares in the form of moral advice communicated through the Sermones. 
It is significant that Horace viewed conversational poetry as a suitable medium for 
educating and transmitting moral advice, the ultimate source of which is philosophical wisdom.45  
This is particularly evident in Horace’s epistolary correspondence with Augustus, in which he 
identifies the ideal poet as one who is “useful to the city” (Ep. 2.1.124: utilis urbi) and “nurtures 
the mind by friendly precepts” (ibid. 128: pectus praeceptis format amicis).46  The power and 
authority of Horatian verse to communicate public consilia, moreover, is prominently featured in 
the so-called “Roman Odes,” where the poet, invoking the philosophical patronage of his 
43Cf. De oec. col. 23.42-6: οὐ[δ]ὲν γὰρ ἐκχεῖν [κ]α[ὶ ἀ]νατρέπειν εἴ[θιστ]αι 
λαμπροτάτα[ς καὶ πλ]ουσι[ωτάτας οἰκίας ὡ]ς πολυτέλι[αί τε] δι[αίτ]ης κα[ὶ] λαγνε[ῖαι καὶ] 
π[ε]ριβλέψε[ις] κτλ. (“For nothing is wont to drain and upset the most illustrious and wealthiest 
estates more than prodigality, salaciousness, envy” etc.).  Cf. also Lucr. 4.1123-124 (a vivid 
description of the economic effects of lust): labitur interea res et Babylonica fiunt, | languent 
officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans (“Meanwhile, wealth vanishes, and turns into Babylonian 
perfumes; duties are neglected, good name totters and sickens”). 
 
44Cf. Lucr. 4.1073-76, where only “healthy” individuals (sanis) enjoy “pure pleasure” 
(pura voluptas).  As Konstan (1973) 32 notes, the adjective here means “unmixed with pain,” 
and it is likely that Horace intends a similar meaning by referring to himself as purus at lines 64 
and 69.  In his treatise De gratitudine, Philodemus mentions the appreciation of those who 
receive moral advice from sages, who are “pure” (col. 11.18: καθαρούς) and “free from toil” 
(ibid. 7-8: ἐλεύθεραν ἀναποήν).  See Tepedino Guerra (1977) 96-113 for the fragments. 
45Cf. Ars. 309: Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons (“Of good writing the 
source and font is wisdom”).  For the moral sense of this passage, see Rudd (1989) 202.  As Tate 
(1928) 68 notes, the identification of the ideal poet as sage owes more to the Stoics than to any 
other Hellenistic tradition.    
 
46For the influence of the Augustan program on Horace, see the important studies of 
Newman (1967), especially the section on Horace (270-364), and White (1993) 123-33.  Lowrie 
(2007) 80-85 provides a much shorter consideration. 
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Hellenistic predecessors, refers to his lyrics as “soothing advice” (Carm. 3.4.41: lene consilium) 
while emphasizing their indispensability and tempering effect (ibid. 65-6: vis consili expers . . . 
vim temperatam).47  In contrast to this, in the Sermones Horace dispenses private consilia 
(1.4.133: consilium proprium; 1.6.130: me consolor) directly to his patron through informal 
conversations that take place in an intimate setting (cf. 1.6.18: remotos).48  Perhaps in response 
to Philodemus’ preference in De poematis for the linguistic and syntactical clarity of prose (col. 
28.27: σαφήνειαν),49 these friendly chats are designed aptly to communicate moral wisdom 
through conventional language expressed in an ostensibly prosaic manner (cf. 1.4.42: sermoni 
propriora).50  Horace’s satiric exchanges with Maecenas, therefore, may replicate Philodemus’ 
“philosophical discussions” (De oec. col. 23.24-5: λόγων φιλο[σό]φων),51 which ideally take 
place with friends in isolation (ibid. 15-16: μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν); and while the poet’s 
47See Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 69 for the political significance of these lines.  
 
48But DuQuesnay (2009) 19-58 illustrates the many allusions to contemporary politics in 
these supposedly apolitical poems.    
 
49Like Lucretius, who attempted to challenge the Epicurean view of poetry as obscure 
and unsuitable for communicating wisdom, Horace is concerned above all with clarity.  Cf. Ars. 
25-6: brevis esse laboro, | obscurus fio (“Striving to be brief, I become obscure”) as well as 40-
41: cui lecta potenter erit res, | nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo (“Whoever shall 
choose a theme within his range, neither speech will fail him, nor clearness of order”).  
Tsakiropolou-Summers (1995) 254-56 discusses the importance of luciditas within the context of 
Roman aesthetics. 
 
50Horace’s claim that writing verse does not necessarily make one a poet (1.4.56-63) 
resembles that of Aristotle in Poet. 1447b16-20: οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ 
πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν 
(“Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their metre; so one should call the 
former poet, the other a natural scientist”).  
 
 51Cf. especially 2.6.71, in which Horace, perhaps with an additional nod to the otium and 
ambience of a Ciceronian villa, identifies the philosophical conversation which takes place at the 
Sabine estate as sermo. 
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concern with brevity (cf. Ep. 2.2.335: esto brevis) undoubtedly reflects the influence of 
Callimachean standards,52 his bluntness conforms to Philodemus’ description in De oeconomia 
of the best moral advice as pithy and, above all, particularly useful (col. 27.35-9): ἀ[λλ]ὰ δὴ καὶ 
[πι]θανώτερος ἂν [εἶ]ναι δόξ[ει]εν ὁ παντελῶ[ς ὀ]λίγα φήσ[ων] ἡμᾶς περὶ πρά[γ]ματος 
μ[ε]ιζόνως ὠφελή[σ]οντος (“Whereas the more trustworthy sage would seem to be the one who 
will give us advice about what is of greater benefit in few words”).53  The poet’s self-portrayal 
as a pithy advisor who shares moral advice with his friend, however, is admittedly one-sided: it 
remains to consider in what manner Maecenas is portrayed as the ideal Epicurean patron. 
Horace’s depiction of his patron as withdrawn from society, unaffected by political 
ambition and involved in intimate friendships is in many ways consistent with Epicurean 
tradition.54  The ethical considerations Horace addresses to Maecenas in Sermones 1.6 suggests 
that, like the poet, the millionaire patron was likewise free from political ambition, which is 
apparently corroborated by the ancient testimony regarding his contentment with equestrian 
status.55  In the same poem, Horace describes both himself and Maecenas as “withdrawn from 
52As Gowers (2012) 84 notes, philosophy is traditionally portrayed as long-winded.  Cf. 
Plaut. Ps. 687: iam satis est philosophatum (“That’s enough philosophizing!”).  For the influence 
of Callimachus on Horace in general, see Cody (1976), especially 103-19.  Thomas (2007) 50-62 
and Freudenburg (1993) 185-235 have discussions of “Callimachean aesthetics” in the Sermones.  
 
53Philodemus emphasizes the “limits of speech” in De conv. col. 5 (2: ὁμιλίας πέρας).   
 
54See Enc. Or. 1.792-803 for the evidence concerning Maecenas vis-à-vis Horace.  I do 
not intend to argue here that Maecenas was actually an Epicurean, only that Horace creates a 
persona for him that is in many ways consistent with Philodemus’ economic theory.  The former 
view has been advanced by various scholars, including Avallone (1962) 111, André (1967) 15-
61 and Mazzoli (1968) 300-326.  But cf. Boyancé (1959) 334: “Mécène n’était pas homme à 
adherer à une école, surtout à une école exigeante comme l’était l’épicurienne.”  
 
55Cf. Vell. 2.88: C. Maecenas . . . non minus Agrippa Caesari carus, sed minus 
honoratus—quippe vixit angusti clavi plene contentus—nec minora consequi potuit, sed non tam 
concupivit (“Gaius Maecenas . . . was not less loved by Caesar and Agrippa, though he had fewer 
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the vulgar masses” (1.6.18: nos . . . a volgo longe longeque remotos), and elsewhere he mentions 
how Maecenas provides friends with a secluded venue within the city (1.9.49: domus) and a 
salubrious paradise (1.8.14: Esquiliis . . . salubribus) in which social gatherings and friendly 
discussions take place.56  In De oeconomia, Philodemus also describes the ideal patron as a 
wealthy landowner who offers his dwelling to friends as a tranquil getaway:  
 
ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιπλοκὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ἐξ ὧν ἀηδίαι πολλαὶ παρακολουθοῦσι, 
καὶ μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον καὶ παρὰ τοῖς [σώφροσι]ν εὐσχημονεστάτην 
πρόσοδον. (De oec. col. 23.11-18) 
 
For this [i.e., being a gentleman landowner] least of all brings involvements with men 
from whom many difficulties follow, since it offers a leisurely withdrawal with friends 
and the most fitting profit for those who are prudent. 
 
 
The ideal host, therefore, offers a suitable retreat from the turmoil of politics and a safe haven for 
philosophical discourse among friends.57  One thinks especially of Horace’s identification in the 
Sermones of the private community of poets, who abandon political ambition (cf. 1.10.84: 
honors heaped upon him, since he lived thoroughly content with the narrow strip of the 
equestrian order.  He might have achieved a position not less high than Agrippa, but he had not 
the same ambition for it”).  Lyne (1995) 135, however, convincingly argues that Maecenas’ 
decision to remain a knight was motivated by the desire to exercise “real power, interesting 
power, inside power” without the bureaucratic obstacles associated with senatorial office. 
 
56This is a reference to the horti Maecenatis, which were located on the Esquiline.  Cf. 
Plin. Nat. 19.50: iam quidem hortorum nomine in ipsa urbe delicias agros villasque possident.  
Primus hoc instituit Athenis Epicurus otii magister (“Now in fact they possess delightful land 
and villas within the city, which they call ‘gardens.’  Epicurus, the teacher of leisure, was the 
first to establish this tradition in Athens”).  Griffin (1984) 192-93, who is followed by Lyne 
(1995) 133-35, notes that Maecenas’ wealth was most likely the result of profits from 
proscriptions and evictions following the civil war (and which Horace identifies as the cause of 
his own poverty!).  For the evidence suggesting that Maecenas probably took an active role in 
the battles of Philippi and Actium, see Evenpole (1990) 104-5. 
 
57For the importance of withdrawal and the notion of a safe haven from the turmoil of 
politics, see Wurster (2012) 86-9.  As Roskam (2007) and Fish (2011) 72-104 explain, however, 
this negative view does not entail the complete rejection of political life, which, depending on 
the circumstances, could actually be the best option in terms of the pleasure calculus. 
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ambitione relegata) and gather with Maecenas in a venue that is pure and virtuous (cf. 1.9.49-50: 
domus pura).  Further on in his economic treatise, Philodemus emphasizes the dangers of 
friendlessness and misanthropy regarding relationships based on economic exchanges (De oec. 
col. 24.19-33: ἀφιλία . . . ἀφιλανθ[ρω]πία); he also notes that in times of financial hardship 
property managers should be harder on themselves than on their friends (ibid. col. 26.1-9), and 
even recommends that they make provisions for them “as for children” (ibid. col. 27.5-9: οἷα 
τ[έ]κνα).  In comparing patronage to fatherhood Philodemus probably had in mind the Roman 
designation patronus, which is etymologically related to pater and effectively communicates the 
similarities between the patron-client and father-son relationships.58  Horace likewise expresses 
this in Sermones 1.6, in which he underscores his dependency on Maecenas by virtually adopting 
him as a new father and source of financial stability.59  This is communicated by references to 
the poet’s “speechless modesty” (57: pudor infans) as well as the patron’s nine-month gestation 
period (61: nono post mense).60  Philodemus also notes that, like a good father, the ideal patron 
ensures that his friends are “economically provided for after his death” (De oec. col. 27.7-8: ἵν’ 
ἔχωσιν καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἐ[φ]ό[διον]).  According to Suetonius, Maecenas made such 
provisions for Horace (Vit. Hor.): Maecenas quantopere eum [sc. Horatium] dilexerit . . . testatur 
. . . multo magis extremiis iudiciis tali ad Augustum elogio: “Horati Flacci ut mei esto memor” 
58Schlegel (2000) 112.  Cf. Ep. 1.7.37: rexque paterque (“O my king and my father”).  
 
59Without, of course, rejecting or trivializing the important role of his biological father, of 
whom Horace was obviously quite proud.  See Harrison (1965) 111-14. 
 
60See Schlegel (2000) 110, Henderson (1999) 184 and Kerferd (1959) 207.  For pudor as 
an expression of virtue, cf. 1.6.82-3: pudicum, | qui primus virtutis honos (“He kept me chase—
and that is virtue’s first grace”).  Lucilius also expresses this sentiment (296-97 M): quod pectore 
puro, | quod puero similes (“with a pure heart, like a child”).  Gowers (2012) 234 discusses the 
social undertones of pudor, which indicates an “unservile nature.” 
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(“And the degree to which Maecenas loved Horace is witnessed even more by the following plea 
made to Augustus in his last will: ‘Remember Horatius Flaccus as you have remembered me’”).  
Of course, the most fundamental provision an ideal patron can make in response to a friend’s 
useful advice is the bestowal of various benefits during his lifetime, particularly financial 
rewards.61  Philodemus euphemistically refers to these benefits as “gratitude and honor” (De oec. 
col. 23.27-9: εὐχάριστο[ν ἅμ]α μετὰ σεβασμοῦ παντ[ός]),62 and, if it can be assumed that the 
quantity and quality of such goods indicates something about a client’s worth, then one can 
safely conclude that Horace was especially “honored” by Maecenas.63   
 The management strategy Philodemus recommends in his economic treatises appears in 
Horace’s charming account of his so-called “Epicurean day” in Sermones 1.6.110-28, which 
consequently reveals something about the philosophical convictions underlying his persona’s 
economic choices.64  The poet’s description of Maecenas and himself as far removed from the 
masses (18) is complemented by his quasi-psychological retreat into a safe haven within the 
heart of Rome.65  Similar to the “pure house” of Maecenas on the Esquiline (1.9.49: domus 
 61Cf. De gratitudine, in which Philodemus states that the mark of “genuine friendship” 
(col. 5.9-10: φιλίας . . . νομίμης) is the eagerness of a patron “to anticipate his friends’ needs” 
(col. 10.10-11: περὶ φίλων προνοεῖν).  
  
62Cf. Saller (1982) 28: “the traditional rewards for poets were pecunia and honores.”  
  
 63Cf. Ep. 1.7.15: tu me fecisti locupletem (“you have made me rich”).  For Horace’s 
mention of his patron’s “generosity” (benignitas tua) and his own “wealth” (me ditavit), which is 
probably a reference to the Sabine estate given to him around 33 BC, see Epod. 1.24.  This will 
be discussed in relation to Sermones 2.6 in Chapter 3. 
  
64Gowers (2012) calls this account an expression of “Epicurean contentment” (219) 
involving “perfect Epicurean otium” (245), but does not offer further details.  Armstrong (1986) 
277-80 refers to this passage as “pure convention,” but adds further observations concerning 
Horace’s “luxury” which will be discussed below.   
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pura), Horace’s own “townhouse” (1.6.114: domum) is a place of mental health and refreshment, 
which, though situated in the midst of urban chaos, offers freedom (cf. De oec. col. 23.15-16: 
ἀναχώρησιν) from the distressful “interactions” (ibid. 11: ἐπιπλοκάς) and “many pains” (ibid. 
13: ἀηδίαι πολλαί) associated with political ambition and avarice.  And while ownership of a 
moderately sized townhouse in the middle of Rome indicates substantial wealth,66 this did not 
result (at least according to Horace’s account) from the ambitious effort to build a fortune, which 
would involve painful toil and anxiety (cf. De oec. col. 15.37-43).  In order to emphasize his own 
freedom from ambition and the consequences of “success,” moreover, Horace introduces Tillius 
as the perfect contrast:67 the phrase “I go about alone” (1.6.112: incedo solus), for example, 
answers to “[one must] drag about all sorts of companions” (101-102: ducendus et unus | et 
comes alter); the declaration “I don’t worry about having to wake up early tomorrow” (119-20: 
non sollicitus mihi quod cras | surgendum sit mane) counters “[one must] greet many clients 
65This is most likely an expression of Epicurean maxim “live unknown” (λάθε βιώσας), 
for which see Roskam (2007) 33-44, who also considers the application of this saying to 
Horace’s Epistulae (166-79).  Cf. Lucr. 1.50-1, which is a plea for Memmius to have a “mind 
removed from cares” (animum . . . semotum a curis) and 2.646-48, where the divine nature is 
said to be “separated and far removed from the affairs of humans” (semota ab nostris rebus 
seiunctaque longe). 
 
66Armstrong (2010) 17: “owning one’s house in Rome was as unusual as in modern New 
York city.” 
 
67See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 108.  There is much disagreement among scholars 
regarding the identity of this Tillius.  The scholiasts identify him as L. Tillius Cimber, one of 
Caesar’s assassins; Enc. Or. 1.917-18 conjectures that he was his brother; Armstrong (1986) 
272-73 and DuQuesnay (2009) 47 interpret lines 38-41 as referring to Tillius, and therefore 
conclude that he was the overly ambitious son of a freeman father (a tempting theory, since it 
would provide the perfect contrast with Horace).  Toher (2005) 183-89, who provides a more 
detailed summary of the debate, agrees that he was L. Tillius Cimber.  According to Toher, the 
phrase sumere depositum clavum at line 25 refers to Tillius’ decision to withdraw from politics at 
some point, only to return later on account of his overwhelming ambition.  Cf. Lucr. 3.60-1 for 
political ambition and greed as causing men to “transcend the limits of justice” (transcendere 
fines | iuris) and engage in “crimes” (scelera).   
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with the morning salutatio” (101: salutandi plures), which recalls Philodemus’ description of 
waking early in order to attend to household business as “wretched and unseemly for the sage” 
(De oec. col. 7.30: ταλαίπωρον δὲ καὶ ἀνοί[κε]ιον φιλοσόφου).  Furthermore, the fact that 
Horace’s restful withdrawal is largely the result of freedom from physical labor, which is 
performed exclusively by servants (1.6.116: pueris tribus), may similarly reflect Philodemus’ 
recommendation that managers transfer such mundane chores to their servants.68  In general, the 
language Horace uses to characterize his pleasurable existence at home is informed by 
Philodemus’ description of the ideal ἀναχώρησις εὔσχολος: he lives “more pleasantly” than 
Tillius (110: commodius), his own “pleasure” dictates his destination (111: quacumque libido 
est), he “lies abed until late morning” (122: ad quartam iaceo) and wanders about (122: vagor), 
he is “not troubled” by business (119: non sollicitus69) and, taking into account the positive 
results of his calculated choices and avoidances, he lives “more sweetly” (130: victurum 
suavius70) than the general population.  According to Horace, moreover, his pleasurable 
existence is largely the result of choices made in accordance with the requirements of nature, 
some of which are economic in the modern sense: his food purchases, which consist of “greens 
and wheat” (112: holus ac far) as well as “leeks and chickpeas” (115: porri et ciceris), reflect 
actual physical needs rather than the overindulgent choices of a glutton (cf. 1.6.127: pransus non 
 68Cf. De oec. col. 23.7-11.  Αs Armstrong (1986) 278-79 rightly notes, this modest 
description certainly does not imply that Horace only had three servants, but that he required 
three at suppertime: “[T]he ‘Epicurean day’ in Horace is more of a luxury item than it looks.  We 
need hardly believe . . . that Horace could afford no more than three slaves to serve his table at 
his Roman house.  The topos of Epicurean ‘simplicity,’ rather, is plainly one for the luxurious 
and gentlemanly, who can afford better but consider this much tasteful.” 
 
69Gowers (2012) 247: “another defensive denial, Romanizing Epicurean ataraxia.”  
 
70For suavis as an allusion to Epicurean ἡδονή, cf. Lucr. 2.1 (suave) and Gowers (2012) 
249. 
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avide).71  In many ways, therefore, Horace’s description of his secluded and otiose life, which is 
made possible by income that made him more affluent (as his ownership of an urban domus and 
a least three servants show) but not insensitive to the requirements of nature, applies the 
principles that characterize Philodemean economic theory. 
Many characteristics of Philodemus’ economic teachings reappear, alongside various 
other philosophical and literary themes, in Sermones 1.1.  His introductory address to 
Maecenas72 establishes the literary setting for this poem as an informal conversation between 
friends, who withdraw from society in order to examine the philosophical cause of the general 
population’s discontentment:  
Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem 
seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa 
contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis? (S. 1.1.1-3) 
How comes it, Maecenas, that no man living is content with the lot which either his 
choice has given him, or chance has thrown in his way, but each has praise for those who 
follow other paths?   
 
The intentional directness and low register of Horace’s language reflects the informal style of 
discourse traditionally associated with the Cynic diatribe;73 contrary to the Cynics’ reputation for 
 
71Cf. Carm. 1.31.15-16: me pascunt olivae, | me cichorea levesque malvae (“My fare is 
the olive, the endive, and the wholesome mallow”).  Oltramare (1962) 141 interprets Horace’s 
meager fare as “végétarianisme cynique.”  
 
72Gold (1992) 162-75 discusses the question of audience in this poem and observes the 
following: “Maecenas is presented here not as a patron, but as a friend who is interested in 
philosophical disquisitions on contentment and greed and is the suitable recipient of a diatribe on 
these subjects” (164).  See also Armstrong (1964) 86-96, who discusses the structural similarities 
of Sermones 1.1-3, particularly with regard to their “detached” prologues. 
 
73For Horace’s prosaic opening, see Lejay (1915) 280 and Gowers (2012) 62.  Axelson 
(1945) 76 includes nemo in his register of typically “unpoetische Wörter.”  See also Freudenburg 
(1993) 11, who considers this language consistent with “the popular moralist of Greek diatribe.”  
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public invective and street preaching, however, the poet frames this philosophical discussion 
within the context of a peaceful but private withdrawal among friends, which recalls 
Philodemus’ descriptions of the ideal Epicurean community in De oeconomia (col. 23.11-18; 22-
36).74  From the point of view of two detached observers (cf. 1.6.18: nos . . . remotos), therefore, 
Horace leads Maecenas through a philosophical investigation of the causes motivating the vulgar 
masses’ choices and avoidances, which is a skill his father had attributed to the instruction of an 
unnamed sage in Sermones 1.4 (115: sapiens).  The poet’s scientific method, however, is a 
reflection of his virtuous upbringing as programmatically described in the same poem,75 and 
which involves close observation of the manifest behavior of generic examples of moral 
For studies on Horace’s so-called “diatribe satires,” see Herter (1970) 320-64, Wimmel (1962) 
and Freudenburg (1993) 8-27.  As Moles indicates in his OCD article (s.v. “diatribe”), and as 
other scholars have argued (see Sharland [2009b] for the debate), the notion of diatribe was 
described as a genre by Usener but does not appear to have been employed in antiquity to refer to 
a specific kind of literature.  See also Oltramare (1926) 9-66, Kindstrand (1976) 97-9 and Indelli 
and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995) 53-61. 
 
74Cf. Gold (1992) 168, who states that the inclusion of nemo forms “a privileged group of 
two, who are not quite included with the rest of mankind.”  Gowers (2012) 59 describes Horace’s 
opening as a “splendid isolation from the rest of humanity.”  Cf. a similar opening in Lucretius: 
 
sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere 
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 
despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 
errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, 
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. (2.7-13) 
 
But nothing is more delightful than to possess lofty sanctuaries serene, well fortified by 
the teachings of the wise, whence you may look down upon others and behold them all 
astray, wandering abroad and seeking the path of life:—the strife of wits, the fight for 
precedence, all laboring night and day with surpassing toil to mount upon the pinnacle of 
riches and to lay hold on power. 
 
75Schrijvers (1992) 59; Oliensis (1998) 25; Gowers (2003) 70-71.   
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deficiency (1.4.106: exemplis vitiorum; cf. 1.1.13: cetera de genere hoc).76  In the case of 
Sermones 1.1, Horace’s preliminary observation of the perceptible behavior and consequences of 
vice resembles the methodological approach of Philodemus in treatises like De ira, De 
adulatione and De superbia; both authors, moreover, consciously imitate the Cynics’ flamboyant 
technique for the sake of its shocking effectiveness, which later Epicureans generally considered 
useful for communicating ethical truths.77  In the case of Horace, this becomes apparent 
immediately following the introductory address, as he launches into a popular theme of moral 
philosophy identified as μεμψιμοιρία or “the blaming of one’s fortune,” which, according to the 
evidence,78 was extremely popular among Cynics like Bion: 
‘o fortunati mercatores’ gravis annis 
miles ait, multo iam fractus membra labore; 
contra mercator navim iactantibus Austris: 
‘militia est potior.  quid enim?  concurritur: horae 
momento cita mors venit aut victoria laeta.’ 
agricolam laudat iuris legumque peritus, 
sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat; 
ille, datis vadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est, 
solos felicis viventis clamat in urbe.  (S. 1.1.1-12) 
76Gowers (2012) 66, commenting on the significance of genere hoc: “draws attention not 
just to the type of examples used and rejected here but also to the unnamed genre that contains 
them.”  Cf. also Rudd (1966) 15: “[T]his poetry . . . is concerned entirely with the behavior of the 
individual in society.” 
77See, e.g., Gigante and Indelli (1978) 124-31, Indelli (1988) 25, Schmid (1978) 135 and 
Gigante (1992) 107-8. 
 
78No particularly outstanding specimen of μεμψιμοιρία has survived from the Cynics, 
aside from the fragmentary evidence from Teles, for which see Kindstrand (1976) F16A and 
Hense (1969) 9-10.  More significant examples are given by later sources such as Cic. Off. 120, 
the seventeenth pseudo-Hippocratic letter (which Fraenkel [1957] 93 says is “certainly later than 
Horace”), and a passage from the third century AD sophist Maximus of Tyre, for which see 
Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 5.  Scholarship concerning the role of μεμψιμοιρία in Sermones 1.1 is 
extensive: see, e.g., Heinze (1889) 15-17, Fraenkel (1957) 90-97, Rudd (1966) 13-21, Herter 
(1970) 330-33, Fiske (1971) 219-28, Freudenburg (1993) 11-16 and Beck (2007) in general.    
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“O happy traders!” cries the soldier, as he feels the weight of the years, his frame now 
shattered with hard service.  On the other hand, when southern gales toss the ship, the 
trader cries: “A soldier’s life is better.  Do you ask why?  There is the battle clash, and in 
a moment of time comes speedy death or joyous victory.”  One learned in law and 
statutes has praise for the farmer, when towards cockcrow a client comes knocking at his 
door.  The man yonder, who has given surety and is dragged into town from the country 
cries that they only are happy who live in town. 
 
The erratic behavior of these individuals, whose dissatisfaction breeds envy and results in the 
constant transgression of both natural and social boundaries,79 provides a stark contrast with the 
contentment and otium of the poet’s “Epicurean day” as described in Sermones 1.6.111-31.  
Furthermore, while the comparison of antithetical professions is probably Cynic,80 Horace’s 
clear emphasis on the mental and physical disturbances that result from their restlessness, which 
bears noteworthy resemblance to a similar passage in Lucretius (3.1053-1067), is suggestively 
Epicurean: the immense toil that the soldier and farmer undergo preclude the enjoyment of 
bodily repose (Arr. 7.2: ἀπονία), while the constant anxiety that plagues the merchant and 
politician render impossible the attainment of tranquility (ibid. ἀταραξία).  As Horace indicates 
a few lines later, however, the irrational willingness of these individuals to undergo such 
excessive labor is ultimately motivated by their underlying desire to accumulate great wealth. 
In closely uniting discontentment and avarice as joint causes of the toil associated with 
certain sources of income, Horace is following a philosophical tradition of which Philodemus is 
79Cf. Carm. 1.1.7-18.  Radermacher (1921) 148-51, who noted the similarities between 
these two passages early on, conjectured that the Carmina passage had actually been composed 
first, and that Horace modified and appended it to Sermones 1.1 later in life.  This thesis, 
however, is rejected by Wimmel (1962) 11-17.  
 
80Heinze (1889) 17 considers Bion as the most likely candidate.  Fiske (1971) 220-21 
agrees with a Cynic source, and adds to the list the fragmentary evidence from Phoinix of 
Colophon, for which see Gerhard (1909) 4-7.  Wimmel (1962) 12 is more cautious, agreeing that 
Horace’s pairing of lives draws from an older source but that “es für dies Motiv keine 
Quellenvermutungen gäbe.” 
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an important part.81  This tradition includes Theophrastus’ sketch of the typical μεμψίμοιρος in 
his collection of moral essays, which implicitly identifies greed as the underlying cause of 
grumbling: the discovery of a coin, for instance, does not satisfy the desire for treasure (Char. 
17: θησαυρόν).  The role of greed with regard to discontentment is also suggested by Bion, who 
warns against “desiring” the lot of others.82  In a fragment attributed to Philodemus’ lost treatise 
De invidia (PHerc. 1678), in which envy is described as the cause of intense suffering (fr. 12.1: 
μάλιστα πάθειν) and self-inflicted pain (ibid. 4-5: λυπούμενοι),83 avarice is explicitly 
connected to irrational vice (ibid. fr. 16.1: φιλαργυρίας . . . ἄλογον κακόν).84  One may 
compare this to Horace’s description of certain individuals’ irrational willingness to undergo 
extreme labor, even to the point of risking their lives, for the sake of acquiring wealth: 
ille gravem duro terram qui vertit aratro, 
perfidus hic caupo, miles nautaeque, per omne 
81Beginning with Heinze (1889), scholars have thought that the rough transition from 
discontentment to avarice was evidence that Horace had spliced these themes from two separate 
sources (15: diversa componi).  Cf. Rudd (1966) 13, who refers to the “informal aspect” of 
Sermones 1.1 and Fiske (1971) 219, who mentions Horace’s “partially successful attempt” to 
fuse the two themes.  The debate continues to the present day, with a number of scholars 
recognizing that Horace was most likely drawing from a single philosophical tradition according 
to which these themes were closely related.  See Fraenkel (1957) 92-5, Wimmel (1962) 11-16, 
Armstrong (1964) 88, Herter (1970) 340-42, Brown (1993) 89, Dufallo (2000) 579-90 and 
especially Beck (2007), whose extended introduction provides a detailed and useful summary of 
the debate (with bibliography).  Hubbard (1981) 305-21 argues for unity based on the poem’s 
“rhetorical mode.” 
 
82Kindstrand (1976) F16A: μὴ οὖν βούλου δευτερολόγος ὢν τὸ πρωτολόγου 
πρόσωπον (“Do not, therefore, desire to be the star when you are but a supporting actor”). 
 
83See the edition, translation and commentary by Tepedino Guerra (1985) 113-25.  
Tsouna (2007) 124-25 gives a brief analysis of the fragments.  For the connection between envy 
and self-inflicted pain, cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1108b5 (λυπεῖται) and Eth. Eud. 1233b20 (τὸ 
λυπείσθαι).  For Bion’s treatment of envy, Kindstrand (1972) F47A-48. 
 
84Cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8: καὶ τούτων πάντων αἰτίη φιλαργυρίη (“Of all this [suffering], 
greed is the cause”).  
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audaces mare qui currunt, hac mente laborem 
sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant, 
aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria . . . (S. 1.1.28-32) 
That farmer, who with tough plough turns up the heavy soil, our rascally host here, the 
soldier, the sailors who boldly scour every sea, all say that they bear toil with this in 
view, that when old they may retire into secure ease, once they have piled up their 
provisions . . . 
 
The busyness conveyed by this action-packed description, which is summed up by the phrase 
laborem ferre, may reflect the restless toil and pursuit of riches designated by the Greeks as 
πολυπραγμοσύνη,85 but it may also engage with the economic advice of Philodemus, who 
sanctions the accumulation of wealth provided that it is not accompanied by toil and anxiety:  
[Τ]ῶι γὰρ μὴ λυ[πε]ῖσθαι τ[ῶι] παραπολλυμέν[ωι] μηδὲ διὰ τὴν ἄκρατον σ[που]δὴν 
περὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ το[ὔλαττ]ον ὑφ’ αὑ[τ]οῦ ζητρί[οις τισὶ]ν ἐ[γκ]εῖσθαι, τούτω[ι γ’] 
ὀ[ρ]θῶς οἰκο[νο]μεῖσθαι νομίζω τὸν πλοῦ[τ]ον· ὁ [γ]ὰρ κατὰ τὴ[ν κτῆ]σ[ι]ν π[όν]ος 
[κἀν] τῶι πρὸ[ς βί]αν ἕλκειν ἑαυ[τὸν] γίνετ[αι] κἀν τῶι περὶ τῶν ἐλαττ[ωμάτ]ων 
ἀγωνιᾶν ὡς εὐθέ[ως εἰ]ς ἀλγηδόν[α κ]α[τ]αστησόντων ἢ παροῦσαν ἢ 
προσδοκωμένην. (De oec. col. 14.23-30) 
For this is what I consider the proper administration of wealth to be: not to be grieved at 
the loss of revenue nor to be involved in “slave treadmills” with oneself because of the 
unconquerable zeal regarding profit and loss.  For the toil involved in acquiring wealth 
involves dragging oneself by force and agonizing over losses that will quickly result in 
pains, either present or expected.  
 
According to Philodemus, therefore, it is not wealth acquisition itself but the potential “toil” 
(πόνος) it involves that is to be avoided.  Unlike the individuals in Horace’s itemized 
85Cf. Teles’ report of Bion as quoted by Fiske (1971) 221-22: ἢ πάλιν οὐχ ὁρᾷς διότι οἱ 
μὲν πλούσιοι πλείω πράττοντες κωλύονται τοῦ σχολάζειν; (“Or don’t you see that the rich, 
on account of being overactive, are prevented from enjoying leisure?”).  It should be noted, 
however, that Bion’s praise of adaptable merchants who boldly undergo storms at sea is certainly 
not echoed by Horace in the above passage (pace Fiske [1971] 222), in which audaces refers 
more closely to their rashness in foolishly risking their lives as confirmed at lines 6-8.   Cf. also 
Arit. Pol. 1258a1-15 for a description of the continuous toil (διατριβή) associated with 
accumulating limitless wealth. 
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descriptions, whose broken limbs, calloused hands and constant fear of death are the direct result 
of an active pursuit of wealth (cf. 38: quaesitis, 92: quaerendi), the ideal economist is not 
obsessed with increasing profits at the expense of physical and mental health (cf. De oec. col. 
15.39: ἄλυπον and 42: φροντίδα βαρεῖαν); rather, he passively “accepts” more (δεκτέ[ον]) 
whenever it comes easily and without harm (cf. ibid. coll. 16.44-17.2).86  In other words, 
Philodemus recommends that the pleasure calculus be applied to every economic decision:  
 τοῦτο γὰρ δε[ῖ] καὶ ποεῖν τὴν χρείαν ἄλυπον καὶ τὸ διὰ ταύτης τέρπον ἀκέραιον τὸ 
 μὴ προσεῖναι τῆι πλούτου κτήσει τοῖς σοφοῖς φροντίδα βαρεῖαν πῶς δυνήσεται 
 σῴζεσθαι, μη[δ’] ὅταν οἱ σφαλερώ[τ]ατοι κ[αιρ]οὶ καθεστήκωσι[ν]· 
 (De oec. col. 15.37-45) 
This is also necessary: to enjoy revenue without pain and make sure that the pleasure 
derived from this revenue is pure and that its acquisition does not render to the sage 
profound anxiety regarding how he will preserve it or when difficult times will arrive. 
 
In light of this advice, Horace’s characters’ frenzied pursuit of leisure (cf. 1.1.31: otia) by means 
of intense pain and prolonged suffering seems all the more irrational.87  It is even possible that 
the poet, in a spirit of irony, has deliberately constructed these introductory scenes as a comic 
inversion of the Epicurean calculus with regard to wealth administration.  This may be further 
confirmed by Horace’s surprisingly negative description of agricultural work, which, judging by 
Cicero’s evaluation (Off. 1.151) and Livy’s famous portrait of Cincinnatus (3.26.8-11), was 
traditionally accepted by Romans as perhaps the noblest source of income.  For the poet, 
86See Asmis (2004) 159: “Philodemus emphasizes that the rich person must not grab; he 
accepts.”  
 
87Gowers (2012) 64: “This looks more like a satire on human irrationality and the ironies 
of plus ça change than deliberately incompetent logic on Horace’s part.”  Cf. also Hippoc. [Ep.] 
17.5: τίς ἡ κενὴ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀλόγιστος μηδὲν μανίης διαφέρουσα; (“What is this empty and 
irrational passion, no different from madness?”) and Plut. Mor. 7.21.2 (De cupiditate divitiarum) 
for a description of the desire for wealth as “manic” (μανία) and “crazed” (ἐνθουσιασμῷ). 
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however, it is inherently toilsome: the farmer’s turning the weighty earth (1.1.28: gravem 
terram) with a hard mattock (28: duro aratro) is overbearing labor, as the carefully chosen 
vocabulary and ponderous succession of three spondees communicates.  Horace’s criticism, 
however, may have been influenced by a similar evaluation of Philodemus, who, in addition to 
emphatically condemning the active pursuit of wealth through military service (De oec. col. 
22.17-28: πορισμὸν . . . δορίκτητον; cf. 29: miles) and political office (ibid. coll. 22.28-23.1: 
τοὺς πο[λ]ιτικούς; cf. 9: legum peritus), likewise rejects agricultural labor (ibid. col. 23.8: 
γεωργο[ῦν]τ’ αὐτόν; cf. 9: agricolam) as wretched on account of the many pains it involves 
(ibid. col. 23.7), which preclude the attainment of leisurely retirement (ibid. col. 23.15-16: 
ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον; cf. 31: otia recedant).88 
Horace subsequently compares the vulgar masses’ obsession with accumulating wealth to 
the industrious ant, which, in addition to addressing issues related to Epicurean economic theory, 
also serves as an entertaining transition to the important topic of wealth limitation.  According to 
Epicurus, the proper administration of wealth is characterized by forethought, which implies that 
88See Laurenti (1973) 154-64, Tsouna (2007) 188-91 and Asmis (2004) 168-70 for these 
passages.  According to Teles (Hense [1969] 42), Diogenes described how people wish to grow 
up, but, as soon as they are grown, complain about having to engage in military service and 
politics (but no mention of agriculture), which prevent them from enjoying the leisure 
(σχολάσαι) they had taken for granted as youths.  It is possible that, like Philodemus, Zeno of 
Citium rejected agriculture as an acceptable source of income, although positive evidence for this 
is restricted to an ambiguous line from Stobaeus (= SVF 1.312).  Chrysippus omits agriculture 
from his list of ways of acquiring money in De vitis, for which see Natali (1995) 122-23.  Cf. 
also Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.5, which includes a short description of farming as inherently toilsome: 
ἄλλοι δὲ τῶν περὶ γεωργίην ἀσχοληθέντων (“some [laugh] at those who practice [lit. have 
been deprived of leisure with regard to] farming”).  This last source betrays the influence of 
Epicureanism in various passages (e.g., the mention of ἀταραξία at 12 and 17.7, the atomic 
swerve at 17.7 and the implication that perception alone is sufficient for knowledge at 17.7).  
Like Philodemus, moreover, the author of this letter rejects mining from slave labor and horse 
breeding as acceptable sources of income (17.5; cf. De oec. col. 23.1-7). 
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the sage will not beg daily like a Cynic (Arr. 1.119.6-7: οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν . . . οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν) but 
rather plan ahead (ibid. 1.120a1-2: προνοήσασθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος).89  The same issue is 
dealt with by Philodemus, who in both of his economic treatises draws heavily from Metrodorus 
in order to condemn the Cynics’ rejection of all possessions and their practice of begging daily as 
involving much anxiety and torment (De oec. col. 13.32-3: καὶ φροντίδ[α]ς καὶ [ἀγ]ωνίας), 
both of which ultimately result in more pain than pleasure.90  Instead, the sage economist 
recognizes the importance of planning ahead, as Philodemus explains: 
Δεῖ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ συνάξειν τι καὶ τὸ συναχθὲν φυλάξειν ‘μὴ τὸ παρὸν εὖ 
ποιεῖν’, κατ’ Ἐπίχαρμον, οὐ μόνον δαπάνης ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ προφανέντος κέρδους 
ἁρπαστικὸν γινόμενον, προνοεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος· (De oec. col. 25.4-12) 
 
And it is necessary to gather something as provision and to preserve what has been 
gathered (“lest one should live well for the moment,” as Epicharmus says), and, making 
acquisitions not only with a mind towards actual expenses but also foreseeable profits, to 
be mindful of the future. 
 
The importance of forethought and the recognition that wealth acquisition, even if accompanied 
by some toil, is preferable to mendicancy is communicated by Horace’s fabulous simile,91 which 
emphasizes the ant’s industry and providence: 
89See Asmis (2004) 148, Gigante (1992) 29-36 and Castaldi (1928) 291. 
  
90Philodemus discusses this issue at length in De oec. coll. 12.5-17.2, for which see 
Tsouna (2007) 177-80, Balch (2004) 184-86, Asmis (2004) 149-61 and Laurenti (1973) 97-149.  
For Cynic beggary (πτωχεία) as the rejection of all possessions and thus distinct from Epicurean 
poverty (πενία), which is the possession of few things, see De div. coll. 42.31-5 and 45.15-18 as 
well as Balch (2004) 195-89, Gigante (1992) 39-42 and Castaldi (1928) 305. 
    
91Cf. the Aesopic version (Perry 373).  Marchesi (2005) 310 (n. 11) notes, however, that 
the ant’s laboriousness was so common in antiquity that it is difficult to connect Horace’s 
passage specifically to Aesop.  For fables as rhetorical and moral exempla, see Holzberg (2002) 
1-38, who does not include the above passage in his list of Horace’s references to fables (32).  
For their role in Roman education, see Bonner (1977) 254-56, who mentions their popularity 
among children.  This may be suggested by Horace’s earlier simile (25-26): ut pueris olim dant 
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                                                 sicut  
parvola—nam exemplo est—magni formica laboris 
ore trahit quodcumque potest atque addit acervo 
quem struit, haud ignara ac non incauta futuri. (S. 1.32-5) 
Even as the tiny, hard-working ant (for she is their model) drags all she can with her 
mouth, and adds it to the heap she is building, because she is not unaware and not 
heedless of the morrow. 
 
Translating the standardized Greek epithet πολύμοχθος (cf. ps.-Phocyl. 170), Horace connects 
the ant to his previous characters by means of her “great labor,” which she undergoes for the 
sake of financial stability.92  In contrast to their restlessness and obsession with gain, however, 
the ant’s toil is favorably described in terms of reserved caution (35: non incauta) and passive 
awareness (35: haud ignara), which motivate her to plan for the future.93  Unlike the shameless 
dog, therefore, whom the Cynics considered a pristine example of how to live according to 
nature,94 the ant lives by calculated forethought and enjoys the worthwhile benefits of her toil, 
crustula blandi | doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima (“even as teachers sometimes give 
cookies to children to coax them into learning their ABCs”).  His delightful story of the laborious 
ant, therefore, is a metaphorical “cookie” (crustulum) intended to sweeten an elementary lesson 
(elementa prima).  Cf. Lucr. 1.936-38.  The Cynics were widely recognized in antiquity for 
promoting their extreme asceticism by means of “sweeteners.”  Diogenes, for example, 
compared his comic style to medicinal honey (for which, see Oltramare [1926] 15), while Bion 
reputedly stated that the only way to please the vulgar masses is to “transform oneself into a 
honeyed cake” (Kindstrand [1976] F18: πλακοῦντα γενόμενον).  
    
92For the ant as negatively characterized for its “love of gain” (φιλοκερδὴς θηριώδης), 
see Gerhard (1909) 27 and Laurenti (1973) 103.  
 
93Cf. Ep. 2.2.190-91: utar et ex modico, quantum res poscet, acervo, | tollam (“I shall use 
and from my modest heap take what need requires”).  See Wimmel (1962) 15-16 and Rudd 
(1966) 29.  A very different emphasis occurs at Verg. G. 1.185-86, according to which the pesky 
ant is motivated by fear: populatque ingentem farris acervum | curculio atque inopi metuens 
formica senectae (“Or the weevil ravages a huge heap of grain, or the ant, anxious for a destitute 
old age”).  Horace describes the wise man’s economic prudence by using the expression metuens 
futuri at 2.2.110, although this is not the same kind of destructive fear the miser experiences, as 
will be shown below.  
  
94See Gerhard (1909) 23-4, Oltramare (1962) 49 and 145 and Fiske (1971) 223. 
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just as the sage economist is “not unaware of the toil involved in such possessions, nor of the 
enjoyment that comes from it” (De oec. coll. 18.45-19.1: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ πόνος ὁ καθ’ ὁποιανοῦν 
κτῆσιν [ἄ]δηλος αὐτῶ[ι] δῆλον ὡς οὔθ’ ἡ τέρψις ἡ διὰ τ[ὴν κτῆσι]ν).  In addition to rejecting 
Cynic mendicancy, in their economic treatises Philodemus and Metrodorus also apply to the sage 
a “measure of wealth” (ibid. col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον), which, in accordance with a 
similar doctrine expressed by Aristotle in the Politica (1257b30-1258a14) and influenced by his 
description of the mean (Eth. Nic. 1107b5-10), places a certain limit to wealth acquisition within 
the context of household economics.95  Philodemus follows Epicurus in valuing wealth as a 
useful means of satisfying necessary desires (cf. Arr. 1.121b4: ἀπορήσαντα), but places 
additional value on its ability to increase the general quality of life by removing difficulties, 
provided that this is not accompanied by more pain than pleasure (cf. De oec. col. 14.9-23).  
Under no circumstances, however, will the sage become a professional moneymaker or view 
wealth acquisition as an end in itself:96 
95See Tsouna (2007) 177-80, Asmis (2004) 165, Natali (1995) 111-12 and Laurenti 
(1973) 99 for the πλούτου μέτρον doctrine in Philodemus.  As Rudd (1996) 23 notes, the notion 
of equating virtue with the avoidance of extremes (especially ὕβρις), which was crystallized in 
doctrinal form by Aristotle, is certainly much older and even part of the fabric of ancient Greek 
culture. 
  
96For Philodemus’ identification of the sage as a good χρηματισμός but not a 
φιλοχρήματος, see Tsouna (2007) 192-94 and Natali (1995) 112-14.  This should be contrasted 
with the definition of economic prudence (σωφροσύνη) given by Xenophon’s spokesman 
Ischomachus at Oec. 7.15: ἀλλὰ σωφρόνων τοί ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς οὕτως ποιεῖν, 
ὅπως τά τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἕξει καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου 
προσγενήσεται (“[D]iscretion . . . means acting in such a manner that their possessions shall be 
in the best condition possible, and that as much as possible shall be added to them by fair and 
honorable means”).  Cic. Off. 1.25 gives a similar description: Nec vero rei familiaris 
amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est (“Still, I do not 
mean to find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody, but unjust 
acquisition of it is always to be avoided”). 
93 
 
                                                     
 Τεχνίτης μὲν οὖν ἅμα καὶ ἐργάτης [κ]τήσεως πολλῆς καὶ ταχέως συναγομένης οὐκ 
 ἴσως ῥητέος ὁ σοφός· ἔστι γὰρ δύναμις καὶ περὶ χρηματισμὸν, ἧς οὐ κοινωνήσει 
 σπουδαῖος ἀ[ν]ήρ. (De oec. col. 17.2-9) 
Let not the sage be called an expert or a practitioner at generating much wealth and 
collecting it efficiently, for there is indeed a certain expertise and ability concerning 
moneymaking in which the prudent man will not take part. 
 
Philodemus’ point is that the sage may freely acquire even great wealth, but that this must not be 
motivated by fear of poverty or a perverted understanding of the practical value of money; above 
all, the sage’s economic practices must not violate the pleasure calculus.  This doctrine appears 
to be instantiated by Horace’s ant, whose wisdom allows her to gather substantial stores with the 
ultimate goal of actually enjoying their benefits and providing for her needs: 
quae, simul inversum contristat Aquarius annum, 
non usquam prorepit et illis utitur ante 
quaesitis sapiens97 . . . (S. 1.1.36-8) 
Yet she, soon as Aquarius saddens the upturned year, stirs out no more but uses the store 
she gathered beforehand, wise creature that she is . . . 
  
By means of the transitional quae,98 Horace effectively shifts the argument’s focus from the toil 
involved in acquisition to the topic of wealth limitation, of which the ant suddenly becomes a 
primary exemplar.  The tiny creature’s “wisdom” is conveyed by the prudence and logic of her 
economic practices,99 which are clearly limited (non usquam prorepit) and adhere to the 
97The reading sapiens, which is given by Ψ and Blandin(ian)us, seems more appropriate 
than patiens, which appears in Ξ.  As Wimmel (1962) 16 n. 16 observes, however, the latter 
reading would still be consistent with Horace’s portrayal of the ant’s ability to “endure” a 
measure of wealth (cf. 1.1.106: modus).  
  
98Rudd (1966) 29: “So the innocent quae in v. 36 has actually the force of at ea.  It 
represents the very thin end of the wedge which Horace is about to drive between the ant and the 
greedy man.” 
  
99Schlegel (2005) 23 calls the ant “The only sapiens in the poem.”  Cf. Hes. Op. 778, 
where she is referred to as “the knowing one” (ἴδρις). 
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requirements of the pleasure calculus: the previous toil involved in gathering stores (illis ante 
quaesitis) is outweighed by her present enjoyment (utitur).100  As will soon become clear, 
Horace’s entertaining description of the ant is carefully opposed to his portrayal of the miser, and 
as such provides the key to understanding his economic message. 
Horace’s extended description of the miser’s irrational behavior and bizarre 
administration of wealth, which depend heavily on the Cynic and comic traditions, may also be 
interpreted as projections of his underlying false desires and fears.  One may compare this to 
Philodemus’ description of the safeguards necessary for financial security and prosperity, which 
includes above all the responsible management of one’s desires and fears: 
 Ὧν δ’ ἐπιτηδευτέον εἰς π[ρ]όσοδον καὶ τήρησιν ταύτης τε καὶ τῶν προϋπαρχόν[τ]ων 
 τὸ μὲν συνέ[χ]ον ἡγητέον ἐν τῆι τῶν ἐπιθυμίων εὐσταλείαι καὶ τῶν [φ]όβων· 
 (De oec. col. 23.36-43) 
Of the things that one must pursue for the sake of revenue and the protection of both this 
and the possessions one had before, one must keep in mind that the principle one consists 
in managing one’s desires and fears. 
 
In the lines following this passage he specifically identifies the desire for “admiration” (ibid. 
coll. 23.46-24.1: π[ε]ριβλέψε[ις]), which also suggests the competition inspired by envy (or, as 
commonly designated in Greek, πλεονεξία) as one of the primary causes of the mismanagement 
 
100Fiske (1971) 232 compares this portion of the ant simile to the following fragment 
from Lucilius, which may have expressed to same view through a similar example (561 M): sic 
tu illos fructus quaeras, adversa hieme olim | quis uti possis ac delectare domi te (“Thus should 
you also acquire such fruits as you may enjoy and delight in at home when adverse weather 
arrives”).  Cf. also De oec. col. 18.40-44: Μετρήσει μὲν οὖν ἴσως τὸ συμφέρον καὶ κτήσει καὶ 
φυλακῆι πολὺ βέλτισθ’ οὗτος, ὥστε μὴ πλείω [π]ονεῖν διὰ τὰ χρήματ’ ἤπερ εὐπαθεῖν (“[The 
sage] will better calculate what is beneficial for both the acquisition and preservation of things, 
so as not to engage in more labor for the sake of money than pleasure”).   
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of wealth.101  One may compare this to the Horatian miser’s year-round pursuit of wealth and 
insatiable desire to become the Uncle Scrooge of ancient Rome: 
                             cum te neque fervidus aestus  
demoveat lucro neque hiems, ignis mare ferrum, 
nil obstet tibi, dum ne sit te ditior alter.  (S. 1.1.38-40) 
While as for you, neither burning heat, nor winter, fire, sea, sword, can turn you aside 
from gain—nothing stops you, until no second man be richer than yourself.102 
 
Our first impression of the miser, therefore, occurs within the context of his need to outstrip all 
others in financial prosperity and win universal admiration, although this is not explicitly 
revealed as a false desire until later: at the very heart of the poem, Horace introduces the partial 
answer to his introductory question Qui fit by the following verses (61-2): at bona pars hominum 
decepta cupidine falso | ‘nil satis est,’ inquit, ‘quia tanti quantum habeas sis’ (“But a good many 
people, misled by false desire, say ‘You can never have enough: for you are worth as much as 
you have’”).  The expression “worth as much as you have” appears to have been a commonplace 
in ancient literature, which influenced the Cynics as well as Lucilius and Plutarch;103 as Pseudo-
101Cf. Lucr. 2.11-12, in which the vulgar masses are described as contending “night and 
day with ever-present toil in order to achieve the greatest wealth and possess property” (noctes 
atque dies niti praestante labore | ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri)   
 
102Gold (1992) 168-69 interprets the second person pronoun singular tu, which occurs 
frequently in lines 38-91, as addressed to the “internal audience” as represented by the vicious 
miser.  Lyne (1995) 139-43, on the other hand, notes the grammatical ambiguity of tu throughout 
the poem and considers the possibility that it occasionally refers to Maecenas (especially at lines 
38, 40 and 41).   
 
103It is expressed already in Pind. Isthm. 2.11, and more explicitly by Bion (Fiske [1971] 
237) to which cf. Plut. Mor. 50 (De cupiditate divitiarum): κέρδαινε καὶ φειδοῦ, καὶ τοσούτου 
νόμιζε σεαυτὸν ἄξιον εἶναι ὅσον ἂν ἔχῃς (“Make acquisitions and take care of them, and 
consider your worth as determined by your possessions”).  A similar passage occurs in Lucilius 
(1119 M): aurum atque ambitio specimen virtutis est: | tantum habeas, tantum ipse sies tantique 
habearis (“Gold and public approval are virtue’s ideal: you will be regarded and valued in 
accordance with how much you possess”).  
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Acro noted long ago, however, Horace specifically roots this desire in a false or empty opinion 
(ad 61: Falsa opinione, aut inepta et inani cupiditate), which scholars have rightly connected to 
Epicurus’ description of the exaggerated desire to fulfill a natural need as originating in idle 
imaginings (Arr. 1.5.149.9-12: κενοδοξίαν).104  In the case of the miser, he incorrectly imagines 
that more wealth will result in more happiness (72: gaudere) and tranquility (31: otia), which 
consequently urges him to amass limitless heaps of unused cash (70-73) in the boundless search 
for money and self-worth (92: sit finis quaerendi; 106: est modus).105  Unlike the ant, therefore, 
who observes the proper modus by making calculated “expenditures” in accordance with her 
means (cf. De oec. col. 25.23-4: κατὰ τὰς ὑπάρξεις ἀναλίσκε[ι]ν) and rations wealth in order to 
satisfy both natural and necessary desires, the miser views wealth acquisition as an end in itself 
and refuses to enjoy its benefits (73): nescis quo valeat nummus, quem praebeat usum? (“Don’t 
you know what money is for, what end it serves?”).106  As Epicurus states, however, the objects 
of limitless desires, such as wealth and admiration, cannot of themselves procure freedom from 
disturbances or result in true happiness and joy: 
 Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος 
 ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὔθ’ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περίβλεψις οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν 
 παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας. (Αrr. 6.81) 
 
104Fiske (1971) 236, Rudd (1966) 24 and Schlegel (2005) 22.  Horace perhaps 
underscores the irrationality of the miser’s false opinion concerning hoarded wealth by placing 
into his mouth the Lucretian phrase suave est (51), which originally refers to the tranquility of 
those who have withdrawn from the race for wealth (cf. Lucr. 2.1-2). 
 
105Cf. Cic. Fin. 1.45: inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest 
(“No measure or limit, moreover, can be found for empty desires”).  According to Teles (Hense 
[1969] 43), Bion similarly taught that limitless desires for wealth push one into service like a 
slave. 
 
106Gowers (2012) 76, commenting on usum: “‘enjoyment,’ in the Epicurean or financial 
sense.”  
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The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession 
of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else 
that is associated with unlimited causes. 
 
The notion that substantial wealth cannot eliminate disturbances or contribute to happiness is 
associated with Epicurus’ teaching that pleasure cannot be increased beyond the satisfaction of 
basic and necessary desires (Arr. 144.8-12).  This is echoed by Philodemus, who states that, 
since the requirements of nature are easily satisfied, the loss of wealth is “indifferent” (De div. 
col. 53.3-5: [ἀδιά]φορο[ν]) and that one may derive “equal pleasures” from wealth and poverty 
(ibid. col. 56.4-8: ἴσ[ας] ἡδονάς).107  For this reason the sage economist is not disturbed or 
frightened by financial loss, which is certainly more than can be said of the miser. 
Horace completes his identification of the underlying reasons for economic vice by 
incorporating the negative consequences of fear into his description of false desire.  According to 
the poet, it is the “fear of poverty” (1.1.93: pauperiem metuas minus; cf. 76: metu), the “terror of 
evil theft” (77: formidare malos fures) and the “dread of being oppressed by scarcity of food” 
(98-9: ne se penuria victus | opprimeret, metuebat) that drives the miser to take drastic measures 
in order to guard his ever-growing wealth.108  This exaggerated concern for his livelihood, for 
instance, scares him into thinking that any expenditure will result in the complete liquidation of 
his resources:   
quid iuvat inmensum te argenti pondus et auri 
furtim defossa timidum deponere terra? 
“quod, si conminuas, vilem redigatur ad assem.” (S. 1.41-3) 
107See Asmis (2004) 152.  
 
108Cf. Lucr. 1076-1094, where the empty fear of death is the underlying cause of the 
vulgar masses’ “great desire for life” (vitai tanta cupido), which is projected by their 
discontentment and constant labor. 
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What good to you is a vast weight of silver and gold, if in terror you stealthily bury it in a 
hole in the ground?  “But if one splits it up, it would dwindle to a paltry penny.”  
 
Horace’s description of the miser secretly burying his gold, which echoes a similar passage in  
 
Plautus (Aul. 6-8),109 also serves to distinguish him from the wise ant’s careful use of her  
 
store.110  The inclusion of timidum, moreover, reveals his economic habits as influenced by the  
 
fearful equation of expenditures with poverty, which Philodemus associates with the wretched  
 
toil and anxiety avoided by the sage economist:  
 
 Κτᾶσθαι μέντοι γ’οὐ δυνήσεται πλεῖστα καὶ τάχιστα καὶ διαθεωρεῖν, ὅθεν ἂν 
 μάλιστα τὸ πλεῖον αὔξοιτο, μηδὲν ἀπομετρῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πλέον 
 καὶ τοὔλαττον, καὶ τὰ προϋπάρχοντ’ ἀεὶ φυλάττειν ἐντόνως· πολὺς γὰρ ὁ πόνος ἤδη 
 περὶ τοῦτο καὶ μετὰ φροντίδος σκληρᾶς γιγνόμενος καὶ πᾶν τιθείσης ἐν πενίαι τὸ 
 δυσχερές. (De oec. col. 19.4-16) 
[The sage] will not acquire as much as possible very quickly or examine closely whence 
his surplus may be increased most of all, measuring off nothing with regard to the 
ultimate purpose but with regard to the more and the less, and always striving to 
safeguard his possessions.  For the toil associated with this is great and brings bitter 
anxiety, which equates every difficulty with poverty.  
 
As Philodemus explains, the fear of poverty is completely unfounded, primarily because the 
requirements of nature are easily satisfied (ibid. col. 19.16-19): ἐναργῶς τῆς φύσεως 
δεικνυούσης, ἄν τις αὐτῆι προσέχηι, διότι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις εὐκόλως χρήσεσθ’ (“although 
nature makes it clear that if anyone pays attention to her, since she is easily satisfied and requires 
few things”); for this reason, worry about an economic fall is “not worthy of fear” (De div. col. 
109Cf. also Theoph. Ch. 10.14: καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ τῶν μικρολόγων καὶ τὰς ἀργυροθήκας 
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν εὐρωτιώσας καὶ τὰς κλεῖς ἰουμένας (In fine you may see the money-chests of the 
penurious covered in mold and their keys in rust”). 
  
110Heinze (1889) 18 and Fraenkel (1957) 93-4 note that the portrayal of animals as free 
from such practices was a standard Cynic theme.  Cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8: τίς γὰρ λέων ἐς γῆν 
κατέκρυψε χρυσόν; (“What lion every hid gold in the ground?”).   
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12.14: οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον φόβου).  One may, for example, quite easily fulfill necessary desires for 
food by purchasing basic foodstuffs, as Horace reminds the miser (1.1.74-5): panis ematur, 
holus, vini sextarius, adde | quis humana sibi doleat natura negatis (“You may buy bread, 
greens, a measure of wine, and such other things as would mean pain to our human nature, if 
withheld”).111  Although Horace’s advice concerning such meager fare may appear to have an 
ascetically Cynic flavor, a few distinctions should be made: first, the Cynics were famous in 
antiquity for their rejection of all social conventions, which especially included money, as 
Diogenes’ divinely-inspired injunction to “deface the coin” reveals (Diog. Laert. 6.20-21);112 
furthermore, even relatively less austere Cynics like Bion equated “independence” (αὐτάρκεια) 
with extreme “poverty” (πενία), which for them entailed the complete rejection of such basic 
conventions as beds, eating utensils and wine.113  As mentioned already, Epicureans like 
Philodemus condemn the Cynics’ view of poverty as entailing mendicancy (De div. col. 45.15-
17: πτωχεία[ν] . . . στέρ[ησιν οὐ] πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ πάν[των]), which is an evil (ibid. 43.4-5: 
κα[κόν δὲ π]τωχεία), and instead emphatically define πενία as “the possession of few things” 
111Porphyrio likewise links this passage to “necessary desires” (ad 75: quae sunt 
necessariae).  Cf. 1.2.111-12 for similar advice: natura . . . quid latura sibi, quid sit dolitura, 
negatum (“Nature . . . what satisfaction she will give herself, what privation will cause her 
pain”).  Cf. also 1.6.115: porri et ciceris (“leeks and chickpeas”).  For Epicurus’ teaching on 
necessary desires, see Arr. 5.149.1-8. 
 
112See Desmond (2008) 98-103 for the Cynics’ renunciation of money.    
 
 113Oltramare (19) 51-2 and Kinstrand (1976) 217-18.  The evidence from Teles is 
preserved by Hense (1969) 7-8, which involves a speech given by Poverty personified and is 
worth quoting here: καὶ ἡ Πενία ἂν εἴποι . . . “ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεὴς εἶ; ἢ οὐ μεσταὶ 
μὲν αἱ ὁδοὶ λαχάνων, πλήρεις δὲ αἱ κρῆναι ὕδατος; οὐκ εὐνάς σοι τοσαύτας παρέχω ὁπόση 
γῆ; Καὶ στρωμνὰς φύλλα; . . . ἢ πεινᾷ τις πλακοῦντα ἢ διψᾷ Χῖον;” (“And Poverty would say: 
“indeed, do you lack any of the necessities of life?  Do not roads pass through the midst of wild 
greens, and are not the natural springs full of water?  Do I not supply you with the earth as your 
bed and the leaves as your blanket? . . . Does one’s hunger demand honeyed cakes or one’s thirst 
Chian wine?”). 
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(ibid. col. 49.11 = 45.4-5: ὕπαρ[ξιν] τῶν ὀλίγων), which is a good (ibid. col. 49.11-12: ὅ ἐστιν 
ἀγαθ[όν]).  This is the context in which Philodemus asserts that the sage, though unwilling to 
engage in toilsome beggary, will be content with few possessions and not fear poverty (De oec. 
coll. 15.45-16.4): [οὔ]τε [γ]ὰρ ἀσχαλᾶι σώφρων ἀνὴρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρρὴς τῆι 
ταπεινῆι καὶ πενιχρᾶι διαίτηι, τὸ φυσικὸν εἰδὼς καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης διοικούμενον (“[The sage] is 
confident with regard to the future and the possibility of a poor and meager life, for he knows 
that the requirements of nature are satisfied even by this”).  Being poor, therefore, means 
possessing “what suffices” (cf. col. 16.7-8: τὰ . . . ἱκανά) without being distressed by the 
unquenchable desire for more (cf. De div. col. 58.8-9: τῆς [ἐ]πιθυμίας τῆς π[ρ]ὸς πλοῦτον).  
The same advice is offered by Horace when he states the importance of “requiring only what one 
needs” (1.1.59: at qui tantuli eget quantus est opus),114 and it also explains his careful distinction 
between being “poor” (79: pauperrimus; cf. Carm. 1.1.18: pauperiem pati) and living without 
any means whatsoever (103-4): non ego avarum | cum veto te, fieri vappam iubeo ac nebulonem 
(“When I call on you not to be a miser, I am not bidding you become a worthless prodigal”).  
114Cf. Ep. 1.2.46: quod satis est cui contingit nihil amplius optet (“Whoever lives 
according to what is sufficient does not long for anything more”).  I disagree with Fiske (1971) 
224-25, who equates Horace’s understanding of satis with the Cynic teaching that the sage will 
live ἀρκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσι (see Hense [1969] 38).  The expression τοῖς παροῦσι seems to 
me to entail “that which is at one’s immediate disposal” (i.e., the earth, natural springs, wild 
barley etc.); Horace’s point, however, is not that the miser should get rid of his money and live 
like a beggar, but that he should learn to administer it properly and enjoy its benefits responsibly.  
Cf. Horace’s explicit rejection of Cynic beggary at Ep. 1.17 (the pleasure-seeking Cyrenaic 
Aristippus addresses a Cynic straw man):  
 
                          equus ut me portet, alet rex,   
officium facio; tu poscis vilia, verum 
dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem. (Ep. 1.17.20-21) 
 
“[My conduct is better by far]: I do service that I may have a horse to ride and be fed by a 
prince; you beg for paltry doles, but you become inferior to the giver, though you pose as 
needing no man.” 
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Above all, he reminds the miser that there is “moderation in property management” (106: est 
modus in rebus),115 and that, rather than living like a Cynic beggar or fearfully hoarding treasure, 
he should imitate the wise ant by acquiring and enjoying wealth responsibly. 
Towards the end of his ethical investigation Horace considers the detrimental 
consequences of overvaluing wealth, which, aside from the immense toil and anxiety already 
mentioned, includes universal abandonment.  In his description of the many benefits associated 
with cultivating friendships, Philodemus mentions that, far from being a financial burden, close 
friends are “a more profitable acquisition . . . than tilled land and a most secure treasure against 
the turns of fortune” (De oec. col. 24.47-25.4: κτήσει[ς λ]υσιτελέστεραι . . . ἤπερ ἀγρῶν καὶ 
πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροί).116  Indeed, the cultivation of friendship is described 
as sowing seeds in the earth, from which it becomes possible to “reap the fruit many times over” 
(ibid. col. 25.18-21: πολλαπ[λάσι]α καρπίζεσθαι γίνεται).  Part of this process involves 
philanthropy (cf. col. 18.34 τὸ φιλάνθρωπ[ον]),117 and, according to Philodemus, the sage is 
always concerned with sharing surplus wealth with his friends, whose companionship ultimately 
contributes to the preservation of suitably acquired wealth (ibid. col. 24.19-35).  The greedy and 
115This meaning of res, which is often equated with land (cf. 1.1.50: iugera centum), is 
confirmed by the obvious parallel in 1.4.31-2: nequid | summa deperdat metuens aut ampliet ut 
rem (“[the miser] fearful lest he lose aught of his total, or fail to add to his wealth”); cf. also 
1.4.110: patriam rem.  Gowers (2012) 81 notes the following: “Technically modus is a measured 
amount, sometimes of land . . . here, connected with fixed boundaries (certi fines), it recalls 
physical images of plots of land.”  Cf. also Lucil. (1331 M): virtus quaerendae finem re scire 
modumque (“Virtue is knowing when to limit and control the search for wealth”). 
 
116For the importance of φιλία in this treatise, see Laurenti (1973) 168-72, Asmis (2004) 
173-76 and Tsouna (2007) 182-83.  The importance of friendship in times of financial crisis will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
117Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 8.1155a115-20 for the identification of philanthropy as an 
expression of the natural bond that exists between members of the same species.  
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acquisitive economist, on the other hand, hoards wealth, isolates himself from society, incurs the 
hatred of others and consequently jeopardizes his revenue: 
Καὶ μὴν ἀφιλία δοκεῖ μὲν ἀναλωμάτων κουφίζε[ιν], ἀσυνεργήτους δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπὸ 
πάντος καταφρονουμένους καὶ [ὑ]π’ εὐνοίας ἀπολυωρήτους, ἐξ ὧν οὔτε πρόσοδος 
ἀξιόλογος οὔτε τήρ[η]σις ἀσφαλής, ὥστε ἂν φιλίαν περιποι[ῆ]ται, καθ’ ἑκάτε[ρον] 
εὐτυχή[σ]ει.  Καὶ ἀφιλανθ[ρω]πία δὲ [κ]αὶ ἀνημερότης ζημιοῖ πολ[λ]ὰ καὶ 
ἀβοη[θ]ήτου[ς] ποιεῖ , πολ[λ]άκις δ’ ἄρδ[η]ν ἀν[αρ]πάζεσθαι [τ]ὴν οὐσίαν.  
(De oec. col. 24.19-33)  
 
Indeed, traditional managers think that friendlessness procures relief from costs, but it 
isolates them and makes them despised by everyone and not highly esteemed with regard 
to people’s favor, which does not lead to suitable revenue or secure preservation; 
consequently, if he should cultivate friendships then he would be fortunate in each of 
these areas.  But misanthropy and rudeness cause much suffering, make one helpless and 
often cause one’s property to be plundered entirely. 
 
Perhaps a perfect example of this is afforded by our miser, whose overwhelming preference for 
money (cf. 1.1.86: cum tu argento post omnia ponas) is analyzed within the context of a 
hypothetical situation: in the case of a medical emergency, he would be completely abandoned 
and left alone helplessly to face the “turns of fortune,” as Horace explains:  
at si condoluit temptatum frigore corpus 
aut alius casus lecto te affixit, habes qui  
assideat, fomenta paret, medicum roget, ut te 
suscitet ac reddat gnatis carisque propinquis? 
non uxor salvuum te volt, non filius; omnes 
vicini oderunt, noti, pueri atque puellae. (S. 1.1.80-85) 
But if your body is seized with a chill and racked with pain, or some other mishap has 
pinned you to your bed, have you someone to sit by you, to get lotions ready, to call in 
the doctor so as to raise you up and restore you to your children and dear kinsmen?  No, 
your wife does not want you well, nor does your son: everyone hates you, neighbors and 
acquaintances, boys and girls. 
 
Contrary to the sage economist, therefore, the miser continues to lose friends and suffer more 
intensely on account of his perverted administration and understanding of wealth.  In addition to 
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this, moreover, Philodemus notes that such reckless mismanagement and misanthropy runs the 
risk of incurring the envy of others, whose desire to plunder wealth (cf. De oec. col. 24.32: 
ἀν[αρ]πάζεσθαι [τ]ὴν οὐσίαν) often results in unspeakable deeds of violence (cf. De inv. fr. 6: 
μοχθηρὰ πράττειν).118  The relationship between wealth and envy, which was somewhat of a 
commonplace of moral philosophy,119 affects even close friends and family members, as 
Horace’s story about the fate of Ummidius at the murderous hands of his liberta clearly shows 
(1.1.99-100): at nunc liberta securi | divisit medium, fortissima Tyndaridarum (“Yet a 
freedwoman cleft him in twain with the axe, bravest of the Tyndarid breed”).120  With this grave 
warning, Horace proceeds to conclude his analysis of the empty desires and fears underlying the 
vulgar masses’ discontentment (cf. 108-9: nemo | se probet), which, as has been shown, is 
closely related to avarice and manifests itself in the endless contest over wealth (cf. 113: 
locupletior) and willingness to undergo perpetual toil (cf. 112: hunc atque hunc superare 
laboret). 
Horace’s ethical approach in Sermones 1.1 has often been examined within the context of 
popular philosophy as expressed by the Cynic diatribe, and for obvious reasons; as the preceding 
section has shown, his moral advice also engages with contemporary Epicurean views 
concerning wealth administration as evidenced by Philodemus’ economic treatises.  This advice, 
moreover, which takes the form of a relaxed dialogue between sage client and receptive patron, 
118Cf. also Arist. Eth. Eud. 1234a30: ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται, πρὸς 
γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (“Therefore envy contributes to injustice, for the actions 
that spring from it affect another person”).    
 
119See Gerhard (1909) 92-4 for the evidence.  In De libertate dicendi Philodemus notes 
that the sage is “free of all envy” (col. 1b.6-7: φθόνου καθαρός). 
 
120Gowers (2012) 80: “[T]he miser who occupies two poles of existence is split down the 
middle in a parody of the golden mean by an axe-wielding freedwoman.”  
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may occur within the larger context of the ideal Epicurean community as described by 
Philodemus in De oeconomia.  The intimacy of the relationship between Horace and Maecenas, 
the role of poetry as useful advice and the nature of this advice with regard to wealth and 
property management have been the central focus of this chapter.  In the following chapter, the 
role of Epicurean economic theory in Sermones 2 will be examined, which will require careful 
consideration of how the relationship between Horace and Maecenas changed over the decade, 
especially in light of the poet’s continued withdrawal from society and newfound status as a 
landowner in his own right.  Of special importance will be the details associated with Horace’s 
management of his Sabine estate, which he received from his grateful patron in 33 BC, and how 
this reflects or even challenges Philodemus’ economic advice. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EPICUREAN ECONOMIC  
 
THEORY IN SERMONES 2 
 
 
The second book of the Sermones presents Horace’s audience with a very different approach to 
ethical investigation, which largely reflects the heightened tension of political events leading up 
to and following the Battle of Actium in 31 BC.  As the civil war between Antony and Octavian 
steadily escalates and perceived threats from prominent figures like Cicero are met with 
gruesome violence, Horatian satire’s already subdued libertas becomes further restrained, in 
accordance with Trebatius’ legal advice in Sermones 2.1, by complete silence (cf. 5: quiescas) 
and the withdrawal into what has been described as a “walled garden.”1  This personal 
withdrawal is most obviously expressed by Horace’s delegation of the satiric role to other 
speakers, who are generally portrayed as dispossessed or bankrupt sages, loquacious diatribists 
and, to use Anderson’s description, doctores inepti.2   Rather than completely preclude moral 
sincerity, however, the presence of such parodic elements has a tempering or balancing effect 
reminiscent of the poet’s method in Book 1 (cf. 1.1.24: ridentem dicere verum).  With this in 
mind, the following chapter will consider first the advice given by one of these speakers in 
Sermones 2.2 identified as Ofellus, a dispossessed farmer whose views concerning wealth 
administration communicate many of the teachings expounded in Philodemus’ economic 
treatises.  It will also examine Horace’s self-deprecating portrayal of the Stoic “sage” 
1Rudd (1966) 131.  See also Freudenburg (2001) 71-5.  
 
2Anderson (1982) 42, although I intend to show that the precepts of these speakers often 
contain accurate and coherently expressed philosophical teachings (especially in the case of 
Ofellus).  Oliensis (1998) 54 discusses the connection between Horace and these speakers.  For a 
useful introduction to Sermones 2 in general, see Muecke (2007) 109-20. 
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Damasippus in Sermones 2.3, who incorporates similar economic advice into his analysis of 
Horace’s moral and financial inconsistency.  His criticisms are particularly relevant, especially 
given the poet’s acquisition of the Sabine estate in 33 BC and newfound economic status as 
landowner in his own right.  This will be explored lastly as the central topic of Sermones 2.6, in 
which Horace’s wishful retirement to his country getaway and desire to engage in philosophical 
discussion with close friends reflects the ideal Epicurean community as described by 
Philodemus. 
In Sermones 2.2 Horace indirectly expounds upon the virtues of economic restraint by 
casting philosophical precepts into the mouth of a rustic sage, whose portrayal as a conservative 
Roman peasant resembles that of the poet’s father in Sermones 1.4 and may similarly conceal 
“suspicious” Greek doctrines.  The sage is identified as Ofellus, an Apulian local who had 
recently been dispossessed of his “little farm” (114: metato agello), which is a financial loss he 
has borne with equanimity and transformed into the opportunity for a diatribe on simple living: 
 
 Quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo, 
—nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecepit Ofellus 
rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva—,  
discite non inter lances mensasque nitentis . . . (S. 2.2.1-4) 
What and how great, my friends, is the virtue of frugal living—now this is no talk of 
mine, but is the teaching of Ofellus, a peasant, a philosopher unschooled and of rough 
mother-wit—learn, I say, not amid the tables’ shining dishes . . .  
 
The character of Ofellus bears close resemblance to Horace’s father, who was also a bumpkin 
sage raised on a “starveling farm” (1.6.71: macro pauper agello) and whose virtuous ability to 
live frugally and content with few possessions is transmitted to others as precepts.3  In addition 
to this, Ofellus also resembles the poet himself, who, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
 3Barbieri (1977) 486 acknowledges some of these parallels.  
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similarly lost his paternal inheritance as a result of the resettlement program (Ep. 2.2.49-52).4  
And while it is possible that Ofellus was an historical figure known to Horace in his youth (cf. 
112-13: puer . . . Ofellum . . . novi),5 the aforementioned parallels between this rustic sage and 
the poet suggest that the former functions as the latter’s mouthpiece for communicating 
philosophical and economic advice to contemporary Romans.6  Of course, Horace attempts to 
disassociate his surrogate from the Greek philosophical tradition by emphasizing his rusticity and 
homespun wisdom (3: abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva),7 both of which contrast with the 
exotic luxury and overindulgence which for centuries traditional Romans had associated with the 
effeminate East, as Horace implies (10-11): si Romana fatigat | militia adsuetum graecari (“If 
Roman military training is too rigorous for one accustomed to Greek culture . . .”).8  On the other 
hand, the abundance of philosophical terms (virtus = ἀρετή; boni = ἀγαθοί; sapiens = σοφός), 
the reference to Socratic frugality (1: vivere parco), which, according to Cicero, was the ideal of 
Greek philosophers like Epicurus (Tusc. 5.89), and the learned imitation of the Platonic opening 
4This connection is also made by Coffey (1976) 83, Oliensis (1998) 54 and Freudenburg 
(2001) 99. 
  
5For the rare historical and epigraphic evidence for this name, which appears to be Oscan, 
see Schultze (1904) 291.     
 
6Cf. Fiske (1971) 379: “In this satire Ofellus is a Romanized counterpart of the popular 
Cynic preacher, who is used as the mouthpiece for Horace’s own philosophical ideas, just as 
Horace’s father was in satire 1.4.”    
 
7The qualification of Ofellus as an unschooled sage and the use of Athena’s Roman name 
both emphasize his portrayal as a traditional local.  See also Lejay (1915) 374, Kiessling-Heinze 
(1910) 168 and Courtney (2013) 131.  Muecke (1993) 117 notes that, although Ofellus is a 
home-schooled rustic, he nevertheless transmits his values “in the terms of Hellenistic ethics.”  
Bond (1980) 114-23 argues for “conscious inconsistency” in Horace’s depiction of Ofellus, 
whom he views as an Italian rustic with a knack for (in Bond’s view) mostly Stoic doctrines.  
 
8See Rudd (1966) 161-65, who also notes that austerum (12) discus (13) and aera (13) 
are Greek importations.  Also Muecke (1993) 118.     
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“this is not my story” (Sym. 177a: οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος),9 collaboratively undercut the poet’s 
clever smokescreen and suggest that what follows is perhaps a reflection of his own 
philosophical—but useful—convictions concerning wealth.  Regarding the delivery of Ofellus’ 
advice, it has been noted that his portrayal as a lowly but fervent preacher borrows many 
elements from the Cynic tradition;10 his identification as a quasi-Epicurean sage, however, may 
actually be a better fit: the rustic sage’s rejection of the sordidus victus (53-69) typically 
associated with Cynic “shamelessness” or ἀναίδεια is not only a possible reflection of Horace’s 
own opinion, but also a clear expression of that of conservative Romans like Cicero (Off. 130).11  
Unlike the Stoics, moreover, whose philosophical ideal was extreme and unattainable enough to 
elicit playful sarcasm from Horace (cf. Ep. 1.1.106-8), Epicurus’ universal invitation to 
philosophy (Arr. 4.122.1-11) effectively attracted Romans from all walks of life, including, as 
Cicero notes, respectable but uneducated rustics like Ofellus.12  As a matter of fact, Epicurus 
even states that, like Ofellus, the sage will be “fond of the countryside” (Arr. 1.120a.2: 
φιλαγρήσειν) and will closely associate the practice of philosophy with economic matters (Arr. 
9Some of these philosophical parallels are also given by Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 168, 
Rudd (1966) 170, Muecke (1993) 116, Freudenburg (2001) 110-11 and Courtney (2013) 131.  
 
10Fiske (1971) 379.   
  
11For the evidence, see Griffin (1996) 190-96.  
 
 12Cf. Cic. Off. 2.12: Itaque ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt Cincinnatum illum ut 
dictator esset, sic vos de plagis omnibus colligitis bonos illos quidem viros, sed certe non 
pereruditos (“Our ancestors brought old Cincinnatus from the plough to be dictator.  You 
ransack the country villages for your assemblage of doubtless respectable but certainly not very 
learned adherents”).  Note the connection between Cicero’s bonos and Ofellus’ identification of 
his audience as boni (1).  Bond (1980) 114-16, in discussing the term boni in this satire and its 
Greek equivalent ἀγαθοί, briefly traces its development from the Classical period, in which it 
refers strictly to the landed aristocracy (cf. the Roman usage), to Aristotle, in whose writings it 
takes on the moral and philosophical meaning of “virtuous.” 
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6.41): Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν (“One must laugh and philosophize and 
manage one’s economic affairs”).  One wonders, therefore, whether this connection influenced 
Horace’s choice to portray his sage as a country-dwelling local whose advice is economic in 
nature, or even whether the name Ofellus translates Philodemus’ description of the ideal 
economist as a “useful advisor” (De oec. col. 27.39: ὠφελή[σ]οντος), who, like Horace, is 
trustworthy and speaks with few words.13 
Immediately following the introduction of Ofellus as Horace’s authoritative replacement 
is an extended consideration of the requirements of nature as easily satisfied and affording the 
“highest pleasure” (2.2.20-21: summa voluptas).  This is briefly prefaced by the description of 
luxurious delicacies as originating in “false desires” (6: adclinis falsis) and resulting in poor 
physical health (5: insanis), both of which corrupt the mind’s ability to engage in discussions 
concerning the truth (7-9).14  Along similar lines, Epicurus identifies “physical health” (Arr. 
4.128.2: τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν) as essential for living happily but readily acquired through a 
13Rudd (1966) 144 suggests that the name may also communicate the frugality associated 
with small bits of food (ofella).  With regard to the role of speaker, Palmer (1893) 255 says that 
Horace quotes Ofellus verbatim throughout the poem, although Rudd (1966) 171 and Courtney 
(2013) 131 show that the rustic’s knowledge of Plato and other authors makes this highly 
unlikely.  As Muecke (1993) 114 notes, moreover, very little of what is said in this dialogue 
belongs unequivocally to Ofellus, who, rather than displaying the “excessive zeal” Anderson 
(1982) 44 attributes to both him and Damasippus, is a model of restraint and virtue.  For the 
concept of ὠφελία among the Cynics, which, given their rejection of convention, would not 
extend to the kind of economic advice given by Horace’s spokesman in Sermones 2.2, see 
Gerhard (1909) 32-3. 
  
14Cf. Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 169, who interpret insanis in terms of the unlimited (“über 
das Maß des Gewöhnlichen hinausgehend”) and read adclinis “in übertragener Bedeutung . . . 
inclinat ad falsa.”  Muecke (1993) 117 considers the possibility that this metaphor communicates 
the “prone to” (euemptōtos) of Stoic ethics.  Pseudo-Acro interprets the passage as meaning 
“rather prone to what is false” (pronior ad falsa). 
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simple diet, which gives “health to the full” (ibid. 4.131.4: ὑγίειάς ἐστι συμπληρωτικόν).15  In 
contrast to this, he portrays a luxurious diet as a distraction and juxtaposes it to the sober 
reasoning and truth seeking associated with frugality:  
  
 Οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ 
 ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ 
 νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρήσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας 
 ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.  (Arr. 4.132.1-6) 
 
For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfactions of boys and 
women, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce 
a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choices and 
avoidances, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbances of 
the spirit. 
 
 
A blessed life, therefore, is attained not through overindulgence but through the careful 
observation of the limits and requirements of nature, which not only satisfy one’s basic needs 
and produce physical health (cf. Arr. 5.149.1-8), but also eliminate distractions and are thus more 
conducive towards the contemplative life and the search for truth (cf. 2.2.7: verum . . . mecum 
disquirite).  On this basis, Ofellus states that one should avoid the useless toil and cost involved 
in acquiring Athenian honey, Falernian wine and fish (15-17), for nature only requires simple 
fare and, besides, the pleasant life is to be found in sober reasoning and self-control:     
 
cum sale panis 
latrantem stomachum bene leniet.  unde putas aut  
qui partum?  non in caro nidore voluptas 
summa, sed in te ipso est.16  tu pulmentaria quaere 
sudando: pinguem vitiis albumque neque ostrea 
15For the role of Epicurus’ advice to Menoeceus in this poem, see Fiske (1971) and 
Courtney (2013) 131.  Vischer (1965) 71-4 examines Epicurus’ doctrine of “simple living.” 
 
16Cf. Persius’ similarly introspective advice at 1.7: nec te quaesiveris extra (“and do not 
search outside yourself”). 
  
 
111 
                                                 
nec scarus aut poterit peregrina iuvare lagois. (S. 2.2.17-22) 
Bread and salt will suffice to appease your growling belly.  Whence or how do you think 
this comes about?  The chiefest pleasure lies, not in the costly savour, but in yourself.  So 
earn your sauce with hard exercise.  The man who is bloated and pale from excess will 
find no comfort in oysters or trout or foreign grouse. 
 
 
As Pliny the Elder mentions, the reference to bread and salt as proverbial representatives of a 
meager fare had been made already by Varro (Nat. 31.89), and Lucilius similarly refers to the 
stomach’s need for “poultice such as milled barley” (813 M: molito hordeo uti cataplasma).17  
Horace’s point, however, is not that one should avoid luxuries on principle, but that such 
refinements should not be regarded as necessary, especially since nature only requires the bare 
minimum (cf. Arr. 4.130.5-131.7).18  This is expressed by means of the barking-belly metaphor, 
which originates with Homer (Od. 7.216 and 20.13) and Ennius (Ann. 584) but here more likely 
reflects a similar passage from Lucretius (2.17-18): nihil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi ut qui | 
corpore seiunctus dolor absit (“[not to see that] all nature barks for is this, that pain be removed 
away out of the body”).19  For this purpose simple foods easily suffice, as Epicurus’ well-known 
identification of “bread and water” (Arr. 4.131.1: μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ) as able to afford the greatest 
17See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 170 and Courtney (2013) 131.  Fiske (1971) 381-82 
examines the evidence from Lucilius in more detail.  Hudson (1989) 75 says that Horace’s “salt” 
translates Epicurus’ μᾶζα. 
 
18This is echoed by Philodemus in De oec. coll. 16.3-4 and 19.16-19.  I do not think, 
however, that Horace’s discussion of simple food is to be equated with the Cynics’ wholesale 
rejection of luxury and complete dependence on nature, as Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 170 and 
Fiske (1971) 379 suggest.  Instead, Horace seems to be criticizing the view that luxury goods are 
of prime importance and necessary for happiness.  Cf. Rudd (1966) 167: “All this does not mean, 
of course, that Horace had no palate.  He enjoyed good food as much as anyone and he respected 
the character of an old Falernian.  He did sincerely feel, however, that the gluttony which 
flourished around him was wasteful and foolish and that a great deal of his contemporaries’ 
connoisseurship was no more than snobbish affectation.”  
 
19On this passage, see Bailey (1947) 799.   
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pleasure shows.  Closely related to this teaching is the assertion that pleasure cannot be increased 
once necessary needs have been met (Arr. 5.144.8-9), which explains why delicacies such as 
oysters, trout and foreign grouse will bring “no pleasure” (2.2.22: nec . . . iuvare) to one who has 
engorged himself and thus exceeded the natural appetite for food.20 
In addition to ignoring the requirements of nature and promoting useless overindulgence, 
which does not contribute to an increase in pleasure, such luxurious feasting is actually 
detrimental to good health and therefore violates the pleasure calculus.  As Lucretius notes in his 
explanation of the sense of taste, the ultimate purpose of self-nourishment is to promote the 
stomach’s constant health, especially since the pleasure of flavor does not extent to the belly:  
 
Deinde voluptas est e suco fine palati; 
cum vero deorsum per fauces praecipitavit, 
nulla voluptas est, dum diditur omnis in artus. 
nec refert quicquam quo victu corpus alatur, 
dummodo quod capias concoctum didere possis 
artubus et stomachi validum servare tenorem. (Lucr. 4.628-32) 
Again, the pleasure that comes from flavour does not go beyond the palate; but when it 
has dropped down through the throat, there is no pleasure while it is all being distributed 
abroad through the frame.  Nor does it matter at all with what food the body is nourished, 
so long as you can digest what you take, and distribute it abroad through the limbs, and 
keep the stomach in a constantly healthy condition. 
 
 
All the culinary ostentation that goes with serving exotic peacocks (2.2.23: posito pavone) and 
oversized fish (33-4: trilibrem mullum), therefore, contribute absolutely nothing to the actual 
20Cf. Arr. 6.59: Ἄπληστον οὐ γαστήρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί φασιν, ἀλλ’ ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς 
ὑπὲρ τοῦ γαστρὸς ἀορίστου πληρώματος (“It is not the belly that is insatiable, as many say, 
but rather the false opinion concerning the belly’s limitless greed”).  
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nourishing process,21 a view which Ofellus expresses in the form of a rhetorical question (27-8): 
num vesceris ista, | quam laudas, pluma? (“Do you eat the feathers you so admire?”).22  
Furthermore, the vain appearance of the bird (25: vanis rerum) is a reflection of the glutton’s 
false opinion concerning the purpose of food and preference for a “big fish on a big dish” (39: 
porrectum magno magnum spectare catino | vellem), which closely resembles the miser’s 
irrational desire in Sermones 1.1 to “drink from a broad river rather than a tiny brook” (55-6: 
magno de flumine mallem | quam ex hoc fonticulo tantundem sumere).23  As Philodemus states, 
moreover, the natural pleasure of self-nourishment, which is easily satisfied, is “necessary . . . for 
the health of the body” (De elect. col. 6.1-4: ἀναγκαῖαι . . . δ[ὲ πρὸς] τὸ ἄγ[ει]ν [ἐν ὑγι]είαι τὸ 
σῶ[μα]), whereas unnecessary overindulgence and “sumptuous fare” (ibid. col. 5.17: τ[ρυ]φῶν 
τοιούτων) result in physical harm.24  This view is similarly expressed by Ofellus, who gives a 
vivid description of the detrimental effects of such fare on the body:  
21The indifference regarding the peacock’s tail feathers with regard to flavor is similarly 
expressed by Lucilius (716 M): cocus non curat caudam insignem esse illam, dum pinguis siet 
(“The cook cares not whether those tail feathers are pretty, provided that the peacock is plump”).  
 
22Of course, Horace repeats Ofellus’ criticisms of the obsession with sumptuous feasting 
in poems 2.4 and 2.8, as Mueke (1993) 227 notes. 
  
23Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 173 compare the glutton’s words to that of the miser at 
Sermones 1.1.51: at suave est de magno tollere acervo (“But it is sweet to draw from a large 
heap”).  Cf. also Arr. 6.69: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῷον εἰς ἄπειρον τῶν 
ἐν διαίτῃ ποικιλμάτων (“The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly 
desire varieties of dainty food”). 
  
24Cf. De bono reg. col. 19.26-31: οὐ γὰρ μ[ό]νον νη[φό]ντων αἴδειν “κλέα ἀνδρῶν,” 
ἀλλὰ καὶ πινόντω[ν], οὐδὲ παρὰ μόνοις τοῖς αὐστηροτέροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς 
τρυφεροβίοις Φαίαξι (“Not only of those who soberly sing of the glorious deeds of men, but 
also of those who drink among both the rather austere and the overly sumptuous Phaeacians”).  
The Phaeaceans were famous in antiquity for their luxurious feasting and carefree indulgence, 
for which see Ath. 1.9a (τρυφερωτάτους ἑστίων Φαίακας) and 1.16c (τῆν τῶν Φαιάκων 
τρυφήν). 
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           quamquam 
putet aper rhombusque recens, mala copia quando 
aegrum sollicitat stomachum, cum rapula plenus 
atque acidas mavolt inulas.  (S. 2.2.41-4) 
And yet they are already rank, yon boar and fresh turbot, since cloying plenty worries the 
jaded stomach, which, sated as it is, prefers radishes and tart pickles the while. 
 
As this passage clearly indicates, the overabundance of fancy foods is transformed into an evil 
concoction that disturbs the poor stomach, whose bloated sickness could have been avoided by 
the consumption of the simple fare it prefers.25  As a result of such irrational feasting, the goal of 
which was identified earlier as the “highest pleasure” (19-20: voluptas | summa), the body 
actually experiences severe pain.  Horace quickly notes, moreover, that the satisfaction of 
necessary desires can be fully accomplished by a meager diet of eggs and black olives (45-6), 
which he equates with “poverty” (pauperies).26  As discussed in the previous chapter, Horatian 
poverty needs to be contrasted with the desire for more, which is reprehensible (cf. Carm. 
3.29.55-6: probamque | pauperiem sine dote quaero), and identified with the willingness to live 
content with few possessions (ibid. 1.1.18: pauperiem pati) and to avoid the economic vices of 
sumptuousness and meanness, the latter of which is the central focus of Ofellus’ subsequent 
consideration. 
Ofellus’ continuing discourse on plain living expresses the importance of avoiding 
meanness (53: sordidus victus), which leads to the maltreatment of servants and makes for a 
careless and niggardly host, both of which Philodemus addresses in his economic treatises.  His 
description of the characteristics associated with this vice is introduced by Avidienus, a 
25The theme of indigestion in connection with moral advice reappears in Persius (3.98-
106) and Juvenal (1.142-3, 4.107 and 6.428-32), for which see Rimell (2005) 81-9.  Hudson 
(1989) 69-88 and especially Gowers (1993) 109-219 discuss the role of food and food metaphors 
in Roman satire. 
 
26See Vicher (1965) 149-50. 
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shameless miser whose unwillingness to spend money has led to his deplorable appearance and, 
as a consequence, to the “appropriate nickname of Dog” (56: cui Canis ex vero dictum).  Rather 
than suggest, however, as some commentators do,27 that this individual was actually a Cynic, 
(which would be inconsistent with his obsession for eliminating expenditures and amassing 
wealth like a miser), the label may simply reflect conservative Romans’ association of sordidness 
in general with Cynic beggary.28  Indeed, Avidienus’ willingness to serve sour wine to his guests 
and anoint himself with rancid oil (58-9) closely resembles Theophrastus’ portrait of the “mean 
man” or αἰσχροκερδής, who similarly feeds his guests poor fare (Char. 30.2-3) and is overly 
concerned with the preservation of his oil (ibid. 8-9).29  Such extreme parsimony is condemned, 
along with its opposite vice, by Epicurus, who states that the wise man will prudently impose 
limits on frugality (Arr. 6.63): Ἔστι καὶ ἐν λιτότητι μεθόριος,30 ἧς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιστος 
παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι’ ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι (“There is likewise a certain limit to 
frugality, which, if ignored, results in pain similar to the one who has succumbed to sumptuous 
living”). This is precisely the reason why, as Horace states in the following lines, the sage will 
avoid both extremes (65-6): [sapiens] mundus erit, qua non offendat sordibus atque | in neutram 
27Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 175 mention Avidienus’ “kynishen Askese” and Muecke 
(1993) calls him a symbol of radical Cynic poverty.   
  
28On this point, see n. 9 above.  Courtney (2013) 132 notes that the nickname “Dog” 
likely “implies a filthy life” and cites line 65 (mundus) in addition to Ep. 1.2.26 (immundus 
canis).  For Cynicism in Horace’s Epistulae, see also Moles (1985) 33-60.  In addition to being 
associated with Cynic poverty, sordidness was also a byproduct of meanness, as Horace shows at 
1.6.107: obiciet nemo sordis mihi, quas tibi, Tilli (“No one, Tillius, will accuse me of your 
meanness) and especially at 2.3.111-28, which bears a striking resemblance to the Avidienus 
passage as will be discussed below.  For the expression hac urget lupus, hac canis and its moral 
significance, see Houghton (2004) 300-304. 
 
29Cf. Pseudo-Acro’s interpretation of canis as “ruined by greed” (perditus avaritia). 
  
30Ι follow here Usener’s reading rather than that of the MSS. (V: λεπτότητι καθάριος) or 
Muehll (λεπτότητι καθαριότης), the latter of which is accepted by Arrighetti.    
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partem cultus miser (“[The sage] will be neat, so far as not to shock us by meanness, and in his 
mode of living will be unhappy in neither direction”).31  The importance of observing the 
Aristotelian golden mean or, perhaps more fittingly given the context, the Epicurean “measure of 
wealth” (De oec. col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον), is underscored by two relevant examples of 
economic vice: Albucius is “cruel to his servants” (2.2.64-8: servis . . . saevus) while Naevius 
“serves his guests greasy water” (68-9: unctam | convivis praebebit aquam).  The first example 
resembles Philodemus’ description of the vicious economist (De oec. col. 11.3: φιλοχρημάτου), 
whose decisions are motivated by greed and who mistreats his servants and subordinates by 
denying them certain foods (ibid. col. 9.26-32),32 breeding them like animals (ibid. col. 10.15-
21), and forcing them into cruel and dangerous work conditions (ibid. col. 23.3-5).  The 
acquisitive manager, moreover, is also stingy and views guests as a burden, since he equates 
convivial gatherings with financial loss and consequently imagines that “friendlessness procures 
relief from costs” (ibid. col. 24.19-21: Καὶ μὴν ἀφιλία δοκεῖ μὲν ἀναλωμάτων κουφίζε[ιν]).  
The ideal economist, on the other hand, whom Ofellus subsequently identifies as the “sage” 
(2.2.63: sapiens), will not only be content with few possessions but will also know how to 
administer wealth responsibly and in a spirit of kindness and generosity. 
Ofellus’ previous descriptions provide a sharp contrast with his treatment of the prudent 
manager’s administration of wealth, which includes physical health, forethought and generosity.  
The importance of moderation is communicated by his emphasis on the sage’s good health (71: 
31Cf. Ter. Hau. 440-41: vehemens in utramque partem, Menedeme, es nimis | aut 
largitate nimia aut parsimonia (“You are too excessive in either direction, Menedemus, being 
either too generous or too stingy”).  
  
32This connection is also made by Pseudo-Acro’s interpretation of saevus erit as 
Neglegens ad conparanda obsonia (“Neglectful at providing food”).  
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valeas bene), whereas the overindulgent glutton’s distended and onerous belly prevents his mind 
from soaring to the lofty heights of philosophical contemplation (78-79): [corpus onustum] 
animum quoque praegravat una | atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae (“[the heavy 
body] drags down the mind as well and fastens to earth a fragment of the divine spirit”).  Like 
the belly stuffed full with a variety of delicacies (cf. 77: dubia cena), Horace has crammed into 
this passage, in an undoubtedly playful and parodic manner, multiple references to and different 
expressions of Platonic and Stoic doctrines.33  His passionate identification of the corporeal as an 
impediment to wisdom and the soul as connected to the divine ether, however, both of which 
threaten to transport the audience into the realm of theoretical speculation, is tempered by the 
following verses, in which Ofellus mentions the ancient tradition of enjoying culinary pleasures 
moderately and sharing surplus wealth with one’s friends (89-93).  The importance of friendship 
within the context of sharing and convivial gatherings is underscored once again in a later, more 
expansive passage worth quoting here:   
 
ac mihi seu longum post tempus venerat hospes, 
sive operum vacuo gratus conviva per imbrem 
vicinus, bene erat non piscibus urbe petitis, 
sed pullo atque haedo; tum pensilis uva secundas 
et nux ornabat mensas cum duplice ficu. 
post hoc ludus erat culpa potare magistra 
ac venerata Cere, ita culmo surgeret alto, 
explicuit vino contractae seria frontis. (S. 2.2.118-25) 
 
33Courtney (2013) 133: “[T]his is a sarcastic Epicurean joke at this belief, a joke that 
belongs to Horace, not Ofellus.”  Cf. Pl. Phd. 83d for the idea that physical pleasure “affixes” 
(προσήλοι) the soul to the body, a passage Cicero likely had in mind at Tusc. 5.100 when he 
says “What about the fact that we cannot make proper use of the mind when stuffed with food 
and drink?” (Quid quod ne mente quidem recte uti possumus multo cibo et potione completi?).  
Horace also alludes to Stoic physics in calling the mind a “particle,” which translates the Stoic 
ἀπόσπασμα (cf. SVF 1.128 and 2.633), and associating it with the “divine breath” or πνεῦμα.  
See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 178 and Muecke (1993) 125.   
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“And if after long absence a friend came to see me, or if in rainy weather, when I could 
not work, a neighbour paid me a visit—a welcome guest—we fared well, not with fish 
sent from town, but with a pullet and a kid; by and by raisins and nuts and split figs set 
off our dessert.34  Then we had a game of drinking, with a forfeit to rule the feast, and 
Ceres, to whom we made our prayer—“so might she rise on lofty stalk!”—smoothed out 
with wine the worries of a wrinkled brow.”  
 
 
The purpose of Ofellus’ emphasis on occasional indulgences with guests is to communicate 
advice that is not only practical, but also conducive towards physical health and the cultivation of 
friendships.  A similar view is expressed by Philodemus, who places significant value on the 
economic benefits of sharing wealth with friends and setting aside time for communal gatherings 
and visitations: 
 
 Χρὴ δὲ, καθάπερ πλειόνων προσπεσόντων χαρίζεσθαι ταῖς ἀβλαβέσι τῶν ὀρέξεων 
 αὑτοῖς καὶ φίλοις, οὕτω συμβάσης ἁδρᾶς κοιλότητος ἀναμάχεσθαι ταῖς μὴ 
 ἀνελευθέροις συστολαῖς, καὶ μᾶλλόν γε ταῖς εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ ταῖς εἰς φίλους, καὶ πρὸς 
 ἐπισκέψεις καὶ παρεδρείας ἐνίοις καὶ συλλογισμῶν συνθέσεις κατατίθεσθαί τινας 
 χρόνους. (De oec. col. 27.1-12) 
 
And just as one ought to indulge oneself and one’s friends in those desires that are 
harmless when a larger quantity of goods has happened to come to hand, so one ought to 
compensate for the losses with retrenchments that are not illiberal and that are applied 
more to oneself rather than to one’s friends when there is a serious shortage of cash; and 
one ought to set aside time for visitations, communal gatherings and comparisons of 
ideas. 
 
 
According to this description, friendship is a major priority for the good manager, who, rather 
than indulge himself in private, would rather save the “wild boar” (2.2.89: aprum) for a special 
occasion and in the meantime subsist on plain fare, as Ofellus does (116-17): non ego . . . temere 
edi luce profesta | quicquam praeter holus fumosae cum pede pernae (“I was not the man to eat 
on a working day, without good reason, anything more than greens and the shank of a smoked 
ham”).  According to Philodemus, moreover, such consideration and generosity on the part of the 
34Cf. Verg. G. 2.136-225 on the extended praise of Italy’s fertility. 
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sage economist only attracts friends, who, in the case of an economic crisis, can lend assistance 
by providing financial or, perhaps more importantly, emotional support (De oec. coll. 24.46-
25.4): εἰσὶν δὲ κτήσει[ς λ]υσιτελέστεραι . . . ἤπερ ἀγρῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστατοι 
θησαυροί (“[friends] are considered to be more profitable . . . than tilled land and they are a 
treasure that is most secure against the turns of fortune”).35  One may contrast this with the 
ostentatious manager, whose uncontrollable spending and lavishness have won him not only the 
hatred of others (2.2.96-7), but also have resulted in financial loss (cf. 96: damno) and 
“pennilessness” (98-9: egenti | as).36  Philodemus similarly states that financial vice engenders 
the hatred of others (De oec. col. 24.19-33) and he identifies prodigality as a primary destroyer 
of wealth (ibid. col. 23.42-6): οὐ[δ]ὲν γὰρ ἐκχεῖν [κ]α[ὶ ἀ]νατρέπειν εἴ[θιστ]αι λαμπροτάτα[ς 
καὶ πλ]ουσι[ωτάτας οἰκίας ὡ]ς πολυτέλι[αί τε] δι[αίτ]ης (“For nothing is wont to drain and 
35The sharing of surplus wealth with one’s friends is the hallmark not only of Epicurean 
philanthropy as described by Philodemus above, but also an expression of the Greek notion of 
“liberality” (ἐλευθεριότης), for which see Arist. Eth. Nic. 1120a5-35.  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 
181 cite Cic. Tusc. 4.20.46: misericordiam (utilem) ad opem ferendam et hominum indignorum 
calamitates sublevandas (“pity is useful for affording assistance and alleviating the woes of 
unfortunate men”).  For this translation of indignus, see Palmer (1959) 269.  Cf. also 1.2.5: inopi 
dare nolit amico (“he refuses to give to a friend who is destitute”).  The Cynics also highly 
valued generosity (χρηστότης), for which see Kindstrand (1976) F38A-C with commentary 
(247).  On the other hand, the Cynic understanding of philanthropy involves “stripping oneself of 
wealth” (cf. Kindstrand [1976] F38A: χρηστότης δὲ ἀφαίρεται [sc. πλοῦτον]) in order to live a 
completely independent life, as the collected maxims in Oltramare (1926) 51-52 show.  This 
view contradicts Aristotle’s teaching concerning proportionate generosity (Eth. Nic. 1120b5-
1121a10), which is echoed by Philodemus’ observations on giving to friends in accordance with 
one’s means (De oec. col. 25.24-31).  It should also be noted that Ofellus urges his wealthy 
interlocutor to give out of his “surplus” (102: quod superat), not to do away with all his 
possessions.   
  
36See Courtney (2013) 133 for damnum and dedecus as an alliterative pair that also 
appears in Plaut. As. 371 and Bacch. 67.  As Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 181 note, the spendthrift’s 
extreme poverty is underscored by his inability to afford even the “purchase of a noose” (99: 
laquei pretium), which is a reference to the Greek comic tradition and also appears at Plaut. 
Pseud. 88 (Calidorus explains his reason for borrowing a drachma): restim volo mihi emere . . . 
qui me faciam pensilem (“I want to buy a rope . . . to hang myself with”).  
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upset the most illustrious and wealthiest estates like prodigality”).  Even if one’s financial 
resources are substantial enough to avoid serious depletion, as Ofellus’ imaginary interlocutor 
smugly retorts (2.2.99-101), the implication in this passage is that changes of fortune (cf. 108: 
casus dubios) may nevertheless lead to economic crises, which the friendless and myopic 
manager will find extremely difficult to endure. 
 Horace concludes this economic sermon by shifting the focus from detached examples to 
concrete proof of how one should endure the changes of adverse fortune,37 which is afforded by 
the life of Ofellus himself.  This is introduced by a passage which resembles the ant simile in 
Sermones 1.1 and likewise communicates the principal attributes of an ideal economist:  
 
    uterne 
ad casus dubios fidet sibi certius?  hic qui 
pluribus adsuerit mentem corpusque superbum, 
an qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri 
in pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello? (S. 2.2.107-11)         
Which of the two, in the face of changes and chances, will have more self-confidence—
he who has accustomed a pampered mind and body to superfluities, or he who, content 
with little and fearful of the future, has in peace, like a wise man, provided for the needs 
of war? 
 
 
Imitating the wisdom of the Horatian ant (cf. 1.1.38: sapiens), the sage economist rations his 
stores carefully and is mindful of the future (cf. 1.1.35: non incauta futuri), knowing that nature 
will easily fulfill the needs of one who is content with little (cf. Arr. 4.130.5-131.2).38  This 
involves careful preparation (111: aptarit . . . bello), as Horace indicates employing a military 
37Rudd (1966) 169.  
 
 38Cf. also De oec. col. 19.16-19: ἐναργῶς τῆς φύσεως δεικνυούσης, ἄν τις αὐτῆι 
προσέχηι, διότι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις εὐκόλως χρήσεσθ’ (“although nature makes it clear that if 
anyone pays attention to her, since she is easily satisfied and requires few things”). 
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metaphor, which, as Frances Muecke notes, is paralleled in Latin only by a fragment of Publilius 
Syrus (465): Prospicere in pace oportet, quod bellum iuvet (“One ought to foresee in time of 
peace that which helps war”).39  The emphasis on bravery or rather αὐτάρκεια in the face of 
adverse fortune, which is expressed at the end of the poem (135-36), may likewise recall the 
teachings of Epicurus (Arr. 3.131.6-7) as well as the Cynics,40 although their underlying reasons 
for such courage are quite different.  For the Cynics, it originates in the complete rejection of all 
conventions, so that the loss of wealth becomes literally impossible, as William Desmond 
explains: 
 
[T]he Cynic boasts that he lives in utmost simplicity, without house, furniture, cups, 
weapons, clothes, jewelry or money: in short, without the products of human craft and 
technology.  Unhoused, unwashed, unshaven, unshod and almost unclothed, eating figs, 
lupin-beans, lentils and whatever else he finds growing in the fields or hills nearby, the 
Cynic is an “all natural” philosopher who would . . . simplify everything.  Eat when 
hungry, drink when thirsty.  Seek shelter from the elements when you have to.  Relieve 
sexual needs when they arrive.  Use only what is immediately available.  Live here, 
now.41   
  
 
39Muecke (1993) 127.  Pseudo-Acro compares this passage to Juv. 1.168-70: [voluta] 
haec animo ante tubas: galeatum sero duelli | paenitet (“Ponder over these things before the 
trumpets sound: once you’ve got a helmet on it’ll be too late to have second thoughts about the 
battle”).  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 182 cite Pl. Leg. 8.829a: οὐκ ἐν πολέμῳ τὸν πόλεμον 
ἑκάστοις γυμναστέον, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ τῆς εἰρήνης βίῳ (“Let each man train for battle in peacetime, 
not wartime”).  Cf. also Philodemus’ quotation of Epicurus in De div. col. 40.11-14: καθάπερ 
εἶπεν Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν παρῆι ποτὲ πεσὼν . . . ὁ σοφὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον οὐ τρέπεται (“Just 
as Epicurus said: ‘Whenever the sage yields, having fallen into poverty, he alone is not 
defeated’”).  Perhaps Ofellus’ words contain a veiled reference to the Battle of Philippi, at which 
Horace himself was stripped of his landed inheritance (cf. Ep. 2.2.49-52), and I agree with 
Freudenburg (2001) 117, who suggests that Horace’s satiric themes in Book 2 may reflect the 
frustration of an author who was “not so ready to adapt” to the many changes of the new age.   
 
40See Oltramare (1926) 57. 
 
41Desmond (2008) 151.  Much of the evidence for this passage is collected by Oltramare 
(1926) 51-2.  Cf. also Kindstrand (1976) F17.  
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As the passage clearly indicates, the Cynics were unafraid of losing wealth precisely because 
they had none;42 the Epicurean manager, on the other hand, is able to endure financial loss with 
equanimity because he is, as Philodemus states, “confident with regard to the future and the 
possibility of a poor and meager life” (De oec. col.16.1-3: [οὔ]τε [γ]ὰρ ἀσχαλᾶι σώφρων ἀνὴρ 
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρρὴς τῆι ταπεινῆι καὶ πενιχρᾶι διαίτηι); the reason for the sage 
economist’s confidence, moreover, is that “he knows that the requirements of nature are satisfied 
even by this” (ibid. 3-4: τὸ φυσικὸν εἰδὼς καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης διοικούμενον).  Unlike the 
overindulgent spendthrift, therefore, who has become accustomed to an abundance of fancy 
delicacies (cf. 2.2.109: pluribus adsuerit) and will undoubtedly be crushed by their absence when 
his wealth is gone, Ofellus draws “unwavering confidence” (108: fidet sibi certius; cf. De oec. 
col. 16.1-2: πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρρὴς) from the fact that he is “content with little” (110: 
contentus parvo) and that “cheap eggs and black olives” (45-6: vilibus ovis | nigrisque . . . oleis), 
which provide the body with health and are conducive to the good life, will always be readily 
available.  One may compare this logic to a similar argument made by Philodemus regarding the 
financial loss of an individual who “is good at procuring what suffices for himself” (De oec. col. 
16.6-8 οὔτε κακὸς εὑρέσθαι τὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἱκανά):  
 
 Τίνος ἂν  οὖν ἕνεκα τηλικαῦτ’ ἔχων ἐφόδια πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς ἐν πολλῆι ῥαιστώνηι, 
 κἂν πλοῦτον ἀποβάληι, πέραι τοῦ μετρίου κακοπαθήσει σωτηρίας ἕνεκα χρημάτων;  
 
For what reason, therefore, would one who can acquire such means [i.e., ta hikana] for 
the good life with such easiness undergo extreme suffering on account of financial loss, 
even if he should lose his wealth?   (De oec. col. 16.12-18) 
 
 
42See Rich (1956) 23-4.  
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The realization that a victus tenuis is easily supported explains why Ofellus is indifferent to the 
loss of wealth, to which one may compare De div. col. 53.2-5: ἀδιάφορον μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐκ 
πλούτου μετάπτωσιν εἰς πενίαν (“[They say that] the fall from wealth into poverty is 
something indifferent”); indeed, Horace tells us that, even after the confiscation of his property 
and reduction of wealth, he continues to enjoy the same degree of satisfaction as before (2.2.113-
14): [Ofellum] integris opibus novi non latius usum quam nunc accisis (“This Ofellus, as I well 
know, used his full means on no larger scale than he does now, when they are cut down”).43  In 
addition to this, the rustic sage has “prepared for war” by cultivating friendships and being 
generous to his friends (118-25), who, as Philodemus puts it, are a secure treasure that fortune 
cannot deplete or destroy (De oec. col. 25.3-4).  This may provide the context for Ofellus’ 
defiant assertion that, no matter how wildly Fortune rages, she will never diminish the bond of 
camaraderie (2.2.126-27): saeviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus: | quantum hinc 
inminuet? (“Let Fortune storm and stir fresh turmoils; how much will she take off from this?”).44  
Horace concludes the discourse on plain living by reminding his audience of the fickleness of 
fortune, which, as the Cynics would point out, has not “given her goods to the rich, but only lent 
them,”45 and of the transience of wealth, which, as Philodemus states, is “easily destroyed and 
 43Muecke (1993) 127: “Because he lived frugally before he lost his farm, he has not had 
to change the way of life in which he is happy.”  See also Freudenburg (2001) 99. 
 
44For the language in this line as a possible imitation of “epic grandeur,” see Muecke 
(1993) 129, who cites relevant parallels.  I take hinc as a reference to the bulwark of conviviality 
expressed in the immediately preceding passage (118-25), with the phrase quantum aut at 126 
introducing the second defense against fortune, i.e., the ability to subsist on meager fare.    
 
45Kindstrand (1976) F30A-D: τὰ χρήματα τοῖς πλουσίοις ἡ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηται, ἀλλὰ 
δεδάνεικεν.  Cf. also Eur. Phoen. 555 and Men. Dysk. 797-812.  Fiske (1971) 385-86 cites a 
handful of Lucilian parallels of which the following is especially noteworthy (701 M): cum 
sciam nihil esse in vita proprium mortali datum (“Since I know that nothing in life has been 
given to mortals as their own possession”).  The same thought is expressed by Lucretius (3.971): 
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perfectly subject to being taken away” (De div. col. 54.8-10: εὔφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ τελέως 
εὐαφαίρετος ὁ πλοῦτος).  According to both Ofellus and Philodemus, therefore, the best way to 
maintain a “stout heart” (2.2.136: fortiaque . . . pectora) in the face of such economic uncertainty 
is to be content with little, which nature easily procures, and to draw strength from one’s friends, 
who are a most stable treasure “against adverse fortune” (De oec. col. 25.3: πρὸς τὴν τύχην; cf. 
108: ad casus dubios). 
 Immediately following Ofellus’ advice on simple living Horace introduces the character 
of Damasippus, a recent convert to Stoicism whose tirade against moral deficiency, which is 
much longer and harsher than that of Ofellus, focuses largely on economic vice.  As with the 
previous satires, the initial verses of Sermones 2.3 give the context in which this diatribe occurs:  
 
‘Sic raro scribis ut toto non quater anno 
membranam poscas, scriptorium quaeque retexens, 
iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus 
nil dignum sermone canas.  quid fiet?  at ipsis 
Saturnalibus huc fugisti. (S. 2.3.1-5) 
So seldom do you write, that not four times in all the year do you call for the parchment, 
while you unweave the web of all you have written, and are angry with yourself because, 
while so generous of wine and of sleep, you turn out no poetry worth talking about.  
What will be the end?  Why, you say, even in the Saturnalia you fled here for refuge. 
 
 
The preceding lines indicate that Damasippus has taken upon himself the task of chiding Horace 
for his excessive leisure in the country,46 which is preventing him from filling notebooks with 
vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu (“Life has been loaned to everyone and freely granted 
to no none”).  Cf. Horace’s prayer to Mercury for the lifelong preservation of his Sabine estate 
(2.6.4-6). 
 
 46Rudd (1966) 173 imagines the setting as the Sabine estate, which Maecenas had given 
Horace in 33 BC.  He is followed by Muecke (1993) 133 and Courtney (2013) 135.  
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the kind of satiric invective he had “promised” (6: promissis).47  The impetuousness of this city-
dwelling street preacher differs significantly from the appreciation of the value of convivial 
otium accorded to Ofellus, whom Horace portrays as the “ideal of the frugal life in the 
countryside;”48 perhaps more importantly, the Stoic’s failure to appreciate the philosophical 
and—for Horace— literary advantages of a “leisurely withdrawal with friends” (De eoc. col. 
23.15-16: μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον) reflects his misunderstanding of the poet’s high 
standards, which call for refinement and brevity rather than the sheer productivity of a Lucilian 
“flow” (1.10.50: fluere).49  Instead of appreciating Horace’s love of the countryside, Damasippus 
blames him for his laziness and overindulgence (2.3.3: vini somnique benignus; cf. 14-15: Siren | 
desidia)50 and wishes to transport him back to Rome where the “pedestrian Muse” (2.6.17: 
musaque pedestri) will be more productive.  In fact, Damasippus is so thirsty for hardcore 
invective that he virtually hijacks the narrative for his own purposes, as Freudenburg explains: 
 
 Damasippus sees no trace of “virtue” [13: virtute] in Horace, no satiric vigour, so he 
 has to assume it was “left behind” [ibid.: relicta] like some forgotten pair of socks that 
 did not make it into the bag.  He cannot see it because he equates it with something 
47On the other hand, at this time Horace was also composing the Epodi, and it is probable 
that Damasippus’ mention of Archilochus (12) refers to these iambic poems, as Kiessling-Heinze 
(1910) 186, Muecke (1993) 133, Cucchiarelli (2001) 120-25 and Courtney (2013) 135 suggest. 
 
48Muecke (1993) 114.  Cf. Ep. 1.10.1-2, dedicated to Aristius Fuscus, in which the poet 
draws a distinction between Epicurean “lovers of the country” (ruris amatores) and Stoic “lovers 
of the city” (urbis amatorem).  For the contrast, see Barbieri (1977) 502. 
 
 49See Freudenburg (2001) 113: “[W]hat Damasippus sees as a playboy’s failure to buckle 
down and produce vast amounts can be taken as an allusion to the poet’s Callimachean aesthetic 
sense; that is, his determination to produce small amounts, finely crafted.”  Horace 
communicates the literary advantages of otium and the withdrawal from society at 1.1.138-39 
and 1.6.122-23.  Cf. also Ep. 2.2.77: scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbem (“The 
whole chorus of writers loves the grove and flees the city”).  
 
50For wine and sleep as promoters of poetic excellence and providing inspiration, see Ep. 
1.19.1-11 and 2.2.78 respectively.  
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 Horace has failed “miserably” [14: miser] to produce: endless reams of lectures against 
 vice; hard-hitting Stoic diatribe.  And because Horace cannot produce it, Damasippus 
 undertakes to produce it for him, and so we have the rest of the poem, ad nauseam, the 
 second longest lecture Horace (n)ever wrote.51 
 
 
It has been noted that the harshness (to say nothing of the extraordinary length) which 
characterizes Damasippus’ bitter attack is at odds with Horatian satire’s usually helpful 
criticisms.52  Anderson, for example, refers to the neophyte’s ravings as “impractical moral 
fanaticism,” presumably since they rigidly apply philosophical doctrines without the slightest 
concern for moral correction,53 and Philodemus similarly condemns the harsh and impractical 
approach to vice associated with Stoic and Cynic treatments of harmful emotions.54  In this one 
of his longest poems of all, moreover, Horace clearly parodies the prolixity and endless vitriol of 
such treatments; on the other hand, his humorous depiction is not void of moral truth, which, 
despite the poem’s nominally Stoic content, is eclectic in nature and therefore incorporates many 
of the commonplaces of Hellenistic ethics.55 
51Freudenburg (2001) 115.  For the various mannerisms and topoi of the traditional Stoic 
diatribe which Horace imitates in this poem, see Lejay (1915) 384, Cèbe (1966) 262 and Fiske 
(1971) 388.  
 
 52Muecke (1993) 131: “Horace . . . disassociates himself from the Stoics’ rigid 
dogmatism, which swamps the listener without encouraging him to reach the balanced 
perspective and sense of reality which Horace himself offers elsewhere.”  Cf. Cèbe (1966) 262-
63, who says that “ce sont leurs procédés et leur langage qu’il dénigre, non la subsance de leur 
enseignement.” 
 
 53Anderson (1982) 45.  
 
 54De ir. col. 1.7-20 (a description of the criticisms of an unnamed adversary): εἰ μὲν οὖν 
ἐπετίμα τοῖς ψέγουσι μ[ό]νον, ἄλλο δὲ μηδὲ ἓν ποιοῦσιν ἢ βαι[ό]ν, ὡς Βίων ἐν τῶι Περὶ τῆς 
ὀργῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τ[ῶ]ι Πε[ρ]ὶ παθῶν θεραπευτικῶι, κἂν μετρίως ἵστατο (“If, 
moreover, he had stopped at criticizing those who merely blame others and achieve nothing else 
or very little, such as Bion in his treatise On anger or Chrysippus in his On treatments for anger, 
then it would have been appropriate”).  
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 The extreme zeal of Damasippus is the result of a conversion to Stoic philosophy 
following a financial crisis and the realization that “all fools are mad” (32: insanis et tu stultique 
prope omnes).56  According to Horace’s description, Damasippus had suffered the complete loss 
of his wealth (18-19), which, unlike Ofellus, was a misfortune he was obviously unable to bear 
with equanimity (37-8): nam male re gesta cum vellem mittere operto | me capite in flumen (“For 
when, after my financial failure, I’d covered my head and was intending to hurl myself into the 
river . . .”).57  The entire scene, however, is conveyed in a strongly parodic manner: covering the 
head was customary near death, but it also recalls Plato’s dramatic telling of Socrates’ last 
moments (Phd. 118a6-7); Damasippus’ savior, whom he identifies as a Stoic sage named 
Stertinius,58 suddenly and auspiciously “appears on his right side” (38: dexter stetit)59 and 
55See Rudd (1966) 183 and Fiske (1971) 389. 
 
 56For the Stoic doctrine that “all fools are mad” (πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται), see Cic. Tusc. 
3.7-11.  Horace’s interlocutor, however, does not observe the distinction Cicero draws between 
moral unsoundness (insania) and mental illness (furor), for which see Rudd (1966) 181-87.  
Pigeaud (1990) 9-43 examines at length the Stoic tradition of madness as a sickness in this poem.  
With regard to the speaker, Cicero mentions a man named Damasippus who was involved in the 
purchase of antiquities and real estate (Fam. 7.23.2-3; cf. 2.3.20-26).  Bailey (1976) 29-30 
identifies him as the son of Licinius Crassus Junianus (Brutus) Damasippus.  Juvenal mentions a 
certain Damasippus who had suffered the “destruction of his riches” (8.185: consumptis opibus). 
 
 57Muecke (1993) 130.  This extreme reaction to his bankruptcy is probably intended to 
expose Damasippus as a hypocrite, especially given his earlier advice to Horace concerning 
fulfilling promises “with equanimity” (aequo animo).  Cucchiarelli (2001) 160 notes “varie 
esperienze in commune” between Damasippus and the Cynic Menippius of Gadara, including the 
loss of wealth and desire to commit suicide (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.99-100). 
 
58Horace mentions him again at Ep. 1.12.20, regarding which Pseudo-Acro states the 
following: Stertinius philosophus, qui CCXX libros Stoicorum Latine descripsit (“Stertinius was 
a philosopher who wrote two-hundred twenty books on Stoicism in Latin”).  Very little is known 
about this individual, for which see Rawson (1985) 53 and Desideri (1996) 906 in Enc. Or.  His 
name, which appears to be connected to the verb stertere, may conceal a pun in identifying the 
longwinded sage as “Mr. Snore.”  See Sharland (2009a) 113-31. 
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employs the archaic subjunctive “doeth” (38: faxis), which Horace uses elsewhere in a solemn 
prayer to Mercury (2.6.5); the Stoic sage’s teachings, which, according to Damasippus, were 
“rattled off” (33: crepat), are rehashed in the form of ὑπομνήματα (34: descripsi . . . praecepta) 
that create bathos when compared to Xenophon’s record of Socrates’ teachings and, later on, 
Arrian’s preservation of those of Epictetus.60  To make matters worse, Damasippus is identified 
as a “fool” not only by his own teacher (40: insanus) but also by Horace (326: insane), which is a 
label this late learner (cf. 1.10.21: o seri studiorum) confirms by his misapplication of Stertinius’ 
doctrines.61  Indeed, according to Cicero, the Stoic sage should use philosophy primarily to self-
medicate: 
 
Est profecto animi medicina philosophia.  Cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis 
petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus et viribus ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus 
elaborandum est. (Tusc. 3.6) 
 
The medicine of the soul is certainly philosophy, whose aid must be sought not, as in 
bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost endeavor, employing all 
our resources and strength, that we may have the power to be ourselves our own 
physicians.62   
 
 
59Courtney 2013) 136 says that Stertinius appeared to Damasippus “like a deus ex 
machina.” 
  
 60Fiske (1971) 387.  It should also be noted that Philodemus likewise recorded the 
lectures of Zeno, of which the treatise De libertate dicendi is an excerpt. 
  
61Rudd (1966) 175.  Cf. Cèbe (1966) 263: “Ses paroles respirent l’intolérance des 
neophytes.” 
 
62A very similar view is expressed by Persius (1.1.7): nec te quaesiveris extra (“Do not 
seek outside yourself”).  Cf. also Arr. Diss. Epict. 1.15.2: ὡς γὰρ τέκτονος ὕλη τὰ ξύλα, 
ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ ὁ χαλκός, οὕτως τῆς περὶ βίον τέχνης ὕλη ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου (“For just 
as wood is the material of the carpenter and bronze that of the statuary, so each individual’s own 
life is the material of the art of living”).  See also Courtney (2013) 135. 
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Nevertheless, instead of evaluating his own life in the light of his recent conversion and 
education, Damasippus immediately takes the opportunity to attack mercilessly everyone else’s 
faults, including those of Horace (307-25).  In order to do so, he relates the doctrines of 
Stertinius, who, like a comic actor in a Plautine prologue,63 now takes center stage and requests 
the audience’s attention while carefully outlining the content of his “play” (78-80): wicked 
ambition (ambitio mala), avarice (argenti amor), self-indulgence (luxuria) and superstition 
(tristis superstitio).  As is immediately clear from this list, vices associated with avarice and the 
mismanagement of wealth in general promise to be the main focus of his diatribe, which is 
indeed the case.  The overemphasis on economic vice, moreover, is intriguing given the content 
of the previous satire, and although there are certain thematic similarities between these two as 
well as Horace’s treatment of avarice in Sermones 1.1, there are also significant differences. 
 Stertinius’ attack on avarice focuses largely on examples of meanness (82-157), which 
establish numerous connections to the immediately preceding treatment of Ofellus as well as to 
that of the poet himself in Sermones 1.1.  The first representative of avarice is the miser 
Staberius,64 whose obsession with displaying the sum total of his amassed wealth on a tombstone 
is explained as originating in his great fear of poverty:  
 
                          quoad vixit credidit ingens 
pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si 
forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset, 
ipse videretur sibi nequior. (S. 2.3.91-4) 
 As long as he lived, he believed poverty a huge fault and there was nothing he took 
 keener precaution against, so that, if by chance he had died less rich by one farthing, he 
 would think himself so much the more worthless. 
 
63I owe this observation to Muecke (1993) 141.   
 
 64As Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 199 and Muecke (1993) 142 point out, this individual is 
otherwise unknown.   
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Like the unnamed miser in Sermones 1.1, who fears poverty (1.1.93: pauperiem metuas; cf. 
2.3.110: metuens) and equates any reduction of wealth with a corresponding reduction of self-
worth (1.1.62), Staberius hoards his money and mistakenly identifies it as the summum bonum.65  
Of course, these convictions are the expression of a false opinion (cf. 1.1.61: cupidine falso): in 
the case of the Horatian miser, limitless wealth is associated with pleasure (1.1.51: suave est; 78: 
hoc iuvat?), while for Staberius it is better than virtue and produces all of the defining 
characteristics traditionally applied to the Stoic sage: 
 
             omnis enim res, 
virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris 
divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit ille 
clarus erit, fortis, iustus . . . et rex. (S. 2.3.94-97) 
“Everything, you see, merit, renown, beauty, everything divine and human yields to 
beauteous66 riches; the man who has amassed riches will be illustrious, brave, just and 
wise . . . and a king.” 
 
 
This is a complete perversion of Stoic doctrine, which states that virtue alone is inherently good 
while external factors such as riches and health are considered to be “preferred indifferents,” 
indicating that they should be chosen for their benefits although they contribute nothing to 
happiness or virtue.67  As has been discussed above, Epicurus similarly states that great wealth 
cannot make one truly happy or provide the benefits associated with the summum bonum (Arr. 
 65Ofellus identifies a similar mistake in 2.2.19-20: non in caro nidore voluptas | summa 
(“The greatest pleasure does not lie in a costly aroma”). 
 
66 Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 201 note that the identification of wealth as “beautiful” 
(pulcher) has religious connotations, implying that Staberius views wealth as “der wahre Gott.”  
Cf. Cic. Fam. 9.14.4 for the orthodox position: Nihil est . . . virtute formosius, nihil pulchrius, 
nihil amabilius (“Nothing is more handsome, beautiful or worthy of love than virtue”).  
 
67For ancient evidence regarding the Stoic doctrine of “preferred indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα 
προηγμένα), see Long and Sedley (1987) 349-55.  
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6.81); Philodemus, moreover, who recognizes the usefulness of wealth, warns against making 
financial acquisition an end in itself (De oec. col. 17.2-9) and associating the loss of revenue 
with poverty, which results in intense pain and anxiety (ibid. col. 19.4-16).68  Indeed, the refusal 
to make expenditures because of the risk of poverty or a reduction of self-worth ultimately leads 
to wretched squalor, as the sorry life of Staberius shows: he feels compelled to keep constant 
vigil over his enormous heap (112: vigilet; cf 1.1.76: vigilare metu), from which, unlike the wise 
ant in Sermones 1.1, he refuses to subtract despite his intense hunger (2.3.113: esuriens); instead, 
he chooses to subsist on bitter herbs and sour wine (114-17; cf. 2.2.55-62) and his tattered, moth-
bitten rags are a poor excuse for clothes (117-19).69  As Stertinius indicates, moreover, 
Staberius’ twisted views regarding wealth actually prevent him from using it properly (108-9): 
qui discrepat istis | qui nummos aurumque recondit, nescius uti (“In what way is he different 
from such men, the one who hides his coins and gold, being ignorant of its purpose?”).70  The 
68This is also expressed in De div. col. 27.6-10: ποιούμενοι τὴ[ν φυ]λακὴν καὶ σὺν 
μερίμναις ἐ[π]ωδύνοις· καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς οὕτως ἀγωνιῶντες ὡς ἀνυπ[αρξίας] 
(“Endeavoring to preserve wealth with painful anxieties and agonizing over the loss of revenue 
as if it were penury”).  It should also be remembered that Philodemus states that “the fall from 
wealth to poverty is indifferent” (ibid. col. 53.3-5).  Regarding wealth itself, Philodemus does 
not identify it as a “preferred indifferent” but considers it beneficial or detrimental in relation to 
the disposition of the one using it.  Cf. De oec. col. 14.5-9: Οὐ φαίνεται δ’ ὁ πλοῦτος ἐπιφέρειν 
ἀλυσιτελεῖς δυσχερείας παρ’ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴ[ν] τῶν χρωμένων κακίαν (“Wealth does 
not seem to bring profitless troubles of its own accord, but rather as a result of the wickedness of 
those who misuse it”).  Diogenes Laertius preserves a similar Stoic version of this teaching 
(7.101-3). 
   
 69These descriptions depend heavily on traditional depictions of “meanness” 
(ἀνελευθερία) and the “desire of base gain” (αἰσχροκερδία), for which see Arist. Eth. Nic. 
1121b10-15 and Theophr. Char. 30 respectively.  For keeping vigil day and night as a symptom 
of meanness, which appears at 1.1.76, cf. Plaut. Aul. 72-3. 
 
 70Cf. 1.1.41-2 for hiding gold in the earth, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
was a traditional motif in serio-comic literature: cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8 and Plaut. Aul. 6-8.  
Horace similarly chides the miser for being “ignorant of money’s potential, of the enjoyment it 
can bring” (1.1.73: nescis quo valeat nummus, quem praebeat usum?). 
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problem of being ignorant about money and its value is a common theme of moral philosophy 
but of particular importance to Epicurus, who identifies philosophical αὐτάρκεια with the ability 
to be satisfied with and enjoy one’s possessions (Arr. 4.130.5-7).71  This is also expressed by 
Philodemus in his economic treatises, which emphasize the sage economist’s ability to acquire 
and use wealth beneficially (De oec. col. 19.45-20.1): ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρ[ον] μάλιστ[α] 
καὶ κτᾶται καὶ χρῆται καὶ ἐπιμέ[λεται πλούτο]υ (“. . . although the sage in particular acquires, 
uses and cares for wealth to his own advantage”).72  In contrast to this, Staberius’ hoarding of 
wealth results not only in sordidness and physical discomfort, but also in much anxiety as he 
fearfully keeps imagined despoilers away and worries about “not having enough” (123: ne tibi 
desit). 
 The other examples of economic vice Stertinius presents are associated with greed as 
well as self-indulgence, both of which Damasippus eventually attributes to Horace himself.  
Regarding the consequences of being unable to enjoy wealth, perhaps the best or at least most 
extreme example is afforded by the miser Opimius, whose greedy refusal to make expenditures 
ultimately results in his own death (147-57).  Stertinius refers to him as “poor Opimius” (142: 
pauper Opimius), which, given the obvious connection to opimus, is certainly intended as a 
clever oxymoron73 but also alludes to Epicurus’ famous paradox describing the desire for great 
wealth as spiritual poverty (Arr. 6.25): Ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ 
 71See Rudd (1966) 183.  Gowers (2012) 76 also identifies Horace’s mention of the 
“enjoyment” (1.1.73: usum) associated with wealth as motivated by Epicureanism.   
 
 72Cf. De div. col. 23.30-31: πλοῦτον ὠφελ[εῖν . .] εὖ χ[ρωμένους] (“[They say that] 
wealth can be beneficial for those who use it properly”). 
 
 73See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 205-6, who cite Carm. 3.16.28: magnas inter opes inops 
(“poor in the midst of great riches”).  Rudd (1966) 141 and Muecke (1993) 147 discuss the 
possible identity of this individual. 
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πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὁριζομένος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία (“Poverty measured by the limits of 
nature is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty”).74  Unlike the hospitable Ofellus, 
moreover, who, in accordance with Philodemus’ economic advice, knows how to enjoy good 
things with friends and visitors on occasion (2.2.118-25), the rich miser’s inclination to “drink 
bad wine on holidays” (2.3.143: Veientanum festis potare diebus)75 and “vinegar on working 
days” (2.3.144: vappamque profestis) closely resembles the meanness of Avidienus (2.2.59-62) 
as well as the stinginess of the inhospitable Naevius (2.2.68-9).  A life of squalor and bad wine, 
however, is by no means the only consequence of meanness: on his deathbed Opimius is not 
surrounded by friends and family members (similar to the Horatian miser), but by his joyfully 
expectant heir:  
 
quondam lethargo grandi est opressus, ut heres 
iam circum loculos et clavis laetus ovansque 
curreret. (S. 2.3.145-47) 
 One day he was overcome by a tremendous lethargy, so that his heir was already running 
 around among the cash-boxes and keys, happy and jubilant. 
 
 
Philodemus describes “friendlessness” (ἀφιλία) as one of the major consequences of love of 
money (De oec. col. 24.19-33), although, as Stertinius clearly indicates, Opimius has not been 
totally abandoned: the final scene of this example involves a brief dialogue between the gravely 
ill Opimius and his “very quick-witted and faithful doctor” (147: medicus multum celer atque 
74A similar view was expressed by the Cynics, for which cf. Kindstrand (1971) F36: 
Πρὸς πλούσιον μικρολόγον, “οὐχ οὗτος,” ἔφη, “τὴν οὐσίαν κέκτηται, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐσία τοῦτον.”  
(“Regarding a wealthy miser, he [Bion] said ‘he does not own his possessions; rather, his 
possessions own him”). 
 
 75For the low quality of Veientine wine, which Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 206 call “ein 
abscheulicher roter Krätzer,” see Pers. 5.147. 
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fidelis), which recalls a similar passage describing the Horatian miser’s hypothetical illness 
(1.1.80-86).  In both cases, meanness is associated with death: for the miser, it results in 
universal abandonment and a complete lack of medical assistance; for Opimius, it prevents him 
from accepting the nourishing “rice pudding” (155: tisanarium oryzae)76 which will save his life 
by restoring blood and raising his collapsed stomach (153-54).  The reason for his rejection is 
that, like Staberius, he mistakenly views poverty as a “sickness” (157: morbo) and the most 
horrendous “wickedness” (92: vitium), which prevents him from enjoying the many benefits 
wealth can provide.77  In his remaining treatment of economic vice, Stertinius considers the 
madness of those who suffer from the opposite extreme, namely, self-indulgence (224-46).  It is 
generally acknowledged that the general focus on vitia contraria, which is a commonplace of 
Horatian satire (cf. 1.2.24), largely reflects Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean; when applied 
specifically to economic vice, however, it may also express the Epicurean “measure of wealth” 
doctrine expounded by Philodemus in De oeconomia (col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον).  
According to this teaching, it is the management of one’s desires and fears which results in the 
proper administration of wealth (ibid. col. 23.36-42); in other words, one must eliminate the fear 
of poverty, which inevitably leads to meanness, as well as the unnecessary desires for exotic 
foods and pleasures, which originate in a self-indulgent disposition and often result in the 
destruction of wealth (ibid. coll. 23.42-24.2).  In Stertinius’ diatribe, the self-indulgent type is 
 76André (1981) 54 discusses the medicinal uses associated with rice, which, as Pliny 
notes (Nat. 18.71), had to be imported from India and therefore cost more than local barley.  See 
also Muecke (1003) 148.  
 
 77Cf. De divitiis, where Philodemus describes poverty as a “good” (col. 49.12: ἀγαθ[όν]) 
that is “not worthy of fear” (col. 36.11-12: οὐ [γὰ]ρ ἄξιον φόβου), and De oeconomia, where he 
discusses the benefits of wealth (col. 14.9-23). 
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exemplified by individuals like Nomentanus (224-38; cf. 1.1.102)78 and the sons of Quintus 
Arrius (243-46), whose desire for extravagant commodities and dainties such as nightingales 
eventually strips them of their resources.  It is Damasippus, however, who, in response to 
Horace’s question “With what folly do you think I am mad?” (301-2: qua me stultitia . . . | 
insanire putas?), criticizes the poet for being avaricious and overly indulgent: this is directly 
connected to his “mad passion” for love (325: furores) and perhaps to his otiose life in the 
countryside (3: vini somnique benignus), but also includes his desire to imitate Maecenas by 
“building a fortune” (308: aedificas), which is generally understood as a reference to the Sabine 
estate.79  Horace’s self-deprecating response to these accusations involves the comic portrayal of 
himself as irascible and frustrated with his mad interlocutor (326: insane), with no serious 
attempt to raise an objection or provide a defense of his administration of wealth.  This topic, 
however, is revisited in Sermones 2.6, in which Horace finally addresses his relationship with 
Maecenas and provides a detailed description of life on his newly acquired country villa. 
 The idyllic portrayal of life in the country in Sermones 2.6 is deceptively simple, since, in 
addition to addressing the important theme of leisure as a prerequisite for poetic activity, it also 
involves an expression of gratitude that reconnects Horace’s audience to the complicated issue of 
patronage.  This poem, which has been closely associated with Sermones 2.2 on account of its 
praise of rural simplicity, may also engage further with the tension between city and country 
 78See Rudd (1966) 142. 
 
79Muecke (1993) 165” Horace was probably building or extending the villa on the Sabine 
farm, where the conversation is imagined as taking place.”  See also Courtney (2013) 139.  This 
will be discusses again in Chapter 5. 
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implicitly communicated at the beginning of Sermones 2.3.80  Indeed, it may offer a response to 
the criticisms of Damasippus concerning the inadequacy of country life for literary productivity, 
which, in accordance with the characteristics of Horatian satire, requires otium and often draws 
inspiration from the poet’s own life experiences (whether accurately portrayed or exaggerated to 
promote a literary persona).  Horace’s acquisition of the Sabine estate, which probably occurred 
in 33 BC,81 was undoubtedly one of these experiences, the significance of which is clearly 
revealed at the outset by an elaborate prayer of thanksgiving:  
 
Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus, 
hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons 
et paulum silvae super his foret.  auctius atque 
di melius fecere.  bene est.  nil amplius oro,  
Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis. (S. 2.6.1-5) 
This is what I prayed for!—a piece of land not so very large, where there would be a 
garden, and near the house a spring of ever-flowing water, and up above these82 a bit of 
woodland.  More and better than this have the gods done for me.  I am content.  Nothing 
more do I ask, O son of Maia, save that thou make these blessings last my life long. 
 
 
80Boll (1913) 143 was the first to arrange the poems in Book 2 as intentionally paralleled 
to one another, a thesis which Fraenkel (1957) 137 doubts but Rudd (1966) 160-61 is much more 
willing to accept.  For the role of tension or opposition in this poem, especially that of civic 
duty/leisure and Stoicism/Epicureanism, see Muecke (1993) 194. 
 
81Reckford (1959) 200.  But cf. Bradshaw (1989) 160-86, who points out that there is no 
explicit evidence in the corpus to identify Maecenas as the source of the Sabine estate.  Aside 
from ignoring the abundant evidence in favor of this connection, his skepticism also overlooks 
various social factors and matters of décor to be discussed below.  Also puzzling is Bradshaw’s 
identification of Octavian as the possible source of the Sabine estate (163-66), which, although 
not impossible, is a claim that does not satisfy his own rather unreasonable demand for explicit 
evidence.         
 
82This is the translation offered by Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 257 and Muecke (1993) 197, 
both of whom support it by citing Var. R. 1.21.1 (a passage encouraging proprietors to establish 
their villas below a wild wood).  Cf. also Carm. 3.1.17: destrictus ensis cui super impia | cervice 
pendet (“for whom a drawn sword hangs upon impious head”).  Of course, the alternative is to 
take super his as “moreover” or “in addition to this,” as does Fraenkel (1957) 138 n. 2. 
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It is curious that the poet should choose to express his gratitude to Maecenas in the form of a 
solemn invocation to Mercury, complete with formulaic lines used in traditional prayers.83  
There are, however, various possible reasons for this: in addition to containing the mob’s 
jealousy (48: invidiae), which was a bitter-sweet reality that plagued Horace constantly (cf. 
1.6.45-7), this prayer may reflect the Romans’ general distaste for explicit references to the 
exchange of services between patrons and clients, which would have been especially 
inappropriate within the context of a sophisticated poem.84  Ellen Oliensis gives an explanation 
of Horace’s indirect expression of gratitude: 
 
“[T]he displacement is sufficient to stave off the self-incriminating “thank you” 
(portraying Horace as a poet for hire) that we might have expected Horace to produce.  
Moreover, had Horace thanked Maecenas directly, the poem might be read as an enforced 
or ungraciously punctual pay-off of Maecenas’ generous gift.  As in Satires 1.6, the 
obliquity of Horace’s “thank you” keeps the satire’s value from being exhausted in the 
act of exchange.85 
 
 
Perhaps on a more personal level, the omission of an explicit acknowledgement of Maecenas as 
Horace’s benefactor may additionally suggest a certain level of autonomy on the part of the poet, 
who, in an earlier dedication to his patron, had boldly reserved gratitude for his biological father 
(1.6.65-71).86  As a poet, moreover, Horace was entirely justified in associating Maecenas, to 
whom he refers elsewhere as a source of wealth (Epod. 1.31-2; Ep. 1.7.15), with the god of 
financial prosperity, thereby transforming an otherwise perfunctory expression of gratitude into a 
83See Fraenkel (1957) 138 n. 1.  
 
 84Rudd (1966) 253: “As Maecenas heard that magnificent opening, in which a human 
name would have been quite out of place . . .”  
 
85Oliensis (1998) 48. 
 
86Cf. Ep. 1.7, in which Horace famously and unabashedly asserts his independence from 
Maecenas and his gifts, particularly the Sabine estate. 
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lofty and traditional invocation.87  This association is further confirmed by Horace’s deliberate 
use of the matronymic Maia nate, which, in addition to reflecting the traditional Greek formula 
(cf. Hom. Hymn Merc. 1),88 also appears conveniently to echo his patron’s name.89  The 
allegorical identification of a Roman benefactor as Mercury likewise appears in Carm. 1.2 (43: 
filius Maiae), although Horace’s model was perhaps Vergil’s Eclogae 1, in which Tityrus extols 
the source of his rural property in the following manner (6-7): O Meliboee, deus nobis otia fecit. 
| Namque erit ille mihi simper deus (“O Meliboeus, it is a god who wrought for us this peace—
for a god he shall ever be to me”).90  In Horace’s version, however, the connection to patronage 
is strongly implied by means of the carefully chosen vocabulary: he is “pleased with the favor” 
(13: gratum iuvat; cf. Epod. 1.24: tuae spem gratiae) of Maia’s son, who has granted him “gifts” 
(5: munera; cf. Ep. 1.7.18: dono)91 and who offers him protection as a “guardian” (15: custos; cf. 
Carm. 1.1.1: praesidium); indeed, Mercury could be regarded as Horace’s protector just as easily 
 87Cf. Fraenkel (1957) 141: “Horace was poet enough to adopt and transform the hopes, 
the fears and even the prayers of bygone generations.”  According to Fraenkel (1957) 140 and 
Rudd (1966) 248, the religious tone of this introductory prayer and the gravity of words such as 
carmen (22) is uncharacteristic of the Sermones and looks forward to his lyric odes.  Courtney 
(2013) 151, however, is more cautious. 
   
 88Muecke (1993) 197.  Cf. also Alcaeus’ fragmentary hymn to Mercury, which contains 
the phrase Μαῖα γέννατο (Campbell, 308b.3).  Horace’s imitation of this poem in Carm. 1.10 
begins with the vocative Mercuri, which, of course, would have been metrically impossible in 
hexameters. 
 
 89Oliensis (1998) 48.  
 
 90See Bowditch (2010) 60.  
 
 91Cf. Plaut. Cist. 93: in amicitiam insinuavit . . . blanditiis, muneribus, donis (“He 
insinuated himself into friendship through flattery, favors and gifts”).  The word munus is often 
associated with divine gifts (cf. Verg. A. 12.393 and Cic. Arch. 18) as well as buildings or 
property. 
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as Maecenas, since both offer assistance with regard to poetic activity: the former through 
inspiration and the latter through his gift of a suitable venue for leisurely withdrawal.92  
Horace’s acceptance of the Sabine estate when he was already prosperous may seem to 
contradict Epicurus’ economic restrictions and views of natural wealth, which impose strict 
limits on financial success; the details related to the acquisition of his newfound estate, however, 
closely reflect Philodemus’ economic advice.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Epicurus 
sanctioned moneymaking only out of dire necessity (Arr. 121b4); in other words, wealth should 
be acquired for the purpose of satisfying the necessary desires associated with survival, such as 
food and drink.  This is consistent with his view of natural wealth as the equivalent of having 
few possessions (Arr. 6.25), since such desires are easily satisfied and therefore cannot justify 
the acquisition of substantial resources (Arr. 5.144.1-2).  As mentioned above, Philodemus 
echoes this advice in his economic treatises, stating that poverty is a “good thing” (De div. 49.12: 
ἀγαθ[όν]), that the loss of resources is indifferent to happiness (ibid. col. 53.3-5) and that the 
sage will be content with the thought of living a poor and meager life, since nature is easily 
satisfied (De eoc. col. 19.16-19).  In addition to this, however, he cautiously suggests that 
responsibly acquired wealth, although contributing nothing of itself to happiness and pleasure, 
affords relief from difficulties and is conducive towards leisure and the contemplative life; it is, 
therefore, much preferable to a life of little means: 
 
 Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τήρησις, ὅση πρέπει τῶι κατὰ τρόπον αὐτοῦ προεστῶτι, 
 παρέχει μὲν τιν’ ἐωίοτ’ ὄχλησιν, οὐ μὲν πλείω γε τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἐφήμερον πορισμόν, 
 ἄν δὲ καὶ πλείω, τῶν ἄλ[λ]ων ὧν ἀπαλλάτει δυσχερῶν [ο]ὐ πλείον’, ἂν μ[ὴ] δείξῃ 
 τις, ὡς  οὐκ ἀποδί[δω]σιν ὁ φυσικὸς πλοῦτος [πο]λλῶ[ι] μείζους τὰς ἐπικαρπίας ἢ 
 τοὺς πόνους τῆς ἀπ’ [ὀ]λίγων ζωῆς, ὃ πολλοῦ δεήσε[ι παρ]ιστάνε[ιν.]  
 (De oec. col. 14. 9-23)   
 
 92For the identification Maecenas = Mercury as parodic, see Bond (1985) 74-5.  
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The care and preservation of wealth that suits someone who takes care of it properly does 
not afford greater trouble than the provision of daily needs, and even if it affords more 
trouble, this is not more than the difficulties from which it releases us, unless someone 
shows that natural wealth does not provide a much greater balance of rewards over toil 
than does the life of little means, which he will be very far from showing. 
 
 
The significance of Philodemus’ point lies in the subtle but meaningful opposition between 
natural wealth and the “life of few possessions,” which is different from Epicurus’ equation of 
natural wealth with the possession of few things.93  This is not to say that Philodemus places the 
highest value on wealth; rather, he borrows language from the Stoics and describes the change 
from wealth to poverty as “indifferent” (De div. col. 53.3-5: [ἀδιά]φορο[ν]) with regard to 
happiness or virtue, and he rejects the notion that there is a great “difference” (ibid. col. 41.35-7: 
διαφορά) between the two economic states, since both are able to produce “equal pleasures” 
(ibid. col. 56.4-8: ἴσ[ας] ἡδονάς).94  In the passage following the block quotation above, 
however, he carefully states that the Epicurean sage, though content with little and unwilling to 
suffer for the sake of wealth, merely “inclines in his wishes towards a more bountiful way of 
life” (De oec. col. 16.4-6: ῥέπει δὲ τῆι βουλήσει μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφθονωτέραν).95  
93Asmis (2004) 159: “Everything Philodemus says is compatible with Epicurus’ own 
teachings.  But there is a change of emphasis.  Whereas Philodemus offers a defense of wealth, 
Epicurus’ economic advice appears, on the whole, a consolation for poverty.”  
 
94Cf. De oec. col. 16.1-4.  The Stoic doctrine of “indifferents” or ἀδιάφορα has been 
discussed above.  Of particular relevance is the evidence from Stobaeus (2.83.10-84.2 = SVF 
3.124), according to which Antipater regarded wealth as having “selective value” (ἐκλεκτικὴ 
ἀξία), which means that, all things being equal, it should always be preferred to poverty.  Cf. 
Plutarch Mor. 75.1047e (De communibus notitiis = SVF 3.138), who mentions how Chrysippus 
considered it madness not to pursue wealth, and Cicero (Off. 1.25), who places no limit on 
wealth acquisition so long as “no one is harmed in the process” (amplificatio nemini nocens).  In 
contrast to this, Philodemus never claims that wealth must be pursued or that it can be amassed 
without limits so long as no one is harmed.  Instead, he suggests that the sage accept wealth but 
simultaneously expresses the value of poverty (πενία), which the sage is never obligated to 
avoid.  Cf. De oec. coll. 15.45-16.4 and De div. coll. 41.9-15 and 47.9-11.     
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Philodemus makes it clear that the sage freely accepts more wealth but only when it comes easily 
and without harm; in other words, he receives it from grateful patrons (e.g., Piso and Maecenas) 
rather than actively seeking it out (ibid. coll. 16.44-17.2): τὸ [δὲ π]λεῖον, ἂ[ν ἀ]βλ[α]βῶς καὶ 
[εὐ]πόρως γίνηται, δεκτέ[ον, τὸ] δὲ κακοπαθ[ε]ῖν [κατ’ α]ὐτὸ τοῦτο μή (“One should accept 
more wealth if it comes without harm and easily, but one should not suffer on account of this”).  
In this sense the Epicurean manager, who is content with little, prefers but does not desire to live 
affluently, and he only accepts more wealth when it comes easily and, in the ideal situation, in 
the form of “gratitude” (gratia, εὐχάριστον) from patrons and friends. 
 The preceding summary of Philodemus’ defense of wealth, which differs from the more 
restrictive attitude of Epicurus, may help to explain Horace’s acquisition of the Sabine estate, 
which, far from being a “little farm” (Ep. 1.14.1: agelli; cf. 1.6.71 and 2.2.114), was likely a 
spacious property with significant agricultural potential.  Horace hints at the superiority of this 
property in Sermones 2.6 by mentioning its size and quality, both of which have exceeded his 
moderate hopes (1-4): Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus . . . auctius atque | di melius 
fecere (“This is what I prayed for!—a piece of land not so very large . . . More and better than 
this have the gods done for me”).96  His use of modus is noteworthy, for this word elsewhere 
denotes the proper measure which corresponds to moderation and correct behavior (cf. 1.1.106: 
95In other words, the sage should coolly accept but not endeavor to accumulate wealth, 
which is “easily taken away” (De div. col. 54. 9: εὐαφαίρετος) and “easily destroyed” (ibid. 8: 
[εὔ]φθαρτος).  This is consistent with Epicurus’ teaching concerning the “independence” (Arr. 
6.44: αὐτάρκεια) of living with few possessions. In this sense, Philodemus’ expression “inclines 
in his wishes” certainly does not imply a “desire for wealth” (De div. col. 58.8-9: [ἐ]πιθυμίας 
π[ρ]ὸς πλοῦτον), which is reprehensible. 
 
 96See Lyne (1995) 20.  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 257 translate auctius atque melius as 
“reichlicher und besser.” 
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est modus in rebus);97 the Sabine estate, however, clearly exceeds this measure, which is a 
strange admission paralleled only by the poet’s recognition of Maecenas’ generosity in Epodi 1 
(30-31): satis superque me benignitas tua | ditavit (“enough has your generosity enriched me and 
more than enough”).98  As scholars have noted, the mention of divitiae is undoubtedly a 
reference to the Sabine estate, the overall quality of which, shockingly enough, appears to violate 
Horace’s usual demand for moderation and contentment.99  Indeed, the actual magnitude of what 
most modern commentators (undoubtedly misled by Horace) inaccurately describe as a “farm” is 
carefully and discretely revealed by the poet himself.100  In his epistolary correspondence with 
Quinctius, for example, the poet addresses the issue of the Sabine estate’s agricultural 
productivity (Ep. 1.16.1-16), which consequently indicates something about its economic 
potential, as Leach notes:  
 
 The hypothetical questions he attributes to Quinctius locate his description within the 
 discourse of agricultural self-sufficiency.  All the products he has listed—crops, olives, 
 orchards, pasturage, and vines—imply a major agricultural establishment, suggesting that 
 97As Muecke (1993) 196 and Gowers (2012) 81 note, in addition to its ethical 
connotation modus is also the technical term indicating a measure of land.  Cf. Plaut. Aul. 13: 
agri reliquit ei non magnum modum (“He left him not a large measure of land”). 
  
 98Leach (1993) 272, reporting the observations of a young philologist regarding the 
remains of Horace’s villa in Italy, states: “[H]is confrontation with the architectural actualities 
disturbed his literary preconceptions in one particular.  The unanticipated spaciousness of the 
villa and its properties seemed out of keeping with Horace’s own protestations of a modest 
lifestyle.” 
 
99Furthermore, if Suetonius’ testimony is taken into account, it seems that Horace was the 
recipient of not one, but possibly three properties (Suet. Vit. Hor. 18-19): vixit plurimum in 
secessu ruris sui Sabini aut Tiburtini, domusque ostenditur circa Tiburni luculum (“He lived for 
the most part either in his Sabine or his Tiburtine country retreat, and a house of his is shown 
near the grove of Tiburnus”).  Lyne (1995) 9-11 also accounts for Horace’s extended description 
of a retreat at Tarentum at Odes 2.6 and the townhouse he had acquired soon after his purchase 
of the post of scriba—a possible total of five properties! 
 
 100See Oliensis (1998) 42, Leach (1993) 275-76 and Lyne (1995) 6.  
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 the question being answered is really, “How large and how productive is the farm?”  If 
 we were to answer this question on the basis of Horace’s offerings in Ode 1.17 to 
 Tyndaris, of copia . . . ruris honorum opulenta, we would have to say “very productive,” 
 but in the immediate situation Horace plays down productivity.101 
 
 
All of this, of course, begs the question: how are we to reconcile Horace’s status as an opulent 
proprietor with Epicurean frugality and the importance of vivere parvo (2.2.1)?  As suggested 
above, the answer lies in the views expressed by Philodemus in his economic treatises, which 
sanction and even promote the acquisition of wealth under specific conditions.  The first 
important observation is that, in accordance with Philodemus’ teaching, Horace neither pursues 
wealth nor does he constantly desire more like the “foolish” manager (8: stultus);102 on the 
contrary, he is able to “endure poverty” (Carm. 1.1.18: pauperiem pati), whom he “courts and 
whose virtue is its own dowry” (ibid. 3.29.55-6: probamque | pauperiem sine dote quaero) since 
she is easily satisfied and always provides “what is enough” (Ep. 1.2.46: quod satis est).103  In 
spite of this profound respect for poverty and his overall contentment, however, Horace clearly 
indicates that he is not poor: as a result of his patron’s generosity, not only does he “lack 
troublesome poverty” (Carm. 3.16.37: importuna tamen pauperies abest; cf. Ep. 2.2.199: 
pauperies . . . absit) but he enjoys substantial wealth, as he plainly states in a later 
correspondence (Ep. 1.7.15): tu me fecisti locupletem (“You have made me rich”).104  The point 
 101Leach (1993) 281.  Cf. Barbieri (1977) 501, who notes that Horace “non mostra 
interesse per la rendita e per le carateristiche economiche del fondo.”  On this poem in general, 
see Kilpatrick (1986) 96-9.  For a study of the differences between the poetic and historical 
Sabine property, see Frischer (1995) 31-45. 
 
 102 Rudd (1966) 243-44 
 
 103See Vischer (1965) 147-52, whose analysis does not consider the fact that, despite 
Horace’s respect for poverty, he was willing to accept wealth.  
 
 104For the meaning of this adjective, which is rarely applied to people, as denoting 
“abundant in land” (i.e., locus + plenus), see Cic. Rep. 2.9.16: quod tum erat res in pecore et 
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is that Horace, like the Epicurean manager, “does not grab, he accepts,”105 and that this 
prosperity is the result of a generous patron’s favor, which he freely receives and responsibly 
enjoys without toil or anxiety.  As he makes perfectly clear in Epistulae 1.7, moreover, the poet 
is certainly not afraid to lose his wealth or return to a state of poverty, but he presently requests 
that, if possible, his newfound fortune should last a lifetime (2.6.4-5): oro | . . . ut propria haec 
mihi munera faxis (“My only prayer is that you should make these gifts mine for ever”).106  Far 
from attempting to avoid poverty and desiring limitless wealth, therefore, Horace simply 
“inclines in his wishes” towards affluence; and as he consciously demonstrates in the rest of 
Sermones 2.6, his decision to accept such prosperity reflects Philodemus’ concern for applying 
the pleasure calculus to every economic decision and ensuring that increased wealth does not 
result in increased pain.           
 Rather than functioning as a superficial foil to the later description of country life,107 
Horace’s account of the cares associated with Rome at 2.6.23-57 are necessary for justifying his 
acceptance of the Sabine estate and his leisurely withdrawal there with friends.  Following the 
poet’s second prayer to a deity, which, despite the grandiloquent tone, is merely a “counterpoint 
locorum possessionibus: ex quo pecuniosi et locupletes vocabantur (“Because in the past wealth 
was understood in terms of livestock and the possession of land: whence people were called 
pecuniosi or locupletes”).  Philodemus mentions the troubles and difficulties associated with 
poverty and wealth’s ability to remove them at De oec. col. 14.9-23, as quoted above (p. 141). 
 
 105Asmis (2004) 159.  
 
 106Unlike his paternal inheritance, which was lost in the confiscations.  On the formulaic 
nature is this prayer, see Muecke (1993) 197.  Cf. also Philodemus De oec. col. 13.34-39: τινὰ 
δὲ δεκ[τέον], ὧν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον, τ[ὸ] βάρος ἔχοντα με[ῖ]ον ὅταν παρῆι, μᾶλλον π[ρ]ὸς 
ὅλον [βί]ον ἀλλὰ μὴ πρός τ[ι]να καιρό[ν] (“Certain things ought to be accepted, among which 
is wealth, since it is less of a burden when present, especially if it lasts a lifetime rather than for a 
moment”). 
 
 107Fraenkel (1957) 142.  
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to his own rueful groans,”108 he introduces a long list of duties and responsibilities, all of which 
violently thrust him (24: urge) into the bustling, crowded streets of Rome (28: in turba).  The 
setting is aptly conveyed by the turbulent weather which accompanies him and projects his 
interior, psychological disturbances (26: interiore gyro) all the way to the “black Equiline” (32-
3: atras | . . . Esquilias), which used to be salubrious (cf. 1.8.14) but is now the source of infinite 
anxieties (33: negotia centum).109  Through his vivid description of the innumerable cares and 
problems of urban life, Horace intentionally obscures the real source of his wealth, which is not 
the pastoral god Mercury but the city-dweller Maecenas!110  Of course, the dizzying flurry of 
requests and demands which buffets the audience for almost thirty lines (29-56) provides the 
perfect setup for Horace’s contrasting description of the serenity and tranquility of country 
living, which, instead of reminders and early business meetings (37: meminisses; 34: ante 
secundam)111 offer sleep and forgetfulness (61: somno; 62: iucunda oblivia).  Above all, it offers 
Horace as landowner and host the opportunity to provide his friends with the kind of leisurely 
withdrawal into a rural stronghold (16: in arcem) which is conducive to philosophical 
108 Rudd (1966) 249.  See also Courtney (2013) 151. 
 
109For weather metaphors as a common feature of Hellenistic philosophy and particularly 
favored by the Epicureans, see Chapter 1, p. 48 n. 57. 
 
110Oliensis (1998) 50: “Horace’s country retreat is not just an alternative to but a gift 
from the city, a crumb, as it were, from the master’s table.  Unlike the country mouse, that is, 
Horace has chosen the path not of virtuous poverty but of (to give it its best construction) 
virtuous wealth—his relation with Maecenas involves usus as well as rectum.”  I agree that 
Horace is partly attempting to establish his independence and “defend himself from charges of 
manly subservience” (51); I would point out, however, that, according to Horace’s own words, 
he has not chosen wealth but freely accepted it (benignitas tua me ditavit; tu me fecisti 
locupletem).  Braund (1989) 42 describes Horace’s negative account of life in the city as 
intended to “condemn the jealousy and curiosity” of others. 
 
 111Cf. 1.6.122: ad quartam iaceo (“I lie abed until ten o’clock in the morning”). 
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discussions.112  After a convivial meal and a few rounds of relaxed and free drinking, which 
recalls the hospitality of Ofellus (2.2.118-25),   
 
sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis, 
nec male necne Lepos saltet; sed quod magis ad nos 
pertinet et nescire malum est113 agitamus: utrumne 
divitiis homines an sint virtute beati; 
quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos; 
et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius. (S. 2.6.71-6) 
[C]onversation arises, not about other people’s villas or town-houses, not whether Lepos 
dances badly or not, but we discuss what has more relevance to us and not to know is an 
evil: whether it is wealth or virtue that makes men happy; or what leads us to friendships, 
self-interest or rectitude; and what is the nature of goodness and what its highest form. 
 
 
This scene, which identifies the contemplative life and the search for wisdom among friends as 
the perfect expression of tranquility, reflects Cicero’s idealized portrait of Cato (Sen. 46) but also 
recalls Philodemus’ description of landownership as an acceptable source of income (De oec. 
col. 23.11-16): ἥκιστα γὰρ  ἐπιπλοκὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ἐξ ὧν ἀηδίαι πολλαὶ 
παρακολουθοῦσι, καὶ διαγωγὴ ἐπιτερπῆ καὶ μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον (“For it 
brings the least involvement with men from whom many difficulties follow, since it offers a 
pleasant life and a leisurely withdrawal among friends”).  These “men from whom many 
 112See Braund (1989) 40. Cf. also Verg. G. 2.458-74 for the pleasures of country life, 
which includes plenty of otium and secura quies.   
 
 113Cf. Ep. 1.1.24-6 (note especially the opposition of pauperes, i.e., people like Ofellus 
and Horace’s father, to locupletes, i.e., Horace himself): 
 
        id quod 
aeque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus aeque, 
aeque neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit.  
 
 [Philosophy], which shall benefit the poor and the rich alike, and which will be 
 damaging to both children and old people if neglected. 
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difficulties follow” correspond to individuals such as Horace’s colleagues from the quaestorship 
(2.6.36-7) as well as the other nameless individuals whose requests “dance around my head and 
on all sides” (34: per caput et circa salient latus); in contrast to these trivial concerns, his 
country villa provides the setting for philosophical conversation, the informal and friendly nature 
of which is effectively communicated by the conviviality of the gathering as well as their 
identification as “chats” (118: sermo; cf. 1.1.42: sermoni propriora).114  Furthermore, this kind 
of leisure is made possible by the complete absence of labor, which Horace associates 
exclusively with the city (21: operum . . . labores); indeed, whether at home or on the estate, 
Horace portrays himself as preoccupied with philosophy and poetry, while his meals are served 
by personal waiters (cf. 1.6.116: pueris tribus) or household slaves (2.6.66: vernas procaces),115 
and elsewhere he implies that agricultural work in the Sabine fields is performed by a team of at 
least eight laborers (2.7.118: opera agro nona Sabino).116  Horace’s mention of laborers within 
the context of his repeated emphasis on rural otium echoes the advice of Philodemus, who also 
emphasizes the importance of delegating manual labor to servants in order to make oneself 
available to one’s friends and to the pursuit of wisdom (De oec. col. 23.7-11): ταλαίπωρον δὲ 
καὶ ‘γεωργο[ῦν]τ’ αὐτὸν οὕτως ὥστε αὐτουργεῖν’· τὸ δ’ ἄλλων, ἔχοντα γῆν κατὰ σπουδαῖον 
114Cf.  De oec. col. 23.30-36: λο[ιπὸ]ν δὲ ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλο[ν]ε[ί]κων καὶ 
[σ]υ[λ]λήβδη[ν] εἰπεῖν [ἀτ]αράχων, ὡς τό γε διὰ σοφ[ιστι]κῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικ]ῶν ο[ὐδέ]ν 
ἐστι βέλτιον τοῦ διὰ δη[μοκ]οπικῶν καὶ συκοφαντικ[ῶν] (“These discussions, moreover, 
should be truthful, free from strife, and, in a word, peaceful, since holding discourse though 
sophistical and contentious speeches is no better than doing this through demagogical and 
slandering ones”).  For Philodemus’ implied contrast between leisurely discussions and the 
formal debates characteristic of forensic oratory, see Tsouna (2012) 97.  
 
 115See Armstrong (1986) 278-79 for the luxury involved in Horace’s gentlemanly way of 
life and his ownership of servants.   
  
 116Horace also employed the services of a bailiff (Ep. 1.14.1: vilice) when he was away 
from the country. 
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(“‘Cultivating the land oneself in a manner involving work with one’s own hands’ is also 
wretched, while ‘using other workers if one is a landowner’ is appropriate for the good man”).117  
This freedom from manual labor allows one time for more important things such as the topics of 
discussion Horace mentions, which, in addition to reflecting current debates among 
contemporary philosophical sects, also highlights wealth (74: divitiis), friendship (75: amicitias) 
and tranquility (76: summum bonum) as the primary concerns of Epicurean economic theory. 
This chapter has attempted to show that, although Horace often delegates the role of 
satirist to other speakers, he still manages to communicate an economic message that 
consistently engages with Epicurean doctrine and is relevant to contemporary Romans.  Through 
the mouth of Ofellus in Sermones 2.2, for example, the poet not only elucidates the many virtues 
of frugality but also suggests, in accordance with Philodemus’ economic advice, that 
dispossessed proprietors ought to endure the loss of wealth indifferently and with equanimity.  
Similar advice is given in Sermones 2.3 by Damasippus through the recorded lectures of 
Stertinius, although his love of the city, longwinded diatribe and overly critical analysis of 
humanity as a whole significantly contrast with Horace’s portrait of the rustic Ofellus, who in 
many ways resembles the poet himself.  Of course, one important difference between these two 
is that, whereas Ofellus demonstrates how to lose wealth, Horace’s self-portrayal in Sermones 
2.6 appears to be a Philodemean commentary on how to acquire and enjoy substantial wealth 
properly.  In the next chapter, the role of flattery and frankness in the Sermones will be 
examined, particularly with regard to Horace’s lucrative relationship with his patron, which was 
constantly the subject of envy and has been described as the product of flattery.  Of special 
 117 See Tsouna (2012) 97, commenting on Philodemus’ discussion of sources of income: 
“[H]e appears to assume that the person who wishes to live the philosophical life owns a 
substantial estate, complete with slaves, and also is probably using the services of a professional 
property manager as well.” 
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concern will be the manner in which he addresses or forestalls this accusation through the 
practice of frank speech and the colorful depictions of shameless flatterers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FLATTERY AND FRANKNESS  
IN SERMONES 1 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Horace’s self-portrayal in the Sermones as an ethical expert 
who dispenses moral consilia to a grateful and receptive patron shows signs of engagement with 
or at least knowledge of Philodemus’ economic advice.  Closely interconnected with the issue of 
patronage, moreover, is the potential role of self-serving flattery, which, given the Epicureans’ 
reputation for forming social bonds out of utility, was often identified as the underlying 
motivation for their relationships with patrons and friends.  By drawing evidence from 
Philodemus’ fragmentary treatise De adulatione, this chapter will investigate Horace’s 
relationships with his friends, especially Maecenas, with the antithesis between friendship and 
flattery in mind.  In Sermones 1.6, for instance, the poet attempts to distance himself from wordy 
and self-seeking adulators not only by emphasizing his lack of ambition, but also by highlighting 
his reticence in the presence of Maecenas, who receives from Horace only straightforward 
frankness concerning his humble identity.  In addition to promoting his pure motives, moreover, 
this exchange also alludes to the frankness and concern with moral correction which Horace 
learned from his father in Sermones 1.4, and which characterize his own methodological 
approach to vice in the introductory satires as distinct from the longwinded bitterness of Lucilius 
and the merciless invective of Old Comedy.  Furthermore, the nature of Horatian satire, which 
does not glorify libertas in itself but rather employs it for the purpose of moral correction, will be 
shown to reflect the nature of Epicurean frankness, which Philodemus describes as a therapeutic 
tool for moral correction and intimate communication among friends in his treatise De libertate 
dicendi.  Finally, this chapter will consider how Horace emphatically contrasts himself with 
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selfish adulators by examining Sermones 1.9, which includes a character portrait that 
incorporates many characteristics of the typical flatterer as discussed by Philodemus in De 
adulatione.      
 Patronage in antiquity was often associated with flattery, especially in the case of 
Epicurus and his followers in Rome, which might have prompted Philodemus to redefine the 
sage’s role in terms of philosophical friendship.  Perhaps the earliest portrayal of this traditional 
association appears in the fragments of Eupolis’ comic play Adulatores, which contains 
references to the sophist Protagoras as a parasite in the house of his wealthy Athenian patron 
Callias (PCG 5.157-58).1  This portrait undoubtedly influenced Plato’s comic depiction of the 
same sophist in his Protagoras, in which the eponymous sage enjoys suitable lodging and 
philosophical leisure at Callias’ expense (314d9-315b8).2  The charge of flattery, however, 
which in the case of the sophists had been largely marginal, became a more prevalent and serious 
problem as a result of societal changes in the Hellenistic period, as David Konstan explains:  
In the altered ideological environment of the Hellenistic period, in which 
friendship between the powerful and their dependents was the focus of attention, the chief 
worry concerning the perversion of friendship was the possibility that a person motivated 
by narrow self-interest would insinuate himself into the coterie of a superior and, by a 
1See Ribbeck (1884) 9-12 for a discussion of this fragment and for lists of the Greek and 
Roman comic plays which involve flatterers or parasites (30-31).  A much more recent study on 
the fragments of Eupolis’ Adulatores is Storey (2003) 179-97. 
2Cf. Theat. 164e7-165: οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ 
Ἱππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος (“It is not I Socrates, who is drawn to Protagoras’ teachings, 
but Callias the son of Hipponicus”).  In the Gorgias Plato twice makes a connection between 
rhetoric, which is a distinctively sophistic skill, and flattery (517a6-7; 522d9).  See Longo 
Auricchio (1986) 81-2 for more examples from Plato; Millett (1989) 25-37 has a useful 
discussion of patronage and its avoidance in democratic Athens. 
 152 
                                                 
pretense of friendship, achieve his own gain at the expense of his master.3 
 
Within this new social context, those closest to monarchs and wealthy individuals (and therefore 
most susceptible to the charge of flattery) were typically advisors or literary figures, who in 
many circumstances also happened to be philosophers.4  The importance of distinguishing 
flatterers from friends was actually a significant concern in contemporary philosophical 
literature, as evidenced by Aristotle’s treatments in both the Ethica Nicomachea (1126b11-
1127a12) and the Ethica Eudemia (1233b40-1234a3), not to mention Theophrastus’ influential 
character portrait of the flatterer (Char. 2).5  In the case of Epicurus, whose extant fragments do 
not mention flattery, the situation is rather different: he sanctioned patronage as the only 
reputable source of income for the sage, which on occasion entails “service to a king” (Arr. 
1.121b5.1-2: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν); because the Epicureans understood 
friendship as primarily utilitarian (cf. Arr. 6.34 and 39), however, prominent figures of the sect 
were easily accused of shameless flattery, which, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is exactly what 
happened to Epicurus regarding his various benefactors.6  Indeed, the distinction between 
3Konstan (1996) 10; also helpful is Konstan (1997) 93-108.  Gold (1987) 15-38 provides 
a survey of patronage in Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic Greece. 
4Ribbeck (1884) categorizes and lists the known flatterers of Alexander the Great (84-6), 
Demetrius Poliorketes (86-8) and other Hellenistic rulers (88-92).   
5For this portrait, see especially the new edition of Diggle (2003) 181-98, which includes 
a helpful introductory note on the flatterer.  Trapp (1997) 125 mentions lost treatises on flattery 
attributed to Simias, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Theopompus, Clearchus, Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus.  
6I give here the full quotation from Diogenes’ account (Arr. 1.4.10-5.3): Μιθρῆν τε 
αἰσχρῶς κολακεύειν τὸν Λυσιμάχου διοικητὴν, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Παιᾶνα καὶ ἄνακτα 
καλοῦντα.  ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Ἡρόδοτον καὶ Τιμοκράτην τοὺς ἔκπυστα αὐτοῦ τὰ 
κρύφια ποιήσαντας ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ κολακεύειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο (“[He is also said to have] 
flattered shamelessly Mithres, the steward of Lysmachus, calling him in his letters both ‘Savior’ 
and ‘My lord.’  Idomeneus too and Herodotus and Timocrates, who divulged his secrets, he is 
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“friend” (φίλος) and “flatterer” (κόλαξ) was notoriously blurry in antiquity in general,7 but it 
was perhaps even more difficult to ascertain in Horace’s or Plutarch’s Rome, where the 
stratifications of amicitia were many and the number of Greek sages vying for their patrons’ 
favor unsurprisingly elicited charges of flattery.8  Cicero in particular considered the Greeks 
“truly deceptive in general as well as fickle and knowledgeable in their constant dedication to 
excessive flattery” (Q. fr. 1.5.19-20: vero fallaces sunt permulti et leves et diuturna servitute ad 
nimiam adsentationem eruditi).9  He was also a staunch opponent of the Epicurean view of 
friendship (Amic. 45 and 51; cf. also Fin. 2.78-9), which, among other things, motivated his 
critical portrayal of Philodemus’ relationship with Piso as the product of flattery (Pis. 70: 
adsentatorem).  Despite the fact that Cicero’s attack involves the application of general 
stereotypes and stock qualities, which suggest that it is more comic than serious,10 his negative 
portrayal of Epicurean relationships probably inspired Philodemus to address formally the 
differences between sages and flatterers.11  It is possible, therefore, that certain aspects of his 
said to have praised and flattered all the same”).  For more details, especially concerning 
Mithres, see Beloch (1926) 331-35 and Castaldi (1928) 293-99.  Lucian notes in his satire De 
parasito that Epicurus shamelessly made the parasitic art his philosophical “goal” (11: τέλος).  
For the close relationship between parasites and flatterers, see McC. Brown (1992) 98-106 and 
Arnott (2010) 322-24.  This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
7Hunter (1985a) 483: “In the Greek world φίλος was used as a court title, and so a man 
who was φίλος (or ἑταῖρος) τοῦ βασιλέως was, from another point of view, a flatterer and a 
slave.”  This issue is treated at length by Plutarch in Mor. 4 (Quomodo adulator ab amico 
internoscatur). 
8Allen and DeLacy (1939) 61-3.     
9Cf. Orat. 1.22.102 for similar derogatory remarks concerning the Greeks.  
10See Gigante (1983) 44-7 and Corbeill (1996) 169-73.  Maslowski (1974) 69-71 and, 
more recently, Griffin (2001) 95-7 note that Cicero actually portrays Epicureanism favorably by 
stating that Piso had seriously misunderstood their doctrines (Pis. 69).         
11Glad (1996) 24-5. 
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treatment in De adulatione are intended to counteract this portrayal or at least apologize for any 
misconceptions.  In PHerc. 222, for example, he acknowledges that between sages and flatterers 
“there will be similarities” (col. 2.1-2: ἔσονταί τινες ὁμοιότητες) such as the reception of gifts 
and honor, which others mistakenly identify as the fruits of obsequiousness (ibid. 18-21): καὶ 
τῶν [ὑ]παρχόντων πόλλ’ ἀπολα[υ]στὰ διδόασιν αὐτῶι· κα[ὶ σ]υ[γ]γενεῖς ἐνίων καὶ 
συνήθε[ις] π[ρ]οτιμώ[μ]ενον ὁρῶντες [ἀποδιδ]όασιν αὐτὸν ὡς κόλα[κα] (“Even the relatives 
and associates of some [sages] will consider him a flatterer when they see him being honored 
more than others”).12  Both figures, moreover, are often drawn to wealthy or powerful patrons 
(ibid. col. 5.2-3: ἀνθρώπ[οις] μεγαλοπλούτοις), in whose presence they praise philosophical 
wisdom (ibid. col. 2.9-10: [τ]ῶν [ἀγα]θῶν ἐπα[ιν]ετικὸ[ς σοφίας]).  The difference between 
these two, however, lies in their respective intentions or dispositions: the flatterer, whose 
rhetorical charm and malicious intent surpass that of even the “mythical Sirens” (ibid. col. 2.6-7: 
α[ἱ μυ]θικαὶ Σειρῆνες), speaks only to please his victim (PHerc. 1457, col. 4.7:  πρὸς χά[ρ]ιν 
λέγων) while slandering his competitors (PHerc. 222, col. 2.13-16), and his attraction to wealthy 
individuals is motivated by avarice alone (PHerc. 1457, col. 12.22: φιλαργουροῦσι).13  The 
sage, on the other hand, engages in conversations that are “truthful and devoid of spite” (De oec. 
12The critical editions of these fragments are the following (see also the Introduction, p. 
8): PHerc. 222, Gargiulo (1981); PHerc. 223, Gigante and Indelli (1978); PHerc. 1089, Acosta 
Méndez (1983); PHerc. 1675, De Falco (1926); PHerc. 1457, Bassi (1914) and Kondo (1974); 
PHerc 1082, Caini (1939).  Also helpful are the treatments of Longo Auricchio (1986) 79-91 and 
Tsouna (2007) 126-42.  For differing views regarding the proper organization of these fragments, 
see the back-to-back arguments of Capasso (2001) 179-94 and Monet (2001) 195-202.  
13Cf. Pl. Soph. 222e1-223a1 and Arist. Eth. Nic. 1127a8-10.  Theophr. Char. 2 describes 
flattery as “the kind of converse which is dishonorable but profitable to the one flattering” 
(ὁμιλίαν αἰσχρὰν εἶναι συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι).  Philodemus briefly discusses the 
“dispositions” (διάθεσεις) of flatterers and sages in PHerc. 1089, coll. 1-2. 
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col. 23.30-31: ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλο[ν]ε[ί]κων), nor does he imitate the flatterer’s garrulity and 
rhetorical charm.  Instead, he is particularly trustworthy because his conversation is not only 
“frank” (PHerc. 222, col. 3.27-8: παρρη[σιαζό]μενον) but also pithy and beneficial to the 
recipient (cf. De oec. col. 27.37-9), whose response to the sage’s companionship, which is 
pleasing without being obsequious,14 is described as profound and genuine gratitude (ibid. col. 
23.27-8: εὐχάριστο[ν]).   
Philodemus’ concern with defending his reputation as a moral expert and close associate 
of the wealthy Piso in light of Cicero’s criticisms might have influenced Horace’s depiction of 
his own relationship with Maecenas.  The poet’s charming recollection in Sermones 1.6.54-64 of 
the initial meeting with his future patron is obviously intended to portray the former as an honest 
and virtuous candidate, but it is also designed to combat the traditional identification of the sage-
client as a subservient flatterer.15  Horace begins by immediately disassociating himself from the 
overly ambitious and headstrong toady, who characteristically propels himself towards his 
14For the distinction between “being obsequious” (ἀρέσκειν), which is a sign of flattery, 
and “being pleasing” (ἁνδάνειν; cf. 1.6.63: placui tibi), which is an acceptable characteristic of 
Epicurean relationships, see Kondo (1974) 54-6 and Glad (1996) 28.  This comparison with 
ἁνδάνειν  is based on PHerc. 1457, col. 10.8-9, which is partially damaged and reads as follows 
in Bassi’s 1914 edition: ἐν τοῖς ΠΕ . ΚΑ . Α . ΔΑΝΕΙΝ.  Kondo, following the obviously 
plausible reconstruction of previous scholars, reads ἐν τοῖς πέλας ἁνδάνειν (“in being pleasing 
to one’s neighbors”) and compares Arr. 6.67: εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίου εὔνοιαν διαμετρῆσαι (“to 
win the good favor of one’s neighbor”).        
15In what follows I present an interpretation of Horace as attempting to distinguish 
himself (although not without humor) from flatterers, which contrasts in general with Turpin 
(2009) 129-37, whose view of Horace as a parasite and a completely inept moralist is far too 
extreme and ignores the poet’s claim to write about seria (1.1.27) and verum (ibid. 24).  I am 
happy to cite Kemp (2009) 5, who likewise defends Horatian satire against the charge of moral 
incompetence. 
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unsuspecting prey like a hunter.16  He prefaces this carefully constructed scene by declaring that 
Maecenas rejects shameless ambition (51-2: prava | ambitione), which, according to Philodemus, 
motivates flatterers to seek glory through relationships with millionaires: 
[ἡ] δόξα τοίνυν χάριν ἀσφαλείας ἐδιώχθη κατὰ φύσιν, ἥν ἔξεστιν ἔχειν καὶ ἰδιώτηι 
καὶ φιλοσόφωι , κακία[ς δ’ οὐ] πάσης, ἐν αἷς ἡ κολακεία [πρ]ωτα[γ]ωνι[στ]εῖ καὶ 
μεί[ζον]ά [γ’] ἀδοξ[ί]αν αἰ[κ]ῆ π[ε]ριτίθ[ησιν ὅταν ε]ὐδοξίαν ἀποτελ[εῖν 
προσ]δοκᾶται.  [Χάριν περιου]σίας ἢ δόξης ἢ καὶ τινος ἀ[ρ]χῆς ἀρέσαντες 
ἀνθρώπ[οις] μεγαλοπλούτοις καὶ δυν[α]στευτικοῖς ἢ καὶ δημοκό[ποις]. 
(PHerc. 222, coll. 4.4-5.4) 
 
A good reputation, which both the philosopher and the layman can have,17 is pursued for 
the sake of security in accordance with nature, but not by means of vice, in which flattery 
is quite involved since it brings greater infamy and shame when it is expected to produce 
fame.  [Flatterers] aim to please millionaires, potentates and demagogues for the sake of 
16Cf. Eupolis’ portrayal of the flatterer as tracking down his prey in the agora (PCG 
5.172, see also Storey [2003] 190), which ultimately inspired the poets of New Comedy, as 
Terence’s characterization of Gnatho in the Eunuchus suggests (to which, cf. the especially 
portrayal of Artotrogus at Plaut. Mil. 31-45): 
hoc novomst aucipium; ego adeo primus inveni viam. 
est genus hominum qui esse primos se omnium rerum volunt 
nec sunt.  hos consector; hisce ego non paro me ut rideant, 
sed eis ultro arrideo et eorum ingenia admiror simul. 
quiquid dicunt laudo; id rursum si negant, laudo id quoque. 
negat quis, nego; ait, aio. postremo imperavi egomet mihi  
omnia assentari.  is quaestus nunc est multo uberrimus. (Ter. Eu. 248-
52) 
Now there’s a new way to catch our prey, and I’m the original inventor.  There is a type 
of men who want to be the first in everything but aren’t.  I track these down.  I don’t set 
out to make them laugh at me; I laugh at them instead while at the same time expressing 
admiration for their wit.  Whatever they say, I praise it; if they then say the opposite, I 
praise that too.  They deny, I deny; they affirm, I affirm.  In a word, I’ve commanded 
myself to agree to everything.  That’s the most profitable way to make a living these 
days. 
17Cf. Fiske (1971) 317, who gives Teles’ record of Bion’s opinion concerning 
reputations: πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἀδοξίαν ἴσως ἔχοντα (“[He said that he was] equally disposed 
towards a good reputation or a bad one”).  This is obviously not Horace’s father’s view when he 
expresses concern for “preserving your livelihood and reputation” (1.4.118-19: vitam famamque . 
. . incolumem).  
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possessions or glory or out of some other motive.  
 
Philodemus’ description of the dangers of flattery as producing more infamy than fame reflects 
the principles of the hedonic calculus, but it also recalls Horace’s warning concerning placing 
oneself in “Glory’s chariot” (1.6.23: Gloria curru), which ultimately results in slavery to 
political responsibilities and possible infamy, as Tillius quickly discovered (107): obiciet nemo 
sordis mihi, quas tibi, Tilli (“No one will taunt me with [lit. throw at me] meanness as he does 
you, praetor Tillius”).18  Furthermore, Horace underscores his passive immunity to ambition by 
employing the similar verb obferre (but with a very different meaning) to explain his encounter 
with Maecenas (54): nulla etenim mihi te fors obtulit (“For it was no case of luck throwing you 
in my way”).  This expression is noteworthy, since it communicates that it was not Horace who 
“thrust himself” into the millionaire’s path; rather, their initial meeting was owed to the 
intervention of the poet’s close friends, who thrust Maecenas into the poet’s path.19  His mention 
of high-quality friends like Vergil and Varius, who freely vouch for his ethical credentials (55: 
18Cf. PHerc. 1675, in which Philodemus, quoting Hermarchus, discusses the similarities 
between politicians and flatterers, both of whom must please their subjects in order to achieve 
notoriety: πονοῦσιν οὖ<ν οἱ> πολι[τ]ευόμενοι· προσεπιφέρε[ι] τοιγαροῦν· ‘παραιτο[ῦ]ντα[ι] 
διὰ μὲν τὸ περὶ πολλοῖς δυσαρεστεῖν στυγοῦντες αὐτοὺς, διὰ δὲ τὸ περὶ πλείστου 
ποιε[ῖ]σθα[ι] τὰς παρ’ αὐτῶν δό[σεις] καὶ [τ]ιμὰς, πάλιν ἀν[τι]ποι[ού]μενοι δουλεύειν· 
[τοιοῦτό]ν τι [γ]ίνεται, φησί, καὶ [π]ερὶ τοὺς κόλ[α]κας (“Thus do politicians toil, and he adds 
accordingly ‘They ask for favors because they suffer annoyances on account of many and they 
hate them, because they put great value in gifts and honors from them, and in return exert 
themselves by serving.’  And this sort of thing happens, he says, to flatterers as well”).  Rudd 
(1966) 51 notes that maintaining gloria involved “attending all kinds of tiresome functions and 
‘cultivating’ people who in themselves were boring and disagreeable.”  See also Glad (1996) 32-
3. 
19Gowers (2012) 233 notes that the verb obferre “suggests thrusting something in 
someone’s path” (cf. 1.4.123, where Horace’s father “thrusts” examples into his son’s line of 
vision).  Lucilius’ description of his encounter with Scipio probably influenced Horace (1009 
M): producunt me ad te, tibi me haec ostendere cogunt (“They brought me to you and forced me 
to show you these verses”).    
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quid essem), is also significant: it would seem that from its very inception Horace’s relationship 
with Maecenas is attributed to, as well as contextualized and defined by, honesty and genuine 
friendship, which, as Philodemus notes, is “the adversary of flattery” (PHerc. 1082, col. 2.1-3: 
φιλία . . . ἧς ἀντ[ί]παλός ἐστιν ἡ κολακεία).20  By choosing to overlook completely his literary 
talents, moreover, Horace attempts to emphasize further his personal worth and thereby deflect 
any charges of flattery (1.6.46-8).21  Indeed, one wonders whether Cicero’s critical portrayal of 
Philodemus as a flattering poet in any way deterred Horace from making such a connection 
explicit in Sermones 1.6.22  Regardless of the poet’s reason, his overwhelmingly positive self-
portrait assures Maecenas that he has nothing to fear from this potential client, who, in 
accordance with Philodemus’ description of the sage in De gratitudine (PHerc. 1414), is “pure” 
20Kemp (2010b) 67.  Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1126b20-21, in which “friendship” (φιλία) is 
regarded as the most suitable mean between “flattery/obsequiousness” (κολακεία/ἀρεσκεία) and 
“surliness/quarrelsomeness” (δυσεριστία/δυσκολία).  
21Rudd (1966) 41 interprets rodunt at line 46 as resentment, while Gowers (2012) 232 
comments that this verb is “part of the traditional vocabulary of satirical invidia.”  I follow Kemp 
(2010b) 65 in adding to these the charge of flattery.  Regarding the omission itself, another 
possibility is that it reflects the nature of Horatian satire as “unpowerful,” as Schlegel (2005) 54 
suggests. 
22Cic. Pis. 70: Est autem hic de quo loquor non philosophia solum sed etiam ceteris 
studiis quae fere Epicureos neglegere dicunt perpolitus; poema porro facit ita festivum, ita 
concinnum, ita elegans, ut nihil fieri posit argutius.  In quo reprehendat eum licet, si qui volet, 
modo leviter, non ut improbum, non ut audacem, non ut impurum, sed ut Graeculum, ut 
adsentatorem, ut poetam (“Moreover, this man about whom I am speaking is quite polished not 
only in philosophy but also in those other pursuits which they say the Epicureans neglect; 
furthermore, he writes poems that are so festive, apt and elegant that nothing could be more 
clever.  If anyone wished to censure him for this even slightly, it would not be because he is 
shameless, overly bold or impure, but because he is a Greekling, a flatterer and a poet”).  
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(col. 11.18: καθαρούς; cf. 1.6.64: pectore puro and 69: purus) and does not snatch away his 
friends’ wealth (ibid. col. 9.2-6).23 
Another aspect of Horace’s self-portrayal in Sermones 1.6 that further highlights his 
distance from self-seeking ambition is the combined role of frankness and pithiness, both of 
which are antithetical to the flatterer but characteristic of the sage.  In contrast to the expressed 
criticisms of nameless aristocrats (29 and 38-9), the blare of trumpets in the forum (43-4) and the 
jeers of envious poetasters (45-8), Horace’s encounter with Maecenas occurs within the context 
of remarkable silence and tranquility:  
ut veni coram, singulatim pauca locutus— 
infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari— 
non ego me clarum patre, non ego circum 
me Satureiano vectari rura caballo,  
sed quod eram narro. (S. 1.6.56-60) 
On coming into your presence I said a few faltering words, for speechless shame stopped 
me from more.  My tale was not that I was a famous father’s son, not that I rode about my 
estate on a Saturian steed: I told you what I was.  
 
The language Horace employs in this passage, which contains an astonishing array of 
monosyllabic and disyllabic words surrounding the jarring presence of the five-syllable 
Satureiano (which represents the boaster’s inflated arrogance), has rightly been identified as an 
expression of Callimachean brevity (cf. Aet. 1.23-24).24  Without any reference to the nature of 
23The evidence for this treatise is collected by Tepedino Guerra (1975) 96-9.  Cf. Eupolis’ 
description of flatterers as rapacious thieves (PCM 5.162): φοροῦσιν, ἁρπάζουσιν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας 
| τὸ χρυσίον, τἀργύρια πορθεῖται (“They carry off and snatch away the gold from one’s house, 
and the silver is hauled away”).  This passage is discussed by Storey (2003) 183, who attributes 
it to Callias or a slave.  In his satire Reviviscentes sive piscator, Lucian portrays inauthentic 
philosophers as concerned solely with making money (42-5). 
24Freudenburg (1993) 206 and Oliensis (1998) 32 discuss the programmatic nature of this 
Callimachean passage.  For the significance of Satureiano, which may contain a pun with satur, 
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his poetry, therefore, Horace subtly communicates that the hallmark of his satire will be a terse 
frankness directed toward a discerning patron, who is more of a paternal figure than a king.25  
Nevertheless, the entire scene is an expression of a traditional topos involving the truthful sage’s 
exchange with a powerful king, which might have originated with Herodotus’ account of Solon 
before Croesus (Hdt. 1.30-33) and was apparently of great interest to Philodemus.  In his 
doxographical treatise Stoicorum Historia, he examines the philosophical nature of frankness as 
employed by Zeno of Citium before Antigonas Gonatas (coll. 8-9),26 and he offers a similar 
consideration of Plato before Dionysius I of Syracuse in the counterpart treatise Academicorum 
Historia.27  Of course, the most popular precedent cited among scholars and commentators for 
Horace is that of Bion before Antigonus (Kindstrand [1976] F1A), although one immediately 
observes that the poet’s account is much pithier than Bion’s eleven lines of autobiographical 
see Gowers (2012) 234.  For the anaphoric repetition of negatives in the denial of wealth, cf. 
Lucil. (132 M): ostrea nulla fuit, non purpura, nulla peloris (“I had no crimson clothes, no 
purple trappings and no large mussels”).   
25Schelgel (2005) 53-4 discusses the poet’s self-representation as a stuttering child before 
an imposing paternal figure, whose nine-month deliberation resembles a gestation period. 
26See Dorandi (1994) for an edition and translation of this treatise.  Clay (2004) 62-4 
offers a concise but enlightening summary of its contents.  The passage cited above contains a 
friendly insult of Antigonus directed toward Zeno, whose response has not survived (col. 8.1-
13).  In the following column, however, Philodemus reports that Zeno was Antigonus’ “equal” 
(9.2: ἴσον τε καὶ ὅμοιον) and that he enjoyed “sweet competitions” (ibid. 3: φιλονικίαν ἡδεῖαν) 
with the Macedonian king, who “marveled at the man and honored him” (ibid. 5-6: θαυμάζειν 
καὶ τιμ[ᾶ]ν).  Cf. Diogenes’ account of Zeno’s correspondence with Antigonus (7.6-9).    
27Dorandi (1991).  The reference to Plato’s frankness occurs at col. 2Χ.11-15: καὶ 
τ[ο]ύτου σκαιότερ[ον] αὐτοῦ τὴν παρρησία[ν] ἐνέγκα[ντ]ος, ὅτι ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς αὐτῶι 
[δο]κ[εῖ] φα[ν]ῆναι εὐδαιμονέστερος, οὐ[κ] εἶπεν αὐτ[όν] (“and this one [Dionysius] showed 
himself to be ill at ease with his [Plato’s] frankness, because when he [Plato] was asked who he 
thought was more blessed than others, he [Plato] did not say him [Dionysius]”).  According to 
Olivieri (1914) 54 and, more recently, Clay (2004) 69, a similar reference to Plato’s frankness 
can be found at De lib. dic. col. 15b5-6, which contains a quotation of Plato’s “second sailing” 
(δεύτερον πλοῦν) as it appears in Phd. 99d1-2 (cf. also Plut. Mor. 4.52d and 67c-e).  
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details complete with allusions to Homer.28  His simplicity and straightforwardness in this scene, 
however, are carefully balanced by the silence which characterizes Horace’s demeanor before 
the wealthy Maecenas, and which may reflect the principles of Philodemean homiletics as 
expressed in his treatise De conversatione.  According to Philodemus’ fragmentary explanation, 
virtuous “conversation” (ὁμιλία) between true friends employs frankness whenever necessary 
but also observes the “power of silence” (col. 6.2: σιωπῆς δύναμις), which is an expression of 
the sage’s tranquility and underscores his disdain for dishonest or “evil talk” (col. 7.17: κακῆς 
ὁμιλίας).29  That is to say, unlike the flatterer or ambitious politician who will say anything to 
their listeners, a true friend’s conversations are motivated by goodwill and therefore 
communicate only what is relevant or helpful, as emphasized in De libertate dicendi:  
 πᾶς [τίς] ποτε εὐνοῶν καὶ συνετ[ῶς] κα[ὶ συν]εχῶς φιλοσοφῶν καὶ μέγας ἐν ἕξει καὶ 
 ἀφιλόδοξος καὶ [δη]μαγωγὸς ἥκιστα καὶ φθόνου καθαρὸς καὶ τὰ προσόντα μόνον 
 λέγων καὶ μὴ συνεκφερόμενος, ὥστε λοιδορεῖν ἢ πομπε[ύ]ε[ιν] ἢ [κ]αταβάλλε[ιν ἢ] 
 βλάπτ[ειν], μηδ’ ἀσ[ε]λγε[ί]αις κα[ὶ κολ]ακευτ[ι]καῖς χρώ[μενος τέχναις]. 
 (col. 1b.2-14) 
. . . everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and continually 
and is great in character and indifferent to fame and least of all a politician and clean of 
envy and says only what is relevant and is not carried away so as to insult or strut or 
show contempt or do harm, and does not make use of insolence and flattering arts. 
 
In a similar fashion, Horace does not portray himself as an obsequious flatterer whose rhetoric 
tickles the ear with “honeyed words” (cf. PHerc. 222, col. 7.9-10: μει[λίττει] δὲ τὸν 
28Moles (2007) 166-67 discusses the parallels between Bion’s frank but rather prolix 
explanation and Horace’s much more condensed version.  See also Rudd (1966) 49 and 
Freudenburg (1993) 205-6. 
29See Amoroso (1975) 63-76 for the fragments of this treatise.  Tsouna (2007) 122-23 
briefly discusses its contents.  Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1126b11-21 for a discussion of the different 
kinds of ὁμιλία. 
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κολα[κε]υόμεν[ον])30 and whose physical appearance is similarly designed to please the eyes, as 
Philodemus explains (PHerc. 1457, col. 6.27-31 [fr. 7]): καὶ πλείστο[υ δὲ ἀποκείρα]σθαι καὶ 
τοὺς [ὀδόντας λευ]κοὺς ἔχειν κ[αὶ τὰ ἱμάτια δὲ χρη]στὰ μεταβά[λλεσθαι καὶ χρίσ]ματι 
ἀλείφε[σθαι] (“For the most part the obsequious man keeps his hair nicely trimmed, his teeth 
are whitened, he wears fashionable clothes and stays well-oiled with chrism”).31  In contrast to 
this, the poet shows and tells Maecenas exactly “what he was” (1.6.60: quod eram), without the 
cosmetic trappings of rhetoric or fashion.32  Furthermore, his few words are identified as 
originating in a “pure heart” (64: pectore puro), which, as quoted above, implies freedom from 
envy and ambition; indeed, unlike the flatterer, whose greatest enemies are his competitors (cf. 
PHerc. 222, col. 2.13-14: μάλιστα . . . [τοὺς] κόλακας ἐ[κ]διώκει), Horace does not envy Varius 
or Vergil, whom he considers “the best of friends” (1.6.54: optimus) rather than rivals for 
Maecenas’ favor.33  Overall, Horace’s self-description in this scene effectively foreshadows the 
30Cf. Bion’s statement that those who love flattery are “like amphorae, being easily lead 
about by their ears” (Kindstrand [1976] F51): ἀμφορεῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὤτων ῥᾳδίως 
μεταφερομένοις.   
31In this passage Philodemus quotes from Theophrastus’ character portrait of the “petty-
proud man” or μικροφιλότιμος (Char. 21), which he applies to his description of the obsequious 
man (ἄρεσκος). 
32Horace gives a similar, frank self-description in Ep. 1.194-97 (cf. the probable intertext 
in Ovid’s description of the appearance of the flattering amator in Ars. 1.513-22): 
si curatus inaequali tonsore capillos 
occurri, rides; si forte subucula pexae 
trita subest tunicae, vel si toga dissidet impar, 
rides.     
If, when some uneven barber has cropped my hair, I come our way, you laugh; if haply I 
have a tattered shirt beneath a new tunic, or if my gown sits badly and askew, you laugh. 
33Cf. 1.9.49-52: 
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tone of his Sermones: they will be neither obsequious nor slanderous and overly critical, but 
rather truthful and terse for the sake of his audience’s moral benefit. 
Despite Horace’s programmatic reticence before his patron, as a satirist his poetry 
endeavors to provide a critical but honest appraisal of contemporary society with regard to 
morality, the justification for which (as with many other things) he owes to his virtuous 
upbringing as described in Sermones 1.4.  One of the major aspects of Horace’s moral training 
which reflects Epicurean tradition is his father’s pedagogical use of frankness, which applies 
many of the methods described by Philodemus in De libertate dicendi.  As mentioned in Chapter 
1, Horace’s brand of satire resembles that of Lucilius, although it has been suggested that he 
tempers his predecessor’s harsh libertas by employing Aristotle’s doctrine of the gentlemanly 
and liberal jest (Eth. Nic. 1127b33-1128a33).  This virtue is opposed to “buffoonery” 
(βωμολοχία) as defined by the excessive desire to ridicule others (ibid. 1128a33-1128b2), which 
is a vice Horace similarly rejects in his correspondence with Lollius Maximus: 
 
est huic diversum vitio vitium prope maius, 
asperitas agrestis et inconcinna gravisque, 
quae se commendat tonsa cute, dentibus atris, 
dum volt libertas dici mera veraque virtus. (Ep. 1.18.5-8) 
 
There is a vice opposite of this [sc. flattery]—perhaps a greater one—a clownish 
rudeness, awkward and offensive, which commends itself by scraped skin and black 
teeth, while fain to pass for simple candor and pure virtue. 
 
 
                     domus hac nec purior ulla est 
nec magis his aliena malis; nil me officit, inquam, 
ditior hic aut est quia doctior. 
“No house is cleaner or more free from such intrigues than that.  It never hurts me, I say, 
that one is richer or more learned than I.”  
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The mention of “importune harshness” (asperitas inconcinna) when blurting offensive remarks 
in this poem establishes a link to the bitter frankness of “biting Cynics” in Epistulae 1.17 (18: 
mordacem Cynicum), whom Horace similarly criticizes as “importunate” and “inept” (ibid. 29: 
inconcinnus; 32: ineptus).34  Philodemus similarly responds to the Cynic tradition of moral 
invective in De libertate dicendi (col. 3b.4-5: κυνώδη; cf. fr. 73.12-13: κυνι[κω]τέραν), 
particularly by frequently condemning harsh criticism for its own sake and emphasizing the 
importance of frankness as a therapeutic tool intended either to prevent or correct moral 
deficiency.35  One may compare this to Sermones 1.4, in which Horace attributes his “rather free 
34For a detailed discussion of the significance of παρρησία for the Cynics, see Scarpat 
(1964) 62-9 and Kindstrand (1976) 263.  A more recent study is that of Konstan (1996) 7-19.  
Cicero gives a similar definition of the terms Horace uses at Orat. 2.17, which is followed by a 
description that fits the Cynics in general (18): Omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt 
innumerabiles, haud sciam an nulla sit maior quam, ut illi solent, quocumque in loco, 
quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissime 
disputare (“Of all the social improprieties, moreover, which are beyond number, I doubt that any 
is greater than what those Greeks are accustomed to do: I mean engaging in strenuous arguments 
over the most inappropriate or trivial matters in all places and among anyone who seems 
suitable”). 
35Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 79 (the end of the passage has been heavily reconstructed, but the 
general sense is clearly that of a contrast between harsh and well-intentioned frankness): μηδὲ 
συνεχῶς αὐτὸ ποιεῖν, μηδὲ κατὰ πάντων, μηδὲ πᾶν ἁμάρτημα καὶ τὸ τυχὸν, μηδ’ ὧν οὐ χρὴ 
παρόντων, μηδὲ μετὰ διαχύσεως, ἀλλὰ συνπαθῶ[ς] τ[ὰς ἁμαρ]τίας ὑπο[λαμβάνειν καὶ μὴ] 
καθυ[βρίζειν μηδὲ λοιδορεῖ]ν (“Nor to do it [sc. criticize frankly] continually, nor against 
everyone, nor every chance error, nor errors of those whom one should not criticize when they 
are present, not with merriment, but rather to take up the errors sympathetically and not to scorn 
or insult”).  Similar advice occurs at frs. 37.4-8, 38.1-6 and 60.3-10.  Philodemus also explicitly 
supports condemnation of the harshness of Bion and Chrysippus in his treatise De ira (col. 1.11-
20), for which see Crönert (1906) 32, Gigante and Indelli (1978) 125 and the critical edition of 
Indelli (1988).  Horace apparently held a similar opinion with regard to the Stoics’ overly harsh 
diatribes, as his portrayal of the longwinded and arrogant Damasippus in Sermones 2.3 reveals.  
For general studies of Epicurean frankness, which is not mentioned in the fragments of Epicurus 
and appears to have been developed by Philodemus’ teacher Zeno of Sidon, see Olivieri (1914) 
vii-viii, Gigante (1983), 55-113, Glad (1996) 30-59 and the introduction in Konstan et al. (1998) 
1-24.  For discussions of this tradition in Horace, largely with respect to the Carmina and 
Epistulae, see Dewitt (1935) 312-19, Michels (1944) 173-77, Hunter (1985a) 480-90 and Kemp 
(2010b) 65-76. 
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speech” (103-4: liberius si | dixero quid), which is intended to provide moral correction and to 
which he contrasts the backbiting and dishonest speech of false friends (81-5), to his father’s 
training (105: insuevit pater).36  Furthermore, the passage which follows quickly reveals that his 
father’s frankness is the opposite of the typical Cynic asperitas or ineptia, since it is borne out of 
goodwill and chiefly exercised as a preventative measure intended for the future preservation of 
his son’s physical and moral well-being (118: vitam famamque).  This concern may reflect the 
Epicurean tradition of frankness as essentially pedagogical, as witnessed by Philodemus’ 
corresponding inclusion of children among the largest group of recipients of frankness (cf. De 
lib. dic. frs. 18.1: παῖ, 31.2: νέων and 36.5: νεωτέροις),37 which, in addition to being employed 
for corrective purposes, may also be exercised to forestall or prevent vicious behavior.38  In fact, 
his description of frankness as an ongoing treatment that regularly involves the communication 
of advice within a private and intimate setting suggests that, rather than a mere tool for 
correction, Epicurean frankness is an ἦθος or way of living that thrives within relationships in 
36Cf. Cic. Amic. 88-9: Nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec 
accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt (“For friends frequently must be not only advised, but also 
rebuked, and both advice and rebuke should be kindly received when given in a spirit of 
goodwill”). 
37For the theme of “care for the young” (ἐπιμέλεια τῶν νέων) with regard to 
Philodemus’ De libertate dicendi, see Glad (1996) 34 n. 56. 
38DeWitt (1935) 313: “Freedom of speech, as a paideutic method, is there assumed to be 
divided into two parts . . . second, admonition (νουθέτησις) for future behavior.”  A similar view 
is expressed by Michels (1944) 174.  In his diatribe satires Horace combines these approaches: 
his direct audience (i.e., the nameless interlocutors) receives rebuke and correction, while the 
broader circle of intimate friends, including Maecenas, may view these conversations as 
admonitory reflections. 
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small communities,39 a detail which may be reflected by Horace’s portrayal of his father’s 
private training as well as his own limited correspondence within a closely-knit circle of friends.   
The privacy which Horace and his father share and as a result of which frankness is 
exercised for the sake of moral improvement may reflect certain developments in contemporary 
Epicureanism regarding the nature of friendship.  The first observation regarding philosophical 
relationships among Epicureans is that they thrive within communities that, although not 
officially exclusive,40 are generally described in terms of privacy and intimacy.  In his treatises, 
for example, Philodemus repeatedly mentions “intimate fellows” (οἱ συνήθεις) and “the 
members of the household” (οἱ οἰκείοι), who engage in fruitful conversations and forge bonds 
which are not experienced by “the outsiders” (οἱ ἔξωθεν).41  As mentioned above, in the 
Sermones a similar intimacy is foreshadowed by Horace’s exclusive encounter with Maecenas 
but more directly communicated by his father’s private education, which is founded upon an 
impressionable youth’s trustful surrender to a loving parent’s frank admonition concerning the 
outside world.42  His father’s good counsel eventually enables Horace to engage in private and 
39The identification of frankness as a way of life among friends is communicated by the 
title of the collection to which this treatise belongs, which includes mention of “characters” 
[ἠθῶν] and “ways of living” [βίων].  Philippson (1938) 2470, contrasting παρρησία with 
κολακεία, the latter of which is treated by Philodemus in a collection entitled De vitiis et 
virtutibus oppositis, concluded that the former was to be identified as a “virtue” (ἀρετή).  As 
Gigante (1983) 60-61 and Gargiulo (1981)103-4 have convincingly argued, however, the 
opposing virtue to flattery is most likely “friendship” (φιλία), while frankness itself is not a 
virtue but a “way of life” (ἦθος). 
 40Clay (1983) 255-79 explores the details concerning community life among the 
Epicureans.  For the Epicurean concept of “fellowship” (συνδιαγωγή, convictus), see DeWitt 
(1936) 55-63. 
 41See Glad (1996) 28. 
 42Marchietti (2004) 17: “Quando da bambini camminiamo al lato di un adulto che ci 
indica aspetti del mondo, ci affidiamo a lui; ma anch’egli, l’adulto, si affida a noi: accetta di 
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reflective deliberations with himself (1.4.133: consilium proprium), which are similarly frank 
and motivate correct behavior.  Of course, Horace is willing to share these consilia with others, 
but he makes it clear that they are intended for a restricted and familiar audience (73: amicis), 
which he describes in terms of intimate friendship (1.5.42: devinctior; cf. Carm. 1.3.9: animae 
dimidium meae) and, when necessary, constructive criticism reciprocally directed toward himself 
(1.10.78-91; cf. Carm. 1.24.7: nudaque Veritas).43  These passages reveal Horace’s 
understanding of frank criticism as occurring within the context of private conversations among 
close friends, which is an understanding Philodemus obviously shares:   
 
κἂν π[ε]ριδεικνύωμεν ἐπιλογιστικῶς, ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐκ φιλίας 
περιγινομένων οὐδὲν ἐστι τηλικοῦτον ὡς τὸ ἔχει<ν>, ὧι τἀ[γ]κάρδ[ι]ά τις ἐρεῖ καὶ 
λ[έγ]οντος ἀκούσεται.  σφόδ[ρ]α γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὀρέγεται πρ[ό]ς τινας ἐκκαλύπτειν ἃ 
[ν]οεῖ.  (De lib. dic. fr. 28.3-10) 
 
Even if we demonstrate logically that, although many fine things result from friendship, 
there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart and 
who will listen when one speaks.   
 
 
This description of the friendship between members of an Epicurean community as originating in 
a desire to share one’s innermost thoughts is potentially significant, since, as David Armstrong 
has noted, it suggests that “for Philodemus, friendship in its ideal form transcends its beginnings 
entrare nel nucleo intimo, originario, dei nostri affetti, pensieri e memorie, che poi rivestiremo 
delle nostre esperienze.” 
43DeWitt (1935) 312-19 considers the significance of these passages, in particular Carm. 
1.24, with respect to Philodemus’ De libertate dicendi. See also Michels (1944) 173: “One point 
which Horace emphasizes in Serm. 1.4 and elsewhere is that he is not writing for the general 
public, which he either despises or affects to despise, but for his own limited circle of friends.” 
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as a response to our human needs and frailties.”44  The exercise of frankness within the context 
of friendly conversation, therefore, is motivated not by self-interest but by the desire for 
expressing one’s innermost convictions and for moral improvement, as is obvious in the case of 
Horace’s father.  The significance of Philodemus’ statement is that it appears to modify or at 
least expand Epicurus’ original conception of friendship as utilitarian and lying solely in 
potential benefits.45  This is not to say that Philodemus did not recognize friendship as beneficial 
or useful, especially within the context of patronage as an initial means to financial security (in 
accordance with Epicurus’ teaching at Arr. 1.121b4-5),46 but he appears to indicate that, over 
time and through frequent fellowship within a private community, friendship can potentially 
44Armstrong (2011) 126-27, who also notes that Philodemus draws parallels between the 
friendship of gods, who have no need of any benefits whatsoever, and those of the Epicurean 
sage (cf. De dis 3, frs. 83, 84 and 87). 
45Arr. 6.23: Πᾶσα φιλία δι’ ἑαυτὴν αἱρετή· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν τῆς ὠφελείας (“All 
friendship is chosen for its own sake, but its origin is the need for help”).  Usener’s above 
emendation of ἀρετή, which appears in the MSS. and would give Epicurus’ maxim an 
Aristotelian quality (cf. Eth. Nic. 1155a4), has been accepted by most editors and translators.  
O’Keefe (2001) 269-305 and Brown (2002) 68-80, however, have recently argued extensively 
against it.  Armstrong (2011) 126-28 defends Usener’s emendation.  See also Konstan (1997) 
110 for this maxim and for the distinction between φίλοι, who are concrete and useful 
individuals, and φιλία, which is the more abstract concept of reciprocity as essential for survival 
and thus considered to be useful in itself. 
 46Cf. De elect. col. 22.15-22: καὶ πολυωρεῖ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους δύναται 
πλείστους [κ]αὶ φιλοφρονησαμένοις εὐχα[ρ]ιστεῖ καὶ δι’ ἐλπίδας τιν[ῶ]ν αὐτοῖς 
μεταλήψεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ὑπὸ αὐτῶν εὖ τι π[εί]σεσθαι, καίπερ [οὐ] ταύ[τ]ηι μάλ[ισ]τα προ[. . 
. .]ε[– –  –]τ[– – –] (“And he treats with consideration as many other human beings as he possibly 
can, and is thankful to those who show friendly feelings to him, and has hopes of sharing things 
with them and receiving good things from them in his turn, although it isn’t for that most of all . . 
.” [sc. for any practical return] [that he makes these friendships]).  The translation is that of 
Armstrong (2011) 125, whose conjectural interpretation of the missing lines seems plausible and 
would further suggest that Philodemus endorses the view that friendship is valued in itself, apart 
from any advantages.    
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become a selfless—even an altruistic—expression of goodwill toward another.47  According to 
Cicero, certain Epicureans in his day endorsed such a view,48 which Horace appears to express in 
his genuine concern for Vergil’s safety in Carm. 1.3 as well as in his impassioned declaration 
“There is nothing I would compare to a delightful friend so long as I am sound!” (1.5.44: nihil 
ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico).49  The high value he places on friendship is likewise 
reflected by his concern for sharing moral advice with others through frankness, which, as his 
father demonstrates in Sermones 1.4, is an expression of goodwill that cannot exist outside the 
context of intimate friendship.50   
47Asmis (1990) 2395 n. 60 says that Philodemus, in his understanding of the ideal 
communication quoted above, possibly “values the intimacy of friendship more than the security 
that results from it.”   
 48Cic. Fin. 1.69: Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores . . . qui verentur ne, si amicitiam 
propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur.  
Itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri 
propter voluptatem, cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem 
efflorescere tantum ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos 
amentur (“Other less courageous Epicureans . . . fear that if we hold friendship to be desirable 
only for the pleasure that it affords to ourselves, it will be thought that it is crippled altogether.  
They therefore say that the first advances and overtures, and the original inclination to form an 
attachment, are prompted by the desire for pleasure, but that when the progress of intercourse has 
led to intimacy, the relationship blossoms into an affection strong enough to make us love our 
friends for their own sake, even if no practical advantage accrues”).  Tsouna (2007) 28-30 
identifies the Epicurei timidiores as “Philodemus and his disciples.”  This passage is also 
discussed by O’Keefe (2001) 287-89, Brown (2002) 78-9 and O’Connor (1989) 165-86.   
 49Gowers (2012) 198 draws textual parallels between Horace’s declaration and 
Torquatus’ translation of Epicurus’ famous definition of friendship (Fin. 1.65 = Arr. 5.148.9-10).  
See also Gowers (2009b) 39-60 for the thematic connections between Sermones 1.5 and Cicero’s 
De finibus. 
 50Unlike the Cynics, who valued frankness above all things and associated it with the 
complete freedom enjoyed by the sage, who does not need friends.  See especially Rich (1956) 
23: “The Cynic, then, had no desire for wealth, knowledge, pleasure or friendship.”  Scarpat 
(1964) 62 quotes Diogenes of Sinope’s identification of frankness as “the most beautiful thing” 
(Diog. Laert. 6.69: κάλλιστον), which is to be preferred to everything else (ibid. 6.71).  
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In addition to being one of the hallmarks of true friendship and a private expression of 
moral concern within a small community, the Epicurean practice of frankness is also a stochastic 
or conjectural method that relies on appropriate timing and sign inference.51  According to 
Philodemus, frankness is less effective when applied to elderly pupils (De lib. dic. col. 24a.8: οἱ 
πρεσβύτεροι), whereas children, on account of their lack of experience and impressionable 
nature, are more receptive to admonition or correction (ibid. fr. 18.1: παῖ).  In particular, the 
successful practice of frank criticism depends on “appropriate timing” (καιρός), which fosters 
the pupil’s affection and therefore leads to a heightened sense of goodwill and gratitude:  
οὐδ’ εἰς καιρὸν ἐνχρονίζειν ἐπιζη[τ]οῦμεν οὐδὲ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διὰ 
 παρρησίας ἐπιτενοῦμεν τὴν πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὔνοιαν τῶν κατ[ασκε]υαζομ[έ]νων παρ’ 
 αὐτὸ τὸ πεπαρρησιάσθαι.  (De lib. dic. fr. 25.1-8) 
 
. . . nor do we seek to delay at the critical time, nor in some other way, and of how, 
 through frankness, we shall heighten the goodwill towards ourselves of those who are 
 being instructed by the very fact of speaking frankly.        
       
The careful application of frankness at the correct time, which is a conjectural rather than a 
scientific method, may similarly be attributed to Horace’s pater rusticus, who, as a parent 
concerned for his son’s disposition and willing to expose him to examples of sin at a young age, 
is anything but an inept curmudgeon; on the contrary, his well-intentioned admonitions are based 
on observations of perceptible behavior and his advice is delivered at the critical moment, 
namely, while Horace’s mind is still “tender” (1.4.128: teneros animos) and able to be “formed” 
51Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 1.8: καθόλου τ’ ἐπιπαρρησιάζεται σοφὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ, ὅτι 
μὲν στοχαζόμενος εὐ[λ]ογίαις ἔδε[ιξ]ε (“And in general the wise man and philosopher speaks 
frankly because, conjecturing by reasonable arguments, he has shown . . .”).  For Epicurean 
frankness as a conjectural method that depends on the observance of visible signs (σημεῖα) at the 
opportune moment (καιρός), see especially Gigante (1983) 62-72 and Tsouna (2007) 92-3.  For 
the philosophical background of “conjectural methods” (τέχναι στοχαστικαί) as treated by 
Aristotle in the Ethica Nicomachea, see Isnardi (1966) 167-77. 
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(121: formabat).52  As a conjectural method, moreover, frank criticism may be understood as the 
appropriate response to particular moral defects as inferred through the careful “observation of 
signs” (De lib. dic. fr. 57.4-5: σημειωσάμενον), the ultimate purpose of which is to prevent or 
therapeutically treat vice.  In the case of Horace’s father, he uses sign inference (1.4.106: notabat 
. . . exemplis) not in order to provide corrective treatment for the victims, but in order to 
admonish his son by providing him with vivid examples of the consequences of each vice (ibid.: 
quaeque vitiorum).53  As discussed in Chapter 1, the use of examples of moral deficiency for 
pedagogical reasons has a long tradition in antiquity, and the deictic formula “do this, avoid that” 
appears already in Plato’s description of the sophist Protagoras’ educational strategy (Protag. 
325d2-5), which became popular among the Cynics and later influenced Terence’s similar 
portrayal of Demea’s approach (Ad. 417)54 as well as Plutarch’s examination of pedagogical 
methods.  With regard to Horace’s father, however, one notes that his use of examples is not 
merely epideictic but psychological, since it invites Horace to reflect more deeply on the 
consequences of vice and, presumably, on the terrifying prospect that he himself is not immune 
from such disaster.  This use of frank criticism for the purpose of both identifying and preventing 
vice resembles Philodemus’ statement that the sage, on account of his frankness, will “point out 
how many people came to ruin badly, bereft of everything” (De lib. dic. fr. 72: 4-7: καὶ 
παραδείξει πόσοι κακῶς ἀ[π]ώλοντο παντὸς στερόμενοι).  In a similar manner, Horace’s 
father goes beyond the perfunctory dispensation of prohibitions and mandates: he encourages his 
52Michels (1944) 175. 
 53For the “similarity method” of sign inference as practiced and defended by Philodemus 
in De signis and as employed by Horace and his father, see Chapter 1 pp. 27-33. 
54Citroni Marchetti (2004) 25-35, who contrasts Horace’s father with the more emotional 
and less effective Demea in the Adelphoe (see Traill [2013] 332-39), considers the role of the 
poet’s empirical training in the light of Plato’s Protagoras, Respublica and Leges.   
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son to process visually and psychologically the horrible consequences of sin, with the ultimate 
intention of deterring him from such ruin (112: deterreret; 129: absterrent) and allowing him to 
avoid it more easily (106: ut fugerem).  In his ethical treatises Philodemus often recommends that 
teachers admonish their pupils by “placing before the eyes” (De lib. dic. frs. 26.4-5, 42.1, 77.3: 
τιθέναι πρὸ ὀμμάτων) examples of vice or the consequences thereof, which, when 
accomplished effectively and at the right time, inspires a sense of terror and motivates correct 
action (De ir. col. 3.13-18): καὶ τιθεὶς ἐν ὄψει μεγάλ[ην] ἐνποιεῖ φρίκην, ὥ[σ]τε τοῦ παρ’ 
αὐτὸν εἶναι προσυπομνησθέντος ἀποφυγεῖν ῥα<ι>δίως (“And having placed it before the 
eyes it creates great horror in him, with the result that it becomes easier to flee from what he has 
been prominently reminded exits in himself”).55  The ultimate purpose of such pictorial imagery, 
which in the previously quoted passage is corrective, must be considered preventative in the case 
of young Horace, especially given that the autobiographical scene in Sermones 1.4 is intended to 
explain his virtuous disposition and justify his role as moralizing satirist.  As will be seen below, 
Horace’s father’s method of presenting either the real or implied consequences of vice through 
examples intended for moral correction occurs elsewhere in the Sermones and informs the poet’s 
own approach to therapeutic frankness. 
Horace’s conversation with the nameless miser in Sermones 1.1 includes frank 
exhortations (i.e., ἐπίπληξεις) that are directed toward a stubborn “pupil,” whose repeated 
resistance to the poet’s efforts eventually elicits a harsher form of treatment.  As has been 
55The concept of pictorial imagery as a special technique, which was certainly not 
invented by Philodemus or the Epicureans, occurs in Plato (Gorg. 471a8-d2 and 473c1-d2) and, 
more clearly, in Aristotle (Rhet. 3.10.6: πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν), for which see Tsouna (2003) 
243-47.  Its application specifically within the context of therapeutic frankness, on the other 
hand, may have been further developed by Zeno and Philodemus.  For the technique as it appears 
in De ira, see Tsouna (2007) 204-9.  Schroeder (2004) 139-56 discusses the technique of 
“placing before the eyes” (which he calls avocatio) in Lucretius and Vergil.       
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discussed by other scholars, Horace’s incorporation in the introductory poems of nameless 
interlocutors who allow the speaker opportunities for ethical platitudes is largely a Cynic 
technique.56  On the other hand, a technique that involves lively interrogation for the purpose of 
moral correction would have been the perfect template for a literary representation of Epicurean 
frankness, which, according to Philodemus, often requires multiple applications of criticism: 
 
καὶ μηδὲν π[εράνα]ς πάλι χρή[σ]εται πρὸς [τ]ὸν α[ὐ]τὸν.  Εἰ δ’ ἡμαρτικὼς οὐκ 
 ὑπήκουσε τῆς παρρησίας, πάλι παρρησιάσεται· καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς ἐπ[ὶ] τῆς αὐτῆς νόσου 
 διὰ κλυσ[τή]ρος οὐδὲν περάνας, πάλ[ι κε]νοῖ.  καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάλ[ι π]αρρησιάσεται, 
 διότι πρότερον οὐδὲν ἤνυσε, καὶ πάλι ποήσει τοῦτο καὶ πάλιν, ἵν’ εἰ μὴ νῦν ἀλλὰ 
 νῦν [τελεσφορήσηι.]  (De lib. dic. fr. 64.1-13) 
 
. . . and [having accomplished] nothing he will again employ frankness toward the same 
man.  If, although he has erred, the student did not heed the frank criticism, the teacher 
will criticize frankly again.  For although a doctor in the case of the same disease had 
accomplished nothing through a clyster, he would again purge [the patient].  And for this 
reason he will again criticize frankly, because before he accomplished nothing, and he 
will do this again and again, so that if not this time then another time . . .  
 
 
The reason for such persistence is explained in relation to certain dispositions, which, in the case 
of stubborn or recalcitrant patients such as the Horatian miser, are described as being “strong and 
accepting change with difficulty” (ibid. fr. 7.6-8: τοὺς ἰσχυροὺς καὶ μόλις . . . 
56Oltramare (1926) 11, discussing dialogue within the context of Cynic literature, calls 
the inclusion of a fictitious interlocutor “le plus évident de tous les caractères formel de la 
diatribe.”  See also Fraenkel (1957) 92, Coffey (1976) 92 and Freudenburg (1993) 8-16.  
Schlegel (2005) 19-20, however, notes that the connection to popular philosophy does not define 
the function of Horatian satire in Book 1, which is related to “limitation in an ethical or 
experiential sense.”  For Philodemus’ appreciation for the effectiveness of Bion’s literary style 
and his willingness to imitate it in his treaties, see Gigante (1992) 106-8 as well as Gigante and 
Indelli (1978) 124-31 and Indelli (1988) 24-5.  Lucretius similarly exploits Bion and the Cynics, 
for which see Schmid (1978) 135-36. 
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μεταθησομένους).57  The first frank exchange in Sermones 1.1 involves Horace’s attempt to 
reveal to the miser the extreme wretchedness caused by his physical efforts to acquire wealth, 
which, in addition to preventing the enjoyment of Epicurean “physical repose” (ἀπονία), also 
forces him to endure inclement weather (38-9: hiems) as well as serious threats to his life (39: 
ferrum).  In response to the poet’s criticism, which is centered on appealing to the miser’s 
consideration for his physical health, the speaker effectively states that he prefers to ruin his 
body rather than risk his savings (43).58  Instead of abandoning his “pupil,” however, Horace, 
like a good physician, meets this resistance by listening to his interlocutor’s excuses and 
subsequently altering his focus in order to provide more effective criticism (46): non tuus hoc 
capiet venter plus ac meus (“You stomach will not hold more [grain] than mine”).59  In his 
second application of frankness, Horace attempts to explain that the miser’s desire to amass 
unlimited stores is unnecessary and overlooks the requirements of nature (50: naturae finis), thus 
appealing to the Epicurean doctrine of natural and necessary desires as easy to fulfill (Arr. 
4.127.7-10, ibid. 130.9 and 5.149.1-8).60  But once again, the poet’s efforts are dashed by the 
miser’s unwillingness to accept correction, which is expressed by his overpowering and 
57On the distinction between “strong” and “weak” students, see Glad (1995) 137-52 and 
Gigante (1973) 41.  
58Codoñer (1975) 46 regards the speaker’s comments here and elsewhere (e.g., 61) as 
serving a transitional purpose: “Su función es operar un cambio, pasar del planteamiento concreto 
al general, y se encuentra en el adversario de transición.”      
59Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 51.1-4: ἀκ[ού]σει μᾶλλον, [ἅ]μα καὶ θεωρῶν ἡμᾶς κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῶν 
γινομένους κατηγόρους (“the teacher will rather listen while observing us becoming 
accusers even of ourselves, whenever we err”).   
60Gowers (2012) 73 includes the belly, which is a popular organ in Roman satire, among 
the “host of vessels and containers used to measure capacity in the poem (heaps, money-bags, 
jugs, bushels, plots of land).”  See also Gowers (1993) 129: “This Epicurean tirade [sc. Sermones 
1.1] is also a literary polemic on the excessive consumption of words.”   
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misguided desire for “a huge heap” (51: magno . . . acervo).  Nevertheless, in accordance with 
Philodemus’ statement that the sage will employ criticism even on a “third occasion,”61 Horace 
warns that such reckless excess will inevitably cause psychological turbulence (60: turbatam . . . 
aquam), which precludes “tranquility” (ἀταραξία) and complements his initial appeal to the 
preference for physical repose.62  Unsurprisingly, the miser’s continued obstinacy and deluded 
convictions finally drive him to declare “nothing is ever enough!” (62: nil satis est), which 
prompts an obviously frustrated Horace to underscore his stubbornness by asking “What can you 
do with someone like this?” (63: quid facias illi?).  The solution, however, involves an 
application of harsher frankness through the series of vivid representations which immediately 
follows: the prospect of ending up like Tantalus (68-9) and the pathetic portrait of the miser 
sprawled among sacks of money, mouth gaping wide with admiration and religious awe (70-
72).63  Perhaps the clearest example of pictorial imagery involves Horace’s subsequent 
presentation of the hypothetical risks or consequences involved in preferring money to 
friendship: 
 
at si condoluit temptatum frigore corpus 
aut alius casus lecto te adfixit, habes qui 
61De lib. dic. fr. 65.1-8: [εἰ δὲ παρρησί]αι χρήσεται π[άλιν], φανε[ῖται] ὅυτως 
ἐφικέσθαι.  πολλάκι δ’ ἀντιστρόφως, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ποήσας, ἢ ἑξῆς πρότερον ἡ δευτέρ[α], 
τάχα δ’ ἡ τρίτη τελεσφορήσει (“. . . [if] he will employ [frankness again], he will be seen to 
succeed thus.  And often conversely, at timed even when he has done it, either the second one in 
turn or perhaps the third application of frankness will succeed”).  
62For the significance of weather metaphors in Epicurean ethics, see Chapter 1 pp. 24-5 
(especially n. 56) 
63As Herter (1970) 330 observes, Horace’s allegory involving Tantalus was probably 
inspired by Bion (for which, see Hense [1969] 34).  Freudenburg (1993) 190-91 analyzes this 
passage (as well as 1.4.80-85) within the context of literary theory and Callimachean aesthetics.  
For inhians as a typical behavior for misers, cf. Plaut. Aul. 194: inhiat aurum ut devoret (“He 
gapes at the gold as if to devour it”).  
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adsideat, fomenta paret, medicum roget, ut te 
suscitet ac reddat gnatis carisque propinquis? 
non uxor salvum te volt, non filius; omnes 
vicini oderunt, noti, pueri atque puellae. (S. 1.4.80-85) 
 
But if your body is seized with a chill and racked with pain, or some other mishap has 
pinned you to your bed, have you someone to sit by you, to get lotions ready, to call in 
the doctor so as to raise you up and restore you to your children and dear kinsmen?  No, 
your wife does not want you well, nor does your son: everyone hates you, neighbors and 
acquaintances, boys and girls. 
 
 
The vividness of this example, which creates space between the miser and his obsession, is 
designed to cause the patient “great fear” (De ir. col. 3.14-15: μεγάλ[ην] . . . φρίκην; cf. 1.4.127: 
metu) as he comes face to face with his disease and reflects on it objectively.  Of course, part of 
the irony of this scene is that there is no conditionality: the miser is in fact gravely ill and in need 
of medical attention, but his is a moral disease that can only be cured by the philosopher acting 
as physician.  The language Horace uses is wholly consistent with Philodemus’ employment of 
medical analogies to describe the process of frank criticism: the obstinate patient needs a caring 
physician (ἰατρός = medicum) who will sit by his side (βοηθέω = adsideat)64 and apply the 
necessary treatments (θεράπευσις = fomenta) in order to restore (ἀναπλάττω = suscitet) him 
back to health.65  The implication in the passage quoted above, moreover, is that Horace himself, 
64Cf. Sen. Ep. 9.8: dicebat Epicurus in hac ipsa epistula, ‘ut habeat qui sibi aegro 
adsideat’ (“As Epicurus said in this very letter, ‘so that he may have someone who will sit by his 
side when he is sick’”).  
65For medical terminology and imagery in Philodemus’ De libertate dicendi, as well as 
citations of relevant passages, see Konstan et al. (1998) 20-23 and Gigante (1975) 53-61.  Cf. 
Plut. Mor. 4.55c-d: δεῖ γὰρ ὠφελοῦντα λυπεῖν τὸν φίλον, οὐ δεῖ δὲ λυποῦντα τὴν φιλίαν 
ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὡς φαρμάκῳ τῷ δάκοντι χρῆσθαι, σῴζοντι καὶ φυλάττοντι τὸ 
θεραπευόμενον (“For it is not necessary to harm a friend, only to help him; and one should not 
by hurting him harm the friendship, but use the stinging word as a medicine that restores and 
preserves health in that to which it is applied”).  Freudenburg (1993) 191-92 reads frigus as 
“designating bombast, the vice of the grand style,” which is cured through “criticism” (adsideat) 
and “warmers” (fomenta). 
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who has been trying to heal the miser all along and may properly be called an amicus sanus, is 
the physician who will attempt (even if unsuccessfully) to cure vice through the frank criticism 
of his satiric verses. 
In transitioning to Sermones 1.2, traditionally regarded as Horace’s earliest satire, the 
audience encounters the formidable consequences associated with sexual extremes, which, like 
the dangers of poor wealth administration, was a popular topic of moral philosophy.  Perhaps one 
of the most salient features of this treatment is the complex variatio Horace employs, which 
involves engagement with Roman comedy, elegiac poetry, Hellenistic epigram and the Cynic 
diatribe to name just a few genres.66  The impressive and intentionally dizzying array of such 
influences, however, which successfully communicates the disorder and chaos of sexual 
imprudence, is not itself delivered in a “hackneyed” or “confusing” manner, as some scholars 
have asserted.67  Rather, the poet, by means of textual and thematic parallels, coherently 
establishes various links between the importance of maintaining a careful balance regarding 
sexual and financial choices, thus connecting this satiric conversation to the preceding one.68  
Furthermore, the main theme holding all of these components together is not just an abstract 
66See Fraenkel (1957) 83.  Freudenburg (1993) provides the most extensive examination 
of the many allusions to and parallels with Roman comedy.  Fiske (1971) considers the role of 
Cynic diatribe, and Hendrickson (1918) 27-32, Schmid (1948) 181-83, Cataudella (1950) 18-31, 
Cody (1976) 108-19, Gigante (1983) 235-43, Freudenburg (1993) 193-98 and Gigante (1993) 
86-8 all look at the presence and function of the Hellenistic epigrammatists Callimachus and 
Philodemus. 
67Fraenkel (1957) 79 discusses the “hackneyed theme” of this satire; Rudd (1966) 11 
notes that Horace’s alternation between the Aristotelian mean and the advantages of various 
types of ladies is “confusing.”  
68See Armstrong (1964) 88-91 and Bushala (1971) 312-15.  Of particular significance are 
the observations of Dessen (1968) 200-208, who considers the overall importance in Sermones 
1.2 of maintaining a sexual mean through ambiguous terms such as pretium, nummus and 
fructus, which also have obvious financial applications. 
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notion of balance or the vague application of Aristotle’s mean, but a clear expression of the 
Epicurean calculus, which dictates that in all ethical decisions the pleasure derived must 
outweigh the pain involved in satisfying one’s desires (Arr. 4.129.4-130.4).69  This identification 
is not only consistent with Horace’s treatment of the dangers and anxiety associated with certain 
relationships, but it also clears up the confusion expressed by scholars regarding the poet’s moral 
stance.  Some, for example, have correctly noted that nowhere in Sermones 1.2 does Horace 
condemn adultery per se or any particular social status, but have incorrectly interpreted this as 
proof that the poem is “entirely satirical” and “innocent of any moral message.”70  A more 
accurate interpretation would involve the realization that Horace condemns sexual affairs only 
69Cf. 1.2.78-9: desine matronas sectarier, unde laboris | plus haurire mali est quam ex re 
decerpere fructus (“cease to court matrons, for thence one may derive pain and misery, rather 
than reap enjoyment in the reality”).  Courtney (2013) 75 compares Ep. 1.2.55: nocet empta 
dolore voluptas (“Pleasure procure with pain is harmful”).  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 26, Fraenkel 
(1957) 78 and Rudd (1966) 31 both call these verses the “main theme” of the poem, and Curran 
(1970) 230 identifies them as expressing the Epicurean calculus.  Of particular importance are 
the observations of Cataudella (1950) 18-20, who not only considers Epicurean ethics the 
foundational principle of this poem, but also questions, based on lack of detailed evidence and 
proof of a similar treatment, the influence of Bion.  The prominence of Epicurean ethics in this 
poem is discussed further by Fiske (1971) 248-51 and Gigante (1993) 23-4, who states the 
following: “La varietà degli episodi o delle scene è in funzione della tesi unitaria, il cui 
fondamento epicureo è la purezza del piacere, il conseguimento della voluptas intatta, priva di 
dolore, che è basato anch’esso su un doppio, sulla dottrina della scelta e della fuga, del 
discrimine fra retto desiderio e calcolata ripulsa.”   
70Baldwin (1970) 465, who is corrected by Gigante (1993) 19-20.  Schlegel (2005) 28-9 
is more careful, stating that this poem has no “overt moral content,” while Turpin (2009) 122 
declares that Horace is a poet whom “we do not have to take seriously at all.”  Although clearly 
influenced by the Aristotelian mean, Horace’s condemnation of “vice” (1.2.24: vitia) does not 
involve an identification of matronae and meretrices as vicious in themselves, nor of libertinae 
as essentially virtuous, as Lefèvre (1975) 320-22 and Freudenburg (2001) 16 think.  Rudd (1966) 
11, along similar lines, mistakenly concludes that Horace’s critical portrayal of unnecessary 
sexual desire is a condemnation of brothels and prostitutes.  In general the commentators and 
most scholars, such as Freudenburg (1993) 26, Mayer (2005) 142 and Gibson (2007) 21 to name 
a few, identify Horace’s moral stance as exclusively Aristotelian, which is problematic because it 
does not account for the poet’s unwillingness to identify particular social statuses as vicious or 
virtuous; indeed, rather than a golden mean between opposing vices one should think of a 
balanced calculus of pleasures and pains.      
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when they violate the requirements of nature and result in disastrous consequences, such as 
public scandal or the loss of one’s property (1.2.61-2 ~ 1.4.118-19): bonam deperdere famam, | 
rem patris oblimare malum est ubicumque (“To throw away a good name, to squander a father’s 
estate, is at all times evil”).71  In order to communicate this lesson to his audience, Horace 
employs rather shocking and obscene language that is charged with both sexual and moral 
meaning, which recalls to a certain degree the Cynics’ provocative style.72  On the other hand, 
such overt frankness is not gratuitously offensive but ultimately intended to influence correct 
behavior and promote vigorously the importance of satisfying desires in accordance with 
nature.73  This involves an application of practical and frank advice through concrete examples 
as well as graphic visualizations of the dire consequences of vice, all of which Horace learned 
from his father.74 
71Courtney (2013) 76, following Dessen (1968) 202, rightly notes that the mean is to be 
identified with correct behavior rather than with freedwomen themselves.  This important 
distinction had already been made by Cataudella (1950) 25. 
72Fiske (1971) 251 makes the following overly simplistic and exaggerated observation: 
“In the first place the whole satire is characterized by a frankness, not to say a crudeness of 
speech, which recalls in every tone the somewhat brutal παρρησία or freedom of speech affected 
by the Cynics.”  Horace’s use of obscene words like futuo (127), cunnus (36) and mutto (68) also 
recalls the poetry of Catullus, for which see Gigante (1993) 19.  For the implications of such 
language for Horace’s apparently sexist view of women, see Henderson (1999) 184-91, Oliensis 
(1998) 24 and Courtney (2013) 72. 
73See Curran (1970) 230, whose thesis involves showing that such language is intended 
“to make the strongest possible case for nature.”  Turolla (1931) 67 is wrong in stating that 
Horace “è uno che ride malamente,” which completely overlooks the generally protreptic nature 
of this poem and his repeated emphasis on observing the Epicurean calculus for the sake of 
moral correction.  For other descriptions of the strong language of Sermones 1.2, see Lefèvre 
(1975) 311-12. 
74Gigante (1993) 15: “L’oscenità di termini e il disgusto di uno stilema godibili di per sé 
hanno la funzione di suscitare una ripulsa nel comportamento, nella practica della vita che è il 
terreno di prova di validità di un sistema filosofico.  È un aspetto—il linguaggio osceno—della 
malittia degli altri, non del poeta; è una manifestazione della concretezza di cui l’aveva formato 
il padre, ma anche l’indizio della persuasione dell’inefficacia di ogni astrazione, 
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The poet contextualizes his treatment of sexual vice by stating, in mock-epic fashion, the 
importance of observing the hedonic calculus before introducing a series of frank visualizations 
and examples.  Manipulating an Ennian passage and thus suggesting the epic nature of the 
“struggle” (38: laborent) between natural and unnatural desires,75 Horace announces the 
formidable “dangers” (40: pericla) of seeking “pleasure marred by much pain” (39: multo 
corrupta dolore voluptas).  The idea that one’s pleasure should be unmixed with excessive pain 
is of course expressed by Epicurus (Arr. 6.51) and Lucretius, the latter of whom similarly warns 
against sexual delights that result in “care and certain pain” (4.1067: curam certumque 
dolorem).76  More specifically, Horace condemns the many dangers and foolish risks associated 
with adultery (1.2.38: moechis), but he does so through pictorial imagery and vividly “placing 
before the eyes” the frightening consequences of such affairs: 
 
hic se praecipitem tecto dedit, ille flagellis 
ad mortem caesus, fugiens hic decidit arcem 
praedonum in turbam, dedit hic pro corpore nummos, 
hunc perminxerunt calones . . .  (S. 1.2.41-4) 
 
dell’insufficienza degli schemi.”  Freudenburg (2001) 16 views Horace’s sensational treatment 
of sexual vice as “mock-Epicurean,” despite the fact that his message is completely consistent 
with Epicurean ethics. 
75Cf. Enn. Ann. 494-5 Sk.: audire est operae pretium, procedere recte qui rem Romanam 
Latiumque augescere voltis (“It is worth the while to hear, you who wish to advance the Roman 
state and increase Latium”).  See Fraenkel (1957) 81-2, Gigante (1993) 63-4 Smith (2005) 122 
and Gowers (2012) 100 for other views concerning the bathetic juxtaposition of Ennius’ solemn 
expression to Horace’s moechis.    
76I owe this observation to Cataudella (1950) 18-20 and Gigante (1993) 17.  Baldwin 
(1970) 461, who asserts that Horace parodies Lucretius’ didacticism, contrasts the poets’ views 
on prostitutes by quoting DRN 4.1277, which condemns the various postures adopted by scorta 
so that their lovemaking may be more “fitting” (concinnior).  Actually, Lucretius’ point is not to 
condemn prostitution per se but rather to give advice on how to avoid sterility, according to 
which such postures are “unnecessary for wives” (nil nostris opus esse videtur) since they 
prevent pregnancy.  See Bailey (1947) 1316-319. 
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One man has thrown himself headlong from the roof; another has been flogged to death; 
a third, in his flight, has fallen into a savage gang of robbers; another has paid a price to 
save his life; another has been abused by stable-boys . . .  
 
 
Like his father (cf. 1.4.126), Horace aggressively employs the demonstrative combination hic . . . 
ille in order to emphasize proximity and call attention to the ubiquitous consequences of sexual 
vice.77  He relies on examples that are not only practical and immediately relevant, but also 
shocking and therefore intended to deter his audience from a similar fate, which resembles the 
frank use of pictorial imagery in De ira (col. 3.13-18) as described above.  In the same work, 
Philodemus recommends that his followers assess the pure corruption associated with 
unnecessary sexual desires by observing their manifold consequences, which are regarded as 
symptomatic of this particular disposition.78  Indeed, the application of frankness for the purpose 
of curing sexual vice is contingent upon careful observation and inference from signs (De lib. 
dic. fr. 57.1-5): [κἂν μὴ] κατειλήφηι ἐρ[ῶν]τας ἢ κατασ[χ]έτους κακίαις τισίν, ἀλλὰ 
σημειωσάμενον (“Even if it is the case that he [the sage] has not caught them in love or 
possessed by some vices, but has inferred it from signs”).  According to Philodemus as quoted 
previously, these signs may be physical symptoms or the extreme and wretched consequences of 
vice; according to the testimony of the Christian apologist Origen, moreover, the followers of 
77Gigante (1993) 25: “In realtà, Orazio svela un’arte intrisa di realtà, saporosa di 
situazioni e di personaggi, affrancata e rovente, che raffigura lo spettro del pathos d’amore, gli 
amori cittadineschi.  Non astrazioni, ma concretezza di parole e di gesti . . .”  
78De ir. col. 7.16-26: οὕτω δεῖ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν ἐπιλογίσασθαι τοῦ κακοῦ, καθάπερ 
καὶ επὶ τῆς ἐρ[ωτ]ικ[ῆ]ς εἰώθαμεν ποιεῖν ἐπιθυμίας.  τότε [δὴ] πᾶ[ν τὸ λυποῦν αὐ]τοὺς 
ἐξαριθ[μο]ῦμεν [καὶ] τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα [δυσ]χερέστα[τα κοι]νῆι (“Thus it is necessary to 
assess the potency of vice, just as we customarily do with erotic passion.  Then we enumerate 
their pain as well as the extreme and wretched consequences, which they share in common”).  
For the meaning and significance of the term ἐπιλογίζεσθαι, see Chapter 1, p. 52 n. 70. 
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Epicurus avoided adultery solely because of the painful consequences, which usually involve 
death, exile or the fear of being caught by a returning husband: 
 
oἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Ἐπικούρου οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μοιχεύουσιν, ὅτε ἀπέχονται τοῦ μοιχεύειν, 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ νενομικέναι τέλος τὴν ἡδονὴν, πολλὰ δ’ ἀπαντᾶν κωλυτικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς 
τῷ εἴξαντι μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ μοιχεύειν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἔσθ’ ὅτε φυλακὰς ἢ φυγὰς ἢ θανάτους, 
πολλάκις δὲ πρὸ τούτων καὶ κινδύνους κατὰ τὸ ἐπιτηρεῖν τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔξοδον 
ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας κτλ.  (Origen, C. Cels. 7.63 = Us. 535) 
 
But it is not because of this [nature and the law] that the followers of Epicurus avoid 
adultery when they do so, but because of their conviction that pleasure is the final end, 
and many hindrances to pleasure attend upon one who only pursues the pleasure of 
adultery, such  as prison, exile or death; even before these, often there are the risks 
involved in observing the husband depart from the house etc.    
 
 
There are numerous similarities between the moral stance of “the followers of Epicurus” and 
Horace: neither condemns adultery per se but rather the risks involved, which corrupt the 
enjoyment of pure pleasure (1.2.39: corrupta voluptas); both identify these risks as involving 
flight or exile (42: fugiens) and even death (43: ad mortem caesus).79  A further consequence 
Horace mentions is the loss of both money and reputation (61: famam; 62: rem patris; 43: 
nummos),80 which may allude to Lucretius’ association of sexual vice with financial ruin 
(4.1123-240) as well as Philodemus’ description of salaciousness as a primary destroyer of 
 79Pasquali (1920) 325, who refers to this poem as “una diatriba epicurea,” observed these 
connections early on, as did Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 26.  See also Cataudella (1950) 22-5.  
Sbordone (1965) 310-12 presents a fragment of Philodemus’ lost treatise on love (PHerc. 1384), 
in which the victims of sexual passion are described as being “manifestly in danger” (8-9: ἐν 
τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐπιφανές), which may allude to the observable symptoms of this particular vice.  
In a related fragment (PHerc. 1167), he seems to note the “perceptible clarity” (5: [ἐ]ναργές) of 
the consequences of “painful desire” (1-2: λύπην [τὴν ἐπι]θυμίαν).   
80Cf. 1.2.133: ne nummi pereant aut puga aut denique fama (“dreading disaster in purse 
or person or at least repute”).  Lucretius likewise considers the loss of one’s reputation as a 
consequence of sexual obsession (cf. 4.1124: aegrotat fama). 
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wealth in De oeconomia (coll. 23.42-24.2).81  In a later passage, Horace adds to this “mock-epic 
list” of the shocking consequences of adultery by vividly listing other “hindrances” (97: multae . 
. . officient res; cf. πολλὰ κωλυτικὰ in the above passage)82 to true pleasure before completing 
his unabashedly straightforward and frank criticism of sexual vice with an even more shocking 
tableau. 
A preliminary consideration of the ideal lover as described by Philodemus provides 
contrast for the concluding scene, which, paralleling the end of Sermones 1.1, involves the 
application of frankness through pictorial imagery.  In response to the quasi-elegiac miser 
amator who expresses his preference for elusive “prey” by quoting an epigram of Callimachus 
(105-8),83 Horace quotes an epigram of Philodemus, in which the pleasurable convenience of an 
81Cataudella (1950) 20 n. 7 makes a similar connection.  
82In addition to being a parody of epic, the asyndeton and rapid-fire description of 
Horace’s catalogue of the wealthy matron’s attendants has, as Gowers (2012) 111 notes, a comic 
feel.  Cf. Plaut. Aul. 501-2. 
83For a discussion of the language of literary theory in the following passages, see 
Freudenburg (1993) 195-98.  Dessen (1968) 207 also offers interesting observations.  According 
to Cody (1976) 108-19, Horace not only imitates but transforms his original model in order to 
achieve a “moralistic reinterpretation of Callimachus’ amoral epigram.”  Courtney (2013) 79 
observes that Horace corrects Callimachus by subsequently quoting an Epicurean source, and 
Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 36 note “Daß H. hier eines seiner Epigramme dem oben zitierten 
Epigramm des Kallimachus gegenüberstellt, ist eine Artigkeit gegen ihn [Philodemus].”  Cf. 
Freudenburg (1993) 196, however, who reads Philodemus as “the perfect foil for Callimachus.”  
The original source is Callim. Epigr. 33: 
 
   Ὡγρευτής, Ἐπίκυδες, ἐν οὔρεσι πάντα λαγωὸν 
              διφᾷ καὶ πάσης ἴχωια δορκαλίδος 
   στείβῃ καὶ νιφετῷ κεχρημένος, ἢν δέ τις εἴπῃ 
        “τῆ, τόδε βέβληται θηρίον,” οὐκ ἔλαβεν. 
   χοὐμὸς ἔρως τοιόσδε· τὰ γὰρ φεύγοντα διώκειν 
             οἶδε, τὰ δ’ ἐν μέσσῳ κείμενα παρπέτεται. 
The hunter on the hills, O Epicydes, searches out every hare and the tracks of every roe, 
beset by frost and snow.  But if one say, “Lo!  here is a beast shot” he takes it not.  Even 
such is my love: it can pursue what flees from it, but what lies ready it passes by. 
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easy love is contrasted with the “grave cares’ (110: curasque gravis) of a riskier and more 
demanding amour:  
illam “post paulo” “sed pluris” “si exierit vir” 
Gallis, hanc Philodemus ait sibi, quae neque magno 
stet pretio neque cunctetur cum est iussa venire.     (S. 1.2.120-23) 
 
“By and by,” “Nay more,” “If my husband goes out”—a woman who speaks thus is for 
the Galli, says Philodemus; for himself he asks for one who is neither high-priced nor 
slow to come when bidden.84 
 
Both poets refer to the financial and personal advantages of an “easy love” (119: venerem 
facilem), whose natural beauty, like Horace’s pithy satires and Philodemus’ lean epigrams, is 
truthful, unconditionally pleasurable and not exaggerated by artificial and unnecessary 
embellishments.85  The following lines, in which Horace emphasizes the importance of avoiding 
financial strain and recognizing physical pleasure as independent of social class (125-26), have 
84Horace’s presentation of this poem of Philodemus has no exact parallel in the surviving 
epigrams, although poem 38 contrasts matronae with scorta and even mentions a Gallus (Sider 
[1997] 199-202).  Cf. his earlier, direct quotation of a Philodemean epigram (92: o crus, o 
bracchia!) as discussed by Fiske (1971) 255 and especially Sider (1997) 103-10.  Wright (1921) 
168-69 and, much more recently, Courtney (2013) 80 plausibly argue that at lines 120-22 Horace 
is paraphrasing Philodemus’ epigram 22, which Sider (1997) 138 prints as follows (note 
especially the use of obscene language like βινέω = futuo, which Gigante [1993] 82 describes as 
“realismo brutale”): 
 
   πέντε δίδωσιν ἑνὸς τῇ δείνᾳ ὁ δεῖνα τάλαντα 
             καὶ βινεῖ φρίσσων καὶ, μὰ τόν, οὐδὲ καλήν· 
   πέντε δ’ ἐγὼ δραχμὰς τῶν δώδεκα Λυσιανάσσῃ, 
             καὶ βινῶ πρὸς τῷ κρείσσονα καὶ φανερῶς. 
   πάντως ἤτοι ἐγὼ φρένας οὐκ ἔχω ἢ τό γε λοιπὸν 
             τοὺς κείνου πελέκει δεῖ διδύμους ἀφελεῖν. 
Mr. X gives Mrs Y five talents for one favor, and he screws, shivering with fear, one who 
is, what’s more, God knows, no beauty.  I give five—drachmas—to Lysianassa for the 
twelve favors, and what’s more I screw a finer woman, and openly.  Assuredly, either I’m 
crazy or, after all this, he should have his balls cut off with a knife. 
85Freudenburg (1993) 196-97.  For the philosophical correctness of Philodemus’ poetry, 
see Sider (1995) 42-57. 
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often been interpreted as referring to a similar passage from the poet Cercidas of Megalopolis, 
who also mentions the benefits of a cheap love free from worry.86  As various scholars have 
indicated, however, this sentiment was a popular literary topos in Hellenistic poetry, and, given 
the fact that it squares perfectly with Epicurean ethics and that Horace quotes from Philodemus 
at least three times in this satire alone, it may be more reasonable to view it as an imitation of 
one of the latter’s epigrams.87  In any case, the emphasis on emotional and financial stability 
regarding love affairs sets up the perfect contrast with the final scene, in which Horace forces his 
audience to visualize the horrible risks involved in adultery: 
 
nec vereor, ne, dum futuo, vir rure recurrat, 
ianua frangatur, latret canis, undique magno 
pulsa domus strepitu resonet, vepallida lecto 
desiliat mulier, miseram se conscia clamet, 
cruribus haec metuat, doti deprensa, egomet mi. (S. 1.2.127-31) 
 
No fears have I in her company, that a husband may rush back from the country, the door 
burst open, the dog bark, the house ring through and through with the din and clatter of 
his knocking; that the woman, white as a sheet, will leap away, the maid in league with 
her cry out in terror, she fearing for her limbs, her guilty mistress for her dowry, and I for 
86Lomiento (1993) 9-26 provides a detailed introduction to this Cynic poet’s life and 
works, as well as copious bibliographical references and testimonia.  I give the text as it appears 
in her critical edition (fr. 2):  
                     ἁ δ’ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς Ἀφροδίτα, 
καὶ τὸ μη[δε]νὸς μέλειν, ὁπ[α]νίκα λῇς, ὅκα χρήζης,  
οὐ φόβος οὐ ταραχά.  τα[ύ]ταν ὀβλῷ κατακλίνας 
Τ[υν]δαρέοιο δόκει γαμβρ[ὸς τό]τ’ ἦμεν. 
But Venus that paces the market—in preparation of desire demanding no thought or 
attention—here is no fear and no care: one obol will win you a mistress, son-in-law fancy 
yourself to Tyndarus favored among suitors.    
87Lomiento (1993) 229 notes that this sentiment is “un topos commune alla filisofia 
popolare, epicurea . . . e cinica.”  The same theme occurs in comedy, for which see Rudd (1966) 
25.  Cataudella (1950) 28-31 argues for the possibility, which Gigante (1983) 242 seconds, that 
Horace had been exposed to Cercidas through Philodemus’ poetry. 
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myself. 
 
 
Through this unambiguously comic yet startlingly frank exemplum,88 in which Horace playfully 
dissociates himself from the typical elegiac amator, the audience reflects, this time in a more 
direct and forceful manner, on the terrible fears and anxieties which accompany illegitimate and 
therefore dangerous love affairs.  The introduction of a hypothetical situation intended for 
admonition and moral guidance, which is the ultimate goal of pictorial imagery as employed by 
Philodemus, also recalls the end of Sermones 1.1 (80-87) and Horace’s fable of the town and 
country mice in Sermones 2.6 (111-15), both of which incorporate colorful language and literary 
devices for the sake of vividness.  By vividly “placing before the eyes” of his audience the 
formidable consequences of sexual excess, moreover, the poet draws a fitting conclusion to his 
riotously candid (although simultaneously therapeutic) criticism of Roman intemperance. 
In Sermones 1.3 Horace delivers his final, blatantly moral treatment of vice, which, aside 
from being a playful lesson in tolerance and mutual forbearance at the Stoics’ expense, is also an 
example of more subdued and therefore more effective frankness.  In relation to their conviction 
that the sage is perfect in every way, traditional Stoics maintain an impossibly high standard of 
excellence and consequently deny any intermediate stage between virtue and vice: as Cicero puts 
 88See Gowers (2012) 116 for allusions to mime plots and parallels with Roman comedy, 
including Plautus and Terence.  One may compare Horace’s use of comedy within the context of 
administering frankness to De lib. dic. fr. 29.1-5: καταρχώμεθα σή[με]ρόν που καὶ α[ὐ]τὰς 
τ[ιθῶμ]εν εἰς ἐκε[ί]νου τὴν [αἴσθ]ησιν· ὃ κα[ὶ] τῶν κω[μωιδ]ογρ[άφων] ἐμιμή[σ]αντό τινες 
(“Let us begin today perhaps and let us place them before his awareness.  Which some of the 
comic playwrights also portrayed when they etc.”).  Unless the patient is obstinate, Philodemus 
generally recommends that the sage apply frankness in a lighthearted and cheerful manner, as 
Olivieri (1914) observes in his introduction (p. vii), to which cf. De lib. dic. fr. 85.5-10. 
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it, for them all sins were equally reprehensible (Fin. 4.19.55: omnia peccata paria esse).89  Such 
an extreme conviction, according to Horace, naturally results in arrogance and the ill-treatment 
of “inferiors,” who, by means of a hilariously satirical inversion, become the innocent victims of 
the perfect Stoic’s irrational anger (1.3.76-95).90  For his own part, Horace sides with the more 
moderate Epicurean view of friendship, which, in the spirit of therapeutic frankness, recognizes 
but attempts to correct the faults of others.91  Such tolerance, according to Philodemus, is 
primarily the result of the Epicurean sage’s recognition of his own imperfections, which 
occasionally lead him astray and require gentle correction: 
89Cf. 1.2.96: quis paria esse fere placuit peccata (“those whose creed is that sins are 
much on a par”).  For a reference to the original formulation of this thesis, see Diog. Laert. 
7.127: ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μεταξὺ εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ 
ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν φασιν ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ 
στρεβλὸν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον (“For them, there 
is no mean between virtue and vice, whereas the Peripatetics say that in between virtue and vice 
there is progress.  Thus the Stoics say that just as a stick is either straight or bent, so also 
something is either just or unjust and not ‘rather just’ or ‘rather unjust’”).  Although Panaetius 
famously attempted to soften this view among Romans by emphasizing the importance of 
“making progress” or προκοπή (cf. Sen. Ep. 116.5), Horace here attacks the traditional assertion, 
as clearly stated by Chrisyppus (Plut. Communibus notitiis. 1063a = SVF 3.539): ὥσπερ ὁ 
πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος 
ὀργυιὰς πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν 
κακίᾳ . . . οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρι οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ 
διαμένουσιν (“Just as in the sea the man a cubit from the surface is drowning no less than the 
one who has sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are they any less in vice who are a long way from it . . 
. so those who are making progress continue to be stupid and depraved until they have attained 
virtue”). 
90One thinks of the recent convert Damasippus’ overly zealous attack on all and sundry in 
Sermones 2.3, as discussed in Chapter 3.  For the irony involved in Horace’s attack on such 
inconsistency, which is a notion particularly upheld by the Stoic Panaetius (Cic. Off. 1.90 and 
111), see Fraenkel (1957) 86, Grilli (1983) 269 and especially Kemp (2009) 2-4.    
91Kemp (2009) 4-10 offers an excellent consideration of Horace’s adoption of Epicurean 
views in order to criticize Stoic extremism, although his focus on the role of tolerance in 
friendship does not encompass the Epicurean practice of frank criticism.    
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[εἰ τὰ ὑπ]οπτευμένα π[ε]ρὶ το[ῦ σ]οφοῦ, καὶ κοινῶς τ[ο]ῦ κ[α]θηγουμένου, 
καθάρσεως δεῖται.  Πῶς γὰρ μισεῖν τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα μὴ ἀπογνώ[σ]ιμα μέλλει, 
γινώσκω[ν] αὑτὸν οὐκ ὄντα τέλε[ι]ον καὶ μιμνήι[σκων, ὅτι πάντες ἁμαρτάνειν 
εἰώθασιν;] (De lib. dic. fr. 46.1-11) 
 
. . . if the things that are suspected concerning the wise man, and the teacher generally, 
need purification.  For how is he going to hate the one who errs, though not desperately, 
when he knows that he himself is not perfect and re[minds himself that everyone is 
accustomed to err?]92 
 
    
Unlike the Stoic sage, therefore, the Epicurean wise man understands his limitations and 
therefore “sympathizes” with patients’ rather than ridiculing them (ibid. fr. 79.9-11: συνπατῶ[ς] 
τ[ὰς ἁμαρτί]ας ὑπολαμβάνειν).93  Furthermore, the sage is willing to communicate his own 
errors and imperfections to close friends (ibid. fr. 81.1-4), “even presenting,” as Philodemus 
notes, “for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students” (ibid. 55.1-
4: κα[ὶ διδ]όναι παρρησίαι τὰ περὶ αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων).  This view of 
frankness is an expression of what Clarence Glad calls an “ideal of non-concealment” and 
“participatory psychagogy,” both of which are necessary for a successful diagnosis.94  This 
realistic attitude toward moral imperfection, which obviously contrasts with the idealistic view of 
the Stoics, may shed light on Horace’s own admission of guilt and rejection of shameless and, 
one might add, unjustified self-love: 
                     
                      nunc aliquis dicat mihi ‘quid tu? 
nullane habes vitia?’  immo alia et fortasse minora. 
92On this passage and the importance of κάθαρσις, see Gigante (1975) 57.  
93See Michels (1944) 174 and Glad (1996) 38-9.  
94Glad (1996) 48.  For the Epicurean notion of “openness” or “self-revelation” (μήνυσις) 
as a prerequisite for therapeutic frankness, cf. De lib. dic. fr. 39.2-4 and see Gigante (1975) 57 
and Nussbaum (1986) 49.  
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Maenius absentem Novium cum carperet, ‘heus tu’ 
quidam ait ‘ignoras te an ut ignotum dare nobis 
verba putas?’  ‘egomet mi ignosco’ Maenius inquit. 
stultus et inprobus hic amor est dignusque notari. (S. 1.3.19-24) 
 
Now someone may say to me: “What about yourself?  Have you no faults?”  Why yes, 
but not the same, and perhaps lesser ones.  When Maenius once was carping at Novius 
behind his back, “Look out, sir,” said someone, “do you not know yourself?  Or do you 
think you impose on us, as one we do not know?”  “I take no note of myself,” said 
Maenius.  Such self-love is foolish and shameless, and deserves to be censured. 
 
  
This important recognition of his own faults is, as Emily Gowers observes, a “defining moment 
in Satires I,” since it is the first (although by no means the last!) unambiguous example of 
Horace’s fondness for disarming self-deprecation.95  Perhaps of further significance is the fact 
that it occurs within the context of a poem that, in embracing the Epicurean view of friendship 
and forbearance, simultaneously refutes Stoic ethics as conducive toward overly harsh 
criticism.96  In fact, Horace’s awareness of his own failings and relative gentleness in applying 
therapeutic frankness not only provides a corrective model for the Stoics, but it also introduces 
the perfect contrast for his satirical portrayal of the latter as irascible—and therefore utterly 
ineffective—moralizers. 
In his subsequent criticism of the Stoics’ lack of tolerance for “fools” (77: stultis) and 
description of their disproportionate response to perceived offenses, Horace incorporates ethical 
concepts that likewise appear in Philodemus’ frank treatment of anger.  In laying down his 
95Gowers (2012) 125.  Cf. 1.4.130-31 and 1.6.65-6 for Horace’s mention of his 
“moderate faults” (vitiis mediocribus), which receives much more attention in Sermones 2.7 (to 
be discussed in the next chapter). 
96According to Porphyrio (ad 21), this Maenius was “quite infamous in Rome for his 
scurrility and extravagance” (et scurrilitate et nepotatu notissimum Romae fuit), for which reason 
he was probably ridiculed by Luclilius, as Fraenkel (1957) 89 notes (cf. 1203 M).  See Schlegel 
(2005) 31-2 for the difference between Lucilius’ comic branding of others by name and Horace’s 
more constructive branding of Maenius (cf. 24: dignusque notari). 
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principle rule concerning the proper way to punish offenses, for example, he invokes Lucretian 
rhetoric and uses philosophical language to communicate the importance of calculations made in 
accordance with reason:  
 
denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae, 
cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia, cur non 
ponderibus modulisque eis ratio utitur ac res 
ut quaeque est, ita suppliciis delicta coercet?  (S. 1.3.76-9) 
 
In fine, since the fault of anger, and all the other faults that cleave to fools cannot be 
wholly cut away, why does not Reason use her own weights and measures, and visit 
offenses with punishment suited to each? 
 
 
Aside from the Lucretian denique to introduce a new argument and emphasis on ratio,97 
Horace’s use of medical terminology in this passage in referring to the “excision” (excidi) of vice 
recalls similar references to scalpels and operations in Philodemus (De lib. dic. col. 17a.4-8).98  
Furthermore, in maintaining that anger cannot be completely removed but must be controlled by 
reason, Horace counters the Stoic doctrine of emotions as unqualifiedly vicious99 and possibly 
97Obviously one of the standard uses of denique, but the Epicurean tone of this poem and 
the specifically Lucretian explanation of evolution (99-124) leave little doubt as to the allusion, 
as the commentators as well as Fraenkel (1957) 87 and Gowers (2012) 134 note.  See Kemp 
(2009) 5 for a similar observation and for the mention of ratio as “another ironic jibe against the 
Stoics” (4). 
98Cf. Lucr. 3.310: nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst (“one should one think that 
evils can be torn out by the roots”).  The intertext is discussed by Grilli (1983) 270.  
99For the Stoic doctrine of apathy, see the accounts of Stobaeus (2.88.8-90.6 = SVF 
3.378, 389) and Cicero (Tusc. 4.77-9).  In his treatise De ira, Seneca calls anger “the most 
hideous and frenzied of all the emotions” (1.1.1: maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac rabidum) and 
asserts that it should be completely eradicated, not controlled (1.8.4).  See Tsouna (2011) 196-
209 for a more detailed discussion.  Seneca’s main opponents are the Peripatetics, who taught 
that anger, when controlled by reason, could be useful, especially in the context of war (ibid. 
1.8.9, cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.39-46).  Although Panaetius adopted this doctrine of “moderated emotion” 
or μετριοπαθής (cf. Diog. Laert. 5.31 for the term), given Horace’s convenient oversight of the 
Stoics’ more moderate views elsewhere in Sermones 1.3, it seems unlikely that he is alluding to 
this in the above passage, as Gowers (2012) 134 suggests. 
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alludes to Philodemus’ similar statement in De ira concerning the role of correct opinion in 
reacting to offenses with due measure:  
 
συνίσταται γὰρ ἀπὸ το[ῦ] βλέπειν, ὡς ἡ φύσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ μηδὲν         
ψευδοδοξεῖν ἐν ταῖς σ[υ]μμετρήσεσι τῶν ἐλα[ττ]ωμάτων καὶ ταῖς κολάσεσι τῶν 
βλαπτόντων  (col. 37.32-9) 
 
It results from a consideration of the nature of things and not having false opinions 
regarding the comparison of losses and the punishment of offenders.100   
 
 
With regard to Horace’s treatment of the Stoics, the false opinion that “all vices are equal” 
clearly results in the corresponding failure to respond properly to slight offenses, which the poet 
criticizes by vividly describing to his interlocutor the horrible consequences of such folly: 
crucifixion (82: in cruce), hatred (86: odisti), flagellation (119: flagello) and beating with a rod 
(120: ferula caedas).101  This nameless straw man, however, who proves to be every bit as 
obstinate as Horace’s previous patients, arrogantly responds that, as a Stoic sage, he is 
unequivocally superior to everyone because of his complete independence and perfect virtue 
100Grilli (1983) 271 interprets Horace’ mention of weights and measures within the 
context of Epicurus’ κανών.  Philodemus immediately afterwards characterizes this inability to 
exercise moderation (De ir. col. 38.1-5): τὴν κ[ενὴν ὀρ]γὴν κακόν, ὅτι ἀπὸ διαθέσεως γίνεται 
πα[μ]πονηροῦ καὶ μυρία δυσχερῆ συνεπισπᾶται, δ[εῖ] λέγειν [οὐ] κακ[ὸν τὴ]ν φυσική[ν] 
(“[just as we say that] vain anger as a vice originates in a thoroughly wicked disposition and 
leads to a myriad of miseries, so it is necessary to say that natural anger is not a vice”).  This is 
not the place to discuss Philodemus’ complex views on anger and their origins, for which see 
Philippson (1916) 425-60, Indelli (1988) 17-31, Annas (1989) 145-64, Indelli (2004) 103-110, 
Fish (2004) 111-138 and especially Tsouna (2007) 195-238, Asmis (2011) 152-82 and Tsouna 
(2011) 184-96.  Horace’s description of anger as unable to be cut out suggests that it is deeply 
ingrained in our nature, which is a view primarily identified with the Peripatetics and, as shown 
above, contemporary Epicureans (cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.79). 
101Cf. Philodemus’ description of the equally grave actions of irascible individuals in De 
ira, including beheadings (fr. 12.21: τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀφαιρεῖ), beatings (fr. 13.26: τύπτειν καὶ 
λακτίζειν) as well as self-alienation (col. 42.2: προσαλλοτριοῦται) and hatred (col. 42.2-3: 
μισεῖ).    
 192 
                                                 
(126-33).102  Such a refusal to listen to ratio, namely, Epicurean arguments concerning evolution 
and the role of convention in establishing the limits of justice (99-124),103 is met by a shift from 
theory to reality as Horace once again introduces a final tableau that forces the interlocutor to 
visualize his irrational conduct: 
       
                  vellunt tibi barbam 
lascivi pueri; quos tu nisi fuste coerces, 
urgeris turba circum te stante miserque 
rumperis et latras, magnorum maxime regum. (S. 1.3.133-36) 
 
Mischievous boys pluck at your beard, and unless you keep them off with your staff, you 
are jostled by the crowd that surrounds you, while you, poor wretch, snarl and burst with 
rage, O mightiest of mighty kings! 
 
 
This frank depiction of the irascible temperament, with its colorful and entertaining—almost 
theatrical—qualities and vividness, probably owes a great deal to the florid style of Bion, which 
later Epicureans like Demetrius of Laconia (c. 100 BC) employed in their philosophical 
treatises.104  Such borrowing also occurs in the works of Philodemus, who employs Bionian 
102According to the Stoics, the possession of a single virtue implies the possession of all 
the virtues (cf. Stob. 2.63 = SVF 3.280: τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν).  Logically, 
therefore, the Stoic sage is prefect and does all things well (cf. Stob. 2.66.14 = SVF 3.560: 
λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πάντ’ εὖ ποεῖν τὸν σοφόν). 
103 For the satirical or parodic elements of Horace’s imitation of Lucretius in this passage, 
see Grilli (1983) 273-74, Ferri (1993) 37-8, Freudenburg (1993) 26-7 and Turpin (2009) 133-37.  
104See Crönert (1906) 31-3.  According to Diogenes Laertius (4.52), Eratosthenes said 
that Bion was “the first person who had clothed philosophy in a flowery robe” (πρῶτος Βίων 
τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν).  A similar identification occurs in one of the Herculaneum 
papyri (PHerc. 1055), which Crönert assigns to the Demetrius mentioned above (col. 15.2-10).  
The mention of Bion’s style is significant, especially since he is quoted later on in order to 
communicate more gracefully an Epicurean philosophical point (ibid. col. 19.1-6): τοῦτον 
ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Βιωνήου τοῦτο μὲν θήσω, διότι “γένος ἕκαστον 
ζώιων ίδίαν ἐχει μορφἢν ἐν τῶι ἰδίωι γένει” (“Things being as they are, I shall set it down in 
the manner of a Bionian phrase, since ‘each kind of living thing has its own form in accordance 
with its own kind’”).  Cf. Horace’s similar adjectival use of Bion’s name, which is in fact a 
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language for the sake of shocking frankness in describing the symptoms of anger (De ir. col. 
8.34-7): οἷον λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς κ[ρ]αυγῆς διάστασιν [τ]οῦ πλεύμονος σὺν αὐταῖς πλαυραῖς 
(“For example, the swelling of the chest along with the lungs on account of screaming”).105  For 
Horace and Philodemus, however, this connection is a stylistic rather than an ethical one,106 
since both enhance their therapeutic visualizations for the ultimate purpose of effecting the 
avoidance of or release from vicious habits.107 
Perhaps the most colorful depiction of vicious or otherwise reprehensible behavior occurs 
in Sermones 1.9, in which Horace introduces the enormously popular character sketch of a 
garrulous and self-seeking Toady, which, alongside various other models, may also have drawn 
hapax legomena in Latin, at Ep. 2.2.60: Bioneis sermonibus.  See also Gigante and Indelli (1978) 
124-25.  In the fragments of De adulatione, Philodemus even states that “we prefer to speak in 
the manner of Bion” (PHerc. 223, fr. 7: τὰ τοῦ Βίωνος [αἱρούμεν]οι λέγειν).   
105Indelli (1988) 158 includes commentary on the influence of Bion’s treatise De 
apatheia in this passage, evidence for which may be found in Hense (1969) 55-62.  As Tsouna 
(2003) 243 n. 3 comments, the idea that Philodemus parodies the Stoic doctrine of ἀπαθεία in 
his vivid descriptions of the consequences of anger is suggested by David Armstrong in his 
forthcoming translation and commentary.  If he is correct, this may serve to establish a stronger 
link with Horace’s obviously parodic treatment in Sermones 1.3 of the Stoic paradox that all sins 
are equal.  For a similar description of the symptoms of anger (which is heavily influenced by 
that of Philodemus), see Sen. De ira 1.1.3-4 and Tsouna (2011) 198-99. 
106Gigante (1992) 112-13: “Filodemo adatta motivi maturati in ambienti cinici . . . e 
tempera l’ortodossia della dottrina sviluppando pensieri popolari, se non universali, mostrando 
concretezza e realismo e mediano alla società romana temi e motivi che rendevano ancora più 
accessibile e gradevole l’argomentazione filosofica.” 
107Cf. De ir. col. 6.13-23: τὰ [δ’ ἐν τῆι ψ]υχῆι πάθη διὰ τὴ[ν ἡμ]ετέραν ψευδοδοξ[ία]ν 
παρακολουθοῦντα . . . [τὸ] συν[έ]χον [ἔ]χει τῆς ἀπ[οθέ]σεως ἐν [τ]ῶι θεωρῆσ[αι τ]ὸ μέγεθος 
καὶ τὸ πλ[ῆθ]ος ὧν ἔχει καὶ συνεπι[σπ]ᾶται κακῶν (“The emotions in the soul that follow 
because of our false opinions . . . the crucial thing in releasing ourselves from them is observing 
the magnitude and number of evils they contain and bring along with them”).  Annas (1989) 156 
provides a useful explanation of this passage within the larger context of Epicurean emotions. 
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inspiration from Philodemus’ treatment of flattery.108  The setting of this poem in the Roman 
forum (1: ibam forte via sacra) and its abrupt, almost annoying conversational form, originate in 
Catullus (10.2: foro),109 whereas the sketch itself appears to have closer parallels in Theophrastus 
(Char. 3 and 7) and Lucilius.110  Certain aspects of this sketch, however, may be linked to the 
previously mentioned comic and philosophical treatments of the flatterer, particularly with 
regard to Toady’s grand entrance (1.9.3-4): accurrit quidam notus mihi nomine tantum | 
arreptaque manu ‘quid agis, dulcissime rerum?’ (“when up there runs a man I knew only by 
name and seizes my hand: ‘How are you, sweetest of all things?’”).  The manner in which Toady 
accosts the poet in the forum, catching his victim completely unawares, recalls Eupolis’ 
description of the flatterer’s technique (PCG 5.172.7-8): εἰς ἀγοράν.  ἐκεῖ δ’ ἐπειδὰν κατίδω 
108Originally referred to in English as the “coxcomb” and the “bore,” Rudd (1966) 74 
proposed to rename him “the pest,” which Courtney (1994) 1-8 and Gowers (2012) 280-83 have 
adopted.  For reasons that will soon become obvious, however, I shall call him “Toady.”  Cf. 
Diggle (2003) 181.  
109Fraenkel (1957) 114-16 discusses these two poems in more detail.  See Freudenburg 
(1993) 209-11 for the literary significance of Horace’s imitation of Catullan “compositional 
variation.”  For Courtney (1994) 2, the poem’s brief clauses reflect “spasmodic actions seeking 
escape.”  There are also similarities between Horace’s satire and Vergil Ecl. 9, which involves a 
conversation between Moeris and the aspiring and inquisitive poet Lycidas en route to the city 
(1: in urbem).  See Van Rooy (1973) 69-88. 
110Both Fraenkel (1957) 112 and Rudd (1966) 76-7 cite a fragment of Lucilius (1142 M ~ 
534 M): ibam forte domum (“I was on my way home by chance”).  Fiske (1971) 330-36 gives 
more parallels, although the precise nature and extent of Lucilius’ influence is unclear.  See, for 
example, the conflicting views of Rudd (1966) 284 n. 38 and Anderson (1982) 84-5.  Rudd 
(1961) 90-96 doubts the existence of a Lucilian prototype.  Worthy of mention, on the other 
hand,  is Ferriss-Hill (2011) 429-55, who argues that the nameless interlocutor should be 
identified with Lucilius himself.  It should also be noted that there are important connections 
between Horace’s portrayal of Toady and the character dramaticus, as Musurillo (1964) 65-8, 
taking his cue from Porphyrio (ad 1), has demonstrated.  On the influence of drama in general, 
see Rudd (1966) 75-6 and Cairns (2005) 49-55.  Plutarch calls the flatterer a “tragic actor” (Mor 
4.50e: τραγικός ἐστιν).  Anderson (1982) 84-102 reads the tension between Horace and Toady 
within the context of an epic battle, as suggested by the poet’s use of battle terms (16: persequar; 
29: confice) and citation of a line from the Iliad (1.9.78: sic me servavit Apollo  = Il. 20.443: τὸν 
δ’ ἐξήρπαξεν Ἀπόλλων). 
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τιν’ ἄνδρα | ἠλίθιον, πλουτοῦντα δ’, εὐθὺς περὶ τοῦτόν εἰμι (“[I run] into the marketplace, and 
there, when I catch sight of some fool—but a rich one!—I am immediately at his side”).111  His 
ambition and desire for fame is suggested by the proactive “snatching” of Horace’s hand and 
overly charming address “O sweetest thing on earth,” which recalls Philodemus’ observation that 
the flatterer “speaks honeyed words to his victim” (PHerc. 222, col. 7.9-10: μει[λίττει] δὲ τὸν 
κολα[κε]υόμεν[ον]).112  This abrupt entrance and perverted hijacking of one of Horace’s 
favorite terms of endearment (cf. Ep. 1.7.12: dulcis) emphasize Toady’s status as a charlatan and 
an actor, which is only further confirmed by his tactless self-appropriation of the title “learned 
poet” (1.9.7: docti sumus; cf. Ep. 1.19.1: docte Maecenas).113  In his attempt to win Horace’s 
favor, therefore, the speaker mimics his victim’s language and peremptorily insinuates himself 
into Maecenas’ circle by claiming poetic excellence, which apparently includes the ability to 
compose quickly and dance effeminately (23-5).114  Of course, the delicious irony of Toady’s 
111The introduction of a nameless interlocutor, which is already familiar from the diatribe 
satires, establishes connections not only to comedy and the Cynics, but also to the character 
sketches of moral philosophers like Theophrastus (see Gowers [2012] 284) and, as I argue here, 
to Philodemus.   
112With regard to the speaker, Gowers (2012) 284 observes that arripio “signifies his 
opportunistic attitude to life.”  See also Rudd (1966) 7 for the parallel between the opening 
seizure (arrepta manu) and the closing seizure (77: rapit in ius). 
113For the word doctus as referring to Roman poets who were part of the Hellenistic 
literary tradition, see Palmer (1893) 221, Van Rooy (1972) 40 and especially Kenney (1970).     
114Cf. Philodemus’ description of the flatterer’s behavior in PHerc. 222 as resembling that 
of a “little dog or a small monkey” (col. 9.14-15: κυνίδιον . . . ἢ [π]ιθή[κ]ιον), which he 
condemns by saying “it is one thing to mimic someone, and another to emulate him” (col. 10.8-
10: [ἄ]λ[λο μὲν γὰρ] τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τ[ιν’, ἕτερον δὲ] τὸ ζηλοῦν).  Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.51c: ὁ κόλαξ 
αὑτὸν ὥσπερ ὕλην τινὰ ῥυθμίζει καὶ σχηματίζει, περιαρμόσαι καὶ περιπλάσαι ζητῶν οἷς ἂν 
ἐπιχειρῇ διὰ μιμήσεως (“The flatterer bends and shapes himself like matter, as it were, seeking 
to adapt and mold himself to his victims through imitation”).  Plutarch also mentions the “ape” 
(πίθηκος), the “cuddlefish” (πολύποδος) and the “chameleon” (χαμαιλέοντος) in his 
description of the flatterer as imitator (52b-54b), as discussed by Longo Auricchio (1986) 88.  
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clumsy assimilation of the poet’s talents is that he is, as Herbert Musurillo puts it, “Horace by 
inversion, embodying as he does all the qualities that Horace most feared and disliked in a 
man.”115  Closely related to the false association of poetic virtue with shoddy overproduction, 
which is emphatically condemned in Sermones 1.4 (9-13), is the important antithesis between 
garrulity and silence (11-12): aiebam tacitus, cum quidlibet ille | garriret, vicos, urbem lauderet 
(“. . . I kept saying to myself quietly while the fellow rattled on about everything, praising the 
streets and the city”).116  This is often read within the context of similar Theophrastean portraits; 
Horace’s qualification of the speaker’s loquacity as an act specifically aimed at praising 
everything and therefore distinct from wholesome conversation, however, is one that Philodemus 
also makes in De adulatione (PHerc. 222, col. 12.8: ὁμιλίαν ἀντὶ τοῦ [λ]α[λ]ε[ῖν]; cf. PHerc. 
1457, col. 2.6-8: πάν[τ]ων [τ]ὴν ἐπιμέλει[α]ν π[ρ]οσποι[εῖσ]θαι . . . καὶ λαλεῖν).117  This 
distinction, which may engage with Philodemus’ views on homiletics as expressed in his treatise 
De conversatione (see above, p. 11), has potential significance for the Sermones, since it pertains 
to Horace’s self-portrayal as a humble taciturn not only in this poem but also in his previous 
For mollitia and dancing as an effeminate activity to be avoided by men, see Edwards (1993) 63-
97 (especially 68-70) and cf. Lucr. 4.980: cernere saltantes et mollia membra moventes (“see 
them dancing and softly moving their limbs”).  Macrob. Sat. 3.14.6-7 in particular disapproves of 
boys dancing, the mere mention of which he calls nefas.    
115Musurillo (1964) 68.  See also Rudd (1966) 83: “Part of the fun in this satire comes 
from the pest’s failure to recognize his own absurdity.” 
116Ferris-Hill (2011) 431-33, on the other hand, views the interlocutor’s garrulity and 
productiveness as an indication that he is none other than Lucilius, who receives the following 
description at 1.4.12: garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, | scribendi recte (“[he was] 
garrulous and too lazy to bear the task of writing properly”). 
117Theophrastus does not appear to make this connection in his treatments, which focus 
either on flattery (Char. 2) or garrulity and loquacity (ibid. 3 and 7).  Cf. Philodemus’ description 
of the flatterer as one who “speaks in order to please” (PHerc. 1457, col. 1.9: [ὁ λέγων πρὸ]ς 
χάριν). 
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encounter with Maecenas (1.6.56-62).118  In contrast to the benefits of truthful conversation, 
which, like Horatian satire, is characterized above all by frankness, Philodemus describes the 
flatterer as engaging in shameful conversation (PHerc. 222, col. 12.2: αἰσχρὰν ὁμιλίαν), 
including begging and lying (PHerc. 1089, col. 7.5-6: κολακικῶς ὁμιλήσε[ι καὶ πτω]χεύσει καὶ 
ψεύσεται) and as an actor (PHerc. 1675, col. 13.35-6: ὑποκριτάς) who praises one moment and 
slanders his rivals the next (PHerc. 1457, col. 12.21-2: φθονοῦσι καὶ διαβάλλουσι).119  As 
Horace’s persona soon discovers, his pesky companion’s prattling is ultimately motivated by 
envy of potential rivals and personal ambition, both of which are intended to secure his prospects 
for self-gain. 
In the course of this carefully designed portrait, Horace exposes the interlocutor’s true 
disposition by juxtaposing his flattering conversation to his brazen competitiveness and 
desperate desire to win Maecenas’ favor.  Early on in the dialogue Toady betrays his selfish 
ambition by predicting that, rather than accept him as a friend among equals, Horace will be so 
impressed by the flatterer’s skill that he will prefer his company to that of Varius and Viscus (22-
3): si bene me novi, non Viscum pluris amicum, | non Varium facies (“If I do not deceive myself, 
118Oliensis (1998) 37 describes Horace’s response to the interlocutor in Sermones 1.9 as 
“unresponsive silence,” which reflects his inability “to be anything but civil.”  Cf. Schlegel 
(2005) 108, who argues that the poet’s irritating portrait “invites the reader to practice the very 
invective against the interlocutor that Horace’s own character in the poem refuses to practice.”  
Gowers (2012) views the poet as “taking the part of a satirist to suite the times, inoffensive, 
reticent and passive aggressive.”    
119Gowers (2012) 286, who, like many others, reads Horace’s portrait primarily in terms 
of Theophrastus’ descriptions of the garrulous and loquacious man, is only partly right to 
conclude that “The pest is . . . not a subtle flatterer who rations his words to avoid offense” (cf. 
2.5.89-90). 
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you will not think more of Viscus or Varius as a friend than of me”).120  Of course, the irony here 
is that the flatterer’s vicious disposition and false beliefs about self-worth cloud his reason, thus 
precluding any possibility for self-awareness.121  As Philodemus states, flatterers are motivated 
by ambition and “the love of glory” (PHerc. 1089, col. 4.13: [φιλο]δοξ[ία]ν), and “out of the 
compelling desire to insinuate themselves men falsely think that they will be valued more that 
many” (PHerc. 1675, col. 13.15-20: καὶ δ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἠναγκ[α]σμένην ὑποτρέχειν δοκοῦσι 
καὶ π[ρ]ὸ πολλῶν παραλογίζεσθαι . . . [ψευδῶς]).122  This overwhelming desire for success is 
what drives Toady to compare himself to Varius, the chief significance of which lies in the 
latter’s important connection with Maecenas as mentioned in Sermones 1.6.54-5.  The 
implication is that if the flatterer replaces Varius as amicus optimus or “best friend,” Horace will 
120For the expression, cf. Ep. 1.18.1-2: si bene te novi, metues, liberrime Lolli, | 
scurrantis speciem praebere, professus amicum (“If I know you well, my Lollius, most 
outspoken of men, you will shrink from appearing in the guise of a parasite when you have 
professed the friend”).  Horace mentions Varius again at 1.5.40-44 and 1.10.81, to which cf. 
Verg. Ecl. 9.32-6: 
                                  et me fecere poetam 
Pierides, sunt et mihi carmina, me quoque dicunt 
vatem pastores; sed non ego credulus illis. 
nam neque adhuc Vario videor nec dicere Cinna 
digna. 
The Muses have also made me a poet: I have songs as well, and shepherds call me 
vates—but I don’t believe them, for I do not think my poems are yet worthy of a Varius 
or a Cinna. 
 121Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.49b: ἀντιτάττεται γὰρ [ὁ κόλαξ] πρὸς τὸ  γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἀπάτην 
ἑκάστῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐμποιῶν καὶ ἄγνοιαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν 
(“For the flatterer sets himself up against the maxim ‘know thyself,’ creating in each person 
deception concerning himself and also ignorance of both himself and the good and evil that 
concerns him”).   
122Tsouna (2007) 34 describes Philodemus’ general view of vice as irrational: “The 
failures of understanding of vicious persons involve, importantly, understanding of themselves.  
They do not recognize the falsehood of their beliefs, the inappropriateness of their attitudes, and 
the wrongness of their actions.”  See also Nussbaum (1994) 37-40 for the concept of irrationality 
in Hellenistic philosophy.  
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not only become better acquainted with Maecenas, but he will eliminate the competition and—by 
implication—emerge as sole beneficiary of the millionaire’s gifts:  
                                           haberes 
magnum adiutorem, posset qui ferre secundas, 
hunc hominem velles si tradere: dispeream, ni  
summosses omnis. (S. 1.9.45-8) 
“You might have a strong backer, who could be your understudy, if you would introduce 
your humble servant.  Hang me, if you wouldn’t find that you had cleared the field!” 
 
In this passage, the appeal to Horace’ desire for recognition further underscores Toady’s 
complete misunderstanding of the poet, but the notion that success within Maecenas’ circle is 
achieved by internal strife and competition marks the apex of his ineptitude.123  Indeed, for 
Horace the suggestion is intolerable and provokes him finally to address the nature of his 
dealings with Maecenas: 
                              ‘non isto vivimus illic, 
quo tu rere, modo; domus hac ne purior ulla est 
nec magis his aliena malis; nil mi officit, inquam, 
ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni 
cuique suus’ (S. 1.9.48-52) 
“We don’t live there on such terms as you think.  No house is cleaner or more free from 
such intrigues than that.  It never hurts me,” I say, “that one is richer or more learned than 
I.  Each has his own place.” 
 
123Anderson (1982) 97 notes the military implication of summosses as “treacherously 
seizes power from within.”  Cf. PHerc. 222, col. 12.13-14, in which Philodemus quotes Homer 
(Il. 18.535) in order to characterize the nature and effects of flattering conversation: ἐν δ’ Ἔρις, 
ἐν δὲ Κυδοιμὸς ὁμίλεον, ἐν δ’ ὀλοὴ Κήρ (“There were present together Strife and Confusion 
and destructive Death”).  But cf. Ferris-Hill (2011) 443-44, who argues that these lines as well as 
the interlocutor’s (i.e., Lucilius’) apparent interest in Maecenas in general are to be understood 
ironically: “Lucilius professes to desire an introduction to Maecenas, offering himself as a useful 
sidekick to Horace, but he can easily be understood to mean quite the opposite: as the inventor of 
Roman Satire, Lucilius is confident that it is Horace who would play second fiddle to him, were 
Maecenas presented with both at once.” 
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Horace’s impassioned and spontaneous response is intended as a frank defense of Maecenas’ 
circle on the part of a loyal and trustworthy friend.124  It is also the first time in this poem that he 
has taken an assertive stance and voiced his opinion directly, thereby breaking the awkward 
silence as well as the passive-aggressive tone of earlier reactions.125  Philodemus also hints at 
this contrast between the flatterer, whose “wicked conversation” is “full of strife” (De conv. col. 
7.17: κακῆς ὁμιλίας; cf. De oec. col. 23.31: ἀφιλο[ν]ε[ί]κων), and the Epicurean sage, who 
observes certain “limits in speaking” (De conv. col. 5.2: [τῆ]ς ὁμιλίας . . . τὸ πέ[ρας]) but is not 
afraid to voice the truth when necessary (ibid. col. 8.3-5: παρυπομνήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα 
μελ[η]ετή[σ]ει καλῶς λαλεῖν, ποτὲ λαλπῶν, οὐκ ἀε[ὶ σ]ιωπῶν).  Horace likewise refuses to 
engage in shameful conversation with Toady, observing silence until it becomes necessary to 
express the true nature of his dealings with Maecenas by means of a straightforward 
description.126  With regard to winning the favor of his patron, Horace’s final advice to the 
flatterer implies that this will inevitably be impossible: Maecenas is impressed by virtue and 
purity (1.9.49: purior, 54: virtus; cf. 1.6.64: puro), while the flatterer’s strategy involves 
124See Fraenkel (1957) 116 and especially Oliensis (1998) 38, who notes: “. . . Horace 
immediately rushes to the defense of his friends and thereby also of himself.  The spontaneity of 
this defense, which is represented as an outbursts forced out of an otherwise reticent poet by his 
companion’s intolerably offensive insinuations, is underwritten by the dislocated word order 
characteristic of authentic excitements.”  The fact that Horace puts even grammatical distance 
between himself and Toady, using the second person plural to exclude him throughout (e.g., 48: 
vivimus; 68: consistimus), is observed by Rudd (1961) 83. 
125I disagree with Zetzel (2009) 38, who states that in this poem “[Horace] is smug, elitist 
and rude, with no sympathy for the man who is in the position in which he himself once was.”  
This evaluation overlooks that fact that Horace’s portrayal of the flatterer, who is obnoxious, 
chatty, ambitious, greedy and relentlessly self-interested, is intended to be annoying, as Schlegel 
(2005) 108-126 observes.  In other words, this is Horace’ game and we are being forced to play 
it, since his manipulation of a popular character portrait for his own purposes has made sympathy 
an impossible (or at least an unwarranted and inappropriate) reaction.  
126Oliensis (1998) 39: [Horace is] “a man who knows both how to keep his mouth shut 
and when to open it.” 
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corrupting his servants (1.9.57: corrumpam); Maecenas holds audience with those who are 
worthy (56: difficilis aditus; cf. 1.6.54: obtulit),127 while the flatterer, in his usual way, intends to 
force a meeting by accosting him abruptly in the streets (1.9.59: occurram, 3: accurrit).128  
Overall, Horace’s entertaining portrayal of the flatterer provides his audience with social 
commentary on corrupt relationships between patrons and clients in contemporary Rome, but it 
also drives a wedge between himself and his interlocutor by implicitly emphasizing the purity of 
his own friendship with Maecenas and the other members of his literary circle.129   
This chapter has endeavored to examine the nature of Horace’s relationship with 
Maecenas within the context of Epicurean concerns about flattery and frankness.  In 
consolidating his persona as a faithful and true member of Maecenas’ circle of friends, Horace 
underscores the passiveness of his role in the initial encounter with his patron in Sermones 1.6, 
which was due to his virtuous upbringing and pure friendship with Varius and Vergil.  The 
silence and reservation which characterize his conversation with Maecenas further emphasize his 
 127Lejay (1915) 352: “Aditus, les abords de la place, mot de la langue militaire comme les 
autres expressions.  Horace l’entend surtout de l’attitude volontairement réservée de Mécène (cf. 
6, 61); le fàcheux ne l’entend que des consignes données aux gens de service et montre son 
défaut de tact et de finesse.”  
 128Horace’s description of Maecenas both here and in Sermones 1.6 implies that he is not 
one of the many “lovers of flattery” mentioned by Philodemus in PHerc. 1457 (fr. 15.6: 
φιλοκόλακες).  The flatterer’s use of occurrere, which is usually positive (cf. 1.4.135-36, 
1.5.40-41 and 1.9.61), may be yet another example of his self-deception and misunderstanding of 
true friendship.   
129Freudenburg (2001) 93-5, however, draws attention to the parallel between Toady’s 
resolution (non mihi deero) and Horace’s own determination to win Octavian’s favor in 2.1.17 
(haud mihi deero).  As mentioned above, Philodemus explains the difference between self-
seeking flatterers who are obsequious (ἀρέσκειν) and honest friends who are pleasurable 
(ἁνδάνειν) in PHerc. 1457.  Nevertheless, in Sermones 2 Horace appears to be fully conscious 
of the potential similarities between the two, which he playfully exploits for the purpose of his 
satiric portraits. 
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lack of ambition, although this is carefully balanced by the frankness he learned from his father 
in Sermones 1.4.  Indeed, through the diatribe satires Horace proves to his patron that, although 
he knows when to be silent, he is also perfectly capable of administering frank criticism with 
regard to contemporary vices when necessary.  Furthermore, his use of pictorial imagery in order 
therapeutically to shock his nameless interlocutors and thereby facilitate moral correction reflects 
the practice of Epicureans like Philodemus, who viewed this as a healing technique.  Horace 
concludes his self-portrayal as a true friend by means of the character portrait of Toady, which, 
in addition to providing entertainment value, simultaneously highlights his own virtue and 
distinguishes him from self-seeking flatterers.  In the next and final chapter, the attention will 
focus on Horace’s detailed description of flattery as an art form, particularly with regard to the 
traditional role of the parasite.  It will also consider the poet’s self-application of frankness 
through various, unflattering exposés of his own embarrassing vices through the criticisms of 
third-rate philosophers and slaves, which perhaps confirms his trustworthiness as an honest 
friend and client more effectively than his criticisms of others.   
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CHAPTER 5 
FLATTERY AND FRANKNESS  
IN SERMONES 2 
 
In the poems of Sermones 2, which generally include criticisms that are less public than those in 
the previous book, Horace furnishes his audience with inside information concerning the vices of 
social interaction from both ends of the spectrum, namely, self-interested flattery and overly 
harsh frankness.  His original character portrait of Toady in Sermones 1.9, for instance, invites 
readers to observe and consider the characteristics of such a disposition from outside; in the 
detailed conversation between Odysseus and Tiresias in Sermones 2.5, however, which is 
essentially private advice for the self-seeking flatterer as legacy hunter (cf. 2.5.23: captes), the 
poet grants his audience special access to top-secret “tricks of the trade.”  Although Horace’s 
negative portrayal of Odysseus is frequently read within the context of a philosophical debate 
between Cynics and Stoics, this chapter will consider how Horace’s description of the flatterer’s 
devious tactics, which resemble Philodemus’ similar descriptions in De adulatione, serve a more 
relevant purpose: by exposing to Maecenas the hidden strategies and intentions of legacy 
hunters, he implicitly disassociates himself from their kind and underscores his status as a 
trustworthy friend.  In addition to acknowledging the problem of flattery, in this book Horace 
also vigorously explores the Epicurean practice of self-examination through frankness, which, in 
the case of the arrogant and overly critical Damasippus in Sermones 2.3, is also a lesson in the 
misapplication of this method.  Finally, this chapter will examine how, through the self-
deprecating revelations of his own embarrassing faults and inconsistencies via the slave Davus in 
Sermones 2.7, Horace not only indicates his persona’s playfully inept and comic side, but also 
acknowledges his imperfections in accordance with Epicurean frankness, thus reconfirming, at 
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one and the same time, his own self-awareness as well as his identity as an unambiguously 
parresiastic friend and client of the wealthy Maecenas. 
Horace’s portrayal of Odysseus and Tiresias in Sermones 2.5, which has often been 
viewed as his most biting satire on account of its apparently gratuitous invective on society and 
lack of relevance to himself,1 addresses certain issues that are actually of major concern to the 
poet and inform his self-portrayal as a trustworthy friend of Maecenas.  His decision to 
communicate these issues within the context of Odysseus’ conversation with the blind sage in the 
underworld obviously owes a great deal to Homer (cf. Od. 11.100-137), but it is also influenced 
by subsequent comic treatments of κατάβασις adventures, such as that of Dionysus in 
Aristophanes’ Ranae.  Another probable source for Horace is the tradition of dramatic and often 
burlesque criticisms motivated by philosophical debates in the Hellenistic period, especially the 
Silli of Timon of Phlius, which included two books of dialogues with dead sages.2  Within this 
category also falls Menippus of Gadara’s lampoon entitled Nekyia (Diog. Laert. 6.101), which, 
judging by Lucian of Samosata’s later imitation in Menippus sive Nekyomanteia, portrayed the 
philosopher as interrogating Tiresias concerning “the best life” (6: ὁ ἄριστος βίος).3  For G. C. 
Fiske, his own interpretation of this latter source’s apparent polemical underpinnings, namely, 
1Lejay (1915) 416 calls the portrayal “très piquant.”  Rudd (1966) 239, picking up on and 
responding to Seller (1924) 70, notes that it is “generally recognized as the sharpest of all the 
satires,” although he does not see any real trace of Juvenalian detachment from overt moral 
considerations.  Cf. Courtney (2013) 145: “[the poem has] absolutely no relevance to himself; 
this is why it has often been seen as a forerunner of Juvenal and most subsequent satire.”  
2Diog. Laert. 9.111: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον ἐν διαλόγου σχήματι.  φαίνεται γοῦν 
ἀνακρίνων Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον περὶ ἑκάστων (“the second and third [books] are in 
the form of dialogues; for he represents himself as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about 
each philosopher in turn”).  This source is also discussed by Rudd (1966) 237-38 and Coffey 
(1976) 86.  
3See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 241-42, Oltramare (1926) 139 and Rudd (1966) 237-38.  
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Cynic criticism of the Stoics’ idealization of Odysseus as the perfect sage,4 provides a suitable 
background for reading Sermones 2.5 as a “sarcastic attack[s] on the teaching of Chrysippus and 
the earlier Stoa that the sage is a χρηματιστικός.”5  This view, however, is problematic on two 
counts: first, it overlooks the fact that Menippus’ original version—if one can trust Lucian’s 
account—is a condemnation of the inconsistency and hypocrisy of philosophical sects in general 
rather than (as in the case of Horace) a satire on wealth or flattery;6 second, Fiske’s “external 
analogies” between the two works, such as the fact that Menippus mentions Odysseus in passing 
(8) and in one instance portrays Tiresias as laughing (21), are not significant enough to establish 
any meaningful connection.  Instead of reading Horace’s satire within the context of 
philosophical debates between Cynics and Stoics, therefore, one should regard it as involving 
clever manipulation of a traditional scene, transported from Greece to Rome and used as a 
vehicle for social commentary on contemporary problems.  This use of mythological tradition, 
and in particular of a popular figure’s character traits for ethical reasons, more closely resembles 
Philodemus’ utilization of Homeric rulers for a similar purpose;7 in fact, in one of his fragments 
4On the popularity of Odysseus among philosophers in antiquity, especially the Stoics, 
see Stanford (1954) 118-27.  On the other hand, it appears as though Antisthenes, traditionally 
regarded as the founder of Cynicism (although see Dudley [1974] 1-15), also had a devotion to 
Odysseus, on whom he wrote at least three treatises (Diog. Laert. 6.15-18).  This is likewise 
discussed by Stanford (1954) 99-100.  A similar attraction to the hero might have been felt by 
Bion, as Desmond (2008) 33 points out.  Horace eulogizes Odysseus at Ep. 1.2.17-31.   
5Fiske (1971) 401. 
6Rudd (1966) 238 makes the same observation and concludes that, based on these 
different motives, none of Fiske’s other connections are valid.  On the other hand, it is certainly 
not impossible that Horace intended to criticize the Cynics and Stoics in Sermones 2.5; if so, 
however, is not nearly as clearly expressed as in other poems. Cf., for example, the clear 
identification of his Stoic “adversaries” in 1.3 (127: Chrysippus) and 2.3 (44: Chrysippi 
porticus), as well as his condemnation of Cynic beggary in Ep. 1.17 (18: Cynicum). 
7This approach, which becomes the vehicle for political commentary in De bono rege 
secundum Homerum, is consistent with Philodemus’ views regarding literary theory and the 
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of De adulatione Odysseus is described as a parasite among the tables of wealthy old men as 
well as a banqueter among the dead in the Underworld (admittedly a much more likely 
philosophical and satirical model for Horace): 
— — — τὰ] μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τ[ρα]πέζης, τὰδ’ ἐπὶ κλίνης τοῦ Αἰόλου, †καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς† 
 παρεσίτει· παρ’ Ἀλκινό[ωι δ’ ἀρί]στωι τὴν γαστέρ’ ἐμπλή[σας, τ]ὴν πήραν ἠξίου
 μεστὴν [λαβεῖν·] εἰς Ἅιδου δὲ καταβὰς [τραπέζ]ας κατέλαβε νε[κ]ρῶν [αἱματη]ροὺς, 
 καὶ τούτου[ς] ἀνα[ξιώσας π]αρασιτῆσαι.   (PHerc. 223 fr. 3.1-9) 
. . . things at the table and the couch of Aeolus . . . he was acting like a parasite.  And 
having filled his belly at the house of noble Alcinous he thought it fit to take the full 
wallet.  Then, having descended into Hades, he occupied the bloody tables of the dead, 
thinking it fit that these too should act as parasites.8 
 
It is unclear just how popular this view of Odysseus was before the Hellenistic period,9 but it 
became increasingly common among Alexandrian and later authors.10  As mentioned above, in 
Horace it becomes a useful medium for addressing the Roman issue of legacy hunting or 
usefulness of poetry as discussed in Chapter 1, pp. 12-13 (especially n. 28).  In this treatise, 
Philodemus examines the nature of good kingship through the examples and characteristics of 
Homeric rulers: Odysseus is partly criticized for being a harsh ruler (coll. 3-5) and partly extolled 
for his ability to provide council and prevent civil strife (coll. 15.32-7 and 29.22-4).  
8As Kondo (1974) 49-50 discusses, for Philodemus parasitism is not distinct from flattery 
but rather related to it as the species of a genre.  Other species of this vicious disposition include 
the obsequious man (ἄρεσκος) and the sycophant (προστροχαστής), for which see Kondo 
(1974) 50-6 and Tsouna (2007) 130-32. 
9For ancient criticism of Odysseus regarding food, see Stanford (1954) 66-71.  The most 
recent evidence for the popularity of Odysseus, mostly in the fragments of Middle Comedy, is 
Casolari (2002) 197-225.  Heracles is the usual butt of jokes involving gluttony and parasitism, 
for which see, e.g., Ar. Ran. 503-18. 
10Cf., for example, Lucian’s De parasito, in which the spokesman Simon identifies the 
hero as a full-fledged parasite on account of his infamously high regard for “tables laden with 
bread and meat” (10 = Od. 9.8-9).  After quoting this passage, Simon declares (10): ἀλλὰ μὴν 
καὶ ἐν τῷ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων βίῳ γενόμενος αὖθις παρὰ τῇ Καλυψοῖ . . . οὐδὲ τότε εἶπε τοῦτο 
τὸ τέλος χαριέστερον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν παρασίτων βίον (“Moreover, after he had entered into 
the Epicurean life once more in Calypso’s isle . . . even then he did not call that end more 
delightful, but the life of a parasite”).  Plutarch also associates “wily Odysseus” with the 
changeable flatterer in Mor. 4.52c. 
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captatio.11  Cicero had already described the prevalence of this scam, which was aimed at 
wealthy but childless seniors (orbi) and employed flattery as a primary tactic (Parad. 5.2.39): 
hereditatis spes quid iniquitatis in serviendo non suscipit?  quem nutum locupletis orbi senis non 
observat? (“What iniquity does the hope for inheritance not undertake, what call of a rich but 
childless old man does it fail to heed?”).12  Needless to say, it would have been important for 
someone like Horace to disassociate himself from flatterers, and his portrayal of Odysseus as a 
social climber endeavoring to recover his wealth, which reflects the financial and social 
circumstances of his own encounter with Maecenas, may be read as a powerful witness to the 
poet’s honesty and genuineness: indeed, rather than provide simple criticism of obsequious 
individuals, in this poem Horace essentially furnishes his wealthy benefactor with a detailed 
manual outlining the flatterer’s dirty secrets, thus presenting himself as a champion of candor 
and proving that he has absolutely nothing to hide.13 
11Lejay (1915) 416: “Sur ce discours, Horace greffe l’entretien rapport dans cette satire, 
sans se tenir très exactement aux données homériques et en lui pretant un caractère complètment 
romain et contemporain.”  For background on Roman captation, including the social, financial 
and legal contexts leading up to the prevalence of this practice, see Frank (1933) 295-99, Rudd 
(1966) 224-27, Crook (1967) 119-21, Saller (1982) 124-25, Mansbach (1982) and Hopkins 
(1983) 99-103 and 238-41.  Sallmann (1970) 182 n. 2 points out that this technical use of 
captator and captare is not attested before Sermones 2.5 and may be a “satirische Wortprägung 
des Horaz” (Mansbach [1982] 15 and Roberts [1984] 428 make the same observation).  As 
Muecke (1993) 177 notes, however, Romans were certainly aware of the phenomenon itself, as 
Cic. Off. 3.74 and the passage quoted above reveal.  For a list of Roman authors who address the 
problem of captatio, see Champlin (1991) 201-2 as well as the testimonies collected by 
Mansbach (1982) 118-34.      
12See Palmer (1893) 328 and Muecke (1993) 177-78.  
 13One may compare Tiresias’ advice to that of Horace in Epistulae 1.17 and 18, both of 
which are addressed to prospective clients and address the issue of gaining a patron’s favor.  As 
Hunter (1985) 484-86 observes, the poet’s advice to Lollius, although based for the most part on 
sound philosophical doctrines, playfully draws “a very thin line” between the flatterer and the 
successful client.  See also Allen (1938) 172-73.  For the unserious tone of this letter, see 
Fairclough (1991) 367 and Mayer (1994) 241.   
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When Horace’s exploitation of character traits in which Odysseus traditionally abounds, 
such as eloquence, craftiness and, within the context of his desire for reacquiring lost property, 
greed, are interpreted in the light of Philodemus’ treatment of flattery, intriguing connections 
emerge.  The poet immediately highlights these aforementioned traits through Odysseus’ initial 
exchange with the underworld prophet:  
‘Hoc quoque, Tiresia, praeter narrata petenti 
responde, quibus amissas reparare queam res 
artibus atque modis.  quid rides?’  ‘iamne doloso 
non satis est Ithacam revehi patriosque penatis 
adspicere?’ (S. 2.5.1-5) 
O: One more question pray answer me, Tiresias, besides what you have told me.  By 
what way and means can I recover my lost fortune?  Why laugh?   
T: What! not enough for the man of wiles to sail back to Ithaca and gaze upon his 
household gods? 
 
From his very first words, Odysseus is already portrayed as ambitious, restlessly curious and 
acquisitive (1: hoc quoque . . . petenti),14 which are merely symptoms of an avaricious 
disposition as revealed by his impatient demand (2: responde) that Tiresias show him how to 
recover his lost property (2: amissas . . . res).15  In his response the prophet, borrowing a 
typically Horatian expression loaded with moral undertones, identifies the underlying reason for 
the hero’s greed as discontentment (4: non satis est), which recalls the poet’s earlier diatribe on 
avarice in Sermones 1.1 (62: nil satis est) and repeated emphasis on the importance of being 
content with one’s lot (cf. 1.6.96: contentus).  Discontentment and avarice, which provide the 
moral foundation for Horace’s character portrait of Odysseus, are also identified by Philodemus 
14Cf. Verg. Ecl. 1.44, which is spoken by Tityrus, the disinherited shepherd who had 
recently reacquired property as a gift from Caesar: hic mihi responsum primus dedit ille petenti 
(“He was the first to give a response to me in my search”).  
 15For the importance of preserving one’s property in the Sermones in particular, cf. 1.2.62 
and 1.4.110-11. 
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as the main passions afflicting flatterers and motivating their behavior.  They suffer, for example, 
from “desire for wealth” (PHerc. 1457 col. 12.22: φιλαργουροῦσι; cf. ibid. fr. 12.5: πλοῦ[τ]ον) 
as well as “love of fame” (PHerc. 1089 col. 4.13: [φιλο]δοξ[ία]ν),16 both of which feed their 
“habitual discontentment” (PHerc. 1675 col. 11.25-6: [τὸ] δύσκολο[ν] τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν) and 
drive them to praise for the sake of gain.  Returning to Horace’s depiction of Odysseus, an 
additional reason for resorting to adulation as a source of income is the fear of poverty (2.5.9: 
pauperiem . . . horres) and refusal to endure a life of little means (6: nudus inopsque), which 
provides a sharp contrast with Ofellus’ philosophical equanimity and Epicurean understanding of 
the requirements of nature as easily fulfilled in Sermones 2.2 (cf. Arr. 5.149.1-8).17  Like 
Odysseus and Ofellus, moreover, Horace himself had lost his paternal inheritance (Ep. 2.2.50: 
inopemque paterni | et laris et fundi) to forceful confiscations during a war and had become poor 
(ibid. 51: paupertas), although, unlike Odysseus—and this is a crucial point of comparison—he 
regained wealth by means of a virtuous disposition and frankness (1.6.83: virtutis; 60: quod eram 
narro), by which he had managed to gain the favor of Maecenas (ibid. 63: placui tibi).18  
16Horace plays with the Homeric warrior’s typical ignorance of self-modesty at 2.5.19-
18, to which cf. Od. 9.19-20: Εἴμ’ Ὀδυσεὺς Λαερτιάδης, ὃς πᾶσι δόλοισιν | ἀνθρώποισι μέλω, 
καί μευ κλέος οὐρανὸν ἵκει (“I am Odysseus, son of Laertes, who am known among men for all 
sorts of wiles, and my fame reaches to heaven”). 
17As discussed in Chapter 3, Philodemus teaches that the fall from wealth into poverty is 
indifferent (De div. col. 53.2-5) and that poverty is not to be feared (ibid. col. 12.14), particularly 
because the requirements of nature are easily fulfilled (De oec. col. 16.12-18).  See also Muecke 
(1993) 181 for the “fear of poverty” theme in Horace. 
18Oliensis (1998) 57: “The irony is blatant, but the alternative perspective of true 
friendship goes unexpressed.  Is Horace an honest Ofellus, content with his lot, whose farm has 
been miraculously restored, or a Ulysses who has worked hard and deviously to accomplish such 
a restoration?  While Horace might like to fancy himself an Ofellus, he knows that others may 
accuse him of being a Ulysses.  By making the implicit comparison first himself, Horace 
precludes their attack an shows himself to be nobody’s fool.”  See also Freudenburg (2001) 99 
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Odysseus, on the other hand, casually subordinates his noble pedigree and virtue to money as he 
declares most colloquially “birth and virtue without riches aren’t worth a damn!” (2.5.8: et genus 
et virtus, nisi cum re, vilior alga est).19  His empty fears and desires, therefore, are what drive 
him to seek advice concerning what to do and, in a manner perfectly consistent with the “man of 
many turns” (Od. 1.1: πολύτροπος; cf. Carm. 1.6.7: duplicis . . . Ulixei), to inquire about the 
necessary “skills and methods” (2.5.3: artibus atque modis).  This somewhat proleptic 
identification of legacy hunting as a learnable skill and source of income also appears in 
Philodemus, who identifies the need to satisfy false desires as the underlying cause of flattering 
behavior, which manifests itself through the conscious manipulation of rich people by various 
tactics of deception collectively identified as “the flatterer’s art” (De lib. dic. col. 1b.13-14: 
[κολ]ακευτ[ι]καῖς . . . [τέχναις]).20  It should be noted, moreover, that although descriptions of 
flattery as a skill had appeared already in Plato’s discussion of rhetoric (Soph. 222e7-223a1: 
κολακικὴν . . . τέχνην) and in Terence’s humorous parody of its teachability (Eu. 260-64),21 
for similar considerations.  For Philodemus’ distinction between ἀρέσκειν ( = adsentare?) and 
ἁνδάνειν ( = placere?), see Chapter 4 p. 6 (n. 13).   
19Muecke (1993) 178: “Throughout the poem there is an ironic counterplay between the 
heroic status of the characters and the perversion of values implied in captatio, mirrored in shifts 
between epic style and the informal style of conversation.”  This antithetical juxtaposition 
between the high and low styles is also discussed by Sallmann (1970) 180.  Klein (2012) 97-119 
reads this poem as a dramatization of the typical client’s “social performance” in contemporary 
Rome.  For the proverbial worthlessness of seaweed, cf. Verg. Ecl. 7.42: (vilior alga) and Carm. 
3.17 (alga inutili). 
20Cf. also Sen. Ben. 6.38: qui captandorum testamentorum artem professi sunt (“those 
who are professionals in the art of legacy hunting”).  
21For other references to flattery as a skill, see Ribbeck (1884) 63-4.  The passage from 
Terence, which is discussed by Starks (2013) 138-39 and Christenson (2013) 277-78, is worth 
quoting here (for parasites in Terence and Plautus, see Barsby [1999] 126-27 with references): 
Ille ubi miser famelicus videt mi esse tantum honorem et 
tam facile victum quaerere, ibi homo coepit me obsecrare 
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before Plutarch’s Quomodo adsentator ab amico internoscatur and Lucian’s De parasito it is 
Philodemus alone who provides the only surviving and extended treatment of flatterers, which 
includes a detailed examination of their deceptive strategies, concerns and motives.22  Many of 
these details emerge in Tiresias’ exposition of the flatterer’s techniques with regard to legacy 
hunting, which, although an utterly shameless way to grow rich,23 has its own procedure and 
therefore requires a certain expertise (cf. 2.5.10: accipe qua ratione).24 
The first important lesson, according to Tiresias, is to select a victim with specific 
qualifications and thereby ensure that one’s flattering is properly received and quickly rewarded.  
His opening instructions include a clear description of the preferred testator and his potential 
ut sibi liceret discere id de me.  sectari iussi, 
si potis est, tanquam philosophorum habent disciplinae ex ipsis 
vocabula, parasiti ita ut Gnathonici vocentur.  (Eu. 260-64) 
When the starving wretch saw me held in such respect and earning my living so easily, he 
began to implore me to let him learn the technique from me.  I told him to enroll as my 
pupil, in the hope that, just as the philosophical schools take their name from their 
founders, so parasites may be called Gnathonists.  
 22For lost treatises on flattery and their authors, see Trapp (1997) 125, who translates 
Maximus of Tyre’s philosophical orations, in which Odysseus is held as a model of virtue rather 
than as a flatterer. 
23Cf. Ep. 1.1.65: isne tibi melius suadet, qui “rem facias, rem, | si possis, recte, si non, 
quocumque modo rem” (“That man better convinces you who says ‘make money honestly, if you 
can, otherwise make it any way you can—but make money!’”).  Cf. Lucil. 717 M: sic amici 
quaerunt animum, rem parasiti ac ditias (“Thus also do friends seek the mind, but parasites 
wealth and riches”).  See also Saller (1982) 125: “Paradoxically, to hunt legacies was base, yet to 
receive legacies was an honor, an expression of esteem from friends and kin.”  Champlain (1989) 
212 refers to captatio as a negative counterpart of amicitia (legacies were, after all, one of the 
beneficia attached to patronage).  As Tracy (1980) 400 shows, however, a significant number of 
legacy hunters, such as lawyers and praetors, were from “the highest orders of society” 
(splendidissimi, quoting from Tacit. Dial. 6). 
24Muecke (1993) 181 and Courtney (2013) 145 note that accipe has a didactic tone.  See 
also Sallmenn (1970) 181: “Die satirische Leistung der Lehrgedichtsform liegt vielmehr darin, 
daß Horaz damit zu unterstellen scheint, die Erbschleicherei sei eine erlernbare Kunst, und dazu 
eine ernsthafte und würdige, nämlich lehrgedichtsfähige.” 
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weaknesses, such as advanced age and financial prosperity, which additionally hint at his 
susceptibility to exaggerated praise: 
                                                           turdus 
sive aliud privum dabitur tibi, devolet illuc, 
res ubi magna nitet domino sene; dulcia poma 
et quoscumque feret cultus tibi fundus honores 
ante Larem gustet venerabilior Lare dives. (S. 2.5.10-14) 
Suppose a thrush or other dainty be given you for your own, let it wing its way to where 
grandeur reigns and the owner is old.  Your choice apples or whatever glories your trim 
farm bears you, let the rich man taste before your Lar; more to be reverenced than the Lar 
is he. 
 
Horace humorously communicates the seer’s instructions in mock-epic fashion through a parodic 
reference to augury and the prophetic power of birds, which, in the case of this delicious 
thrush,25 will metaphorically lead Odysseus (11: devolet illuc) to the proverbial “golden 
bough.”26  His emphasis on the proprietor’s ownership of great quantities of shining wealth (12: 
res ubi magna nitet) obviously indicates a suitable source of money, but it may also suggests an 
acquisitive disposition that will likely be receptive to all manner of gifts, whether physical 
objects or exaggerated praise.  In addition to this, the ideal victim is advanced in age (12: domino 
sene), not only because this expedites the transfer of the inheritance, but because such 
25Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 244: “turdus, als beliebte Delikatesse.”  Cf. Ep. 1.15.40: cum 
sit obeso | nil melius turdo (“since there is nothing better than a fat thrush”).  For references to 
food as one of the primary baits used by captatores, cf. Ep. 1.1.78-9: frustis et pomis viduas 
venentur avaras | excipiantque senes (“They hunt greedy widows and catch old men with tidbits 
and fruits”).   
26Cf. Verg. A. 6.190-204, where Venus’ doves lead Aeneas to the golden bough.  
According to Servius (ad 190), the use of doves in augury was closely associated with royalty: 
nam ad reges pertinent columbarum augurium (“for augury by doves pertains to kings”).  With 
regard to Odysseus, who was a king in his own right, perhaps Horace’s inclusion of a game bird 
within this context provides additional, although subtle, parody.  Juvenal, on the other hand, has 
legacy hunters offering large turtledoves (cf. 6.39: turture magno). 
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individuals feel self-entitled and worthy to receive high honors (13-14: honores . . . venerabilior 
Lare) while they reject honest criticism, as Philodemus explains: 
ὅτι συνετωτέρους οἴοντ[α]ι διὰ τὸν χρόνο[ν] ἑαυτούς . . . καὶ θ[αυ]μαζ[ό]μενοι καὶ
 τιμώμενοι παρὰ τοῖς πλ[ε]ίοσι παρά δόξαν ἡγοῦνται τὸ πρὸς τινων ἐπι[τιμ]η[θῆναι], 
 καὶ καταξ[ιού]μενόν τ[ι]νων τὸ γῆρας θ[ε]ωροῦντε[ς] εὐλαβοῦνται μὴ τούτων 
 ἀποστερῶνται φανέντες ἀνάξιοι.  (De lib. dic. coll. 24a9-11-24b.1-9) 
. . . they think that they are more intelligent because of the time they have lived . . . and 
since they are revered and honored among most people they consider it untoward to have 
been reproached by some people, and because they deem that old age is worthy of certain 
things, they are careful not to be deprived of these things by having been shown to be 
unworthy of them.  
 
In other words, a rich old man is the legacy hunter’s perfect target for practical as well as ethical 
reasons, since his acquisitiveness and inflated sense of self-worth make him predisposed to 
become what Philodemus calls a “lover of flattery” (PHerc. 1457 fr. 15.6: φιλοκόλακες).  In 
some cases these are people who, “although they realize they do not possess the qualities which 
they are said to possess and that they have imperfections, rejoice at the ones praising them” (ibid. 
fr. 14.5-9: τινες καί περ εἰδότες ὅ[τι] οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἃ λέγον[τ]αί τινα δ’ὥς ἐστ[ι]ν ἁμαρτήματα 
χαίρουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐγκωμιαζομένοις).27  Such individuals are likely to take advantage of or 
even maltreat flatterers (PHerc. 222 col. 7.12-17), since, despite the fact that they are blindly 
conceited and enjoy praise,28 they also realize that their followers’ words are insincere.  Tiresias 
makes similar observations, warning his pupil (2.5.88: cautus adito) about shrewd and 
27See Kondo (1974) 48 and Tsouna (2007) 133-34 for a discussion of this passage and 
“lovers of flattery” in general.  
28Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.49a: δι’ ἣν [φιλαυτίαν] αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ κόλαξ ἕκαστος ὢν πρῶτος καὶ 
μέγιστος οὐ χαλεπῶς προσίεται τὸν ἔξωθεν ὧν οἴεται καὶ βούλεται μάρτυν ἅμ’ αὐτῷ καὶ 
βεβαιωτὴν προσγιγνώμενον (“It is because of this self-love that everybody is himself his own 
foremost and greatest flatterer, and hence finds no difficulty in admitting the outsider to witness 
with him and to confirm his own conceits and desires”).  
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manipulative captandi through the examples of Coranus (64-9) and the old Theban woman (84-
8), both of whom understood their respective flatterers’ intentions and, after having taken 
advantage of their services, ultimately cheated them of their inheritance.29  These warnings, 
however, coupled with the fact that Odysseus’ target suffers from avarice and self-love (as 
mentioned above), indicate that Tiresias’ advice relates more closely to “lovers of flattery” who 
cannot understand their imperfections and therefore truly believe that they have virtues (cf. 33: 
virtus tua) and actually deserve praise.30  The victim’s complete lack of self-knowledge and 
consequent debasement, furthermore, are emphasized by the various dehumanizing metaphors 
which Tiresias employs: he is transformed into an inflated bladder (98: crescentem . . . utrem), a 
set of soft ears (32-3: molles auriculae), a head (94: caput), skin (38: pelliculam), and, perhaps 
most aptly given the hunting metaphor suggested by captare, a greasy hide (83: corio . . . 
29For the theme of “hunted as hunter,” see Tracy (1980) 399-402, Hopkins (1983) 240-41 
and Champlin (1989) 212.  Sallmann (1970) 200 discusses the symbiotic relationship between 
the two individuals, which he refers to as “die unlauteren Wechselbeziehungen zwischen 
Captator und Testator.”  A prime example of this is Plautus’ characterization of the old man 
Periplectomenus, who shrewdly benefits from his legacy hunters’ generosity: 
sacruficant: dant inde partem mihi maiorem quam sibi, 
abducunt ad exta; me ad se ad prandium, ad cena vocant; 
ille miserrumum se retur minimum qui misit mihi. 
illi inter se certant donis, egomet mecum mussito: 
bona mea inhiant, me certatim nutricant et munerant.  
(Mil. 711-15) 
They make sacrifices in giving me a larger portion than they have.  They lead me to the 
sacrifices, they invite me to lunch and dinner with them.  And the one who has given me 
the least amount considers himself the most wretched of the lot.  They compete with gifts 
among themselves while I keep silent; they drool over my property and fight over taking 
care of me and giving me presents. 
30See Tsouna (2007) 133 for this category of “lovers of flattery.”  Roberts (1984) 428 
describes the ideal senex in terms of “self-deception” and “blind self-esteem.”  
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uncto).31  Given the victim’s vulnerable disposition and consequent attraction to the hunter’s 
bait, which make him the ideal quarry for a clever speaker like Odysseus, Tiresias next expounds 
upon the manner in which he may successfully apply the skill of flattery.   
It is perhaps unsurprising that the bulk of Tiresias’ advice on successful legacy hunting 
involves adulatory speech; the specifically Roman legal context in which it is given, however, 
interestingly emphasizes the flatterer’s competitive spirit and perversion of the role of 
“advocate” (30: defensor).  Odysseus’ skill as a persuasive speaker, which in Homer is either 
frank and aimed at preventing stasis within the Achaean ranks (Il. 2.182-206) or gentle like 
falling snow (ibid. 3.216-24), was easily portrayed by later authors in terms of guile and 
deception.32  In Horace’s satire it forms the backdrop for his characterization as a flatterer, who, 
to borrow expressions from Philodemus, “charms the mind in a way that not even the Sirens 
could” (PHerc. 222 col. 2.5-7: κη[λεῖ φρέ]νας οὕτως ὃν τρόπον οὐδ’ α[ἱ μυ]θικαὶ Σειρῆνες), 
“speaks with honeyed words” (ibid., col. 7.9: μει[λίττει]) and is “crafty” (PHerc. 1457 col. 4.27: 
τοῖς αἱμαλίοις) in showing “favor and charm in every way with regard to the commonest things” 
(ibid. fr. 5.31-33: χάριν . . . δὲ καὶ γοητεία παντελῶς ἐπὶ κοινότερα).33  Thus, Tiresias instructs 
31I owe these observations to Roberts (1984) 428-31, who considers the Juvenalian tone 
of Horace’s dehumanization of the legacy hunter’s victim.  He notes, however, that the 
indignatio characteristic of Juvenal cannot be applied to Horace; rather, similar to his portrayal 
of Toady in Sermones 1.9, “it is an indignatio that is not directed by the persona of the satirist, 
but must emerge from our own reaction to the message presented.  The indignation is implicit in 
the content of the satire.  It presupposes a like-minded audience, not one that needs to be 
persuaded.”    
32See Stanford (1954) 90-117 for the references, which point to Odysseus’ popularity 
among the sophists and tragedians, especially Euripides.  
33Cf. Theophr. Char. 2.12: καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν φῆσαι εὖ ἠρχιτεκτονῆσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἀγρὸν εὖ 
πεφυτεῦσθαι, καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ὁμοίαν εἶναι (“He [the flatterer] will remark how tasteful is the 
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the hero to address his victim intimately by employing the first name, since this is pleasing and 
more likely to win his favor (2.5.32: gaudent praenomine).34  Another way to curry favor 
apparently involves the use of affectionate language that coddles the “gentle ears” (31-3: molles 
auriculae), as when Odysseus is encouraged to send his victim home so that he can “pamper his 
precious little hide” (38: pelliculam curare).35  Indeed, the flatterer is in many ways a skilled 
actor (91: Davus sis; cf. PHerc. 1675 col. 13.35-6: ὑποκριτὰς εἶναι) who feigns concern for 
everything (36-8: mea curaest . . . curare; cf. PHerc. 1457 col. 2.6-8: πάν[τ]ων [τ]ὴν 
ἐπιμέλει[α]ν π[ρ]οσποι[εῖσ]θαι), from ensuring his target’s health (94: velet carum caput) to 
extolling his bad poetry (74: mala carmina).36  In Horace’s blatantly Romanized depiction of 
flattery, moreover, this feigned concern extends into the realm of moral and legal support, which 
may reflect Philodemus’ observation that flatterers, specifically parasites like Odysseus, “very 
style of his patron’s house; how excellent the planting of his farm; how like him the portrait he 
has had made”). 
34Cf. 2.6.36-7, where the guild of scribae, to which Horace belonged and with which he 
was obviously on familiar terms, calls on his services: de re communi scribae magna atque nova 
te orabant hodie meminisses, Quinte, reverti (“The clerks beg you, Quintus, to be sure to return 
today on some fresh and important business of common interest”).  See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 
246: “Quinte: den bloßen Vornamen in der Anrede zu gebrauchen, ist Zeichen größter 
Vertraulichkeit zwichen familiares.” 
35Muecke (1993) 184 notes that while the diminutive here does not express contempt, the 
use of pellis instead of cutis has a sarcastic tone.  It may also underscore the victim’s 
dehumanization and foreshadow the metaphor of the greasy hide (83: corio . . . uncto), for which 
see Roberts (1984) 429-31.  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 246 associate this expression with the 
“zwanglose Ton” of the poem in general. 
36For the flatterer’s characteristic concern for his victim’s health see Theophr. Char. 2.10: 
καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι μὴ ῥιγοῖ, καὶ εἰ ἐπιβάλλεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ εἴ τι μὴ περιστείλῃ αὐτόν (“[He is 
the man who will] ask him whether he is not cold? and will he not have his coat on? and shall he 
not draw his skirts a little closer about him?”).  Contrary to Courtney (2013) 148, who strangely 
suggests that Horace mentions praising bad poetry because “out of tactfulness he sometimes had 
to do the same,” this detail is meant to contrast with the frank criticism that Horace describes as 
characteristic of his circle of friends (cf. 1.10.36-91 and Carm. 1.24.5-8, not to mention the Ars 
Poetica as a whole).  
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quickly pretend to pity their victims when they encounter bad fortune and at the same time 
provide assistance” (PHerc. 1457 fr. 2.36-9: ἂν ταχύτα[τα] ἐλεεῖν προσπο[ι]εῖσθαι εὖ 
ἀτ[υ]χοῦντας καὶ βο[ηθ]εῖν ἅμ[α]).37  Of course, in this poem such assistance occurs within the 
context of legal disputes involving the quarry, whose shady past and immorality (cf. 2.5.15-17) 
would be conducive to such public encounters: 
magna minorve foro si res certabitur olim, 
vivet uter locuples sine gnatis, inprobus, ultro 
qui meliorem audax vocet in ius, illius esto 
defensor . . . (S. 2.5.27-30) 
If someday a case, great or small, be contested in the Forum, whichever of the parties is 
rich and childless, villain though he be, the kind of man who would with wanton 
impudence call the better man into court, do you become his advocate . . . 
 
The flatterer’s unconditional support of his “client,” which is a perversion of justice (34: ius 
anceps) as well as of friendship (33: amicum), quickly becomes an overprotective obsession 
fueled by insatiable avarice (cf. 4: non satis est).  In addition to being instructed to spurn all 
others (31: sperne), for instance, Odysseus is encouraged to insinuate himself into a favorable 
position by maintaining a constant presence and becoming the old man’s personal bodyguard 
(35-6), health consultant (37-8) and attorney (38).38  The closeness and exclusivity of this kind of 
personal attachment leaves little room for potential rivals, who, according to Philodemus’ 
37This passage reflects the reconstruction of Kondo (1974) 50.  See Kiessling-Heinze 
(1910) 246 and Muecke (1993) 183 for Horace’s extended development of the topic of legal 
services. 
38For insinuation as a flattering tactic, cf. Cic. Amic. 99: callidus ille et occultus ne se 
insinuet studiose cavendum est (“One must beware lest that clever and subtle fellow carefully 
insinuate himself”).  Kemp (2010) 71 compares this passage to 2.5.47-8: lenitre in spem | adrepe 
officiosus (“by your attentions worm your way to the hope that . . .”).  A similar expression 
occurs in PHerc. 1457 fr. 5.36 (εἰσδύωνται), which is a verb LSJ s.v. translates as “to worm 
oneself into” and cites Dem. 11.4: εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀμφικτυονίαν εἰσδεδυκῶς (“having wormed 
himself [Philip] into the amphictiony”).   
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description (PHerc. 222 col. 2.13-16), are generally on the receiving end of a suspicious 
flatterer’s persecutions.39  With regard to the victim’s family members and relatives, the flatterer 
is even more aggressively disposed and hostile (ibid. col. 7.1-4): [μισεῖ δ’ ὁ κόλαξ] πάντας 
ἁπλῶς τοὺς [ἐπιτη]δείους τῶν κολακευ[ομένων,] μάλιστα δὲ γονεῖς κ[αὶ τοὺς] ἄλλους 
συγγενεῖς (“And the flatterer generally hates those who are intimates of his victims, especially 
their children and other relatives”).  This hostility is understandable in the case of captatio, since 
family members as favorable heirs would most likely present the biggest threat to legacy hunters 
(cf. 2.5.45-6: filius . . . sublatus), who would be in competition with them and constantly anxious 
about their status in the will (54-5): solus multisne coheres, | veloci percurre oculo (“swiftly run 
your eye across to see whether you are sole heir or share with others”).40  As Tiresias explains 
next, however, at times legacy hunters willingly cooperate with other scoundrels (70-71), but 
only in order to gain their favor and ensure that they themselves are praised when absent (71-2): 
illis | accedas socius: laudes, lauderis ut absens (“. . . make common cause with them.  Praise 
them, that they may praise you behind your back”).41  The flatterer’s apparent congeniality 
toward his rivals, therefore, is merely a tactic of self-promotion ultimately designed to win the 
39Tsouna (2007) 128: “The flatterer makes deliberate efforts to isolate his victims, 
chasing away everyone who loves them and also every other flatterer who competes for their 
favors.”   
40See Kemp (2010) 70.  
41Tiresias presents this option as a necessary evil, since is it far better to work alone and 
be the sole victor (73-4): sed vincit longe prius ipsum | expugnare caput (“but far better is it to 
storm the citadel itself”).  Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 251 likewise read this passage as implying 
strong rivalry among the victim’s servants.  Cf. Philodemus’ description of how flattering 
servants manipulate others in order to gain their master’s trust (PHerc. 1675 col. 12.37-41): καὶ 
σπεύδοντες α[ὑ]τοῖς ὑποττάτειν αὐτούς, ἵνα καὶ στέγωσι καὶ συνεργῶσι καὶ πίστιν 
ἐμποιῶσι[ν] τοῦ [ἔ]ξωθεν (“. . . taking care to subordinate them [sc. other servants] to 
themselves, so that they may protect them, collaborate with them and gain the outsider’s trust”).  
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victim’s trust.  Knowing how to select an ideal victim and successfully apply various methods of 
flattery, however, is not enough: Tiresias’ final lesson emphasizes the care which Odysseus must 
exercise in order to conceal his true intentions and avoid being suspected of betraying this trust. 
An important purpose of Tiresias’ advice is to warn his pupil regarding the prospective 
victim’s rather inconsistent temperament, which, upon recognition of the flatterer’s true 
intentions, may be drawn to irascible outbursts or vengeful plots.  Odysseus must prevent this by 
means of artfulness (23: astutus) and opportunistic propriety (43: aptus), which partly involves 
ensuring that his obsequious prattle is carefully regulated: 
                                         cautus adito 
neu desis operae neve immoderatus abundes. 
difficilem et morosum offendet garrulus: ultra 
non etiam sileas;42 (S. 2.5.88-91) 
Be cautious in your approach; neither fail in zeal, nor show zeal beyond measure.  A 
chatterbox will offend the peevish and morose; yet you must not also be silent beyond 
bounds.   
 
This is clearly a perversion of truthful and beneficial conversation, which, according to 
Philodemus, is candid rather than obsequious (De conv. col. 9.15-16: τοὺς δηλ[οῦ]ν[τ]ας καὶ 
[τοὺς σ]υκοφαντοῦντας) and exercises frankness even when this may cause offense (ibid. col. 
10.10-12): π[ο]λλὰ καὶ κατὰ πλεῖστον οὐκ ἐπιτεύξεσθαι νομ[ίζ]οντες, οἱ φρόνιμοι λαλοῦσ[ι] 
(“. . . even when they suppose that much of it will generally not be received favorably, prudent 
 42Samuelsson (1900) 1-10, citing Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.104 as a parallel, had suggested the 
following punctuation: ultra ‘non’ ‘etiam’ sileas (“Beyond ‘yes’ and ‘no’ be silent”).  Although 
Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 253 and Muecke (1993) 191, not to mention Klingner and Bailey in 
their editions, follow him, yet I prefer the punctuation and translation of Fairclough (1926) 206: 
ultra non etiam sileas (“Yet you must not also be silent beyond bounds”).  This interpretation 
seems to be more consistent with Tiresias’ general advice, which is elsewhere far less restrictive 
and encourages more verbal deception and manipulation than Samuelsson’s reading would allow 
(cf. 93: obsequio grassare).    
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men speak”).43  The flatterer, of course, does the exact opposite: his speech (2.5.98: sermonibus) 
and silence (91: sileas) are neither therapeutic nor intended to be beneficial, but rather 
manipulative and inspired by a desire for self-gain.44  Tiresias explains, moreover, that such care 
is necessary to avoid suspicion, which, given the victim’s demented self-love (74: vecors) and 
peevish nature (90: difficilem et morosus),45 would likely result in Odysseus’ expulsion from his 
company and utterly ruin any prospects of inheritance.  Philodemus also emphasizes the 
flatterer’s great concern with avoiding such consequences by maintaining a semblance of 
friendship and thereby remaining undiscovered: 
[ἔ]τι δ’ οὐ διὰ φιλι[κ]ωτέρου πράγματος ἀλλὰ διὰ κολακείας ἐξαγίστου π[αρ’] 
 ἁπ[άν]των πάσας ἐκπορίζεται τὰ[ς] ἐν τῶι βίωι χρείας, ὧν ἀτευκτήσει μᾶλλον 
 [ὑ]πονοηθεὶ[ς] μόνον εἶναι κό[λ]αξ, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ καταγνωσθ[εὶς] . . . [βέ]βαιον μὲ[ν 
 φίλ]ον ὃν πείθο[νται] δι’ αὐτῆς ἐν[ν]οεῖσθαι φω[ράσα]ντες δ’ ἐξο[ρί]ζουσι καὶ 
 π[ικρῶς] βλάβαις με[γ]άλαις ἀ[πωσ]άμενοι· (PHerc. 222 col. 3.3-17) 
No longer then does he acquire from all every advantage of life by means of agreeable 
endeavors, but by means of abominable flattery, which he would not be able to 
accomplish if he were suspected of being a flatterer; no, because, having been recognized 
. . . For when they discover that a “friend” whom they believe to be reliable is plotting 
43This is the kind of uncompromising frankness famously exercised by Solon, Plato and 
other sages before wealthy and powerful individuals.  See Chapter 4, pp. 11-12. 
44For Philodemean homiletics as the “momento paideutico del sapiente,” see Amoroso 
(1975) 63.  The role of silence is discussed by Tsouna (2007) 122-23 as well as in Chapter 4, pp. 
11-12. 
 45As Muecke (1993) 191 notes, this is a standard view of old men (Kiessling-Heinze 
[1910] 253 call it an “allgemeine Wahrheit”) especially prominent in comedy.  Cf. Cic. Sen. 65: 
At sunt morosi et anxii et iracundi et difficiles senes . . . idque cum in vita, tum in scaena intellegi 
potest ex eis fratribus, qui in Adelphis sunt. (“Yet old men are peevish, touchy, irascible and 
difficult . . . and just as this can be seen in real life, so also on the stage from those two brothers 
in the Adelphoe”). 
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through flattery, they banish him and bitterly thrust him out with great blows.46 
 
Tiresias’ warnings regarding the dangers of being too obvious presuppose a similar kind of 
violent reaction from the disillusioned victim, although they may also address another possible 
danger as mentioned above, namely, vengeance through disinheritance.  In this sense, the 
prophet’s earlier advice to avoid “open devotion” (2.5.46-7: manifestum . . . obsequium) and read 
the victim’s will stealthily (53-5: ut limis rapias . . . veloci percurre oculo) fittingly precede his 
example of Nasica, the captator whose plan to ensnare his victim through marriage backfired 
when he was struck from the will (69: nil sibi legatum).47  Similarly, his advice to avoid being 
garrulous is followed by the story of the Theban crone, who posthumously ridiculed an heir for 
his “overbearing manner” (88: quod nimium institerat viventi) by making him her pallbearer and 
thus reversing the roles.  In light of these two examples, Tiresias ironically recommends that his 
pupil observe the “golden mean” (89: neu desis . . . neve immoderatus abundes),48 which will 
allow him to remain undiscovered and more easily achieve his purpose.  Horace’s exposé of the 
flatterer’s methods of hunting for rewards, therefore, contrasts starkly with his own frank advice 
elsewhere as well as with his passive reception of wealth from a grateful patron.  As will be seen 
presently, he goes even further than this elsewhere in Sermones 2 by means of relentless yet 
entertaining self-applications of frankness, thereby preemptively accusing himself of certain 
vices and further confirming his reliability as a truthful friend. 
46A similar observation occurs as PHerc. 1675 col. 13.4-6: καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ 
παρωσθῶσι καὶ δόξαν ἐκκόπτοντες ὡς ἀληθινῶς φιλοῦσιν (“And fearing that they should be 
kicked out as well and, putting an end to the illusion that they truly love their masters . . .”).  
47See Mansbach (1982) 18-19 for the difference between hereditates, which enjoined 
upon the heirs certain legal responsibilities and duties, and legata, which appear to have been 
gifts freely bestowed upon legatees and without any demands.  Odysseus is mentioned twice as a 
potential heir (54: coheres; 101: heres). 
48Muecke (1993) 191.  
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Although the frank criticism employed by the recent convert Damasippus in Sermones 
2.3 contains some ethical truths,49 its overly harsh application and ambitious handling of an 
extremely broad range of vices is ultimately confusing and unhelpful.  Horace immediately 
makes it clear that the Stoic preacher takes issue with satire that is “kind” (3: benignus) and that 
his predilection is for “threats” (9: minantis), whether those hurled publicly by the poets of Old 
Comedy or the more private invective of iambographers (12: Eupolin, Archilochum).50  This 
temperament contrasts especially with the diatribe style of Horace, who, perhaps in accordance 
with Philodemus’ observations concerning frankness, is “cheerful, friendly and gentle” (De lib. 
dic. fr. 85.8-10: ε[ὐη]μέρωι καὶ φιλοφίλωι [και ἠ]πίωι),51 with the result that he is careful “not 
to be frank in a haughty and contentious way, nor to say any insolent and contemptuous or 
disparaging things . . .” (ibid. fr. 37.5-8: [μ]ηδὲ σοβ[αρῶ]ς καὶ [δι]ατε[ταμένως 
παρρησιάζε]σθαι, [μηδ’ ὑβριστικὰ] καὶ καταβλ[ητικά τινα μη]δὲ διασυρτικὰ [λέγειν]).52  As 
discussed previously, the poet’s humility and moderate approach originate in a sober realization 
49See Chapter 3, pp. 19-30.  
50Of course, in Sermones 1 Horace connects these authors to Lucilius, from which he 
attempts to distinguish his own satire (cf. 1.4.1-6).  See also Muecke (1993) 133. 
51Michels (1944) 174 describes Horace’s frankness in terms of Philodemus’ cheerful 
approach as defined by Olivieri (1914) vii: qui contra non iracunde nec magna vocis contentione 
sed leniter et benigne, hilariter et clementer discipulos castigent, magnae eisdem esse utilitati 
(“[He affirms], on the contrary, that those who chastise their pupils not with anger nor by raising 
their voices, but in a manner that is light, kind and cheerful, are of greater use to them”).  Glad 
(1996) 36-8 discusses this in more detail.  
52Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 6.8: [ἐ]πιτιμαῖ μετρίως (“[Epicurus] reproaches in moderation”).  
Although these rebukes are not always easy to hear, they should always be beneficial, as Plutarch 
observes (Mor. 4.59d): σωτήριον ἔχουσα καὶ κηδεμονικὸν τὸ λυποῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλι τὰ 
ἡλκομένα δάκνουσα καὶ καθαίρουσα (“the pain which it [frankness] causes is salutary and 
benignant, and like honey, it causes the sore places to smart and cleanses them too”). 
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of his own imperfections (cf. 1.4.130-31: mediocribus . . . vitiis),53 which corresponds to 
Philodemus’ description of the sage’s gentle criticism and avoidance of hypocrisy as grounded in 
self-knowledge: 
πῶς γὰρ μισεῖν τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα μὴ ἀπογνώ[σ]ιμα μέλλει, γινώσκω[ν] αὑτὸν οὐκ 
 ὄντα τέλε[ι]ον καὶ μιμνήι[σκων, ὅτι πάντες ἁμαρτάνειν εἰώθασιν;]  
 (De lib. dic. fr. 46.1-11).   
 
 For how is he going to hate the one who errs, though not desperately, when he knows that 
 he himself is not perfect and reminds himself that everyone is accustomed to err? 
 
Damasippus, on the other hand, is haughty on account of his recent conversion to Stoicism 
(2.3.33-45), which has inflamed his mind with such philosophic zeal that he feels compelled to 
condemn the entire world (32: omnes).   One of the obvious symptoms of this newfound 
“wisdom” is his extremely dogmatic and longwinded presentation of Stoic doctrine, which, as 
Frances Muecke observes, “is characteristic of an academic approach, not of Horatian satire’s 
conversational mode.”54  Indeed, the main purpose of Damasippus’ lecture is to give a rather 
emotional yet systematic condemnation, in light of the Stoic paradox “all fools are mad,” that 
encompasses every vice but does not offer any real solution.55  His lecture, moreover, is neither 
pithy nor useful, both of which are necessary attributes of the ideal advisor according to 
Philodemus’ description in De oeconomia (col. 27.37-9: [ὀ]λίγα φήσ[ων] . . . ὠφελή[σ]οντος), 
nor does its one-sidedness invite the kind of conversational exchange and observation that, in 
 53For similar admissions, cf. 1.3.20 (vitia . . . minora) and 1.6.65 (vitiis mediocribus). 
54Muecke (1993) 130.  Although it is true that most of the poems in Sermones 2 do not 
display a strong conversational element, the extraordinary length and doctrinaire tone of this 
satire are enough to characterize it as abnormal.  
55Damasippus’ regurgitation of his master’s lecture involves attacks on avarice (82-157), 
ambition (158-223), self-indulgence (225-80) and superstition (281-95).  Note that Horace’s 
diatribe on avarice is only 120 lines long (approximately 60 lines shorter than that Stertinius).  
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addition to being typical attributes of Horace’s introductory satires, are also necessary for 
successful treatment (cf. De lib. dic. fr. 51.1-5: ἀκ[ού]σει . . . θεωρῶν ἡμᾶς).  In contrast to this, 
Damasippus is brimming with invective and does little or no listening; if anything, his approach 
drowns the listener in a relentless barrage of rhetorical questions designed to demoralize without 
perceivable benefit: “do you guard . . . ?” (2.3.123: custodis . . . ?); “lest you should be in want?” 
(ibid.: ne tibi desit?); “how small . . . ?” (124: quantulum . . . ?); “wherefore . . . ?” (126: quare . . 
. ?).  Another consequence of his diffuse and badgering criticism of vice that contributes to its 
overall uselessness is the apparent lack of an audience or targeted victim: whereas Horace’s 
attacks on vice are focused and intended to rebuke an interlocutor—if only a fictional one—and 
provide admonitory advice for his friends and patron,56 his Stoic counterpart addresses the 
general folly of mankind and thereby precludes the opportunity for intimate conversation and 
correction.  Damasippus’ exaggeratedly long and comically inept attack on vice, however, does 
not prevent Horace from cleverly transforming his haughtiness into indirect self-examination, 
which, from the point of view of the poet, does indeed serve a useful purpose. 
It is characteristic of Horatian satire to communicate a subtle, more directly personal, 
message in an indirect and often paradoxical manner; thus, Damasippus’ arrogant condemnation 
of the majority of society, which reveals his ignorance, provides Horace with a suitable vehicle 
for self-criticism and an opportunity to underscore his own humble self-awareness.  The Stoic 
zealot directs his final criticisms toward the poet, who, having cleverly opened the way by means 
of the seemingly innocuous question “from what vice of the mind am I presently suffering?” 
(306-7: quo me | aegrotare putes animi vitio), receives a threefold explanation effectively 
56For Horace’s audience in the introductory satires, see especially Gold (1992) 161-75 
and Lyne (1995) 139-43.    
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accusing Horatius ethicus of being a complete hypocrite.  More specifically, according to 
Damasippus the vices from which the poet suffers are the same ones he had attacked in Sermones 
1: economic ambition (308): aedificas (“you are building”);57 lust (325): mille puellarum, 
puerorum mille furores (“your thousand passions for lads and lasses”); anger (323): horrendam 
rabiem (“your awful temper”).58  The first accusation is bolstered by Damasippus’ version of 
pictorial imagery (cf. 320: imago), which, rather than encouraging Horace to observe clinically 
the likely consequences of his vicious habits in order to motivate reform, employs a traditional 
fable that is more a playful taunt (cf. 320: abludit) than a stern warning (314-20).59  The point, at 
any rate, is that Horace’s ambition and desire to imitate Maecenas not only contradict his earlier 
criticisms and therefore expose him for the hypocrite he really is, but they also reveal his 
inconsistency and lack of a proper sense of decorum: 
                                                  accipe: primum 
aedificas, hoc est longos imitaris, ab imo 
ad summum totus moduli bipedalis, et idem 
corpore maiorem rides Turbonis in armis 
spiritum et incessum: qui ridiculus minus illo? 
an, quodcumque facit Maecenas, te quoque verum est, 
tanto dissimilem et tanto certare minorem? (S. 2.3.307-13) 
57Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 227 and Muecke (1993) 165 interpret this as a reference to the 
Sabine estate, which Horace was apparently in the process of developing.  Courtney (2013) 139 
says that “Damasippus equates this with the lavish construction boom of the time, much deplored 
by moralists, including Horace himself” (citing Ep. 1.1.100: aedificat).   
58Cf. Horace’s self-definition at Ep. 1.20.25: irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem 
(“quick in temper, yet so as to be easily appeased”).  Mayer (1994) 273, who interprets Horace’s 
combination of the adjective and complementary infinitive as equivalent to the Greek ὀξύχολον, 
also cites Carm. 3.9.23: iracundior Hadria (“stormier than the Adriatic”). 
59This is a modified translation of Babrius’ original Greek version (28 = Perry 376).  For 
Horace’s more economic expression of the fable as well as the more vulgar version of Phaedrus 
(1.24 = Perry 376a), see Rudd (1966) 176-78.  As Muecke (1993) 165 observes, the verb abludo 
is found nowhere else in Latin poetry and may be the negative of adludo (“to make playful 
allusion to”). 
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Listen.  First, you are building, which means, you try to ape big men, though from top to 
toe your full height is but two feet; and yet you laugh at the strut and spirit of Turbo in his 
armor, as though they were too much for his body.  How are you less foolish than he?  Is 
it right that whatever Maecenas does, you also should do, so unlike him as you are and 
such a poor match for him? 
 
This self-deprecating portrait of Horace’s relationship with Maecenas, which is appropriately 
viewed through the recent convert’s Stoic lens, highlights the poet’s social ineptitude or, more 
precisely, his violation of the Panaetian notion of “appropriateness” (aequabilitas).60  As one 
may recall, this same issue provides the impetus for Sermones 1.6, in which the poet addresses 
his limitations and sense of propriety by disarmingly repeating the attacks of his envious 
detractors (cf. 46: quem rodunt omnes).61  By the time he had written the poem presently under 
consideration, moreover, Maecenas had already rewarded him with the Sabine estate, which 
undoubtedly would have provoked—at least according to Horace’s implication in Sermones 
2.3—a resurgence or perhaps intensification of similar attacks; in all likelihood, therefore, his 
vivid portrayal of Damasippus is intended to anticipate these attacks by putting a face to 
potential detractors.  At the same time, the public nature of the overzealous interlocutor’s 
criticism and exposure of Horace’s faults in some ways reads like a self-serving parody of 
Epicurean frankness.  It is characteristic of the sage, for example, to promote self-knowledge by 
means of communicating his own faults to other wise men and receiving correction, as 
60See Muecke (1993) 164-5 and Kemp (2009) 2-17.  Cf. also Cic. Off. 1.111: Omnino si 
quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum 
singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam (“If 
there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the 
course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions, which one would not be able to 
maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one’s own”).  Horace actually 
advises against this within the context of patronage at Ep. 1.18.21-36, which Mayer (1994) 245-
46 connects to Damasippus’ criticism of Horace as discussed above. 
 61For the importance of this issue in Sermones 1.3, see Kemp (2009) 1-17 and Chapter 4, 
pp. 36-43.  
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Philodemus states (De lib dic. col. 8b.11-14): δή[ξον]ται δηγμὸ[ν] ἑαυτοὺς τὸν ἠπιώτατον καὶ 
χάριν εἰδήσου[σι τῆς ὠφελίας] ([wise men] “will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and 
will acknowledge gratitude for the benefit”).62  In Sermones 2.3, on the other hand, this ideal of 
frank communication among Epicurean sages completely fails: the sage Damasippus, who 
employs ad hominem attacks (cf. 308-9), does anything but apply gentle and caring 
admonishment (cf. De lib. dic. fr. 26.6-7: κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις), while Horace is certainly 
not grateful for his overly harsh criticisms.63  Instead, he underscores the relentlessness of the 
mad sage (cf. 2.3.326: insane) and his furious onslaught by posing as an exhausted victim, 
desperately crying out “stop!” (323: desine), “hold it!” (324: teneas) and “spare me!” (326: 
parcas).  Despite this humorous portrayal of frank criticism gone awry, however, in the end the 
poet still manages to “show his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly” (De. lib. 
dic. fr. 40.2-5: [δεικνύναι ἀνυ]ποστόλως τὰς διαμαρ[τί]ας καὶ κοινῶς εἰπ[εῖ]ν [ἐ]λαττώσεις), 
which, in addition to demonstrating his self-awareness and consequent freedom from such moral 
 62Although the end of this statement reflects the conjecture of Olivieri (1914) 49, the 
importance of “benefits” in connection with frank criticism recurs in other, well-preserved 
passages of the treatise (e.g., frs. 20.4, 49.5 and col. 17b.10-11).   
63Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.72f: ὑπομιμνῃσκόμενος γὰρ ἄνευ μνησικακίας ὅτι τοὺς φίλους καὶ 
αὐτὸς εἰώθει μὴ περιορᾶν ἁμαρτάνοντας ἀλλ’ ἐξελέγχειν καὶ διδάσκειν, μᾶλλον ἐνδώσει 
καὶ παραδέξεται τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν, ὡς οὖσαν εὐνοίας καὶ χάριτος οὐ μέμψεως 
ἀνταπόδοσιν οὐδ’ ὀργῆς (“For if he be gently reminded, without any show of resentment, that 
he himself has not been wont to overlook the errors of his friends, but to take his friends to task 
and enlighten them, he will be much more inclined to yield and accept the correction, as being a 
way to requite a kindly and gracious feeling, and not fault-finding or anger”).  For the concept of 
“cheerful admonishment” as Philodemus’ preferred mode of correction, see Glad (1995) 120. 
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diseases, also disassociates him from the superficial righteousness of arrogant and ignorant 
zealots like Damasippus.64 
 In Sermones 2.7 Horace presents his audience with a complementary self-examination of 
his own ethical credentials through the mouth of Davus, whose critical scrutiny of his master’s 
faults is more focused and direct than that of Damasippus.  Indeed, Davus’ ascription to Horace 
of vices the poet had systematically examined and condemned previously is foreshadowed by the 
final verses of Sermones 2.3, which mention ambition, lust and anger only in passing (323-25).  
Both poems, moreover, are concerned with the seemingly all-inclusive condemnation of moral 
failings through extended diatribes, which Horace, in a spirit of parodic playfulness, attributes to 
their philosophical proclivities as Stoic sympathizers (although in the case of Davus this is not 
revealed until later).  In a manner similar to that of Damasippus, the criticisms of Davus 
reproduce for his master the teachings of a Stoic authority (45: Crispini; cf. 2.3.33: Stertinius), 
although twice removed (2.7.45: quae . . . docuit me ianitor) and from an individual Horace had 
criticized earlier for being unreliable and loquacious.65  On the other hand, whereas Damasippus 
had rather haphazardly directed his venomous invective toward society at large, Davus’ frank 
criticism is aimed exclusively at Horace and so encompasses in its entirety the topics of previous 
64Evans (1978) 307: “The joke, of course, is on the Mad Satirist who in his dogmatic 
fervor lacks the wisdom, good sense and understanding which already characterize Horace’s role 
in the satires.”  
65Cf. pseudo-Acro ad 45: De Crispino et in primo iocatur (“He also makes fun of 
Crispinus in the first book”).  Horace criticizes him in the following passages (only the first is 
mentioned by pseudo-Acro): 1.120: Crispini scrinia lippi (“the roles of bleary-eyed Crispinus”); 
1.3.138-39: ineptum . . . Crispinum (“crazy Crispinus”); 1.4.13-16: Crispinus minimo me 
provocat (“Crispinus challenges me at long odds”).  For Horace’s personal rivalry with 
Crispinus, who was also a poet and a moralizer, see Oltramare (1926) 129-37 and Stahl (1974) 
44.  The theme of ὑπομνήματα (“philosophical memoirs”) in this poem is discussed by Fiske 
(1971) 405.  Muecke (1993) 215 says that Davus’ report “comes somewhat garbled through the 
mouth of his fellow slave.” 
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satires.66  These topics, which are accompanied by vivid illustrations and examples pertaining to 
the poet himself, may be organized in the following manner: the inability to maintain constancy 
with regard to one’s behavior (6-20), which corresponds to Horace’s discussion of aequabilitas 
in 1.3; this first topic easily segues into the blaming of one’s fortune and restlessness in general 
(22-9), which is introduced by the μεμψιμοιρία theme in 1.1.1-22; the topic of obsequiousness 
and subservience to Maecenas follows (29-42), which may be compared to Horace’s emphasis 
on his passiveness and independence in 1.6 (cf. Ep. 1.7) as well as to his portraits of Toady in 1.9 
and Odysseus in 2.5; sexual promiscuity and adultery are next (46-84), which easily contrast 
with the poet’s condemnation of such vices in 1.2; finally, Davus criticizes his master for his 
refined palate and taste for luxurious foods (103-15), which contradicts his praise of meager fare 
in 2.2 and, less directly, in 2.8.67  In addition to providing, as Harry Evans notes, “a sort of 
summary statement of Horatian satire . . . not at all unsuitable as one of the final poems,”68 this 
critical review also provides Horace with another opportunity for self-revelation through the kind 
of public confession recommended by Philodemus (cf. De lib. dic. fr. 49.2-7).69  As in Sermones 
2.3, moreover, Horace’s comic portrayal of a sermonizing “late learner” once again exploits the 
66Rudd (1966) 194-95.  See also Evans (1978) 307: “Because Davus concentrates on 
Horace alone, his speech to his master is more carefully focused and is reduced in length to 
approximately a third of Damasippus’ rambling discourse.” 
67Rudd (1966) 194 has a similar organization, although, aside from some additional 
observations, I more closely follow that of Evans (1978) 309-8.  
68Evans (1978) 312.  
69For the Epicurean practice of confession as a means of communal psychogogy, see 
especially Glad (1995) 124-32.  Also noteworthy is the observation of Stahl (1974) 51-2: “Wenn 
man Horaz als vor-goetheschem und vor-augustinischem Schriftsteller den Konfessions- oder 
Bekenntnis-Charakter seiner Dichtung nicht hat anerkennen wollen, so kann man hier doch von 
einem Geständnis-Charakter sprechen.  Auch seine Dichtung hat . . . Tagebuch-, Brief- oder kurz 
Privatcharakter, wie er selbst in der letzen und maßgeblichen Beschreibung seines Vorbildes 
Lucilius andeutet (sat. II I, 30ff.).”  
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Epicurean stereotype regarding Stoic harshness,70 cleverly transforming it into the means by 
which he emphasizes his willingness to disclose what is secret to his audience of close friends 
(cf. 1.10.73: nec recito . . . nisi amicis).71  As will be seen, the fact that Davus is one of Horace’s 
“household members” (familiares) means that his criticisms are the result of frequent 
observations within a private setting, which, to a certain degree, provides the material for another 
parodic yet ultimately self-serving display of Epicurean frankness.  
Horace’s portrayal of himself as the master who receives criticism from his slave during 
the Saturnalia provides a suitable and distinctively Roman context for a comic engagement with 
the principles of frankness as explained by Philodemus.  The circumstances of this strange 
reversal of roles and Davus’ identity as keen observer of another’s faults are introduced without 
delay: 
“Iamdudum ausculto et cupiens tibi dicere servus 
 pauca reformido.”  Davusne?  “ita, Davus, amicum 
 mancipium domino et frugi quod sit satis, hoc est, 
 ut vitale putes.”  Age, libertate Decembri, 
 quando ita maiores voluerunt, utere; narra. (S. 2.7.1-5) 
D:  I’ve been listening some time, and wishing to say a word to you, but as a slave I dare 
 not.  
 H:  Is that Davus?   
 D:  Yes, Davus, a slave loyal to his master, and fairly honest—that is, so that you need 
 not think him too good to live.   
 H:  Come, use the license December allows, since our fathers willed it so.  Have your 
 say. 
 
70This is discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 14-15.   
71Cf. De lib. dic. 42.6-11: καὶ τῶν συνήθων δὲ [π]ολλοὶ μηνούσουσιν ἐθελονταί πως, 
οὐδ’ ἀνακρίνοντος τοῦ καθηγουμένο[υ δ]ιὰ τὴν κηδεμ[ονία]ν (“And many of the intimate 
associates will spontaneously disclose what is secret, without the teacher examining them, on 
account of their concern . . .”).  
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To anyone familiar with Roman comedy, the vocabulary and colloquial tone in this opening 
passage make it perfectly clear that Horace intends to couch the following conversation within 
this same tradition.  Not only is the opening verb ausculto mostly relegated to comic 
playwrights,72 but the inclusion of distinctively comic and slave-related words like mancipium 
and frugi, as well as the conversational use of age, makes the same connection.73  Indeed, the 
name “Davus” itself, which is probably taken from Terence’s play Andria,74 appears to imply 
that Horace is being addressed by the servus fallax typical of comic plots; on the other hand, this 
version of Davus clearly indicates that, although restrained by the fear that normally motivates 
comic servants to deceive their masters (2: reformido), he wishes temporarily to abandon his 
apprehensions in order to address Horace as a social equal and candidly denounce him face to 
face.75  In other words, he wishes to employ the same “freedom of speech” (4: libertate) that is 
understood to be the satirist’s prerogative, as Horace indicates elsewhere (1.4.103-4): liberius si | 
dixero quid (“if in my words I am too free”).76  In placing himself in the role of moral expert 
Davus closely imitates his master, adopting not only his expressions (6: pars hominum; cf. 
 72Courtney (2013) 155 makes the same observation.  This verb is extremely common in 
Plautus and appears eighteen times in Terence. 
 73Muecke (1993) 214.  Cf. also the later use of “scape-gallows” (22: furcifer), which is a 
abusive term commonly directed toward slaves by their masters in Plautus (it appears only twice 
in Terence, at An. 618 and Eu. 129).    
 74For the characterization of Davus in this play, see Karakasis (2013) 213-14.   
 75Stahl (1974) 43: “Die reichste unter den eben beschriebenen Satiren [25-42] ist II 7, 
weil sie eine zusätzliche Perspektive besitzt, die allen andern fehlt: ich meine die Änderung der 
gewohnten Rollen zwischen Sprecher und Hörer, wie sie die hier fingierte Situation der 
römischen Saturnalien gestattet, wo zwishcen Sklaven und Herren Gleichheit herrscht, oder gar 
die Herren ihre Sklaven bedienen.”   
 76Stahl (1974) 45.  Evans (1978) 309 and Sharland (2005) 104-5 discuss in more detail 
the significance of the reversal of the roles of satirist and listener in this poem. 
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1.1.61: pars hominum)77 but also his concern with privately communicating advice to intimate 
associates and friends (2: amicum; cf. 1.4.73: amicis).  As an individual who has shared living 
space with his master for an extended period of time, moreover, Davus has a proper 
understanding of Horace’s habits and behavioral faults, which, despite the latter’s apparent 
ignorance, have not gone unnoticed.78  On the contrary, the attentive slave reveals that he has 
been quite observant in listening at the door (1: iamdudum ausculto), presumably while Horace 
recites his satires and condemns the same vices from which he himself is suffering,79  which 
recalls Philodemus’ words concerning the important role of attentiveness in administering frank 
criticism (De lib. dic. fr. 51.1-5): ἀκ[ού]σει μᾶλλον, [ἅ]μα καὶ θεωρῶν ἡμᾶς κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῶν 
γινομένους κατηγόρους, ὅταν [τ]ι διαμα[ρ]τάνωμεν (“. . . he [the sage] will rather listen, at the 
same time as he observes us becoming accusers even of ourselves, whenever we err.”).  By 
treating the Sermones as an inadvertent confession of moral hypocrisy, Davus differs 
significantly from Damasippus, who effectively criticizes the poet for his lack of productivity 
 77Other examples are given by Evans (1978) 310, Muecke (1993) 215 and Courtney 
(2013) 155. 
78For the importance of privacy and community life in the application of Epicurean 
frankness, see Chapter 4, p. 17.  Philodemus notes that, even if a master does not disclose his 
vices, his slaves are conscious of them (De lib. dic. Col. 12a.7-8): ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲν μὲν 
ἐπιφέρωνται τῶν τοιούτων, συνοίδασιν ἅλλο[ι] τε καὶ [οἱ] οἰκέται (“But if they bring up no 
such thing, the others and even the slaves know . . .”) 
 79Horace is intentionally obscure regarding what exactly Davus was listening to, which 
has prompted a variety of opinions from commentators: Palmer (1883) 356-57 offers five 
answers given by older scholars such as Richard Bentley, but ultimately agrees with the view of 
the ancient scholiasts, namely, that Davus was listening to Horace scold some other slaves.  
Evans (1978) 309-10, probably inspired by the reversal of roles theme emphasized by Stahl 
(1974) 43, suggests that Davus was listening to Horace recite his satires.  Courtney (2013) offers 
the same explanation.    
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and for not being satirical enough (2.3.1-16).  Like Juvenal,80 however, Davus cannot remain 
silent for much longer while Horace continues to hold a double standard, and, in keeping with his 
character as a Stoic admirer, takes full advantage of the “license of December” offered by the 
Saturnalia in order to express his disgust without reserve.  This ancient festival, which involved 
the loosening of traditional social restraints between masters and slaves,81 likewise offers Davus 
the perfect moment in which to address Horace’s intolerable hypocrisy and exercise frank 
criticism.  As mentioned in Chapter 4 (pp. 20-1), Philodemus discusses the importance of 
applying frank criticism in a cheerful manner and “at the opportune moment” (De lib. dic. col. 
17b.3: κατὰ καιρόν),82 which is ideally not hampered by social restraints and leads to mutual 
goodwill, but for Davus becomes the chance to unleash nonstop rebuke under the pretence of 
friendly intentions and altruism (2.7.2-3: amicum | mancipium domino et frugi).83  It is quite 
possible, moreover, that in addition to allowing Horace to place himself under the scrutiny of a 
lowly slave, the extraordinary circumstances occasioned by this festive setting also entail a 
complete inversion (and hence destruction) of the poet’s satiric persona. 
 80Cf. the famous opening of Juvenal’s satires (1.1.1): semper ego auditor tantum, 
numquamne reponam? (“Am I always to be a mere listener?  Will I never have the chance to 
respond?”).  On the likelihood that Horace’s opening in Sermones 2.7 inspired that of Juvenal, 
see Evans (1978) 310 n. 15, Muecke (1993) 214 and Sharland (2005) 107. 
 81The Saturnalia likewise provides Damsippus with the opportunity to address the poet 
with impunity (cf. 2.3.4-5: ipsis | Saturnalibus).  For the  festival in general and the tradition of 
slaves playing “king for a day,” see Sharland (2005) 103-120 and Scullard (1981) 205-7.  
 82Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 25.1-3: οὐδ’ εἰς καιρὸν ἐνχρονίζειν ἐπιζη[τ]οῦμεν οὐδὲ κατ’ ἄλλον 
τρόπον (“Nor do we seek to dawdle up to the critical moment, nor in some other way . . .”).  See 
also Gigante (1983) 68-9. 
 83Davus’ onslaught is perhaps foreshadowed by the restrained tone of “for a long time 
now” (1: iamdudum) as well as the rather emotional force of “desiring” (ibid.: cupiens) and, in 
light of the long diatribe to follow, the obviously ironic inclusion of “a few things” (2: pauca). 
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 There are a number of striking differences between Horace’s self-justifying description of 
his upbringing in Sermones 1.4, which establishes his ethical credentials and role as moralist at 
the outset of his satiric project, and his self-deprecating portrayal at Sermones 2.7, which 
compromises this credibility through the exposure of his numerous vices.  In the first instance, 
for example, the poet is a youth whose impressionable mind (1.4.128: teneros animos) is ready to 
be formed by his loving father’s moral teachings (ibid. 120-21: sic me | formabat puerum dictis), 
whereas by the time Davus approaches him with moral advice he is much older and stubbornly 
set in his ways; indeed, his patience for such moralizing wears very thin as he demands to know 
the practical aim of his interlocutor’s drivel (2.7.21-2): non dices hodie, quorsum haec tam 
putida tendant, | furcifer? (“Are you to take all day, you scape-gallows, in telling me the point of 
such rot?”).84  In his youth, furthermore, his father’s instruction resulted in the development of a 
good conscience (1.4.133: consilium proprium), while, according to Davus, in his later years 
Horace’s only proper attributes are his vicious traits (2.7.89: proprium quid), which easily 
overcome his supposed moral and intellectual purity (ibid. 103: virtus atque animus).  Of course, 
Horace’s father had been concerned with preserving his son’s reputation and financial stability 
(1.4.116-19), which, in a manner consistent with Epicurean frankness, he attempted to achieve 
by taking advantage of the critical moment and admonishing him through vivid examples of 
others’ misery.85  Like Horace’s father, Davus likewise takes advantage of the opportune 
moment, namely, the Saturnalia, in order to address the poet; instead of admonishment, however, 
which Philodemus describes as useful for preventing bad habits and associated with friendly and 
 84This kind of expression recurs in the diatribe satires (cf. 1.1.14-15, 1.2.23 and 1.3.19-
20).  As Muecke (1993) 217 observes, the colloquial nature of these expressions adds to the 
overall conversational and comic element of this poem.  
 85As discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 21-3.  
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cheerful correction through examples (cf. De lib. dic. frs. 72-3),86 he deals out unadulterated 
rebuke as if Horace were a stubborn and blindly vicious pupil.  In other words, whereas Horace’s 
father uses frankness in order to prevent his son from becoming vicious, Davus uses it to rebuke 
him on the grounds that he has in fact succumbed to the vices his father had so firmly 
condemned and is therefore thoroughly corrupt.  Accordingly, his first application of frankness 
addresses Horace’s fickle inconsistency and lack of integrity, which originate in his general 
discontentment with life: 
                                                                     laudas 
fortunam et mores antiquae plebis, et idem, 
si quis ad illa deus subito te agat, usque recuses, 
aut quia non sentis quod clamas rectius esse, 
aut quia non firmus rectum defendis, et haeres 
nequiquam caeno cupiens evellere plantam.  (S. 2.7.22-7) 
You praise the fortune and the manners of the men of old; and yet, if on a sudden some 
god were for taking you back to those days, you would refuse every time; either because 
you don’t really think that what you are ranting is sounder or, because you are wobbly in 
defending the right, and, though vainly longing to pull your foot from the filth, yet stick 
fast to it. 
 
Davus’ initial evaluation of his master’s disposition describes the overall failure to adhere to his 
father’s core teaching, which was firmly centered on “living contentedly” (cf. 1.4.108: viverem 
uti contentus) and placed the highest value on the “ancestral traditions” (ibid. 117: traditum ab 
antiquis morem).  As a consequence of having failed to live up to these moral standards, which 
provide the justification for Horace’s criticisms in the introductory satires of Book 1, the poet’s 
credentials are essentially revoked and he is given a taste of his own medicine: like the 
 86For the identification of Epicurean frankness as a τέχνη νουθετητική that adopts a 
gentle and philotropeic method of rebuke, see Gigante (1983) 78-82 and Glad (1995) 120.  The 
distinction between admonition that is preventative and straightforward rebuke is mentioned by 
Michels (1944) 174 and Dewitt (1935) 313 (see also Chapter 4, p. 16 n. 38). 
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discontented masses in Sermones 1.1 to whom a god offers an opportunity for change (15: si quis 
deus; cf. 2.7.24: si quis . . . deus), he too would refuse on account of his lack of independent 
resolve.87  Indeed, unlike the miser who is ignorant of “the right” (1.1.107: rectum), Horace fully 
appreciates the concept of rectitude but lacks the determination and moral strength to adhere to it 
steadfastly (2.7.26: non firmus rectum defendis).  For this reason, Davus logically connects his 
master’s discontentment and moral weakness to his false praise of meager fare (29-32), accusing 
him of employing semantics for the purpose of obscuring his own vices (41-2): insectere velut 
melior verbisque decoris | obvolvas vitium? (“Would you presume to assail me, as though you 
were a better man, and would you throw over your own vices a cloak of seemly words?”).88  It 
would appear, therefore, that Horace is nothing more than an actor who, like the parasite, openly 
praises (22: laudas; 29: tollis ad astra; 30: laudas; 31: amasque) virtue before the wealthy 
Maecenas but only in the hopes of getting a free meal (32-5).89  Finally, Davus criticizes Horace 
for his insatiable lust by applying the Stoic paradox “only the wise man is free and the foolish are 
slaves” (2.7.83: quisnam igitur liber?  sapiens; cf. Cic. Parad. 5: omnis sapientis liberos esse et 
 87Muecke (1993) 217 makes the same connection; she rightly observes, however, along 
with Rudd (1966) 189, that Horace is guilty of more than μεμψιμοιρία.  His main fault, 
according to Davus, is that he lacks independence (αὐτάρκεια), which he masks by means of 
clever poetry and the criticism of other people’s vices.  
 88According to Muecke (1993) 218, this expression means that “Horace is accused of 
being a glutton and Maecenas’ parasite, while claiming to be his friend,” for which see especially 
Ep. 1.18.1-2.  Davus again criticizes Horace’s taste for dainty foods at 2.7.102-10.  
 89According to Philodemus, flatterers praise the wisdom of sages in order to gain their 
victim’s favor (PHerc. 222. col. 2.9-10).  Cf. also Ep. 1.17.43-62, in which Horace gives the 
otherwise unknown Scaeva (see Mayer [2003] 231 and cf. 2.1.53 for the name) ironic advice on 
how to acquire favors such as “food” (48: victum) from a grateful patron. 
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stultos omnis servos),90 which, coming from the mouth of a household slave, clearly serves to 
underscore further the reversal of roles conceded by the Saturnalian privilege.  As one may 
recall, Horace’s father had attempted to prevent such a disposition by emphasizing the ruined 
reputation caused by chasing harlots as well as matrons (1.4.111-15); Davus, however, explicitly 
accuses his master of being “captivated by another man’s wife” (2.7.46: te coniunx aliena capit), 
which, even if not equivalent to an adulterous affair (cf. 2.7.72: non sum moechus), highlights 
Horace’s uncontrollable desire for illicit love.91  By means of this retrospective criticism, 
therefore, the poet shares with his audience a self-reflective summary of his literary persona, 
balancing, as it were, his positive self-portrayal in the programmatic satires by means of Davus’ 
negative appraisal made in hindsight toward the end of the collection. 
Despite his apparent familiarity with Horace’s vices and sustained criticism aimed at 
exposing his master’s hypocrisy, in the end Davus, in addition to being a doctor ineptus, is also a 
rather obnoxious interlocutor whose invective only confirms the moral competence of the poet’s 
persona.  Like Damasippus, whom Horace portrays as a clueless Stoic since he applies salubrious 
doctrines to everyone but himself, Davus is not even close to being the ideal sage: not only is he 
introduced by means of language better suited to the comic stage than to the observations of a 
Stoic philosopher, but he admits to being in the midst of an emotional quandary (1-2: cupiens . . . 
reformido), which is certainly a humorous touch on the part of Horace.92  Even worse, Davus 
 90The paradox, which is attributed to Zeno, is preserved by Diogenes Laertius (7.121 = 
SVF 3.355): μόνον τ’ ἐλεύθερον, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους (“[He said that the sage] alone is 
free, whereas the wicked are slaves”).  See also Rudd (1966) 190 n. 45 and Muecke (1993) 219.  
 91Courtney (2013) 157: “Davus explains that as a strict Stoic he is equating desire and 
accomplishment; remove fear of punishment and Horace will be as adulterous as the best of 
them.”   Evans (1978) 310 n. 19 makes a similar observation. 
 92For the similarly comic portrayal of Damasippus, see Chapter 3, p. 24. 
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misunderstands the paradoxical antithesis concerning wise men and slaves, which, contrary to his 
preference for the comparative in issuing moral statements (e.g., 96: peccas minus atque ego), is 
absolute and thus does not admit of degrees of difference.93  In addition to his comic nature and 
philosophical incompetence, Davus also resembles Damasippus in the harshness and 
relentlessness of his frank criticism, which does not, as Harry Evans explains, correspond to 
actual moral failings of the poet:  
Davus’ experiment in satire is not completely successful; we regard it as a rather as a 
 misguided attempt which merits the angry reaction of his master.  To be effective satire 
 should serve a purpose, and most of Davus’ does not.  Indeed after having read a similar 
 and more longwinded diatribe within the same book in S. 2.3, we are pleased when 
 Horace shouts down his slave after some hundred lines.94 
 
And shout him down he certainly does, with hilarious threats of violence that express both comic 
and tragic tones (116-17): unde mihi lapidem ? . . . unde sagittas? (“Where can I get a stone? . . . 
where can I find arrows?”).95 Similar to the ending of Sermones 2.3, where Horace plays the 
overwhelmed victim of a moralizing Stoic’s hard-hitting frankness, the poet once again reacts 
negatively to his interlocutor’s observations.  In the case of Davus, however, he seemingly places 
himself in the role of the recalcitrant pupil, who, rather than accept correction in a docile fashion, 
as Philodemus explains, “vehemently resists frankness . . . and responds with bitterness” (De lib. 
dic. frs. 5.6-6.4): τὸ[ν σφοδ]ρῶς ἀντέχο[ν]τα παρρησίαι . . . τῶι δὲ καὶ [πικρ]ότητας 
 93Cf. Horace’s correct representation of this doctrine at 1.3.96: quis paria esse fere 
placuit peccata (“Those whose creed is that sins are much on a par”).  I owe the observation 
concerning Davus to Courtney (2013) 156.  
 94Evans (1978) 310.   
 95Muecke (1993) 226 cites Plaut. Mostell. 266 (lapidem) and Carm. 1.12.24 (sagitta). 
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ἀποδίδοντι.96  Nevertheless, according to the Epicurean philosopher it is important for the one 
applying frankness to be persistent, for, even if the pupil initially despises the treatment, he will 
eventually, through multiple applications of this method, come to recognize his faults and 
become purified: 
 [καὶ πρότερον ἀπειθήσας, ὡς ἀλλο]τρίαν ὑπερ[ορῶν ἐπι]φοράν, ὕστερ[ο]ν δ’ 
 [ἀπαγο]ρεύσας, πειθαρχήσει τῆ[ι νο]υθετείαι· καὶ [τ]ότε συν[ε]χόμενος τοῖς 
 ἐκχαυνο[ῦ]σι  πάθεσιν ἢ κοινῶς ἀντικρούουσιν, εἶτα κουφισθείς, ὑπακούσεται.  Καὶ 
 τότε τυχὼν τῶν διαστρεφόντων, νῦν οὐ τεύξετα[ι]· καὶ πρότερον ἀν[τ]ιδοκε[ύ]ων, 
 κα[ὶ] το[ῦ]το πλανω[δ]ῶς οὐ πεπόηκεν, ὕστερο[ν] φωραθεὶς κα[ὶ εὐφρονῶν ποήσει.]  
 (De lib. dic. fr. 66.1-16).97    
 . . . and although he disobeyed earlier, disdaining the reproach as foreign to himself, later 
 he will give up and obey the admonition.  Then, he was afflicted with passions that puff 
 one up or generally hinder one, but afterwards, when he has been relieved, he will pay 
 heed.  Then, he encountered passions that distort one, but now he will not encounter 
 them.  Earlier, he was opposing his opinion to another’s, and in wandering about he has 
 not done this [sc. reformed]; later, when he has been detected, he will indeed do it 
 cheerfully.  
 
Philodemus observes that, through persistence, a stubborn pupil will learn to trust (πειθαρχήσει) 
the one criticizing frankly, eventually heeding (ὑπακούσεται) and even happily accepting the 
admonishment (εὐφρονῶν).98  It is abundantly clear from the final exchange between Horace 
and Davus, however, which closely resembles the burlesque ending of Sermones 2.3, that 
purification and final acceptance are by no means the end products of his household 
interlocutor’s critical approach.  For this reason, Davus’ attempt to motivate correction through 
96See Gigante (1974) 41 and Glad (1995) 137-52 for “strong” students. 
 97Glad (1995) 147-48 discusses this passage in more detail.  As Konstan et al. (1998) 73 
note, the verb ἀντιδοκέω, which they render “to be on the look-out,” is unattested elsewhere.  
The translation adopted above is based on the suggestion of Gigante (1983) 79-80, which is also 
followed by Glad (1995) 147. 
 98The process of relief or κούφισις is also described in terms of “purification” (De lib. 
dic. fr. 46.4-5: καθάρσεως), for which see Glad (1995) 155. 
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frankness completely fails, and, despite his overly negative description of Horace’s bad habits 
being based on personal experience, one is left doubting both his motives and his overall 
trustworthiness as a moralist.99  If anything, he seems more concerned with using the festive 
license in order to unload his bottled-up hatred than with bringing about any serious moral 
reform (a fine friend, indeed).  The intended result of his failure, furthermore, is the same as in 
Sermones 2.3: in the process of venting his disgust for vice through a Stoic diatribe, he becomes 
the means by which Horace applies disarming criticism to himself and thus displays his good 
cheer and sense of moral honesty. 
 Despite the fact that the poems of Sermones 2 are often read within the context of a 
withdrawn satirist whose observations are somewhat impersonal and remote from contemporary 
affairs, they actually contain much revealing information about Horace’s conception of his own 
literary persona, as the preceding examination has attempted to show.  Indeed, the idea that in 
Book 2 Horace recedes into the background or leaves the stage altogether is nothing more than a 
clever illusion, and one that has distracted or even misled scholarship for some time.  It is the 
popular view following Anderson, for example, that the satiric messages of this book are spoken 
by doctores inepti such as Tiresias, Damasippus and Davus, all of whom either give bad advice 
or attempt to express ethical doctrines in a hopelessly unappealing and misguided manner; for his 
own part Horace, in the manner of Plato’s dialogues, leaves it up to the audience to extract the 
correct moral lesson in light of these conversations.100  There may certainly be some truth to this 
interpretation, although I would point out that one major distinction must be made: whereas 
 99Evans (1978) 311: “Since Horace has already treated these failings within his two 
books, one is left wondering whether is worth listening to Davus at all.”  
 100Anderson (1982) 41-3.  
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Plato’s works look beyond to the search for absolute truth, Horatian satire employs ethical 
doctrines and truths self-reflexively and, more often than not, for the purpose of self-justification 
in response to real-life literary or social challenges.  No matter how foolish the dunces of 
Sermones 2 appear to be, one must remember that every word they speak comes directly from 
Horace himself and, as such, has some bearing on the poet’s self-representation and reflects in 
some way his moral convictions.  The perverted advice of Tiresias, for example, certainly does 
not reflect the poet’s ethical views as expressed in Sermones 1; nevertheless, it is anything but 
detached and irrelevant, since it is essentially social commentary on capitation, which was a 
serious problem in contemporary Rome and quite relevant to Horace’s portrayal of his 
relationship with Maecenas.  Through his negative portrayal of Odysseus’ willingness to flatter, 
moreover, Horace stirs up the audience’s indignation and implicitly invites a profound contrast 
with himself, which is ultimately self-serving.  In the case of the ridiculous “sages” Damasippus 
and Davus, their incompetent application of frank criticism, in addition to providing Horace with 
the opportunity to disarm his critics and present himself as a self-conscious moralist with 
integrity, also demonstrates the challenges associated with effective satire, which should be 
beneficial without being overly harsh.   
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The fact that Horace, like most educated Romans, was deeply influenced by Greek philosophy 
and literature has always been recognized by scholars ancient and modern.  It has been the main 
focus of the preceding study to examine further the role of philosophical thought in the Sermones 
by taking into consideration the specific contributions to Epicurean doctrine of Philodemus, who, 
in addition to being the poet’s contemporary, was similarly attempted to provide solutions to the 
economic and social issues of the day.  It is important to bear in mind that, despite the obviously 
playful and comic nature of Horatian satire, the poet was profoundly concerned with the moral 
dilemmas brought on by the disruptive civil strife and political upheavals of the 40s and 30s, 
dilemmas which Philodemus may have anticipated in his treatises or perhaps even experienced 
during his lifetime.1  These issues include the loss and reacquisition of property, the importance 
of leisurely withdrawal in response to increased opportunities for advancement in social status 
and the dangers of public life, the intrigue and self-serving deception closely associated with 
patronage and, perhaps most complex of all, the proper manner in which to address these issues 
frankly without incurring political repercussions.  For Horace, satiric conversations among close 
friends become the vehicle for expression and criticism, but, as has been shown, he self-
consciously (and perhaps very prudently) discusses contemporary problems within the context of 
1The precise dates for Philodemus’ literary activity are uncertain, although Last (1922) 
177-180 posits that his treatise De signis, in which Marc Antony is named (col. 2.17), was 
possibly composed no earlier than 40 BC.  Gigante (1996) 48 thinks that the treatises Philodemus 
dedicates to Vergil and his companions was composed after the publication of the first book of 
Sermones (35 BC) and before the death of Quintilius Varus (24 BC).   
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the personal struggles and relationships of his own literary persona.  The result is that, unlike 
Lucilius, who “rubbed down the city with much wit” (1.10.3-4: quod sale multo | urbem 
defricuit), Horace achieves his goal as satirist through introspective criticisms and wit, self-
consciously employing himself as the canvas on which to display, largely through implied 
contrast, the moral deficiency of his contemporaries. 
Like his complex engagement with literary standards and traditions, the substance of 
Horace’s moral criticisms are likewise sophisticated.  In this sense, they deserve much more than 
a cursory overview linking them to boilerplate Epicureanism or a simple nod to Aristotle’s 
seemingly omnipresent doctrine of the mean.  Of course, it has not been the object of this study 
to argue that Horace was a philosopher in his own right or even that he officially allied himself to 
the Epicurean sect; rather, it attempts to demonstrate that much of the thought underlying the 
development of his persona and his treatment of moral issues is found specifically in the ethical 
treatises of Philodemus, who wrote many of his works with the needs and sensitivities of 
Romans in mind.  The fact that Horace never mentions Philodemus in the capacity of moral 
expert, moreover, is no surprise at all given the proudly Roman nature of satire and its 
consequent resistance to foreign influence.  Instead, Horace communicates the moral wisdom of 
Philodemus and the Greeks through the mouthpiece of traditional and conservative Romans such 
as his father and Ofellus, whereas self-proclaimed philosophers (i.e., Damasippus and Davus) are 
usually portrayed in an obviously negative light.  None of this is to deny, of course, the comic 
and parodic element of the Sermones, which is by no means a foil but rather an essential 
component of the genre that informs and defines how it communicates more serious content.  
This serious content cannot and should not be denied, for this would be completely to rob satire 
of its purpose, which is to expose and respond in a meaningful way to contemporary problems.  
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And despite the anachronistic references of later satirists like Juvenal to bygone eras and their 
“safe” criticisms of deceased or insignificant people, the message of Roman satire is ultimately 
intended for a contemporary audience, which more than justifies Horace’s employment of and 
engagement with the moral doctrines of Philodemus of Gadara in the Sermones. 
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